Security & Geopolitics Archive - Atlantik-Brücke e.V.

How the Iran War Could Shape the U.S. Midterm Election

r.fehrenbach — Mon, 28 Sep 2026 10:34:06 +0000

By Robert Greenway and Anna Gustafson

Midterm elections are generally shaped by the conditions of the country at home, but this year, events in the Middle East are playing an outsized role as they have on a recurring basis for decades — one reason that reducing the threat is so important. And while attacks and uncertainty over energy shipments have reached American families through higher prices, the war has, in fact, weakened a longstanding threat to the United States.

That combination, however, presents a demanding test for the Trump administration. American voters will want to know what has been secured, what Iran can still do, and whether the President has a plan to keep both prices down and the region stable after the fighting subsides. Those questions give the war a direct bearing on November’s vote.

Today, the volatile nature of this conflict has led to continued fluctuations in energy prices and satisfaction. Unfortunately, this has lent itself to diminished enthusiasm and support for incumbent candidates heading into the midterms. Thus far, the public has judged the administration harshly on both the war and gas prices, which has been evident by the President’s approval ratings since the spring.

What they must understand though is the rightful adage: short term pains for long term gains.

Consumer conditions are very likely to improve as the general election approaches as the interim period between the two election cycles will provide the President an opportunity and greater latitude to further degrade the Iranian threat to vital U.S. national security interests.

Naturally, this will reduce costs and steady global markets. But in order for this to happen, there are three elements that dictate what lies ahead.

The security element

First, the U.S. and Israel have largely eliminated Iran’s nuclear program, its air defenses, naval forces, and power projection. Any residual capacity is severely constrained by the lack of support it receives from Tehran under unprecedented economic distress and limited in its ability to sustain a threat to the U.S. and its partners.

However, if left unchecked and not destroyed in the near term, this can be developed into greater capacity once again. For this reason, it is vital that we continue to disrupt, degrade and deny the IRGC and its proxies the capacity to harm American interests, our partners, and maritime commerce. That effort must proceed alongside the mission to complete a new and enduring regional security architecture, which is paramount to contain what remains and preclude its restoration.

The diplomatic element

The diplomatic aspect includes the foundation established by the Abraham Accords in President Trump’s first term. This proved that regional cooperation can indeed survive regional upheaval.

The Mecca agreement — signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan in August of this year — constitutes a milestone towards tripartite coordination but it has not yet yielded a dramatic shift in the use of force to defend mutual interests. For instance, the Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia have continued despite the pact’s pledge to treat an attack on one as an attack on all.

Convergence of interests among key U.S. partners and allies, like those that enabled the Abraham Accords, must be leveraged to provide ample incentives to expand cooperation, build shared defense capabilities, reduce U.S. force posture, and safeguard global energy markets and trade. But to achieve this burden sharing, Washington must assign Israel and our Arab partners responsibilities that each are able to fulfill.

The economic element

Finally, and perhaps most important to midterm voters, is the economic element. Since the start of the conflict markets have been consistently disrupted, yet they will stabilize as shipping resumes and the risk of further Iranian attacks recedes. And while neither outcome is assured before November, in time, more reliable energy flows will bring a marked advantage to both global markets and the U.S., as the principal beneficiary and guarantor now.

Given that fact, it is equally vital to appreciate the President’s efforts to dramatically increase domestic energy production and exports while removing obstacles posed by adversaries and increasing cooperation with Venezuela and our gulf partners, all while taking decisive action taken to eliminate the Iranian threat.

The world has also witnessed the U.S. aggressively pursue its vital interests without impediment. Neither Russia nor China have been willing or able to demonstrably avert actions taken against their erstwhile allies damaging their reputation as an ally alternative to the U.S.

The result of these actions has led to the constraining of Moscow’s access to export revenue through effective market controls, curbing their capacity to sustain the war in Ukraine, as well as constraining Beijing’s ambitions which are wholly dependent upon access to external energy. This strategic leverage is incalculable, and the administration is owed credit on this front.

Regardless, the public must keep in mind, markets will stabilize, efforts will be redirected homeward, and Iran will no longer pose a threat to U.S. interests. This is the purpose of America First: we battle external threats in order to tend to domestic needs and seek a more prosperous future as a nation.

As American voters and allies abroad look to November, I would ask them to measure this war by the dangers it has removed and the order it will leave behind and to remember that this conflict is not being carried out by the Trump administration in spite of them, but rather to protect them. Foreign policy comes with no shortage of trade-offs, but the total elimination of the Iranian threat will only make the world safer for all.

About the authors

Robert Greenway

Robert C. Greenway is Senior Vice President at American Global Strategies.

Anna Gustafson

Anna Gustafson is Research Associate at American Global Strategies.

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Why U.S. Conservatives Want Europe to Buy American Arms

b.wild — Mon, 28 Sep 2026 09:07:12 +0000

By Kenneth R. Weinstein

For much of the Cold War, the transatlantic alliance was an quasi-theological in importance. NATO was an article of faith: a united and free West standing against Soviet communism, with America serving as Europe’s permanent guardian. Conservatives from Eisenhower to Reagan were among its most devoted believers, and rightly so. But after the Cold War, this unexamined faith bred complacency. By the 2010s most European allies spent well under the 2 percent of GDP they had pledged to defense, while summit communiqués celebrated “shared values.”

Donald Trump broke the spell. He treated the alliance not as a creed but as a partnership that must serve concrete interests on both sides of the Atlantic. For all the turbulence, the result is a stronger alliance. At The Hague in 2025, allies pledged 5 percent of GDP for defense and security by 2035. European allies and Canada raised core defense spending by nearly 20 percent in 2025. Germany loosened its debt brake to rearm and is emerging as a serious defense provider. Europe is building real military power for the first time in a generation.

American conservatism contains at least three foreign policy strands

This shift will outlast Trump because it reflects a broad conservative consensus, well beyond one man’s temperament. American conservatism contains at least three foreign policy strands, and they disagree on much.

The restrainers, rooted in the populist and national-conservative wing, distrust open-ended commitments and believe Washington has subsidized wealthy allies at the expense of American workers. The prioritizers see China as the defining challenge of the century and want Europe to bear the burden conventional defense against Russia so American power can shift to the Indo-Pacific. The Reaganite internationalists still prize NATO as history’s most successful alliance and see American leadership in Europe as indispensable.

“And none expects a return to the Atlantic world of a Ronald Reagan or George H.W. Bush.”

What is striking is where these strands converge. All three want a Europe that defends itself. All three judge alliances by what they deliver, rather than what they proclaim. And none expects a return to the Atlantic world of a Ronald Reagan or George H.W. Bush. The GOP’s center of gravity has moved to working-class voters wary of distant entanglements. Even Democrats, under Jake Sullivan’s “foreign policy for the middle class,” absorbed much of the same logic. Europeans hoping to wait out Trump for a restoration are deluding themselves.

The conservative vision is not retreat. It is partnership among capable nations, each clear about its own interests, reinforcing the alliance through enhanced capabilities. Many European conservatives share that vision, understanding that sovereignty begins with the ability to defend oneself.

But partnership cuts both ways, and here Europe risks making a serious mistake. Having accepted responsibility for its own defense, Brussels seems to be trying to wall out American industry. The EU’s €150 billion SAFE defense loan program requires roughly 65 percent European content, and a “tech sovereignty” push would steer public cloud and AI contracts toward European providers. Washington has already warned it will review the waivers that let European firms sell into the American defense market.

Co-production and joint ventures, not protectionism

This is self-defeating. Europe’s new money should buy the most capability in the shortest time, and in missile defense, advanced aircraft, space and secure cloud and AI, American firms often deliver what no one else can. Shutting them out hands ammunition to those in Washington who say Europe wants American protection without American partnership; every strand of conservatism would read a “Fortress Europe” the same way. And the real beneficiary of a fragmented Western defense and technology base is Beijing. The answer is co-production and joint ventures, not protectionism.

The alliance has lost its theology. It has gained something sturdier: a hard-headed partnership grounded in shared interests. Conservatives of every stripe can champion that alliance, provided Europe stops mourning the past and stops building its future by shutting out its most important partner.

About the author: Dr. Kenneth R. Weinstein is the Japan Chair at Hudson Institute, where he served as CEO from 2005-2020.

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“We have to accomodate the U.S.“

Mateusz Borkowski — Fri, 28 Aug 2026 15:08:45 +0000

At the Frankfurt Luncheon “The Zeitenwende and the World (Dis)Order: The End of the Liberal Illusion?”, hosted by the Regional Chapter Frankfurt/Hesse on August 21, 2026, we discussed the emerging world (dis)order and its implications for Germany and Europe with Prof. Dr. Peter Neumann, Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King’s College London.

Following the event, we spoke with Prof. Neumann in a video interview about the growing use of hybrid tactics and when a hybrid threat becomes a military attack. We also discussed the diverging interests of China, Russia, and Iran and how the West can leverage these differences strategically. With regard to transatlantic relations, Prof. Neumann shared his views on how Europe should respond if U.S. security guarantees become a bargaining chip.

Find the answers to these and other questions here:

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Atlantic Bridge — Mon, 17 Aug 2026 16:03:27 +0000

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“2029 is the Red Line”: SACEUR-Talk on Europe’s Defense Buildup

Mateusz Borkowski — Thu, 11 Jun 2026 16:59:31 +0000

At the Atlantic Bridge’s SACEUR talk during the ILA in Berlin, Breuer and Grynkewich called for pace and honesty – and set 2029 as a binding deadline for Europe’s defense buildup.

This year (June 11, 2026), the Atlantik-Brücke hosted its traditional SACEUR talk at the ILA aerospace show in Berlin. The high-profile discussion brought together General Carsten Breuer, Chief of Defense of the Bundeswehr; General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); Airbus Defence and Space CEO Michael Schöllhorn; and OJ Sanchez of Lockheed Martin – to discuss Europe’s progress in defense, but also to lay bare its remaining gaps, as the continent works to restore its military credibility. The panel was moderated by Robert Wall (Aviation Week).

“This is the first time that the Atlantik-Brücke has held its traditional talk with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Chief of Defense of the Bundeswehr in public,” said Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke, in his welcome remarks. “It is also our premiere with General Alexus G. Grynkewich. And General Carsten Breuer is a steadfast partner in our security policy dialogue.”

“Even six to eight years ago, I couldn’t have imagined holding a discussion about the shift in attitude within the Bundeswehr and the defense industry,” Breuer affirmed.

“2029, this is where it counts. And this is the reason why I put a red line on all our timescales in the Ministry of Defense.”

[related] A recurring theme of the discussion was time. Breuer described how he has drawn a firm deadline in his ministry’s planning: “2029, this is where it counts. And this is the reason why I put a red line on all our timescales in the Ministry of Defense.” He repeatedly pressed for openness between politics, industry, and the armed forces, warning that timelines can no longer simply be pushed back. “We have to be honest to ourself,” he said, arguing that if a goal set for 2029 cannot be met, “then we have to discuss how to mitigate this, because there is no other chance.”

The panelists pushed back on the notion that Europe remains a “paper tiger.” “Most allies have increased their defense budgets. Last year, for the first time, all allies met the target set at NATO’s Wales summit,” said Grynkewich. He cautioned, however, that money alone does not create capability – it requires “delivery through an industrial base that’s healthy, that’s innovative.” “It would be wrong to say that Europe has no defense capability at all. The money is now being made available. We in the defense industry have to ramp up the innovation of our products,” Schöllhorn said, stressing: “The defense industry and the procurement system have to work even more closely together.”

The thorniest capability gap lies in long-range precision strike

The thorniest capability gap discussed on the panel lies in long-range precision strike. Breuer outlined a three-step approach – first relying on US capabilities, then procuring systems, and finally building a European solution – while acknowledging the uncertainty around the first two steps. His guiding criterion, he stressed, is availability by the 2029 horizon: systems must be procured “whenever they are available,” depending on what the market and development timelines allow. “We have to establish transparency about the red lines of our objectives. That means by 2029 we have to have been honest with ourselves. After that, we can no longer afford any delays. If a specific goal is at risk, we have to ask ourselves how to mitigate the resulting threat.”

“As for Europe’s capabilities in long-range precision strike, it’s clear that within NATO and from the US perspective we need certain air and maritime capabilities under certain conditions,” Grynkewich emphasized. And he analyzed: “Long-range weapons help the alliance establish deterrence in the short term. In the medium and long term, long-range precision strike has to be complemented by cyber and space capabilities. For that, research and development has to be adapted.”

“Lockheed Martin is rapidly ramping up its industrial manufacturing capacity. All our systems have to contribute to enabling long-range precision strikes,” Sanchez assured.

“Whoever is able to master the data, is gonna have a decision advantage.”

Both generals converged on a deeper point: networking matters more than individual platforms. “It is all about the data,” Grynkewich said. “Whoever is able to master the data, move it more quickly, apply more effective algorithms to it, is gonna have a decision advantage.” The two industry representatives reiterated the call for common standards, and Breuer warned against deferring standardization: “Don’t delay it because we don’t have the time.”

On the alliance’s future shape, Grynkewich framed a lighter American burden as a strength rather than a retreat. Asked what a transatlantic alliance looks like if the US carries less of the load, he answered: “It looks stronger. It looks more sustainable.” He situated this within a “NATO 3.0” concept that gives Europe a more balanced voice.

Asked about a hypothetical scenario in which Russia were to attack the Baltic states, the SACEUR was unequivocal: “Absolutely we’re ready to fight tonight. We’re ready to fight tonight across all 32 nations.” Breuer added: “Our problem is not within the alliance. Our problem sits in Moscow, and therefore we have to do something against this.”

“Absolutely we’re ready to fight tonight. We’re ready to fight tonight across all 32 nations.”

