How can Canada and Germany deepen their partnership and offer each other stability amid rapid and far-reaching change in the global community? That was the central question for participants in the Young Atlantiks Program 2026. The program, created and organized by Atlantik Brücke Canada and Atlantik Brücke e.V. has brought five Canadians and five Germans together to exchange knowledge and ideas on transatlantic cooperation since 2019.

By Moritz Altmann-Meissner & Lisa Xie

From May 17 to 21, these young men and women from diverse backgrounds met in Berlin to discuss various aspects of the transatlantic partnership and attend the 39th German-Canadian Conference. Drawing on expertise in business, academia, journalism, the armed forces, and public policy, they engaged with a range of speakers on topics currently under discussion at the highest levels of government, including energy and critical minerals, security, trade, and artificial intelligence. All sessions were held under Chatham House rules. The program also included an exchange with the Canadian ambassador to Germany, Vera Alexander, who had taken up her post only months earlier and challenged the participants to offer advice on strengthening ties between Canada and Germany. In a session with members of the Bundestag’s Committee for German-Canadian Relations, the Young Atlantiks program was met with strong interest, praise, and discussion of how it might expand in the future.

The exchange was shaped by two major developments in transatlantic relations. On the one hand, the second Trump administration in the United States imposed tariffs on some of its closest trading partners, including Canada and Germany, weakening the economic recovery of many countries. U.S. military support for Ukraine was cancelled, and the ongoing war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran has not only strained NATO but also sharply driven up oil prices. On the other hand, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney drew attention at Davos in January 2026 when he called on “middle powers” to work more closely together. This middle powers narrative was also central to the German-Canadian Conference, where many panelists cited Carney and discussed the practical implications of his call. Following the sessions and their participation in the debates, the Young Atlantiks identified three central takeaways. 

The new Cold War – Defending the Arctic is vital for securing sovereignty

The Arctic is a frontline in today’s multipolar world, a point agreed on by nearly all speakers at the German-Canadian Conference. Since the first Russian activities and claims in the Arctic in 2001, the region has become a hotspot for tensions and disputes. Russia and China have increased their military presence, sending more icebreakers, submarines, and aircraft into the Arctic. Many speakers stressed that control over the Arctic affects the sovereignty of both Canada, as Russia and China send vessels into Canadian waters, and Germany, which depends on open trade routes and stable access to resources. According to German experts, Germany could contribute – amongst other things – vessels from the federal police, the Bundespolizei, to stop and search Chinese fishing fleets in Canadian waters, an issue falling under police rather than military jurisdiction. The addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO was seen by many participants as a key factor in strengthening the alliance’s position in the north. At the same time, some criticized the fact that major gaps still remain in Western Arctic capabilities.

Between Reactors and Renewables – Differences in Energy Policy

Canada and Germany approach the energy transition from different starting points, but their differences can be complementary rather than contradictory. Germany’s experience shows the political and industrial challenges of moving away from nuclear power, while Canada’s energy mix gives it more room to balance renewables, hydro, and other low-carbon sources. A stronger partnership could focus on sharing technologies, regulatory lessons, and grid solutions that improve reliability, affordability, and resilience during the transition.

Critical mineral as an industrial strategic partnership

Critical minerals are becoming a defining area of industrial cooperation between Canada and Germany because both countries need secure, transparent, and diversified supply chains. Canada can offer resources, responsible extraction, and upstream processing potential, while Germany brings advanced manufacturing capacity and strong demand from sectors such as automotive, batteries, and clean technology. A strategic partnership in this area would help both countries reduce dependence on unstable suppliers and build more resilient industrial systems.

Der Beitrag A look back at the Young Atlantiks Program 2026 erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Moritz Meißner

If there was one single event on everybody’s mind at the 39^th German-Canadian Conference in Berlin in May 2026, it certainly was Mark Carney’s speech at Davos four months earlier. The speech, which could be dubbed the Middle-Powers-Declaration, was quoted by almost every panelist and took a prominent role in the discussion One Year in Office: Balancing Global Focus vs. Domestic Challenges about the first years of Carney as Canadian Prime Minister and Friedrich Merz as the German Chancellor. Although some speakers voiced their scepticism about whether Carney could deliver on the high expectations he had raised, his speech was praised by most participants for its bravery and Carney, remarkably popular at home and abroad, appeared to have inherited the title as the de facto leader of the free world.