Breuer closed the discussion with praise for the transatlantic partnership: “I’m absolutely glad to have an American SACEUR here, because this provides – apart from General Grynkewich himself – that transatlantic link, which is also what the Atlantik-Brücke is all about. I think it’s good, and we should keep it this way as long as that’s possible.”

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Canada, Germany, and the Future of the Western Alliance

Mateusz Borkowski — Wed, 20 May 2026 15:30:08 +0000

When Canada decides which submarines to buy, it is not just choosing a weapons system — it is declaring where it stands in the world. A new Atlantik-Brücke Canada paper argues that Ottawa’s pending procurement decision between German and South Korean subs will reveal whether Mark Carney’s talk of a European pivot is genuine grand strategy or geopolitical window-dressing.

The briefing paper by David Bosold and David G. Haglund examines the “special relationship” between Canada and Germany through the lens of “strategic culture,” using the symbols of middle power and linchpin as analytical anchors. The authors compare the landmark speeches by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at Davos (January 2026) and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the Munich Security Conference (February 2026), arguing that media coverage has glossed over a crucial divergence: Carney declared a definitive “rupture” with the old transatlantic order and called for broad middle-power solidarity, while Merz urged allies to “repair and revive transatlantic trust” within an explicitly Western, values-based framework.

The paper then turns to Canada’s pending submarine procurement decision — German/Norwegian TKMS 212CD versus South Korean Hanwha Ocean — framing it as a strategic litmus test. The authors argue this choice should not be read as a revival of Pierre Trudeau’s failed “Third Option” trade-diversification strategy, nor should it be driven primarily by economic offsets. Instead, they contend that NATO interoperability, Arctic sovereignty, and transatlantic alliance cohesion must take precedence, making the German/Norwegian bid the strategically superior choice.

Read the full paper here: A different kind of linchpin

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Semiconductors, High Tech, Trade Power: The German-American Partnership Seeks New Answers

Mateusz Borkowski — Tue, 19 May 2026 15:17:49 +0000

Under the theme “Forging a Future-Ready Alliance,” representatives from politics, business, and research discussed the redefinition of German-American relations at the German-American Conference on May 11, 2026, in New York.

The focus was on how financial markets, technology, and supply chains are holding their own amid the geopolitical pressures of our time. Key topics included the role of global financial capital in the tension between profit, security, and political stability, as well as the booming defense sector: Where does the line between commercial technology and military power lie in the age of dual-use applications?

Other panels examined the transatlantic AI model, the future of the financial system in the digital age, the geopolitical significance of the semiconductor industry, and the new industrial policies of the major powers. The event concluded with a debate on the resilience of global supply chains.

Our sincere thanks goes to Deutsche Bank, which was an outstanding host of the conference.

As part of the conference, we also conducted a series of interviews: with Paula Cipierre, Global Head of Privacy at HCL Tech, and Mark Wehmeyer, founder and CEO of Taktile, we spoke about AI regulation in Europe and the United States.

We interviewed Metin Hakverdi, the Federal Government’s Coordinator for Transatlantic Cooperation, on the topic of security policy.

Jörg Wuttke, partner at DGA and former Chief Representative of BASF in China, argued how Europe can free itself from its dangerous dependencies.

And Dr. Sebastian Schäfer, MP (Alliance 90/The Greens), spoke with us about the energy and climate crisis, its impact on Germany, the future of German youth, and finally how the changing transatlantic relationship should be managed.

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What the Iran war teaches about partnerships

Mateusz Borkowski — Mon, 27 Apr 2026 12:00:39 +0000

The attack on Iran marks the end of unilateral U.S. action — at least in the view of our CEO, Julia Friedlander. In a speech delivered at the Berlin Capital Club on April 23, 2026, she explores how sanctions gave way to military force, why Trump represents a political era that has passed, and why this conflict is not only America’s concern, but Europe’s as well. You can read her full speech here.

“How many of you were surprised that the United States attacked Iran? And how many were surprised that they did this exclusively on Israel’s side? I would argue that any American president, under these circumstances, would have seriously considered military action against Iran — a weakened regime, diminished proxies, concrete intelligence — a tempting golden moment after half a century of containment and countless rounds of sanctions.

[related] The Obama administration, too, considered military options. In 2014, Iran was — according to some intelligence assessments — only months away from a so-called breakout. Yet diplomacy still had a chance at that time, not least because Russia and China were equally interested in a multilateral agreement and in curbing Iran’s uranium enrichment. The negotiations, backed by a United Nations Security Council resolution, lasted eighteen months. They were hard-fought, though far from airtight.

Unable to secure a treaty due to Republican opposition in Congress and pressure from Israel, the United States was forced to negotiate a legally non-binding „agreement“. That agreement was time-limited and did not cover Iran’s support for regional proxies or its ballistic missile activities, but most critically, it was not a treaty. After several attempts to persuade the European signatories to expand sanctions and push Iran to extend the terms of the deal (a task I was involved in at the time), Trump ultimately took pleasure in tearing it apart in 2018.

In the years that followed, sanctions were imposed wherever possible — not only on Iran, but also on Venezuela and Russia — essentially maximum pressure against what felt like every oil-producing nation. The more Trump and later Biden rhetorically escalated sanctions, the more the entire concept lost its effectiveness. Switzerland, acting as the U.S. protecting power in Iran, carefully noted the steady flow along long-established smuggling routes into Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan. And the first shadow fleets began to emerge — much like those operating today in the North Sea. From sanctioned Iran across the Atlantic to sanctioned Venezuela, oil tankers continued to move through international waters.

„’Kinetic’ sanctions are a rather striking way to prevent the financing of terrorism.”

The next step, then, could only consist of bombs. The United States already had some experience in this regard. When the Islamic State expanded across the Middle East in 2014 and captured Mosul, it seized a branch of the Iraqi Central Bank that, thanks to continued U.S. payments, was filled with cash reserves in dollars. Physical money, after all, cannot be frozen by sanctions once you march in. So we bombed it — the first „kinetic sanctions“, ladies and gentlemen, in early 2016. An interesting method of preventing the financing of terrorism, wouldn’t you say? And notice the terminology: Ukraine now refers to its strikes on Russian energy infrastructure as kinetic sanctions. And when sanctions failed to bring down Maduro, the United States ultimately resorted to his abduction. The illusion of a quick and clean sanctions regime was replaced by the illusion of a quick and clean military operation. But of course, it is not that simple.

Our New Alliance

The era in which the United States could act unilaterally is over. So too is the time when it could make such decisions and only ask its allies in hindsight: are you with us or against us? Trump’s belated appeals for support once it became clear that the war would quickly grow more complicated than planned are relics of a hegemonic world order that both the United States and Europe assumed would last forever. That is how America operates. That is how thinking in the Situation Room works. One commands instruments of power that others can hardly even imagine, and becomes blind to their limits. The United States can no longer afford to act in this way. Building alliances is slow and demanding — in the past, avoiding that effort was considered bad form. Today, it is a fatal mistake.

I respect that Chancellor Merz, in his first statement, refrained from judging the decisions of Germany’s partners. For it is one thing to comment from the outside and quite another to be in a position where decisions must actually be made. In the end, there are only two options: to press the button or not. And let us be honest: it is not a tenable position for a country like Germany, which seeks to have a voice on the global stage, to say: We are glad the Ayatollah is gone and we support the elimination of Iran’s missile capabilities, but the war itself is illegal. Of course, I also respect the decision of all European governments, under these circumstances and given the two protagonists, Trump and Netanyahu, not to take an active role in the conflict. Even if one were willing to subject oneself to the shifting moods of the U.S. president, what role would Europe have been expected to play in any case — assuming it was not merely a symbolic gesture of deference to the „Big Daddy“ of NATO, but a tactically meaningful contribution? Ideally, Europe would have been involved, but under different conditions.

“The United States wants partners on equal footing, not dependencies”

Believe me: the National Defense Strategy published earlier this year is not a second Clausewitz. But there is one passage that will stay with me and with my generation of security experts in the United States for a long time: „With rare exceptions, allies have too often been content to rely on the United States for their defense while reducing their own defense spending and instead investing in social welfare and other domestic programs. However, the blame does not rest solely with them. It was, of course, their sovereign decision to underinvest in defense. But that decision was often encouraged by earlier U.S. policymakers who mistakenly believed that the United States benefited from allies who were dependencies rather than partners.“ It reads: dependencies, not allies. What does that mean? It means that the United States wants partners on equal footing, not dependents. Trump is a relic — the final incarnation of a hegemony that no longer exists.

I fear that this war will produce no winners, only losers — in economic terms: a net deadweight loss. Iran will need years to recover, regardless of whether sanctions are eased and the country complies with Western demands to limit uranium enrichment. Israel will have neither eliminated an existential threat posed by a theocratic regime nor regained international support — the images from Lebanon and Gaza are still too fresh. And the United States has once again demonstrated its unparalleled military and intelligence capabilities. But it has lost the political game.I am convinced that had Washington taken the time to build genuine alliances with Europe and the Gulf states, the process would have been slower, but it would also have strengthened its own position and likely avoided this outcome. In the end, Iran was never as close to the bomb as many assumed.

„The United States took a shortcut — and the bill is now coming due.“

The United States took a shortcut — and the bill is now coming due. Meanwhile, Russia and China are operating in the background, providing Tehran with intelligence and material support. This is a far cry from 2015, when they still sat together with the West at the negotiating table. Yet wars in a world in transition are like immersion blenders. For that reason, not everything is negative. Ukraine is emerging as a global leader in drone defense and is concluding agreements with Gulf states. These countries — particularly the Emirates, which long flirted with Iran — are now taking action against illegal Iranian financial flows. Lebanon and Israel are discovering a shared adversary in Hezbollah. And, most importantly for this region, Europe is making further progress in defining itself in security policy.

Step by step, information is emerging about an allied mission to secure shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz. These are good news — first, for European security structures: a coherent military response by European actors in the European interest, without U.S. leadership. Second, for Europe’s relations with the Gulf states and other trading partners. Gradually, we are moving toward a European NATO capable of territorial defense — not without the United States, but alongside it, on equal footing. Not a dependency, but an ally.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are currently witnessing a global conflict in fragments. Imagine, for a moment, we were still living in Europe’s colonial world — it would be incomparably worse. What Europe does with the fragments now will be decisive: new alliances with Gulf states, missions to secure sea lanes, support for Ukraine. This is the beginning of a return to global politics for Europe. And that is why this war is also Europe’s war.”

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Why New Players Will Decide Europe’s Security

Mateusz Borkowski — Fri, 17 Apr 2026 12:24:22 +0000

Cumbersome platforms, long procurement cycles, and bureaucratic institutions: Sven Weizenegger, head of the Bundeswehr’s Cyber Innovation Hub, explains why Europe is not losing the competition for talent and technology due to a lack of ideas, but rather because of its own structures.

In public discourse, defense still triggers familiar reflexes: images of heavy platforms, complex procurement processes, and cumbersome institutions dominate. But this understanding falls short. Modern warfare is undergoing a fundamental transformation — technologically, structurally, and strategically. In reality, defense is evolving into one of the most dynamic technology fields of our time. The central question is no longer whether technology is changing warfare, but who is developing the systems that will determine Europe’s security and capacity to act in just a few years’ time.

From Product to Capability

[related] A core problem lies in the traditional understanding of procurement. For decades, defense was oriented toward acquiring products: platforms, hardware, clearly defined systems with long life cycles. But the reality of modern operations demands something different. What is needed today are adaptive capability packages that evolve continuously. Software is becoming the central element. Systems no longer consist of self-contained units but of networked architectures — so-called “systems of systems.”

In this context, a drone system is no longer a static product but a dynamic software stack with attached hardware. It requires regular updates, rapid iterations, and immediate user feedback. Equally critical is usability: systems that are not intuitive in the field lose their value regardless of their technical quality. Those who continue to rely on the logic of traditional product procurement risk working past the requirements of modern warfare.

Structural Inertia as the Result of Political Decisions

The often-criticized slowness of existing systems is no accident. It is the result of political priorities set over the past decades. After the end of the Cold War, the deliberate focus was on stability, efficiency, and risk minimization. Today’s system meets precisely those requirements. But it is not designed for speed. With the return of geopolitical tensions and an increasingly dynamic threat landscape, however, the benchmark is shifting. Technological developments and operational requirements are changing in ever shorter cycles. Systems that think in decades are coming under pressure to adapt. The necessary acceleration is therefore less a technical question than a political and structural one.

Innovation Dynamics and Industrial Reality

Technological leaps frequently originate outside established structures. New companies can operate free of institutional baggage, iterate faster, and think consistently from the problem outward. Established players, by contrast, are geared toward stability and long-term commitments. For them, new technologies often mean far-reaching adjustments to existing business models and processes.

This does not create a contradiction but a field of tension: innovation often emerges from new players, while scaling, integration, and long-term operation remain the strengths of established structures. The strategic challenge lies in effectively connecting both worlds.

The Competition for Talent and Technology

It is precisely at this interface that a weakness of the European system becomes apparent. Many technology-driven companies developing solutions to security-relevant problems find only limited suitable conditions in Europe. Two factors are decisive: access to initial contracts and direct contact with users. Without these, innovation stalls at an early stage.

Long procurement cycles and complex procedures make it difficult for young companies to build viable business models. Other innovation ecosystems address this proactively: with rapid pilot projects, early contracting opportunities, and clear pathways to end users. The consequence: talent and companies increasingly gravitate toward locations that enable faster implementation. Europe is not losing this competition for lack of ideas, but because of structural conditions.