Trump helped Carney to find his role

What is striking about this speech is not only the content but also its improbability. When Mark Carney took over as prime minister from Justin Trudeau in January 2025 and called a federal election, nobody expected him to win. Every major poll predicted a landslide victory for the Conservatives and Pierre Poilievre. It was Trump’s trade war against Canada and his infamous 51^st state campaign that allowed Carney to find his role. He took a firm stand against Washington, appealed to Canadian patriotism and presented himself successfully as the leader who would preserve Canadian independence. Having earned a good reputation as a highly competent banker during the financial crisis in 2008 and focusing on the economy, he also presented a noticeable pragmatic departure from idealist Trudeau. Carney himself called for a value-oriented realism – a term that is echoed in the Davos speech. Part of that realism is to acknowledge the ever-present threat from south of the border and to realize that the geopolitical landscape has changed for good. It was no surprise then that Carney focused on Canadian resilience in economy, trade, energy and security. The One Canadian Economy Act, which passed parliament in June 2025, attests to that.

“While Carney accepted the departure from the old-world order under Trump as the new reality early on, Merz tried to keep the status quo and lost not only political capital but also credibility.”

So far, Carney’s once unlikely reign can show some success. Canada’s GDP grew by 1.7% in 2025, the second highest growth among the G7. The major projects office – a key institution for accelerating strategic construction projects like pipelines or data centers – was installed at Calgary, currently developing 16 projects of so-called ‘national interest’. The Canadian armed forces have seen the highest enrolment in 30 years, according to Ottawa. And Carney enjoys a remarkable popularity among voters. In a recent poll Abacus Data 59% of Canadians support the course of the government – the highest number ever recorded.

At the same time, Carney faces criticism from environmental groups and members of the First Nations who fear that fast-tracking projects of national interest will lead to disregarding environmental protection standards or the right of co-determination of Indigenous groups. Speakers at the panel also identified the Alberta independence referendum as a problem for the Carney administration. A successful referendum is highly unlikely, but the campaign itself and the discussion could foster division among Canadians and damage the government.

Merz tried an appeasement strategy with Trump, but this was a fruitless endeavour

When Friedrich Merz took office in Berlin in May 2025, he had a very different start than Carney. Although he was never very popular as a politician, his new coalition conjured some hopes – especially in the business sector – after the disastrous end of the highly unpopular ‘Ampel’ government of his predecessor Olaf Scholz. Merz inherited an economic crisis and focussed on reviving the industrial sector. Unfortunately, Germany was one of the main targets of Trump’s trade war. Key industries like the automotive or the chemical sector suffered because of tariffs, high energy costs and a growing feeling of economic insecurity.

The US-Israeli War against Iran made things worse due to oil shortages that made gas prices skyrocket and led to anger and resentment in the population. Like the British prime minister Keir Starmer or NATO chief Mark Rutte, Merz tried an appeasement strategy with Trump, flattering him and bringing gifts to Washington. He learned the hard way that this was a fruitless endeavour. While Carney accepted the departure from the old-world order under Trump as the new reality early on, Merz tried to keep the status quo and lost not only political capital but also credibility.

Despite all this, Merz can still claim at least some moderate success. After the recession of the previous government, the GDP actually grew in 2025, even if only by 0.2%. Illegal migration, the second big issue of the administration, has been reduced significantly. Only about 47,000 illegal border crossings have been registered in 2025 – that number was three times as high just two years ago. However, German companies still lament a suffocating amount of regulation, high energy costs and a weak demand, all of which darken companies’ visions of the near future. So far, the administration has produced no permanent solution for that. Instead, the coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats seems to repeat the fatal flaw of the previous government: key reform projects like pensions, health care or taxes are overshadowed by open quarrels that erode trust in the cabinet.

“While Mark Carney is keen on presenting himself as a leader who cares, who shows empathy, humour and real interest in his fellow Canadians, Merz seems to lack good PR advisors.”

This leads to another major problem for Merz – his style of leadership. While Mark Carney is keen on presenting himself as a leader who cares, who shows empathy, humour and real interest in his fellow Canadians, Merz seems to lack good PR advisors. He has faced backlash on numerous occasions during his first year, implying that Germans are basically too lazy and do not work enough, that they take too much sick leave and that migrants – be they legal or illegal – present a problem in German society. Polls show that Merz appears to many Germans as cold, arrogant and – being a millionaire – detached from the everyday struggles of ordinary people.

According to ZDF, 65% of Germans have a negative opinion about Merz and his government, an all-time-low for a German chancellor, as was highlighted by the panelists at the conference in their conclusion. They warned that the weakness of the Merz administration will further strengthen the AfD, the right-wing party. Once in power in states or the federal government, the AfD could impose unconstitutional measures and become a major threat to the political system in Germany that is founded on a liberal democracy.

About the author: Moritz Meißner is a Young Atlantiks alumnus from the class of 2026 and works as a news editor at Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (MDR).

Der Beitrag Lessons in Realism: Carney’s Rise, Merz’s Stumble erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Canada plays an important role at this year’s World Cup, as the country, together with the United States and Mexico, is taking on the role of host of the tournament. As the venue for several matches, Canada is at the heart of this international event. In an interview with the Canadian Ambassador to Germany, Vera Alexander, we spoke about sports diplomacy as well as the mood in Canada ahead of the 2026 FIFA World Cup.

Der Beitrag „There is already a Hype in Canada about the World Cup“ erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The briefing paper by David Bosold and David G. Haglund examines the “special relationship” between Canada and Germany through the lens of “strategic culture,” using the symbols of middle power and linchpin as analytical anchors. The authors compare the landmark speeches by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at Davos (January 2026) and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the Munich Security Conference (February 2026), arguing that media coverage has glossed over a crucial divergence: Carney declared a definitive “rupture” with the old transatlantic order and called for broad middle-power solidarity, while Merz urged allies to “repair and revive transatlantic trust” within an explicitly Western, values-based framework.

The paper then turns to Canada’s pending submarine procurement decision — German/Norwegian TKMS 212CD versus South Korean Hanwha Ocean — framing it as a strategic litmus test. The authors argue this choice should not be read as a revival of Pierre Trudeau’s failed “Third Option” trade-diversification strategy, nor should it be driven primarily by economic offsets. Instead, they contend that NATO interoperability, Arctic sovereignty, and transatlantic alliance cohesion must take precedence, making the German/Norwegian bid the strategically superior choice.

Read the full paper here: A different kind of linchpin

Der Beitrag Canada, Germany, and the Future of the Western Alliance erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The 39th German-Canadian Conference, organized by Atlantik-Brücke and its Canadian counterpart, brought together policymakers, industry representatives, and academics from both countries in Berlin on May 18 and 19, 2026. The first day began with a visit to the Bundesrat, followed by a joint event with the Transatlantic Business Initiative at the Haus der Deutschen Wirtschaft. The focus there was on critical minerals and the German-Canadian Memorandum of Understanding on raw materials cooperation between the two countries.

The main conference day on the second day at the Canadian Embassy covered a wide range of geopolitical and societal issues: topics included transatlantic research cooperation, the strategic importance of the Arctic, the EU-Canada Security and Defense Partnership, the upcoming AI transformation in the media industry, and the German-Canadian Digital Alliance.

On the sidelines of the conference, we interviewed Michael Hüther, Director and Member of the Presidium of the German Economic Institute as well as Vice-Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke and Prof. Nik Nanos, Founder & Chief Data Scientist of Nanos Research and Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke Canada. Both have been integral parts of the conference for a decade and spoke with us about how the conference’s topics have been influenced by the geopolitical upheavals of recent years, why academic freedom is a competitive advantage for middle powers like Germany and Canada and how they view their respective governments’ track record after their first year in office.