Systemic Filter Effects

These conditions act as a filter. Complexity, opacity, and lengthy decision-making processes favor established players, while new companies frequently fail at market entry barriers. The system thus structurally selects against speed. The very players who could contribute to adaptability through new approaches and short development cycles often find no access. At the same time, existing processes reinforce the dominance of established structures. The result is an innovation system that does not fully exploit its own potential.

From Intent to Operational Impact

Numerous initiatives show that the need for innovation has been recognized. Strategy papers, programs, and organizational units are in place. What matters, however, is operational implementation. Effective innovation requires concrete mechanisms: translating real-world needs into actionable problem statements, rapidly deploying solutions in the field, and systematically scaling successful approaches.

This is precisely the unique role of the Bundeswehr’s Cyber Innovation Hub. As a “Bundeswehr startup,” its mission is to identify and implement unconventional solutions for the troops. The approach is deliberately operational: close to the user, iterative, results-oriented. The focus is not on developing abstract concepts but on concretely improving capabilities in the field. The Hub serves as a bridge between technological innovation and military application — addressing exactly the interface where traditional systems reach their limits.

Time as a Strategic Factor

Modern warfare is increasingly defined by speed. The ability to learn, adapt, and implement quickly is becoming a decisive competitive advantage. Time is thus evolving into a strategic resource. Innovation capability in this context means not only recognizing technological developments but translating them into operational impact — under real-world conditions and within short timeframes.

New players have a central role to play here. They bring speed, new ways of thinking, and technological dynamism into a system that has traditionally been designed for stability.

Conclusion

The transformation of defense is well underway. It concerns not only technologies but also structures, processes, and mindsets. For Europe, this presents a clear challenge: to create an innovation ecosystem that enables speed without sacrificing stability. One that integrates new players without neglecting existing strengths. And one that turns ideas into impact — fast. Modern warfare is not decided on the battlefield alone, but in the capacity to adapt. Or to put it more pointedly: new players are not a trend. They are a strategic factor.

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“We are experiencing the largest disruption of oil and gas supplies”

Mateusz Borkowski — Tue, 31 Mar 2026 13:00:41 +0000

The United States’ and Israel’s ongoing war against Iran has led to a factual blockade of the Strait of Hormuz enforced by the regime, a chokepoint above all for global crude oil and LNG supply chains. What does the current crude oil and LNG market situation look like internationally? How far can easing measures such as releasing strategic national oil and gas reserves range?

In the latest edition of our web series “Better Be Prepared,” we had the pleasure of discussing these questions with our renowned energy experts Samantha Gross, Director of the Energy Security and Climate Initiative at Brookings Institution, and Dr. Samina Sultan, Senior Economist for Economic Policy and Trade at German Economic Institute. The discussion was moderated by Heike Buchter, U.S. Correspondent in the New York office of Die Zeit.

Watch the full webinar below.

Der Beitrag “We are experiencing the largest disruption of oil and gas supplies” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

„The Effectiveness of the UN Security Council is more or less zero“

Mateusz Borkowski — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 08:30:13 +0000

The US coup in Venezuela, the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran and the mixed reactions from allied heads of state have fuelled debate over the relevance of international law today.

In our latest edition of “Better Be Prepared”, we had the pleasure of discussing this issue with the renowned professors of international law Monica Hakimi, William S. Beinecke Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, and Michael Kubiciel, Chairholder for German, European and International Criminal and Criminal Trial Law, Augsburg University, moderated by Dr. Iris Sayram, Director Law & Justice, ARD – Berlin Bureau.

Watch the full webinar below:

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Can Europe Learn from Its Mistakes?

Mateusz Borkowski — Tue, 17 Mar 2026 12:44:51 +0000

Europe underestimated Putin’s drive for expansion, continues to bank on Trump as a mediator, and remains stuck in reaction mode instead of taking the initiative. NATO veteran Dr. Stefanie Babst on a series of political misjudgments — and why the continent must finally find the courage to course-correct.

The consequences of political misjudgments are often severe and long-lasting. This is especially true for interstate relations. Whether the reasons lie in personal hubris, ignorance, or sheer folly is of secondary importance. Examples of fatal misjudgments that have led to massive instability, crises, and in the worst case war fill entire history books. And yet they keep repeating themselves.

Europe, which for decades saw itself as a bastion of peace, stability, and prosperity, is not immune to this. It studiously ignored Russia’s imperial expansionist ambitions. By 2008 at the latest, when Moscow attacked neighboring Georgia, Europe’s leaders should have grasped that President Putin would not shrink from using massive military force to pursue his fantasies of restoring ‘Russian greatness.’ That he had the pro-European Ukraine particularly in his sights was plain to see for anyone willing to look. It was a classic misjudgment on the part of many European leaders, especially in Germany, to underestimate Putin’s strategic ambitions and his willingness to wage war.

The human, economic, social, financial, and ecological consequences for the people of Ukraine are immense. It will certainly take longer than a generation before Ukraine can recover from Russia’s war. The strategic consequences of the brutal military attacks on Ukraine are equally unforeseeable. This is due above all to a second misjudgment that the majority of European leaders stubbornly cling to even in the fifth year of the war: they continue to hope that the Russian aggressor can somehow be persuaded into a ‘peace compromise’ with the help of U.S. President Trump, provided Moscow is not provoked, the West does not directly participate in Ukraine’s defensive struggle, and Putin is offered the prospect of impunity and coexistence between Russia and the West. Reality shows, however, that the fundamental premises of this calculus are wrong. Vladimir Putin has no interest whatsoever in abandoning his strategic objectives in Europe; and President Trump is neither interested in supporting Ukraine in its defense nor does he view Putin’s Russia as a security threat to Europe. Different as Putin and Trump may be in character, both see themselves as alpha males for whom no rules apply. Europe’s misjudgment of these two central actors means that it remains stuck in a reactive corner, with scarcely any visible capacity to shape the future strategic balance of power on the European continent.

The steps toward European sovereignty have so far been small and tentative

On the other side of the Atlantic, U.S. President Trump is in the process of engulfing the entire Middle East in war and instability. His military campaign against Iran is the product of pathological hubris, a multitude of domestic political motives central to his agenda, and a complete misjudgment of the ethno-religious and politico-economic complexity of the Middle East. That the world would be a better place without the brutal mullah regime in Tehran is beyond dispute. But by what means it could be effectively influenced or fundamentally changed from the outside, which global and regional actors would necessarily need to be involved in such an undertaking, and what multiple consequences for Iran itself, the balance of power in the region, international trade flows, and much more would have to be reckoned with — these and other questions Trump has generously ignored. Instead, he has presented the use of massive military force to the world as being without alternative.

Without being able to predict the concrete outcome of the Iran war, there is already today a wealth of plausible reasons to classify the joint military campaign of the United States and Israel against Iran as yet another historic misjudgment.

Political misjudgments, such as those we have been forced to witness repeatedly in recent years, can be adequately lamented, criticized, or talked up; public and political reactions vary depending on one’s point of view. In theory, however, one could also expect our political decision-makers to acknowledge and correct their mistakes. After all, admitting to errors is still a widespread practice in human relations.

Regrettably, however, Europe’s political decision-makers show no sign of rethinking their fundamental assumptions toward either Putin’s Russia or Trump’s MAGA America. While many capitals are happy to emphasize, frequently and loudly, their willingness to develop greater European sovereignty, the steps in that direction are small, hesitant, and take far too long. Moreover, they are not tied to a convincing narrative of what a future European security order based on democracy and the rule of law could look like.

Yet without a serious political willingness on the part of Europeans to set clear limits on Putin’s military expansionism by all means and above all together with Ukraine, Russia’s war against Ukraine will not end. Without the willingness to distance itself from a kleptocratic Trump-America that is increasingly transforming into an autocratic system, Europe will not learn to stand on its own feet. Those who argue that a deliberate but consistent de-coupling from America is impossible for political, economic, and military reasons are limiting not only Europe’s future prospects but also their own thinking. And those who say that the rules-based order is regrettably dead and that Europe has no choice but to accept the raw power of the ‘jungle kings’ Putin and Trump are reinforcing the already palpably fading belief in Europe. Mistakes can be corrected. Europe should summon the courage to do so.

About the Author: Dr. Stefanie Babst is a German political scientist, strategic consultant, and author. She served on NATO’s International Staff for 22 years—from 2006 to 2012 as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, and subsequently until 2020 as Head of the Strategic Planning Staff. This made her the highest-ranking German woman at NATO Headquarters. Today, she works as a publicist and is a co-founder of the consulting firm Brooch Associates.

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“I do not think that the death of Khamenei would change anything”

Mateusz Borkowski — Fri, 20 Feb 2026 16:36:41 +0000

We had the pleasure of hosting a discussion between Mariam Claren, Special Representative and the Head of Iran Programs at the human rights NGO HÁWAR, and Kirsten Fontenrose, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Program, on the possibility of regime change in Iran – and what the German and US government should do to support the Iranian civil society.

Check out the last edition of Better Be Prepared, moderated by Jakob Flemming, Senior Program and Research Manager at Atlantik-Brücke, below:

Der Beitrag “I do not think that the death of Khamenei would change anything” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“I do not think that the death of Khamenei would change anything.”

Pia Kauer — Fri, 20 Feb 2026 16:36:41 +0000

Check out the last edition of Better Be Prepared, moderated by Jakob Flemming, Senior Program and Research Manager at Atlantik-Brücke, below:

Der Beitrag “I do not think that the death of Khamenei would change anything.” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

MSC 2026: Shared responsibility in uncertain times

b.wild — Mon, 16 Feb 2026 17:53:17 +0000

Security issues, defense technology, and social trust: Atlantik-Brücke brought together experts from politics, academia, and business at the Munich Security Conference.

[related] Atlantik-Brücke was once again a guest at this year’s Munich Security Conference (MSC) with several side events. In his opening speech, Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, emphasized: “The recent strains in the transatlantic relationship pose a severe challenge, especially for Europe, and create uncertainty within the alliance. Differences over burden-sharing, threat perceptions, and economic issues highlight the fragility of our partnership. More than ever, Europe must invest in its own security, reduce dependencies and strengthen resilience against external pressures. Germany has a central role to play in this effort and must take on greater responsibility for European security. ”

The series of events organized by Atlantik-Brücke kicked off with a dinner at which Ulrike Malmendier, Fabian Hoffmann, and Nico Lange discussed “The Role of Private Wealth for the Future of Defense.” This was followed by panel discussions on “Technology, Innovation & Power” with representatives from academia, business, and politics, as well as a conversation between FBI Deputy Director Andrew Bailey and Atlantik-Brücke Managing Director Julia Friedlander.

Other program highlights included the traditional Female Network Event with Bärbel Hestert-Vecoli (Edelman Germany), Zhanna Nemtsova (Boris Nentsov Foundation for Freedom), and Ann Cathrin Riedel (NeXT e.V.) on the challenges facing democratic institutions under pressure, as well as the joint presentation of the Edelman Trust Barometer with the BMW Foundation Herbert Quandt and Edelman. Atlantik-Brücke was supported in this by long-standing partners such as the BMW Foundation, DTCP Capital, KPMG, and Gilead Sciences.

Der Beitrag MSC 2026: Shared responsibility in uncertain times erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“I have enormous regard for Atlantik-Brücke”

Pia Kauer — Thu, 05 Feb 2026 10:14:51 +0000

We were honoured to welcome Phil Murphy, former Governor of New Jersey and former US Ambassador to Germany, and Tammy Murphy, former First Lady of New Jersey and political activist, for a fireside chat during their visit to Berlin. Emily Haber, former German Ambassador to the United States, moderated the engaging discussion on current domestic policy developments in the US as well as its foreign policy.

In a short interview with Atlantik-Brücke, Phil Murphy talked about his long-standing relationship with Atlantik-Brücke, the importance of sub-national cooperation between Europe and the US, and his view on German and US competitiveness. And he found clear words for the violence caused by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents in Minneapolis and beyond – and on how to push back.

Der Beitrag “I have enormous regard for Atlantik-Brücke” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“The U.S. positions on Russia Are Not Compatible With Our Own Security Interests”

Pia Kauer — Tue, 27 Jan 2026 10:11:57 +0000

Norbert Röttgen, member of parliament and foreign policy expert, calls for Europe to urge the United States to comply with international law, while maintaining close ties. This includes continuing to invest in transatlantic relations. His commentary was written in German, read the original here.

With the re-election of Donald Trump as president, the role of the United States in the world — and with it the transatlantic relationship — is shifting at a pace few would have predicted. Under Donald Trump, the security of Europe is no longer an integral part of American interests in the way it was for decades after World War II. This change brings uncomfortable truths and consequential decisions for Europe. We want to continue working with the U.S., but at the same time we must recognize that we are now responsible for our own security.

[related]The truth is that even long before Trump, the U.S. had urged Europeans to do more for their own security and to shoulder a greater share of the burden within NATO. We Europeans often ignored these calls out of convenience. Now we must rapidly become capable of defending ourselves so that we never have to be defended. We must rise to this responsibility because the future of Europe and our free, democratic way of life depends on it.

The recently published U.S. National Security Strategy makes clear how the United States views its role abroad and how it sees Europe. Strategically, the U.S. is focused on maintaining dominance in the Western Hemisphere against external political and economic influence. In this framework, democratic rule-of-law states in Europe are at times seen as part of the problem, while reducing tensions with Russia is cast as a goal in order to achieve a type of strategic stability. In pursuit of that goal, pressure is being applied — especially on Ukraine.

For Europeans, these positions are not compatible with our own security interests. Europe’s security depends on the failure of Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Only by preventing Russia from achieving its aims can we stop military force from once again being seen as a legitimate tool of state policy — not just in Europe, but elsewhere, for example as a model for China regarding Taiwan. An end to the war that rewards aggression would not bring peace; it would destabilize Ukraine and further erode the foundations of the European security order.