Recommended reading: The briefing paper by David Bosold and David G. Haglund examines the “special relationship” between Canada and Germany through the lens of “strategic culture,” using the symbols of middle power and linchpin as analytical anchors.

Der Beitrag Emerging Middle Powers: Germany and Canada Seek a Common Path erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Prof. Dr. Michael Hüther und Dr. Simon Gerards Iglesias

The recently concluded trade agreement between the United States and the EU marks a clear departure by the former guarantors of the post-1945 global trading order from a rules-based globalization founded on most-favored-nation treatment, reciprocity, transparency, and liberalization. What is emerging instead – replacing the free and multilateral exchange of goods and capital that benefits all parties – is inward-looking trade, justified in security terms and increasingly based on bilateral relationships.

In addition to a new tariff regime, the agreement commits the EU to increasing its annual energy imports from the United States to 250 billion USD by 2027 and to undertaking direct investments worth 550 billion euros by 2029. Although these tasks – especially investment decisions – ultimately rest with European companies, doubts persist about the EU’s actual need for imported energy, particularly oil and gas. In 2024, the total value of such imports amounted to 384 billion USD, with U.S. deliveries accounting for about 66 billion – just one quarter of the stated target.

“Closer cooperation with Canada could help Europe.”

The United States remains indispensable to the EU – above all in military and security matters, but also economically. Yet the EU must make far greater efforts than before to reduce this dependency. Closer cooperation with Canada could help in this regard, but Canada itself is a prime target of Donald Trump’s expansionism and is deeply enmeshed in the U.S. economy.

Canada, a natural resource powerhouse

Canada shares an 8,900 km (5,500 mile) land border with the United States and is bound by a trade agreement that has resulted in deep economic integration among the North American economies, particularly in the automotive sector. The USMCA agreement, which at Trump’s initiative replaced NAFTA in 2020, shields 95 percent of traded goods from the new tariffs he imposed on his northern neighbor. (Hughes, 2025).

Canada is a resource-rich country. One-fifth of its exports consists of critical minerals and metals, including aluminum, copper, nickel, platinum, and zinc. Over half of these exports are destined for the United States, followed by China, the UK, Japan, and the EU. Owing in part to the world’s largest yet untapped reserves of rare earth elements, Canada has become a target in the intensifying rivalry among major powers – a competition that is increasingly defined by access to and control over critical raw materials. Since 2016, a negotiated trade agreement has been in place between the EU and Canada, although it has still not been ratified by all EU member states. In the context of the Critical Raw Materials Act, they have also established a strategic partnership aimed at encouraging companies to source more raw materials from Europe and North America (Carry, 2024).

Europe’s dependence on raw materials

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has brought Europe’s reliance on imported raw materials into political focus. Terms such as strategic autonomy, friendshoring, and resilience have since become staples of foreign economic policy discourse. Particularly, the dependence on rare earth elements from China is now widely acknowledged as a political commonplace. Yet, German and European companies have so far shown little evidence of diversification, especially when it comes to critical raw materials (Becker, 2025).

The picture is ambivalent. Figure 1 shows Canada’s share of total EU imports and of global exports for selected raw materials in 2024, focusing on its most important export commodities. This allows for a comparison of where Canada is over- or underrepresented in EU raw material imports. For uran elements, nickel ores, iron ores, arsenic, precious metals, and zinc, Canada’s share of EU imports is significantly higher than its share of the global market; for molybdenum, it is nearly equal. In the case of crude oil, copper, graphite, feldspar, and other rate earth elements, however, Canada is strongly underrepresented as a supplier to the EU. Many of these latter materials are classified as “critical” by the European Commission and that are of central importance for the green transition (batteries, wind power, steel products) as well as for strategic autonomy (electrical industry, semiconductors, aerospace).

These differences are largely explained by the fact that for most raw materials in Canada there is a monopsony – one principal buyer dominating the trade. In most cases, this buyer is the United States (e.g., nickel, arsenic, feldspar, graphite). However, in the category of “other ores and concentrates”, which includes rare earth elements, 99 percent of Canada’s exports go to China. China holds majority stakes in the largest Canadian mining companies and controls domestic processing, giving it complete command over the supply chain and raw material pricing (Carry, 2024). Over 90 percent of processing technologies for rare earths (magnets, specialty ceramics, and alloys) worldwide are controlled by China. For lithium and cobalt, the figure is 60 to 70 percent (Public Policy Forum, 2025), extending this technological dominance to foreign markets as well. Canada’s case shows how China entrenches its position in key technology markets abroad, making diversification a far steeper challenge for Europe.

Direct investment as geopolitical weapon

Canada possesses large reserves of critical raw materials that remain largely untapped but are economically viable. The country depends on foreign direct investment to exploit these resources, with 40 to 45 percent of mining investments coming from abroad (Leach et al., 2025). Since the COVID-19 pandemic, China has considerably increased its investments in Canadian mining and has been by far the largest investor since 2021. Nearly 50 percent of all new FDI activity in Canadian mining in 2024 originated from China, followed by the U.S. with 30 percent, while Europe accounted for only 13 percent (Statistics Canada, 2025). Between 2014 and 2019, Europe was the leading foreign investor in Canadian mining – a situation that has changed dramatically.

The EU and Canada are natural partners

To gain greater autonomy in the rivalry between the major powers, the United States and China, and to offer a genuine third alternative, the EU and Canada must deepen their partnership. Canada has recently tightened rules on foreign direct investment, particularly targeting Chinese companies (Borgers et al., 2025), yet still regards the United States as its most important partner. However, Washington’s growing expansionist ambitions run counter to Canada’s approach, which places strong emphasis on human rights (including Indigenous rights) and green sustainability (Sustainable Critical Minerals Alliance). The EU can build on these shared priorities, but it must also be prepared to temper its maximalist demands in international agreements.

The ongoing controversy over CETA has repeatedly centered on arbitration tribunals – mechanisms that are nonetheless crucial to transnational investments, especially in the high-risk mining sector. The fact that CETA still awaits ratification in several EU member states should serve as a warning. If the EU is to rank among the world’s technological and economic leaders, it must prioritize geostrategic considerations over its aspiration to be the global standard-setter.

About the authors:
Prof. Dr. Michael Hüther is Director of the German Economic Institute (IW) in Cologne and Deputy Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke. Dr. Simon Gerards Iglesias is personal advisor to the Director at the IW. This article first appeared as an IW short report.

References
Becker, Markus, 2025, Rohstoffabhängigkeit von China bedroht EU-Wirtschaft, https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/seltene-erden-rohstoff-abhaengigkeit-von-china-bedroht-eu-wirtschaft-a-a0f210e6-983f-4dcc-865d-3ae8bfd69d7f?giftToken=0b2c997a-2065-4760-930d-1970fb89318c  [13.08.2025]

Borgers, Oliver / Gudofsky, Jason / Kwinter, Gideon / Keogh, Erin, 2025, Foreign direct investment reviews 2025: Canada, https://www.whitecase.com/insight-our-thinking/foreign-direct-investment-reviews-2025-canada [13.08.2025]

Carry, Inga, 2024, Rohstoffpartner Kanada: ein (nahe-zu) perfekter Match. Die europäisch-kanadische Rohstoffkooperation in Zeiten des Friendshoring, SWP-Aktuell, Nr. 27

Government of Canada, 2024, Mineral Trade, https://natural-resources.canada.ca/maps-tools-publications/publications/mineral-trade#tbl3, [13.08.2025]

Hughes, Abby, 2025, The U.S. bumped its tariff on Canadian goods to 35%. How big of an impact will it have?, https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/what-in-canada-is-subject-to-35-per-cent-tariff-1.7600029 [13.08.2025]