The authority of international law is non-negotiable for us Europeans. It applies equally to both strong and weak states and is, for many, the most important protection against the predatory actions of militarily stronger neighbors. That is why, in full solidarity, we must also insist that the U.S. uphold international law and must not let it be relativized.

Europe missed the opportunity to put itself in a position where it has the capability to act independently in world affairs. We must make up for that now. This includes continuing to invest in transatlantic relations, which are more than government-to-government ties. They encompass politics, economics, and — above all — the connections between people in the U.S. and Europe that often go back generations and tell the shared and fateful history of our continents. Despite all difficulties, that story is not yet finished.

Norbert Röttgen, Member of the German Bundestag (CDU/CSU), is the deputy parliamentary leader of the Christian Democrats in the German Bundestag. He is also the deputy chairman of Atlantik-Brücke.

To read more on the question of whether the United States is still Europe’s partner, also see the pro comment by Metin Hakverdi, Member of the German Bundestag (SPD), Coordinator for Transatlantic Civil Society, Cultural, and Information Policy Cooperation of the Federal Government at the Federal Foreign Office and board member of Atlantik-Brücke here: “Strategic Decoupling would be damaging for Europe”

Der Beitrag “The U.S. positions on Russia Are Not Compatible With Our Own Security Interests” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

„Strategic decoupling would be damaging for Europe“

Pia Kauer — Tue, 27 Jan 2026 10:10:20 +0000

Transatlantic Coordinator Metin Hakverdi continues to see the United States as Europe’s partner – he sees it as in the continent’s own interest. His commentary was written in German, read the original here.

“Are the United States still Europe’s partner?”

These days, it might be tempting to say no. National security strategy, tariffs, Venezuela, Greenland — there are plenty of reasons to question our relationship with the U.S. No doubt: the Trump administration enforces its interests in drastic ways, strains our alliance with territorial demands, carries ideological conflicts from U.S. domestic politics into Europe, and openly supports European right-wing populists.

[related]And yet, on sober reflection, the United States are still our ally and should remain so. That is not just a legalistic statement with regard to our NATO alliance, which continues despite some fears. It is also neither nostalgia nor habit.

Beyond daily politics, the U.S. on the one hand — and Germany and Europe on the other — objectively share a wide range of common interests. We are closely connected economically and militarily. Europe currently lacks sufficient conventional capabilities and credible nuclear deterrence to protect itself in the near term. We can only face the challenges posed by China and Russia together.

Our economic relations with the U.S. are of outstanding importance, creating jobs and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. Research, supply chains, and investments are deeply intertwined. A strategic decoupling would be economically self-damaging for Europe. Even in our own security and economic interest, we should not burn bridges. Partnership with the U.S. is (also) sober interest-based policy.

At the same time, this does not mean a free pass. Europe must strengthen its own sovereignty and set clear limits. Regardless of how American policy develops in the future, Europe must take on more responsibility. A stronger Europe is not an alternative to the transatlantic partnership, but its prerequisite: if the U.S. drifts further away, Europe must be capable of acting on its own; if they draw closer, Europe is a resilient partner.

Furthermore: the transatlantic relationship is far more than the relationship between individual governments, more than Berlin and Washington, D.C. Our partnership is based on a myriad of contacts and networks at all levels — in politics, the economy, and civil society. And yes, at its core on our shared values. Politics can change, but these transatlantic bonds are enduring. They must, however, be tended to despite all adversity.

The alternative to partnership with the U.S. would be sobering: strategic dependence on authoritarian powers or European great-power fantasies without real basis. Neither is in Europe’s interest. The real conclusion, therefore, is this: the United States are still Europe’s partner. But Europe must make this partnership more European so that it remains transatlantic.

Metin Hakverdi, Member of the German Bundestag (SPD), serves as the Coordinator for Transatlantic Civil Society, Cultural, and Information Policy Cooperation of the Federal Government at the Federal Foreign Office. He is a board member of Atlantik-Brücke.

Also see the contra position of Norbert Röttgen, MdB (CDU/CSU), deputy parliamentary leader of the Christian Democrats in the German Bundestag and deputy chairman of Atlantik-Brücke here: “The U.S. positions on Russia are not compatible with our own security interests.”

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Shaken but Not Deterred: Why I Still Have Hope for International Development After 2025

Pia Kauer — Mon, 19 Jan 2026 09:16:15 +0000

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the world’s largest foreign aid agency, faced significant cutbacks in spring 2025 and was abolished by the Trump administration in July 2025. Tessa Coggio, who worked for a partner NGO of USAID, reflects on this process as well as its long-term implications.

There was much speculation in the days following the January 20^th, 2025 executive order to freeze all U.S. foreign aid spending. Working for a partner NGO of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), my colleagues and I speculated that the Secretary of State would defend development assistance as a critical foreign policy tool–as he had publicly for more than a decade. When instead we were faced with blanket stop work orders, we speculated as to how 6,200 aid programs would be fairly reviewed in only 90 days. We speculated about which words we should use–and shouldn’t use–to justify our work. How could we explain programs that improve water systems in Ghana or the Gaza Strip, provide meals to students in Madagascar, or operate community centers for women and children displaced by the Syrian War in the context of making America safer, stronger and more prosperous?

“A staggering human toll of half a million lives lost.”

[related]This was no easy task. For decades, NGOs implemented programs on behalf of the federal government whose merits were measured more intrinsically: the number of lives saved, jobs created, school attendance rates improved, agricultural output increased, disease incidence reduced. As we compiled such impact metrics to facilitate the 90-day review, we questioned whether they would still be compelling. We speculated about whether we’d be paid for work already conducted or whether the dismantlement of USAID was constitutional. Many of these questions remain tied up in complex court cases. No matter the answer, the damage was done. Before the 90 day review period had even concluded, 83% of programs were terminated. Quite literally overnight, from Sub-Saharan Africa to Pacific Island nations to the frontlines of Ukraine, health clinics closed, food aid sat undistributed in warehouses, child vaccination campaigns ceased, demining efforts stalled. This amounted to more than disrupted programs, layoffs, and contractual questions for implementing organizations. According to estimates by the Center for Global Development, the shuttering of USAID exacted a staggering human toll of half a million lives lost and counting.

There was also speculation as to which donors might step up to fill the gap in humanitarian and development assistance vacated by the United States. The European Union, Germany, France, or the United Kingdom were floated in many conversations as alternative donors we could pitch our programs to. I was more skeptical. In 2024, Germany had already passed steep reductions to foreign aid, cutting its humanitarian budget nearly one-fifth over 2023 and slashing it another 50% in 2026. The imperative to fund more military spending in support of Ukraine’s right to self-defense has provided several European nations further ground to renege on foreign aid commitments.

“What is needed are commitments to international development with staying power.”

One year since the first executive order, I continue speculating often about the future of international development and humanitarian assistance. At the time of writing, the U.S. Congress is moving forward a bill that would provide $20 billion more in foreign aid than proposed in the President’s budget package, and global health programs in particular seem poised to return to prior funding levels. Though I enthusiastically welcome this news, international development proponents would be loath to return to the previous reliance on U.S. assistance. What is needed are commitments to international development with staying power—commitments that survive political cycles, crowd in diversified private and public funding, and cultivate locally owned solutions. Multilateral institutions, including UN agencies, the European Union, and international development banks, remain potent examples of how pooled resources can buffer against the shifting priorities of any one country and safeguard the extended time horizons needed to tackle the world’s most intractable development and humanitarian challenges.

The events of 2025 left many of us in this sector shaken but not deterred. I do this work because I believe strongly that development is not zero sum. Economic security, political stability, social justice, healthy people, and a healthy planet: more of this everywhere is a win for humankind.

Tessa Coggio is a 2023 Atlantik Brücke Young Leader. She is a Monitoring and Evaluation practitioner with a background in international development and humanitarian assistance across Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Tessa is a graduate of the University of Wisconsin and Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service. The views expressed by the author are shared in a strictly personal capacity.

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US intervention in Venezuela: power politics instead of international law

b.wild — Wed, 07 Jan 2026 16:09:49 +0000

Venezuela reveals the crisis in the transatlantic partnership. With its military intervention, the US has made clear what it has already demonstrated in other contexts: it only supports international institutions and procedures as long as they serve US power claims and interests.

By Prof. Dr. Michael Hüther

Geopolitically, the year 2026 began with a bang: the U.S. military special operation in Venezuela. What is initially surprising is that President Trump—who had claimed he wanted to resolve conflicts worldwide and make peace—has made it clear that he does not shy away from the use of military force. Any hopes of a Nobel Peace Prize can likely be shelved at the White House. Geopolitics has always been power politics; such actions are well documented across different eras and have not lost relevance in recent times. Whether the U.S. power-political calculus will succeed remains to be seen, as the explicit reactivation of the Monroe Doctrine, including the “Roosevelt Corollary,” is unlikely to generate enthusiasm in the southern part of the American continent.

[related] In any case, the U.S. government is sending a signal: it may no longer wish to be the universally engaged hegemon, but when it comes to specific power interests, it is prepared to act decisively. The Venezuela operation also sends a message to Putin and Xi Jinping: military “special operations” are not an exclusive instrument of autocratic regimes, and when the United States chooses this path, one should expect precision, effectiveness, and efficiency. This implies that the U.S. will not limit itself to threats and loud gestures outside the American continent—such as in Iran—if an opportunity for a shift in power presents itself. The chance to weaken the so-called “Axis of Evil,” as coined by George W. Bush in 2002, or to break out strong links in that chain, will not be missed.

There are few moral arguments against the removal of violent rule and corruption. Accordingly, no German commentary fails to point out that neither Maduro nor his wife deserves a tear. For some political and journalistic commentators, a sudden gain in moral altitude suffices to legitimize a breach of the law. Historical precedents are readily invoked. Those especially well-versed cite the case of Noriega in 1989, when the U.S. acted similarly in Panama. But repetition does not create international legal legitimacy, and the United States did not justify its actions by invoking a humanitarian emergency or human rights violations in Venezuela; instead, repeated reference was made to Venezuelan oil reserves.

“However, a repeated act does not constitute legitimation under international law.”

The U.S. military operation in Venezuela stands in contradiction to international law. This does not become irrelevant simply because great powers sometimes behave differently. In any legal system, violations do not invalidate the underlying legal principles. International law, however, does not derive its force—as national legal systems do—from comprehensive codification and undisputed jurisdiction, but rather from the historical practice of dominant states and the institutions that have emerged from it. All of this was ignored by the United States. Equally ignored—presumably deliberately—were the consequences of this action for the standing of international law in the context of “great power competition.”

When German politicians—including the Chancellor—explained their striking silence in the first hours by claiming that “the legal assessment of the U.S. operation … is complex” and therefore requires time, they missed the point. What is complex is the political assessment, not the legal one. Despite all historical influences, the core principles of the Westphalian system remain clear: it asserts sovereignty over territory as the foundation of modern statehood and establishes the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, as well as the principle of the legal equality of states regardless of their size or internal political order. This is the basis of most Europeans’ criticism of Russia’s war of aggression. Yet even when two actors violate international law in the same way, the political meaning is not necessarily the same.

For Europeans, the political complexity of the Venezuela operation stems from the increasingly questionable transatlantic partnership and Europe’s existing unilateral dependencies on the United States. Negotiations over Trump’s tariffs were always accompanied by a latent American hint that the U.S. need no longer remain engaged in the Ukraine war, which is viewed as a European conflict. The balance of power within the West has shifted because the United States—as outlined in its National Security Strategy—has little confidence in most European states; it diagnoses cultural decay and seeks to counter it by supporting nationally oriented forces. For the Trump administration, security expenditures are justified only in the direct self-interest of the United States, hardly in NATO’s alliance interest, and certainly not in the defense interest of Europeans.

As a result, what has long been necessary remains central for Europe: the development of hard power—through adequate defense efforts, through deeper European integration among those willing, and through strengthening competitiveness. Only in and through Europe can an effective response in the competition among great powers succeed. Given its attractive living conditions, cultural diversity, differentiated educational systems, and other aspects of soft power, the continent—and the EU—has no reason to hide.

This also requires international credibility, particularly in the realm of rules-based international relations. This is crucial because Europeans appear to be the only actors with a distinct will and a deeply rooted historical experience in this area. With the Venezuela operation, the United States has once again demonstrated what it has already manifested in other contexts—the World Trade Organization, the Paris Climate Agreement, and the International Criminal Court founded in 1998: it supports international institutions and procedures only as long as they serve U.S. power claims and interests. This includes the assertion of both the will and the ability to enforce U.S. law extraterritorially.

“In Europe, you can no longer rely on the openness and accessibility of international markets.”

Europe and Germany should be neither naïve in terms of power politics nor careless with international law. This insight goes hand in hand with the recognition that references to a legal system must never be dismissed as mere moral folklore, and that violations of international law can scarcely be morally offset. Otherwise, Europe will not be able to play an appropriate role in the newly emerging global structure. “Europe first” must be the central response to power politics—or more precisely: Europeans must find the courage to use their economic size and significance for clear interest representation. This presupposes that deviant behavior by opportunistic actors within the EU—such as Hungary—has strict consequences, with the principle of the rule of law being firmly enforced.

Economically, all of this means that Europe can no longer rely on the openness and accessibility of international markets and must therefore pursue a Europe-centered trade system through accelerated free trade agreements. This may appear unrealistic given agricultural resistance in France, Italy, and Poland, but the seriousness of the situation must be recognized here as well. Political leadership is required—both European and national. At present, there are few signs of it anywhere. Yet, as so often in history, pressure from circumstances creates new options for action. This begins with coherent communication in the current situation: a violation of international law remains a violation of international law, and power politics only ever escapes it temporarily.

About the author: Hüther has been head of the German Economic Institute (IW) in Cologne since 2004. From 1995 to 1999, he was secretary general of the German Council of Economic Experts. In between, he worked as an economist in the private sector at Deka-Bank. Hüther is deputy chairman of Atlantik-Brücke.

This article was first published in Süddeutsche Zeitung Dossier.

The text first appeared in German and was translated with the help of AI.

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“I strongly believe that FCAS has a future.”

Pia Kauer — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 10:45:49 +0000

“If Germany and France can align on their defence priorities, this creates a momentum for the whole EU.”

Bertrand de Cordoue is a Senior Fellow at the Institut Jaques Delors and former Director of Research and Technology at the European Defence Agency and Director of Defence and Space at the Airbus Public Affairs department. In this interview, he shares his assesment on German-French cooperation in driving European defense efforts, the difficulties of activating private funds for defense expenses and the future of FCAS, the German-French-Spanish program for a Future Combat Air System.

Our team interviewed Bertrand de Cordoue at the edges of our joint conference with ODDO in Paris. Learn more about the conference here.

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Defense, Debt, Draghi

r.fehrenbach — Thu, 18 Dec 2025 15:14:19 +0000

On December 8 and 9, the Atlantik-Brücke brought 40 of its members to Paris. During a series of events, including a full-day conference hosted by ODDO BHF, the members discussed the domestic challenges that Germany and France share, the task of ramping up European defense, and Europe’s role in relation to the United States and the re-emerging geopolitical order. Distinguished speakers at the conference included former German Minister of Finance Jörg Kukies, former French Minister of Defense Sylvie Goulard, former Governor of the Banque de France Christian Noyer, and former German Ambassador to the UN Christoph Heusgen.

This delegation trip was just the first step in the Atlantik-Brücke’s endeavor to facilitate European coordination on pressing geopolitical and geoeconomic matters. The initiative’s core idea is that transatlantic relations have not been purely bilateral for some time and that a strong, cohesive Europe is required for an equal transatlantic partnership. Therefore, the Atlantik-Brücke will continue its mission to promote European dialogue. Following the Paris trip, a delegation of Atlantik-Brücke members will visit Warsaw in March 2026.

[related] Coincidentally, just days before the Paris delegation trip on December 5, after weeks of uncertainty and the constant threat of a serious government crisis, the German Bundestag approved the government coalition’s pension bill. However, it was no coincidence that pension reform was a recurring theme in Paris. Both Germany and France face the challenges of an aging society, an increasingly unsustainable and debt-financed pension system, and a political deadlock that prevents groundbreaking pension reform.

Nicolas Dufourcq, director general of the French public investment bank Bpifrance, highlighted France’s excessive public spending on pensions (14% of its GDP) and the political circumstances that, in a recent compromise to avert a government collapse, resulted in temporarily suspending the pension reform and effectively freezing the retirement age below 63. While the recent debate over pension reform in Germany was less dramatic, Germany cannot escape the underlying problems of demographic change and unsustainable public finances – and neither can anyone else in Europe if they are to follow through on the often-cited Draghi report, restore European competitiveness and build a robust industrial defense base.

Europe Cannot Afford Pessimism

In the realm of foreign policy, our visit to Paris underscored a shared awareness of the emergency that is currently defining Europe, as our guest Ms. Romatet-Espagne highlighted. This sense of urgency shaped the discussions at our joint conference at ODDO. The central question was no longer whether Europe must rearm, but rather, how it can do so and whether joint procurement can finally deliver. In this context, no keyword was mentioned more often in the debate than FCAS (Future Combat Air System). Once hailed as a model of European cooperation, the €100 billion Franco-German-Spanish fighter jet project now risks failure. Nevertheless, the conclusion was not resignation. As Bertrand de Cordoue rightly noted in our interview with him, Europe cannot afford pessimism. Although the fragmented defense industry landscape will not disappear overnight, effective joint procurement remains the most promising path to faster, more efficient, and more credible European capabilities. Convincing societies to invest in defense amid fiscal constraints and aligning military requirements across nations are difficult tasks. However, avoiding these debates would only deepen Europe’s vulnerabilities. As Lithuanian Ambassador Arnoldas Pranckevičius made clear in his keynote speech, the time for endless strategizing has passed. Europe’s security now hinges on translating strategy into concrete action without further hesitation.

Reinforcing the European Momentum

In a world shaped by rivalry and disruption, Europe must reinforce its transatlantic ties and strengthen its other strategic relationships and friendships. French-German cooperation is essential for advancing Europe as a strategic actor and consolidating its newfound strength. As Chancellor Merz establishes Berlin as a European hub for major peace negotiations, Europe has an opportunity to shape outcomes rather than merely react. We at Atlantik-Brücke are committed to doing our part to reinforce this European momentum. Our inaugural European delegation trip to Paris was a milestone in our renewed European strategy. We will continue to strengthen ties across the continent and build a network of partners and allies prepared to address the challenges of our time. The time is now to reinterpret the transatlantic relationship and engage with our allies on an equal footing.

Der Beitrag Defense, Debt, Draghi erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“Achieving digital sovereignty faster”

b.wild — Mon, 15 Dec 2025 13:08:42 +0000

The threat situation in cyberspace remains tense and continues to grow in quality and quantity in the context of geopolitical power shifts and hybrid attacks. Cyber aggression has massive impacts on the state, economy, science, and society, thus affecting our prosperity as well as our security. At the same time, new technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) are emerging, offering many opportunities but also presenting new challenges—especially in cybersecurity.

In handling technologies and digital products, a dual strategy is needed to prepare for the future: We must strengthen the European market and domestic digital industry while adapting or embedding non-European products as necessary—aiming to use them securely and autonomously. This is only possible through close cooperation among the state, economy, science, and society.

By Claudia Plattner and Florian Seiller

Cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technologies, and mobile standards 5G/6G are key technologies and essential drivers of digitalization. They are transforming our world at tremendous speed, enabling unprecedented innovation for state, economy, science, and society, thus forming the basis of our prosperity and competitiveness. They are indispensable to our economy and increasingly permeate everyday life, from smartphones, tablets, wearables, electric vehicles, smart homes, social media presence, to cloud storage of personal data. Yet we are only at the beginning of profound developments: smart factories, smart cities, eGovernment, automated and connected mobility, eHealth, and New Space may soon become reality. The 2030s might usher in the next megatrend: quantum technologies promising leaps in computing power, communication, sensing, and simulation. Moreover, the number of connected devices is expected to surge to over 39 billion globally by 2033—more than four devices per person.

The cyber threat landscape

To successfully shape digitalization, massive effort and acceleration are required in state modernization, research, market transfer, legislation, and standards, especially if we want to compete in the digital top league and lead in future technologies. Current geopolitical developments confronting the West sharpen our awareness of the inseparability of digitalization and security and the necessity of addressing both jointly as two sides of the same coin.

[related] Particularly in cyberspace, what we call cyber aggression is felt profoundly. It is becoming a central battlefield for hybrid attacks (cyber conflict), a hotspot for criminals (cybercrime), and a sphere of technological dependencies (cyber dominance). Digital espionage, sabotage, disinformation, and propaganda have massively intensified over years, executable from almost anywhere in protected environments far from targets. Attribution is difficult as actors easily mask identities online. The damage caused—both virtual and physical—can be significant. For instance, cyberattacks on a European airport service provider in September 2025 severely disrupted air traffic. Or recall wind turbine disruption due to a satellite network attack in the context of the Ukraine war (2022). Persistent ransomware attacks targeting municipalities or their IT service providers disrupt or paralyze administration. Not only critical infrastructures but also democratic institutions—parliaments, parties, politicians, ministries, authorities, foundations, think tanks, and NGOs—face continuous digital fire aimed at shaking trust in state protection and democracy. A particularly insidious tactic is leaking stolen or manipulated data to discredit victims. Elections, a democracy’s core element, have also been targeted by foreign actors—with Germany’s vigilance keeping substantial success at bay. Many such attacks originate from state or state-affiliated actors such as intelligence services or APT groups with significant financial, technological, and personnel resources.

“Digitalization and security are inextricably linked. It is essential to think of both together.”

Cybercriminals operate sprawling, specialized ecosystems making substantial profits, especially via ransomware. Daily, around 300,000 malware variants appear. Boundaries between cyber conflict and cybercrime are increasingly blurred. The damages from cyberattacks to the German economy are immense: estimates for 2025 are about €202.4 billion, nearly €23 billion more than last year. For comparison, the 2025 federal budget is around €502.5 billion. IT outages from technical problems can also cause massive losses, such as the billions lost in 2024 due to a faulty update of Crowdstrike Falcon security software.

Analogously, Germany experiences continuous espionage and sabotage on land, water, and air, such as drone overflights, arson attacks, airspace provocations, or shadow fleets. Chancellor Friedrich Merz summarized this starkly: “We are not at war, but we are no longer living in peace” (Schwarz Ecosystem Summit, 26.09.2025).

Threat trends in cyberspace exemplified by artificial intelligence

Technological advances significantly shape security and defense policies. Dual-use technology AI is especially powerful, transforming social media, work, research, entertainment, and medicine. However, new technologies can also be misused. Foreign powers, criminals, and politically motivated hackers use innovative technologies to bypass IT defenses and increase digital offensive power. Already, attackers use AI-based methods on IT systems and infrastructure. AI-assisted attack tools speed vulnerability detection and exploitation, evade defenses, deploy malware via tailored social engineering (e.g., almost perfectly personalized phishing emails), or create malicious code—all without deep technical know-how. The darknet offers wide “shopping” options payable in cryptocurrency. AI might even support ransomware payments in cryptocurrency. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) strongly advises against ransom payment. AI also amplifies Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks which temporarily disable web servers via overload. Particularly worrying is generative AI enabling automated attacks.

AI is heavily used for creating deepfakes and spreading disinformation, especially around elections, political campaigns, or to damage reputations. Expert knowledge is not always necessary—faces, voices, texts, and photos can be convincingly faked and misused criminally or politically. Experts increasingly struggle to distinguish real from fake due to rapid AI progress. Transparency is key, involving detection and digital “watermarks” to reliably verify content and provenance and identify AI-generated material. Authenticity confirmation from senders is needed—for example, a chancellor’s video should bear the federal chancellor’s office’s signature, while the Vatican would unlikely sign a photo of the pope in a Gucci coat.

Manipulation risk also comes from tampering AI systems by inputting distorted data to extract sensitive information or manipulate IT systems. In sum: AI models, especially large language models (LLMs), make future attacks faster, cheaper, and accessible to less technical hackers. AI’s military significance is evident in the Russian aggression on Ukraine. Autonomous AI hacking tools that independently compromise IT infrastructures do not yet exist, but LLM-based agents automating parts of attacks are deployed by foreign actors. The future will see attacks involving AI and against AI, cloud infrastructures, autonomous systems, or cryptography (e.g., quantum computing). We face a permanent and accelerating race between attackers and defenders.

The good news: new technologies do not only pose uncertainties but also many new opportunities—also for IT security. AI can help detect cyber threats and vulnerabilities faster (prevention), detect anomalies in data traffic (detection), intelligently analyze huge data sets, and automate defensive measures (response).

At the National IT Situation Centre, the operational cyber defense core at BSI, AI is already in use. However, only one in ten companies currently uses AI for cyber defense, so there is significant room for growth. Saarbrücken, a real AI hotspot, houses BSI’s AI expertise, intensively addressing AI and security questions, including digital consumer protection. In summer 2025, BSI published a checklist for AI systems in finance to systematically assess security, transparency, traceability, and fairness.

Technological dependencies exemplified by AI

Europeans’ vulnerabilities stem not only from direct attacks with new technologies but also from longstanding technological dependencies—digital products, quantum computing, 5G components, hardware, clouds, semiconductors. This is noticeable in administration, economy, and research. Surveys show that dependencies on the USA and China are perceived as largest in Germany. International crises and geopolitical tensions—sometimes fought with tariff and trade policy instruments, causing global trade conflicts—directly impact supply chains and can lead to influence via digital product manufacturers accessing data and services. Examples include solar inverter or router manufacturers from states where official bodies exert extensive control and manufacturers are obliged to full cooperation. Sabotage risks, such as in conflict scenarios, are also present. Such influence possibilities (cyber dominance) risk supply security, economy, and general security.

“The USA and China have significant market power.”

In AI, besides manufacturer access, market concentration causes technological dependency. The USA and China dominate, controlling availability of advanced generative AI models and necessary cloud infrastructures. Powerful AI models are usually licensed restrictively or cloud-hosted. Few large US and Chinese firms dominate training and hosting. Hardware is often overlooked: powerful AI systems demand specific, high-performance chips (GPUs, dedicated AI chips) developed and produced by few global companies in specific regions. This creates tangible supply risks and uncertainties. Additionally, dependency on quality training data with unverifiable validity exists.

Measures to strengthen digital sovereignty

As Germany’s cybersecurity authority, BSI believes states must ensure digital key technologies are available and securely usable to successfully and safely advance digitalization, mitigate risks, and reduce dependencies—especially amid hybrid threats and geopolitical rivalries. Our view: a dual strategy is needed:

First, strengthen the European market and domestic digital industry and accelerate digital sovereignty. Large foreign Big Tech companies still have significant lead in some areas; a full and sudden switch to national and European digital solutions is currently impossible. Since alternatives to foreign suppliers in AI are currently limited, European AI promotion must be intensified. Cybersecurity must be considered from the start (security by design).