Leach, Cynthia et al., 2025, Critical Capital: How Canada can tap foreign investment for its mineral riches, https://www.rbc.com/en/thought-leadership/uncategorized/thought-leadership/critical-capital-how-canada-can-tap-foreign-investment-for-its-mineral-riches/ [13.08.2025]

Public Policy Forum, 2025, How Canada could quickly develop critical materials, LINK [08.08.2025]

Statistics Canada, 2025, International Investment Position, https://ppforum.ca/policy-speaking/how-canada-could-quickly-develop-critical-minerals/ [13.08.2025]

Statistics Canada, 2025, International Investment Position, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610000801  [13.08.2025]

Der Beitrag Canada and the great power rivalry: What options are left for the EU? erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Gerd Braune, Ottawa

“We miss you,” says Maggie Hassan, Democratic U.S. Senator from New Hampshire. “We miss you all.” She’s addressing the Canadians who, these days, are doing everything they can to express their disapproval of the United States, from boycotting American products in supermarkets to avoiding cross-border trips for shopping or vacations. New Hampshire is one of the northeastern border states feeling the strain of the animosity between the once closely allied neighbors. Hassan says she knows that the current “instability in our relationship” has led many Canadians to cancel trips to popular tourist destinations in the U.S. “But we hope you’ll come back,” she adds.

There’s little talk of friendship and trust between the U.S. and Canada in the months since Donald Trump’s second inauguration. When Ontario’s conservative Premier Doug Ford ordered that American wine and whiskey be removed from the shelves of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), the move was met with applause. That sentiment is shared by Sergii, who is browsing the Ontario wine selection at an LCBO store in Ottawa. “We support our local wineries, breweries, and distilleries,” he says. “The shelves are full”—even without U.S. products.

“Geography has made us neighbors, history has made us friends, economics has made us partners.” (John F. Kennedy)

“Geography made us neighbors, history made us friends, economics made us partners”,  that’s how John F. Kennedy described U.S.-Canada relations in his 1961 speech to the Canadian Parliament. That is the past, the last millennium. Trump’s talk of Canada as the 51st U.S. state and his belittling of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who held office until March, by calling him a “governor,” has sparked anger and outrage in Canada. The Intelligencer newsletter of New York magazine notes: “Canadians are angry. Trump achieved what once seemed impossible: our northern neighbors have united against us.”

According to surveys by the polling institute Nanos Research, “pessimism and anger” are the prevailing feelings in Canada toward the U.S. In early July, 34 percent described their feelings toward Americans as “pessimistic,” 24 percent as “angry.” Seventeen percent were indifferent, and just over 21 percent expressed positive feelings such as optimism and satisfaction.

“Especially the talk about Canada as the 51st U.S. state offended Canadians,” says Nik Nanos, Chief Data Scientist at Nanos Research and chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke Canada. There have been disagreements before, such as during President George W. Bush’s administration, but not this level of anger. “No U.S. administration has said such provocative things about Canada,” says Nanos. Trust between the two countries might return someday, “but how long will that take?” Tensions were particularly high in the spring when “a very aggressive Trump” repeatedly attacked Canada with tariffs and threats, and it was unclear who would govern Canada going forward. Since Carney took office, that tension has eased somewhat. To some extent, Canadians have become “desensitized,” according to Nanos. Because “he (Trump) can say one thing today and something else the next day.”

Canada and Europe should strengthen their relations

In any case, Nanos now sees the challenge for Canada and Europe to deepen their relations, and Canada’s opportunity to reduce its dependence on the U.S. Eighty-five percent support lowering trade barriers and connecting Canada’s economy more closely with the EU. “There is a strong mandate to build a stronger relationship with Europe,” says Nanos.

Brian Schmidt, a professor at Carleton University in Ottawa, believes that Canada is shocked by how strongly the U.S. has turned against their country. “They are deliberately trying to damage the Canadian economy.” Canadians see this as a betrayal given the many forms of assistance Canada has provided over the years. Schmidt recalls the Canadian firefighters who helped fight wildfires in the U.S. and the aid given after the terrorist attacks of September 2001. “Canada was always the first to help.” Now, there is “a lot of animosity and anger.”

“The attack with talks of Canada as the 51st U.S. state caught us completely off guard“

The attack with talks of Canada as the 51st U.S. state and the belittling of the Prime Minister as a governor “caught us completely off guard.” Given the size difference between the economies, there is an “asymmetric relationship” between the U.S. and Canada. “Trump sees our vulnerability.” Schmidt sees the U.S. on a path toward “a kind of fascist authoritarian state.”

One person aiming to send a message during these times of Trump’s attacks is the German-born chocolatier Heinrich Stubbe in Ottawa — with chocolate.“Canada is not for sale” is written on dark chocolate bars in white chocolate, as is “Elbows up.” “I had to do something,” he says. The slogans supporting Canada resonate with everyone. “These are statements that anyone who loves Canada can identify with.”He offers the political chocolate in the official languages English and French, as well as in German, Spanish, and  Mandarin. Stubbe plans to keep this sweet culinary tribute to Canada in his product range until Trump is “gone.”

Gerd Braune has been living in Canada’s capital, Ottawa, since 1997 to report on the vast country in North America. Braune studied political science and law in Trier and then worked for the news agency AP as a correspondent for Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate, and from 1992 to 1997 as a news editor at the Frankfurter Rundschau.

Der Beitrag Canada’s new perspective on the US erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Dr. Kim Eduard Lioe and Pia Kauer

In times of geopolitical uncertainty, reliable partnerships are more crucial than ever.  Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, China’s geopolitical rise, and the U.S. retreat from its traditional leadership role are forcing Western democracies to rethink their security policies. Against this backdrop, the newly signed defence partnership between the European Union and Canada marks a strategic milestone — and an opportunity to reshape security dependencies.

While Germany remains primarily focused on Russia’s war against Ukraine and Moscow’s use of hybrid warfare, Canada is also looking northward. Canada faces several emerging threats: increased Russian activity in its airspace, the regular deployment of Chinese dual-use research vessels, and a general uptick in Arctic maritime operations.

In light of Canada’s deep dependence on US military technology, a shift toward greater strategic autonomy is long overdue.

Encouragingly, this sense of urgency has already spurred several promising developments:

[related]1. Ongoing Partnership in Ukraine

Canada remains one of Ukraine’s most committed allies, having pledged $4.5 billion in military assistance since 2022, and contributing to Germany’s Immediate Action on Air Defence (IAAD) initiative, which pools resources from the international community to speed up the delivery of air defense systems for Ukraine. Both Canada and Germany lead NATO battle groups in Latvia and Lithuania, respectively, and are working to scale these up to full brigade strength.

2. Increased Military Spending

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine revealed that Europe was not prepared for a high-intensity, prolonged conventional war. Canada, like Germany, has historically underinvested in defense. However, Mark Carney’s government is ramping up its defense spending. While Justin Trudeau had promised to reach the 2% target by 2032, Mark Carney announced that it would be achieved in March 2026, up from 1.4% in 2024. At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, this target was increased to 5% by 2035 in a joint agreement with European NATO members.

“The new agreement adds a parallel channel — a distinct European-Canadian defence architecture.”

3. New Procurement Initiatives

On the margins of the EU-Canada summit 2025, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Anita Anand and Minister of National Defence David J. McGuinty announced a new European-Canadian Security and Defense Partnership (“SDP”), which will open the door for Canada’s participation in the EU joint procurement program SAFE („Security Action for Europe“). At its core lies a deeper cooperation on military logistics, cybersecurity, and technological innovation. Until now, cooperation in these areas has primarily taken place within NATO. The new agreement adds a parallel channel — a distinct European-Canadian defence architecture. This development is more than symbolic; it reflects a genuine strategic shift, acknowledging that democracies must build new networks to confront evolving threats.