Fortunately, numerous promising national and European approaches, initiatives, and products now exist in cloud and AI. Germany and Europe must catch up. We must invest more in German and European programs and better foster market readiness of domestic developers and manufacturers to produce internationally competitive products. Often, the hurdle is not fundamental research but market entry. This applies to cybersecurity products as well. Building a cyber market concretely benefits our cybersecurity and is a pillar of BSI’s strategy toward a cyber nation.

“We must invest more strongly in German and European programs.”

Second, adapt or embed international products technically as needed for secure and autonomous use and reliable prevention of undesired data leaks. European norms, standards, and security requirements must guide manufacturers and providers. Core is implementing technical control layers in products and services to better secure technologies and reduce dependencies. Yet extensive research and development effort is required. Securing products also requires close collaboration with manufacturers and open source communities nationally, across Europe, and internationally—practiced by BSI already.

The more trustworthy products available, the more sovereign decisions and secure digitalization become. It is about assessing and mastering technologies. Without this ability, we cannot master digitalization or cybersecurity. Assessing security properties and deriving requirements for products and services is a core BSI task. Close exchange with international partners, especially transatlantic, is indispensable.

This is why we also value dialogue at Atlantik-Brücke: it provides a forum for exchange among state, economic, and societal representatives on both sides of the Atlantic, strengthens mutual trust, and brings the transatlantic value community to life amid massive security threats. We look forward to continued exchange and jointly shaping cybersecurity in the future!

About the authors: Claudia Plattner is President of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Dr. Florian Seiller works in Department K24 – Strategies and New Approaches to Information Security (BSI).

[Disclaimer: This text was originally written in German. The English translation was produced with the help of AI.]

Der Beitrag “Achieving digital sovereignty faster” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“Democracy is fighting for survival”

b.wild — Mon, 15 Dec 2025 13:06:39 +0000

Our world order is facing profound upheavals. Democracy, peace, and the rule of law are in peril in many places, warns journalist and human rights activist Düzen Tekkal. In this interview, she speaks about growing identity conflicts and the global rise of extremism and populism. Tekkal calls for an active defense of democracy, stresses the importance of Europe’s strategic autonomy, and criticizes the role of various actors in the Middle East conflict.

Interview with Düzen Tekkal

ATLANTIK-BRÜCKE: Ms. Tekkal, looking at current global conflicts, are we witnessing a world order in transition?

DÜZEN TEKKAL: Clearly, we are experiencing a true Zeitenwende, if I may use that word again. Francis Fukuyama’s thesis that liberal democracies would prevail everywhere at the “end of history” has not come true—quite the opposite. The Western era is over. We are seeing a shift from a bloc-based system to one of single nations increasingly positioning themselves individually. The international architecture as we knew it no longer exists. States act today more “à la carte,” and global politics is more complex than ever. The central task now is to create order—in our thinking, feeling, and action—especially for liberal Western democracies.

Does a “new world order” bring more opportunities for peace—or new risks for conflict?

We see profound identity crises everywhere. We are once again in the midst of a “clash of civilizations” and identity conflicts. What Samuel P. Huntington once described as an open confrontation of cultures has become our reality. Conflicts arise when warlords deliberately instrumentalize identity, ethnicity, and religion. The credibility problem of the West is obvious—too often, values were preached while only self-interests were pursued. This can be seen in conflicts around Ukraine, Israel, and Gaza. Extremists are more active worldwide than ever before. Peace is not a given; it must be actively defended, something we in Europe have ignored for too long.

Much is at stake—our democracy and the rule of law are under threat. Democracy faces unprecedented hostility and fragmentation. Values such as self-criticism and openness to discourse are fading. Social polarization is increasing further through phenomena like “cancel culture.”

Where do you see that democracy is fighting for survival?

[related] Most clearly in the United States, where the rule of law is being eroded piece by piece. Donald Trump governs more and more like someone wielding emergency powers—deploying the National Guard in major cities and using the ICE immigration agency aggressively, which has even led to U.S. citizens being deported. His policies divide the nation and poison the social climate. Extremist political views have become socially acceptable, fueling one another—even through political assassinations, which are disturbingly being normalized in public discourse. For some political observers, the question is no longer whether the United States is on the path toward fascism—it already is. We in Europe must also remain vigilant and resist disinformation campaigns, the hollowing out of democratic institutions, and politically motivated violence.

Right-wing populist parties are gaining traction globally. Should we be seriously concerned about democracy, freedom, and human rights?

Right-wing populists pose a major danger—the AfD (the far-right party Alternative for Germany) shows how extreme positions conquer parliamentary space. But extremism is not confined to the right; left-wing extremism, Islamism, and antisemitism are equally serious threats. My impression is that democrats give up too early. It is alarming to see how many from the political center now believe they can benefit by adopting the AfD’s policies and rhetoric. Yet political barometers show they are not rewarded for tearing down the so-called “firewall.” There is every reason to fear that in next year’s local and regional elections, voters will choose the “original” instead.

The reasons for the shift to the right also lie within the political establishment: many people truly feel left behind, as reflected in the success of radical parties like the AfD and the BSW (the left-wing populist party Bündnis Sarah Wagenknecht) —and not only here; we see the same in America. We must reclaim the spaces of debate and stand up more strongly for our values. Right now, I observe a dangerous “spiral of silence.” People are no longer willing to take risks, as those who clearly voice their anti-fascist stance are immediately attacked. This is especially visible on platforms like TikTok, where the AfD and Islamist groups dominate discourse and deliberately spread their content. Algorithms fuel polarization and lead to dangerous disinformation in parts of society.

Is social media amplifying these developments?

Social media acts like a magnifying glass for society. Algorithmic dynamics often escape any meaningful control. Tech companies fail to take sufficient responsibility, with the result that hate and threats often go unpunished. In my view, we are facing a crisis of democracy.

How can we save our democracy?

It’s now about breathing life back into this democracy—online and offline. That means building a democratic ecosystem. We need civil society actors, but also businesses and organizations like Atlantik-Brücke, to engage in discourse with motivation and courage. Politics has not yet realized that it must give people a sense of what Germany stands for. We must not leave the narratives about Germany to the wrong people.

What role do the United States play in the new world order?

The U.S. is deeply divided and has partly turned away from its international leadership role. Transatlantic relations are more strained than they have been in a long time. Polarization and populist tendencies—especially under Donald Trump—are attacking the democratic core values head-on. Europe is increasingly being seen as an adversary in U.S. politics.

In Europe, we often hear of “strategic autonomy.” Is that a realistic option, or does the continent remain dependent on the U.S.?

Europe is more important than ever for those who defend freedom and democracy. Strategic autonomy is therefore indispensable, and the “European Dream” must be actively advanced. Europe’s ability to defend itself and articulate its position is crucial to our future—this must finally sink in, even for peace-accustomed Europeans. We must convincingly convey that freedom and peace give meaning and life—and are therefore worth defending.

Many European countries are again introducing border controls. Are these signs of the EU’s disintegration?

These are indeed worrying signals. However, their causes often lie within rather than outside. The lack of integration and the failure to convey democratic values are central problems.

Turning to the Middle East: What long-term consequences will Israel’s military actions have for the region?

The Middle East clearly shows that conflicts are no longer regional but have become globalized. Decisions made there have far-reaching consequences because the issue is like social dynamite. We see a dramatic surge in antisemitism worldwide—but also growing dehumanization and lack of solidarity with Palestinians. We must not leave discourse to extremists who exploit the issue for agitation. Many of them are not genuinely concerned about Gaza—otherwise, they would also highlight Hamas’s role or support Palestinian voices calling for a peaceful solution. On the other hand, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government has been issued what amounts to a blank check. We must do everything possible to ensure a livable future for Palestinians in Israel-Palestine.

You have just returned from Syria. The new transitional government under President Ahmad Al-Sharaa is trying to consolidate control after Assad’s fall but faces numerous militias, religious groups, and international actors. Where do you see chances for a sustainable solution?

When I was recently in Syria, I sensed both a spirit of new beginnings and of fear. The Americans’ “easy way out” is, at best, naïve. One cannot ignore or forget Al-Sharaa’s background—and his example shows how one can be both Islamist, jihadist, and statesman. We will pay a bitter price if we don’t view Syria realistically and continue to look away while minorities are threatened. It should be in everyone’s interest that the Syria of the future represents all people—Druze, Christians, Kurds, Alawites, and Yazidis alike. The West’s main mistake is choosing the wrong interlocutors. The massacres committed in Syria, now confirmed by the UN, are driving migration. Where are minorities supposed to go if they no longer feel safe there?

Iran remains a key factor in the region. How will power relations between Iran, the Gulf States, and the West develop in the coming years?

That is the key question. Iran remains a central actor with an aggressive policy, particularly toward Israel. The human rights situation in Iran remains dire, as ongoing protests by the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement and strikes over supply crises show. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps should finally be placed on the EU terror list, as many human rights organizations have demanded. Regarding the nuclear program: pretending that one can deal realistically with the Islamist regime is, in my view, naïve. It remains to be seen how the Gulf States will position themselves in the face of the Gaza war. Hamas and the Islamic Republic have succeeded in one respect: talks about the Abraham Accords have stalled, and normalization efforts among the Arab population have likely lost support—as the Israeli government takes steps undermining a two-state solution.

What role does Turkey play in the new world order?

Turkey acts strategically and exploits its position. President Erdoğan has become a symbolic figure for parts of the Islamic world. But opportunistic interests also play a role: Turkey is considered an ally in stopping migration flows. At the same time, a NATO partner is carrying out heavy military strikes in Kurdish regions, especially in Northeast Syria—bombing villages and destroying civilian infrastructure. Why is this reality barely discussed in political debates, and why does hardly anyone call for an end to arms deliveries to Turkey?

Many people fear Russia. Do you think this fear is justified?

Of course. It should now be clear to everyone: Ukraine is Europe’s defense line. Ukraine is not only defending itself but all of us. Therefore, it is unbearable that some are now turning perpetrators into victims. The policy of “change through trade” with Russia has failed. The fact that parties like the AfD and BSW win support despite echoing Putin’s propaganda is a clear sign of growing polarization and the poisoning of our society.

And what about China?

China’s influence is expanding immensely—especially in technology and, more subtly, in political matters. Control over information and algorithms, as seen with TikTok, shows how far China now shapes the global agenda.

You often say that civil courage must be thought of globally. What does that mean now, as the world order shifts and many feel powerless?

We in Europe cannot afford this sense of helplessness or world-weariness. I regularly meet people in war zones—in Iraq, Kurdistan, or Syria—who have far more to lose yet risk everything. We should take inspiration from that. We live in a country that guarantees freedom of expression—so why do we so rarely take a stand, even though we could? Civil courage is more important today than ever.

What gives you hope?

Despite all the challenges, humanity keeps rising again—even in the most difficult regions of the world. That is the source of courage and hope for the future.

What do you wish from the German government?

Courage, realism, and an uncompromising commitment to stand up against racism, religious extremism, and all forms of hostility toward humanity.

Thank you very much for the conversation, Ms. Tekkal.

Düzen Tekkal is a German journalist and human rights activist. Besides her work as a filmmaker, she is involved in several social projects and serves as chair of the nonprofit humanitarian organization HÁWAR.help.

Interview by Beate Wild, Director of Communications at Atlantik-Brücke.

[Disclaimer: This text was originally written in German. The English translation was produced with the help of AI.]

Der Beitrag “Democracy is fighting for survival” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“Reaching the next generation of transatlanticists”

b.wild — Mon, 15 Dec 2025 13:03:56 +0000

The current developments in transatlantic relations contain an important lesson for German foreign policy. In a time of global upheavals and geopolitical uncertainties, the federal government is determined to strengthen the alliance with the United States, while simultaneously considering new partnerships – for example with countries in Latin America. Our goal must be to reach the next generation of transatlanticists – for lasting security, vibrant freedom, and sustainable prosperity.

By Florian Hahn

The United States remains our most important ally and partner outside Europe. This is especially true with regard to global challenges and numerous conflicts, foremost among them the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East, and in particular for safeguarding our security, our freedom, and our prosperity. Despite all tensions and contradictions, the transatlantic relationship is a pillar of the federal government’s foreign policy, and the transatlantic alliance is the guarantor of our security. This remains true regardless of sometimes critical perceptions in the public sphere – for example, following the speech by US Vice President J. D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference 2025, concerning US trade policy and discussions about the future orientation of the European security architecture.

Through intensive diplomatic visits, since taking office, the federal government has underpinned this with not just words but deeds, including toward the USA. This success is evident in the good contacts between the Federal Chancellor and Foreign Minister with their US counterparts. Together with the US government and allies in NATO, we worked towards the Hague summit and led it to success as an alliance of 32 allies, with a clear commitment to continued collective defense and Article 5, as well as agreement on significantly increased investments in our deterrence and defense, which are crucial for Euro-Atlantic security—our security as the Federal Republic of Germany—given the long-term threat posed by Russia.

Security

[related] The Russian airspace violations in NATO territory this September—whether by drones over Poland and Romania or fighter jets over Estonia—show us how tense the current situation is. In this critical situation, the importance of the transatlantic alliance—the most important and successful defense alliance ever—cannot be overstated. This is particularly true for Germany: about 37,000 American soldiers are stationed here, with key military facilities and infrastructure of the US armed forces located here. It is all the more important that we—together with our allies and European partners—do more for our own security and take responsibility.
The federal government has taken a decisive step with the reform of the debt brake to invest in our own defense capabilities. Like our NATO allies, by 2035 we will spend 5 percent of GDP—3.5 percent for defense expenditures and 1.5 percent for security- and defense-related tasks. At the European level, we have established an instrument that supports European member states in investing in their defense industry and thus their defense capabilities. Both are successes of determined German diplomacy that create new cooperation opportunities—including with the USA. This determination of the federal government to invest more in its own and European security and to strengthen the European pillar in NATO is also positively recognized by the US government.
Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, its military build-up, and revisionist goals beyond Ukraine represent the greatest threat to our security. Despite mediation efforts by the US president, Putin shows no serious willingness to negotiate. A ceasefire or an end to the war is not in sight. It is clear to us: we cannot do without the USA. Therefore, a determined and sustainable engagement by the USA—whether through supporting Ukraine with US weapons systems and sharing intelligence, or through coordinating sanctions and other pressure measures within the G7—is an even more important signal to Russia. At the same time, we Europeans must, within our means, do more to support Ukraine. Since 2022, Germany has already provided or committed bilateral military support amounting to 40 billion euros for the coming years. By supporting the financing of US arms deliveries through a newly established NATO mechanism of up to 500 million euros and the Chancellor’s proposals for the legally secure use of immobilized Russian assets to support Ukraine, we are going a step further. We call on our European EU partners and NATO allies to follow our example.

Freedom

The USA, through their landmark decisions after World War II and their support for German reunification, remain a guarantee of security, freedom, and prosperity in Germany and Europe. Without the courageous decisions of the then US government, there would neither be a reunified, democratic, and economically strong Germany nor a free Europe. For this, we remain very grateful to the USA.
However, this gratitude does not mean that we would adopt every critical statement about freedom of expression and democracy in Europe, not even those from some representatives of the current administration. On the contrary: the values that make Europe strong and the liberal-democratic basic order of Germany are the cornerstones of our freedom. Freedom of expression and democracy are highly valued in Germany and Europe and are preserved and defended through our rule of law.

Prosperity

The numbers are clear: The USA are the most important destination for German exports outside the EU. The USA are the largest non-European investor in Germany. Germany, in turn, is the third-largest investor in the USA. German subsidiaries currently provide about 870,000 jobs in the USA, US subsidiaries in Germany about 640,000, underpinning the importance of the transatlantic economic area. Such close economic interconnections have developed over decades and cannot be substituted in the short term. It is also not in mutual interest to dissolve these closely intertwined supply chains—partly in critical sectors—and thus weaken the resilience of the transatlantic market in the face of major geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges.

“The values that make Europe strong are the cornerstones of our freedom.”

Looking ahead, transatlantic cooperation holds immense potential: together, Europe and the USA account for 43 percent of global GDP and nearly 30 percent of global trade in goods and services. European research institutions, universities, and companies are innovation engines for the critical technologies of tomorrow. To fully exploit this potential, it will be important to strengthen our competitiveness and innovative strength in Europe as well—and thus to meet the USA on equal footing.

From the outset, the federal government has supported the removal of mutual barriers. The trade agreement achieved between the USA and the EU should only be an intermediate step, as its asymmetry poses great challenges to our companies and increases the risk of fragmentation of free trade. However, it creates short-term security and predictability for German and European companies and has prevented an escalation of the trade conflict with potentially serious consequences for the European economy. Therefore, the federal government supports the European Commission in negotiations with the USA along our economic policy interests. At the same time, the federal government advocates European unity among member states and promotes further diversification of EU trade relations.

New lessons, new fields of action

Looking at developments in all three fields—security, freedom, prosperity—since the start of the US government and the federal government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, it becomes clear: current developments in transatlantic relations also contain an important lesson for German foreign policy. Germany must “relearn” self-confident, interest-oriented targeted cooperation with states in the sense of the triad of security, freedom, and prosperity. This applies especially or even particularly when these states do not or no longer fully share our values.

What does that mean? In the case of the USA as a central partner and ally, opportunities and challenges present themselves equally. It is clear that we must preserve the long-grown shared values and interests and build them up where consensus is possible. At the same time, in the transatlantic relationship, alongside core topics of security and economy, we must also define new fields of action along our interests to not only secure this cooperation but also to bring it into a new era.

New target groups

Relations with the USA are changing—especially with regard to our populations: historically, fewer and fewer people in the USA and Germany are socialized transatlantically. To keep relations stable in the USA, it must also be about strengthening them in the middle of our respective societies. Therefore, we need to take care to reach the next generation of Transatlanticists. We want Germany to be positively perceived in all its dimensions in the USA. This means reaching as many diverse population groups as possible. In recent years, the federal government and its predecessors have invested a lot: we have intensified exchanges of our cultural mediators, alumni, and honorary consuls in the USA, strengthened cooperation with subnational partners such as state parliaments, mayors, and other officials in the states, and brought new target groups to Germany through customized programs.

We do not want to rest on achievements and will intensify our efforts. This includes, among others, sports diplomacy at upcoming major events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. It includes the Goethe-Institut opening new locations away from the coasts in Houston and St. Louis. It also includes winning many people in the USA who have contact points with Germany—for example alumni of exchange and scholarship programs or veterans who served in Germany—as ambassadors for Germany. Many of them are willing to actively commit to the German-American partnership.

Future technologies

Whether artificial intelligence, quantum computing, or space travel: when it comes to the critical technologies of the future, European researchers and companies are always involved. Even if we cannot always keep up with the entrepreneurial speed in the USA and the financing opportunities there, cooperation in sensitive technology areas is only possible among like-minded states for reasons of technical and national sovereignty. This is why there is great potential for deepened cooperation between Germany/Europe and the USA. We should focus on space travel; German space start-ups are already important suppliers for US giants SpaceX and Blue Origin, and ESA is already an important partner for NASA. We need to build on and offer proposals here since cooperation with the USA can also be a driver for our own economy and innovation strength. For us, this also means continuing to invest in our own innovative capacity and research security to be an attractive and trustworthy partner.

New partnerships

Whether in the Indo-Pacific or Latin America: the federal government has made it its task to establish new partnerships worldwide and deepen existing ones. This includes our commitment to the timely conclusion of EU free trade agreements with MERCOSUR and Indonesia, support for EU negotiations for free trade agreements with India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, as well as intensifying our relations with Canada. This strengthens the resilience of the European economy, diversifies risks, and creates new starting points for cooperation with the USA and transatlantic relations.

“We must continue to invest in our own innovation capabilities and research security.”

This also applies particularly to Latin America: The US government aims to focus more on Latin America in foreign policy. This involves—especially in competition with China—the question of who will set narratives and exert influence in South America in the future. Germany has a close network on the continent and is seen as a credible partner in many countries. That is why we should coordinate our commitment with the USA and act jointly wherever possible. Especially in connectivity, we can offer alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative with the EU’s Global Gateway and deepen economic ties. We can also contribute importantly in crisis contexts. For example, Germany pledged another five million euros at the UN General Assembly to support international efforts to restore peace and security in Haiti. This sent a signal of our engagement for the region that was closely observed in Latin America and the USA.

Outlook

Our relations with the USA have rarely been straightforward since the end of World War II but have always been of central importance to the Federal Republic of Germany. Even more than a year after Donald Trump’s election as the 47th US president, they will continue to intensively occupy German and European politics. It is therefore all the more important to continue investing beyond everyday business and beyond the major lines of our time in the future of these relations, in the USA and beyond.

About the author: Florian Hahn (CSU) is Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Foreign Office.

[Disclaimer: This text was originally written in German. The English translation was produced with the help of AI.]

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What’s next?

b.wild — Mon, 15 Dec 2025 12:57:11 +0000

By Sigmar Gabriel and Julia Friedlander

In October, a delegation from Atlantik-Brücke visited the NATO headquarters in Brussels. During our conversations on site, we discussed the most pressing challenges for the alliance, the state of the transatlantic partnership, and Germany’s renewed commitment to strengthening its defense sector. We also gained insights into how the startup ecosystem can contribute to building Germany’s defense capacity by providing specific technologies to the state. After the exchange, it was clear to all of us that the world in which we had grown comfortable over past decades no longer exists. But we also recognized that this new world simultaneously sparks the desire to solve problems and invent new solutions.

NATO’s primary focus is once again on deterring potential adversary Russia, to prevent any aggression against Europe. In some ways, it feels as if we have returned to a Cold War mindset. We are at a historic crossroads, that much is certain. But what, you may ask, comes next?

Transatlantic Relations Remain Strained

The transatlantic partnership has been notably strained under US President Donald Trump, as core interests and priorities continue to diverge. The introduction of special tariffs and Trump’s rigid “America First” trade policy have placed significant strain on economic relations. At the same time, Trump openly questions Europe’s defense capabilities. Even after an increase in defense spending by European partners to five percent of GDP, there is considerable uncertainty about the USA’s future role in NATO.

Europe, increasingly faced with security policy challenges—such as Russia’s repeated provocations on NATO’s eastern flank—must urgently strengthen its defense capabilities, yet finds itself under internal political pressure, not least due to the rise of populist movements. Not only in defense policy but also economically, Europe remains dependent on transatlantic ties. It appears likely that the EU’s strategic direction will remain fragmented in the future. While pragmatic cooperation in security crises is temporarily conceivable, in the long term, intraregional divisions will prove too burdensome.

Russia and the Challenge to NATO

[related] Putin currently sees no reason to change his strategy. Peace in Ukraine is unlikely to materialize soon. Russia will continue to be at the center of European security concerns in the coming years. Through repeated border violations—including drone attacks on NATO territory—Moscow is testing the political and military cohesion of the West and is increasingly relying on hybrid warfare. Ultimately, Moscow aims to establish a regional zone of influence modeled along the borders of the former Soviet Union. This not only strains NATO, but also significantly shapes European future planning. At the same time, Russia is deepening its cooperation with countries such as North Korea and China in an effort to form multipolar power blocs against the West. Against this backdrop, Germany is currently undergoing a security policy paradigm shift. The federal government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz aims to make the Bundeswehr Europe’s strongest conventional army in the coming years—a strategic objective backed by a significantly increased budget, broad structural reforms, and the recruitment of new personnel.

The Global South and New Independence

In the Global South, claims to leadership are becoming louder, corresponding to the redistribution of economic power. Countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia are increasingly pursuing independent development paths and partnerships. China, of course, is a key anchor here, massively expanding its infrastructure projects and trade links. But Donald Trump’s aggressive trade and migration policies have also forced other countries into new cooperations. At the end of August, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in China. The three countries promised deeper geopolitical cooperation. We do not know whether this anti-Western signal marks the start of a genuine realignment between India and China. What is clear is that a country like India is trying to maintain its geostrategic balance with radical pragmatism, making Europe’s approach to values-based foreign policy seem less like yesterday’s program and more like something from a past century.

Middle East: Instability and New Power Structures

The Middle East—especially Israel, Iran, and Gaza—remains a region of geopolitical unrest, yet with continually shifting spheres of influence. While the USA, despite its close ties with Israel, seeks closer relations with Gulf states, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey continue to gain geopolitical significance. The constant in this ever-changing region between Syria and Yemen is its permanent state of unrest, an imbalance in which political power can fragment and reassemble at any given moment. The diplomatic role of Germany should not be underestimated in this power carousel. Israel remains the focus of international attention as it continues to face persistent instability in Gaza. For Europe, the pressing question is how to uphold the fragile ceasefire and ensure humanitarian access. Germany remains explicitly committed to Israel’s security and existence as part of its national raison d’état, a position emphasized by Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul. At the same time, many voices in politics and society call for a more nuanced debate, considering the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and growing political pressures within Europe.

AI and Fears of a Crash

Looking to the future today must extend not only to the political but—above all—to the technological realm. The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) contains the promise of rapid technological progress with implications for the distribution of geopolitical power. In the defense sector especially, AI has become a key topic; the Bundeswehr and its European partners are investing heavily in AI-driven systems—from automated analysis of satellite and drone data to optimized logistics processes and autonomous defense systems and scenario analysis. However, the use of AI requires ongoing regulatory and ethical oversight, especially as military applications increasingly push into sensitive dual-use areas. Meanwhile, global competition for semiconductors and access to critical raw materials—especially rare earths—is heightening geopolitical uncertainty.

China, above all, uses export controls as a strategic lever against Western industrialized nations, whose high-tech and defense industries depend on secure supplies. The dependence of Europe and the USA on a few supplier countries carries substantial risks for industrial value chains, defense capabilities, and economic sovereignty. Diversifying supply chains, investing in technological innovation, and forging targeted resource partnerships are therefore central tasks for the future, vital for securing Europe’s long-term prosperity and agency.

AI also carries the risk of an investment bubble that could threaten the American—and thus global—financial system. Credit-financed investments in gigantic infrastructure such as data centers and specialized chips already account for a major portion of US economic growth. If they fail to meet expectations, a chain reaction could ensue, spreading from the tech sector to finance and, ultimately, the real economy. Such a crisis would have far-reaching repercussions for consumer confidence, credit markets, and economic growth. Political support and regulatory measures will therefore be crucial for managing risks and unlocking the sustainable potential of AI.

The Threat of Authoritarian Forces

Donald Trump has fundamentally changed the transatlantic partnership. Hoping for a time after Trump is, however, not sound advice for Europe. For the current situation facing Europeans reveals a structural dilemma: the tactic of delaying conflict through appeasing the US President remains a risky and potentially deceptive strategy—regardless of who is in power in Washington. Europe’s security architecture is still too dependent on the goodwill of the USA; true European sovereignty is not on the horizon.

Domestic American attacks on democracy—from voting rights restrictions to the erosion of rule-of-law institutions—already have effects beyond the United States. They could serve as blueprints for authoritarian forces in other Western democracies. Polarization and rising populism are weakening social cohesion and, with it, the resilience of democratic systems worldwide. Europe’s most important task is thus to learn from the dangers in the USA: by fostering independent institutions, resilient communications structures, and a willingness to take its own responsibility in security and defense policy.