SAFE’s loans for the purchase of defense technology are only open to EU member states. However, Ukraine, EEA/EFTA countries, EU candidate nations and third countries with a Security and Defense Partnership can participate in the joint procurement process – lowering prices for all.

This is especially attractive for Canada which seeks to dramatically decrease its reliance from US defense technologies. Right now, Canada is spending around 70% of its military equipment appropriation on US-made gear.

For instance, Canada announced that it is considering buying European fighter jets in a move to reduce their dependence on US suppliers. And a trilateral letter of intent signed by Norway, Germany and Canada at last year’s NATO summit aims not only to strengthen maritime security co-operation in the North Atlantic but might also pave the way for Canada to join the existing German-Norwegian partnership, in which the two countries are deepening their strategic relationship, with a focus on addressing shared security challenges and enhancing their capabilities in key areas like maritime security and space.

While Canada not only aims to be a buyer but also a supplier under SAFE, participation comes with strict eligibility rules. To qualify, at least 65 % of the total value of a weapon system procured under SAFE must originate from manufacturers located in the EU, an EEA/EFTA state, or Ukraine.

Foreign suppliers can only be included in the 65 % threshold if their governments have a Security and Defence Partnership with the EU, and they then conclude a further bilateral agreement granting access to SAFE procurements. Since the EU and Canada have already agreed to swiftly launch negotiations on a new bilateral agreement, Canadian defence firms are optimistic that their products will soon comply with these requirements.

“Interchangeability of key equipment turns fragmented capabilities into collective strength.”

4. Increased cooperation

In addition to granting Canada access to SAFE, the Security and Defense Partnership between Canada and the EU will increase cooperation on military assistance for Ukraine and aims to enhance the compatibility of Canadian and European military equipment and the cooperation of military personnel.

Of particular promise is the deepening of defence-industrial ties. This not only opens economic opportunities but also promotes technological exchange and industrial innovation.

Both partners face similar challenges: modernizing outdated equipment, building resilient supply chains, and protecting critical infrastructure. A coordinated approach to procurement can eliminate redundancies, reduce costs, strengthen interoperability between armed forces and interchangeability of equipment.

And for Junghans Defence, a long-standing partner of Canada in the field of fuzes for various types of ammunition, business and cooperation models are evolving. Local production of interchangeable fuzes e.g. for artillery ammunition in collaboration with partners in Canada is the logical result.

Interchangeability of key equipment such as fuzes and ammunition turns fragmented capabilities into collective strength by ensuring that ammunition is not just available but usable, by anyone, anywhere, without delay. Interchangeability therefore is not just a convenience – it’s a matter of battlefield readiness.

In conclusion:

Despite its promise, the EU-Canada partnership still faces significant challenges. Implementation details are still to be worked out. Long-term success will also depend on political consistency on both sides of the Atlantic. Another question is how this partnership will coexist with NATO. How can overlapping efforts with the U.S. be harmonized? What role will post-Brexit Britain play in a landscape where it is neither fully in the EU nor closely aligned with Canada?

Yet the deepened EU-Canada cooperation sends a powerful message: that democratic nations can build resilient, innovative, and independent security structures without depending on volatile bilateral relationships. It would be naive to believe that Europe and Canada could replace the US as a protective power and supplier of military technology for each other. Nevertheless, efforts to strengthen cooperation are promising, and in the best-case scenario, they will enhance security in Europe and North America while bolstering their respective economies through friendshoring.

In a world where security is increasingly networked, technology-driven, and global in scope, this partnership is both timely and necessary. The EU gains a reliable partner across the Atlantic. Canada gains strategic autonomy and access to major markets and innovation platforms. For both, this is more than an agreement — it is a strategic promise for the future.

Dr. Kim Eduard Lioe is the CEO of JUNGHANS Defence, a global leader in the manufacture of igniters and ignition systems. He is the author of the book “Armed Forces in Law Enforcement Operations? – The German and European Perspective” and spoke on a panel at this year’s German-Canadian Conference. 

Der Beitrag Canada and Europe Deepen Defense Ties Amid Rising Global Instability erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..