The Future Is Multipolar and Fragmented

With regard to a future Europe, we must abandon the idea that Western hegemony can be sustained. There will no longer be an “old liberal” Europe following in the slipstream of the USA, even if many wish for this out of fear of economic decline and loss of political significance. In an era when China and the Global South are gaining strength, it is becoming ever harder for Europe to defend its interests. But we should finally come to terms with the seriousness of the situation and face the multipolar world order, rather than try to resist it. The coming upheaval will be at least as momentous as the dawn of the age of industrialization. We should strive to actively shape it, not oppose it.

Atlantik-Brücke can count itself fortunate to have access to a strong network in this fragmented world. We are ready to help solve problems and provide orientation. As always, we count on your commitment and expertise!

[Disclaimer: This text was originally written in German. The English translation was produced with the help of AI.]

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“A whole-of-society effort”

b.wild — Mon, 15 Dec 2025 12:54:10 +0000

We stand at the threshold of a new world order. For more than 30 years, we have lived in peace in Europe. That is over. If the West fails to defend our liberal values, we will become the plaything of autocrats.

By Carsten Breuer

International conflicts and their effects are increasingly coming into our consciousness with great force. They are becoming topics of conversation not only on news programs, talk shows, and in surveys, but also at the kitchen table at home. The defense of our security has long ceased to be an abstract task—it is a concrete necessity. This is especially apparent when looking at Ukraine. Russia’s illegal war of aggression has lasted nearly four years. Above all, it is a war of attrition. We see high-tech drones in trench warfare, archaic violence in war crimes in Bucha, and battles to the bitter end in Bakhmut. Putin’s neo-imperialist ambitions have already cost hundreds of thousands of lives. And there is no end in sight. Russia switched to a war economy some time ago.

Its military now receives more spending than all other policy areas combined. Weapons and ammunition are being produced at full speed or, in some cases, refurbished from old stockpiles. Not all of this goes directly to the front, but also to new military units currently being established along the entire NATO eastern flank. Personnel-wise, Putin is preparing for further confrontations: by the end of 2026, Russian armed forces are expected to grow significantly again, to around 1.5 million soldiers. That is twice as many as before the war began on February 24, 2022. According to military analysts, Russia could be capable of launching large-scale attacks on NATO territory within a few years.

[related] Not necessarily as a campaign of conquest, but perhaps as intensified provocation right at the brink of open war, aiming to undermine the Western alliance system, weaken NATO’s security guarantees, and expand its own sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. This is not a prediction, but a plausible possibility. We must take seriously the intentions and goals behind this massive rearmament. Putin is not interested in expanding his massive empire by a few square kilometers. He wants a new world order, and he wants to achieve it through force. Analysts view 2029 as a potential “culmination point,” but the threat is already real today. Putin has long viewed himself as being engaged in a “(shadow) war” against the West. This is evidenced by the increasing number of hybrid attacks that Europe is exposed to.

Even in Germany, we observe a wide range of systematic attacks in the gray area between peace and war: cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, severed data cables in the Baltic Sea, sabotage planning, drone-assisted espionage, disinformation campaigns on social media, and even foiled attack plans. All these “pinpricks” are intended to shake confidence in our state. They aim to undermine the cohesion of our societies. Germany plays a particular role—as Ukraine’s main supporter in Europe and as a hub for the Allies in deploying to NATO’s eastern flank. These hybrid attacks strike us—deliberately scalable and capable of being scaled—at the boundary between internal and external security, specifically at the intersection of different responsibilities. It is essential to act in a coordinated fashion at this point of entry, both nationally and internationally.

“Russia’s quest for power remains, for the foreseeable future, the greatest and most immediate threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.”

Russia’s quest for power will remain, for the foreseeable future, the greatest and most immediate threat to the Euro-Atlantic area. But it is by no means the only one. Across the globe, other crisis hotspots demand our vigilance. The conflict in the Middle East—or rather, conflicts—continue to concern us and require action. Crises overlap, blend into one another, and reinforce each other. And every conflict has the potential to have global effects. This can be seen, for example, with North Korea, which is supporting Russia in the war against Ukraine with soldiers and weapons. Resources flow back—not only financial, but military expertise and, above all, weapons components, including those for carrier rockets that can be equipped with nuclear warheads. Thousands of North Korean soldiers are fighting against Ukraine—and dying for Russia.

“We must view all the seemingly separate crises and theaters of war in the world as a whole.”

The losses are immense, but this way North Korean soldiers gain combat experience. Their baptism of fire against Ukraine increases the combat effectiveness of all North Korean armed forces. What is already clear: this destabilization through such interactions is occurring not only in Europe but also in East Asia. These complex interconnections make it clear: we must view all these seemingly separate crises and theaters of war around the world holistically, from a 360-degree perspective. We must recognize and discuss dependencies, interactions, and connections at all levels of action. In military terms: we have to consolidate the strategic situation, draw the necessary conclusions—at the speed required. And right now, that speed is very high. We are at the threshold of a new world order. In this period of upheaval, the West—and we—bear the responsibility to defend our liberal values with resolve. If we do not engage, we risk becoming the plaything of autocrats. This is not only a moral duty, but a fundamental realpolitik self-interest.

A world in which the rule of law is replaced by the law of the strong is something we cannot and must not accept. And in terms of global challenges, the world is shrinking: crises, and possible solutions, are moving closer together. This challenges us as never before. And it won’t get easier. That is why readiness is today not only our own currency, but that of the entire NATO. For more than 30 years, we have lived in peace in Europe. That is over, and it is hard to get used to. But we have no choice. Credible deterrence is our “best-case scenario.” At the NATO Summit in The Hague in June 2025, all 32 Allies agreed on how and with what military means they will position themselves in the future. They set out, in binding terms, who will take responsibility in which areas.

After the United States, Germany provides the second-largest so-called capability package. We are on the way to becoming the engine of European defense. This means, for example, that we will establish new combat troop units, broaden our industrial base, and strengthen multinational cooperation. Ultimately, it also means that in the future we will spend 3.5 percent of GDP on defense and 1.5 percent on military infrastructure. With the help of the special fund, we have already set many things in motion: we have ordered tanks, ships, aircraft, drones. We expect key deliveries this and next year; unfortunately, armaments are not available off the shelf like at the hardware store around the corner. With the constitutional amendment that exempts defense spending above 1 percent of GDP from the debt brake, we have made another major step to cope with the expanded range of orders.

We have put security first. We now no longer have a time-limited special fund, but an uncapped budget. Uncapped, however, does not mean unlimited. More than ever before, we must justify every cent to the parliament. We can do that. And we will do so. We have already prioritized which capabilities the Bundeswehr needs most urgently. These include systems for air defense, as well as ammunition and means for electronic warfare, among others. It is important that not only the Bundeswehr now has planning certainty, but also industry and startups that must first ramp up their capacities. Equally important is looking well beyond 2029 at the future of warfare. That is why we must think and plan in at least two categories: In the short term, until 2029, the priority is readiness. In the long term, far beyond 2029, it is anticipation, flexibility, and keeping pace with disruptive developments.

Because we now have new technological possibilities that are changing the established paths of technology development and military strategy. In the past, the military was the driver of technological development—today, it is the reverse: technological progress generates strategic challenges. Long term, this will also influence the development of our doctrine and lead us to rethink war—even down to the battlefield. The innovation cycle for drones in Ukraine, for example, is about two weeks. We need to be similarly agile in peacetime—even without war dictating it. Threats on the battlefield force armed forces to constant adaptation. Therefore, we must also become more flexible, agile, and consequently faster in procurement. Wherever necessary, we must also break new ground. We must ask: Where are we not looking today—what do we not yet know, what can we not yet grasp?

But also: How do we ensure the Bundeswehr becomes both a driver of technology and can quickly and reliably incorporate new technologies? There are cooperation opportunities, for example, in the digitization and flexibilization of defense systems through software-based control, in Software Defined Defence. The use of artificial intelligence to analyze data or to support military decision-making is another field where armed forces depend on research and development in business and industry. Therefore, there must be close coordination between business and military strategy development.

“The responsibility for our security and freedom cannot rest solely on uniformed shoulders. It is a task for society as a whole.”

Clearly, the current threat situation can only be met with a comprehensive societal effort, with united forces—state and private. The armed forces are only as strong as the defense industry that stands behind them. It is not only about the ability to innovate, but also about the willingness to take risks—for a higher good.

Soldiers are trained to take risks. They must be able to fight and win. Because they have to win. This does not only apply to soldiers. NATO currently has around 500,000 men and women in high readiness. But for me it is equally clear: responsibility for our security and freedom cannot rest solely on uniformed shoulders. It is a task for society as a whole. Only together can we defend our country; only together can we deter. We must think and act holistically, even now in peacetime. We must become more closely and strongly interlinked. That lays the foundation for resilience. A combat-ready Bundeswehr is only one side of the coin. On the other side, we need equally resilient civil structures—in other words: a society capable of defense.

Both together create the prerequisites for credible deterrence. We soldiers may be the ones who win battles—but modern wars must be confronted by and with a society. The economy plays a major part. The better and faster we can equip our armed forces, the better we will be able to deter. And we must deter. The more credible our deterrence, the greater our chances of protecting the freedom so dear to us. The better our prospects of living in the future as we do now—and of preventing war in Europe. We will only succeed with this effort together—carried by the certainty that a life in freedom and security is worth it.

About the author: Carsten Breuer is a general in the German Army and, since March 17, 2023, the 17th Inspector General of the German Armed Forces.

[Disclaimer: This text was originally written in German. The English translation was produced with the help of AI.]

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Reckoning With a Restless World: Populism, Power, and the U.S.–German Alliance

Pia Kauer — Wed, 26 Nov 2025 11:18:38 +0000

The fourth New Bridge Program Alumni Conference brought together fifty U.S. and German young professionals in New Orleans from November 6 to 8. In this essay, our reporting team analyzes the development of the U.S.–German relationship through the lens of the conference’s insights.

The New Bridge Program Alumni Conference in New Orleans opened with a panel conversation on US-German relations between Christopher Fettweis, Professor of Political Science at Tulane University and Markus Hatzelmann, Deputy Consul General for Germany in Houston.

The conversations that emerged from this panel crystallized a broader reality: the transatlantic relationship finds itself in an era of profound uncertainty, shaped not only by external threats but by internal pressures that challenge the self-image of both Germany and the United States as “leaders of the free world.” Beneath the surface of diplomatic continuity lies an unresolved question—whether today’s sense of crisis is a fleeting disruption or a structural reordering of global power that the West was never ideologically or strategically prepared for.

The claim that we live in a golden age of peace and security with current conflicts merely representing the last shot of the first cold war, glosses over the fundamental shift in great power competition. As noted by legal theorist Mary Dudziak, the nature of modern conflict challenges the traditional measurement of “wartime” versus “peacetime” (War Time: An Idea, its History, its Consequences).

“Soft power alone cannot anchor European security.”

The German realization that soft power alone cannot anchor European security marks a historic shift: Berlin’s renewed military investment reflects not just Russia’s aggression, but the broader foreign-policy recalibration of a U.S. increasingly preoccupied with domestic affordability, inequality, and strains on its own democratic institutions. American soft power, long buoyed by the mythology of the “American Dream,” has become entangled with political polarization and public skepticism toward global engagement. Especially as Trump sends National Guard troops in U.S. cities to symbolize his own power and keep unwelcome opinions at bay (The New York Times 2025).

[related]These domestic currents influence the transatlantic equilibrium as much as external pressures from Moscow, Beijing, and non-state cyber actors. Ultimately, the future health of the transatlantic relationship depends less on historical sentiment and more on a clear, shared commitment to meet contemporary security challenges with commensurate resources and resolve. If the European pillar, led by Germany, fails to demonstrate equal rigor in the face of digital and analog warfare, and the U.S. continues to turn inward, the “up and down” cycle we’ve gotten used to in US-German relations risks becoming a permanent divergence.

Populism as a Stress Test, Not a Sideshow

The rise of populist movements on both sides of the Atlantic, the MAGA movement in the U.S. and the AfD in Germany, should be understood less as aberrations and more as stress tests of each country’s democratic architecture. They reflect a renegotiation of the social contract amid demographic, economic, and generational change. Populism reframes public grievances as existential threats, blurring the lines between legitimate critique and institutional delegitimization. Yet, history suggests that democratic societies tend to experience such periods as oscillations rather than endpoints. What matters is the resiliency of the institutions being tested—and here, both the U.S. and Germany possess deeper democratic guardrails than their current politics might suggest.

Still, the geopolitical implications of these internal dynamics are significant. A West struggling with its own coherence cannot project a unified model of freedom or prosperity. Nor can it rely on assumptions that shaped the post–Cold War world: that economic integration guarantees peace, that information technology inherently empowers democratic movements, or that military conflict remains confined to visible battlefields. In New Orleans, participants underscored how cyberwarfare, disinformation, and drone-based conflict have dissolved the line between war and peace—forcing both countries to rethink how power is understood, exercised, and defended.

At the Whitney Plantation

The New Alumni Council:

Local Realities as Geopolitical Mirrors

New Orleans itself, with its history of resilience, its climate vulnerability, its racial inequities, and its cultural depth, served as a grounding lens for these global questions. The city’s local challenges mirror many of the systemic tensions defining the transatlantic debate: who bears the burden of “resilience,” what inequities erode public trust, how climate injustice reshapes political identity, and how communities respond when institutions fail to protect them. Ignoring these local dynamics—whether in Louisiana or in Saxony—means misunderstanding the forces reshaping global politics. Domestic and geopolitical stability are now inseparable.

The conversations in New Orleans did not offer certainty, but they did point to an emerging hypothesis: that despite the pressures of populism, shifting power structures, and redefined security threats, the U.S.–German relationship is unlikely to fracture. Instead, it is being recalibrated—toward a more realistic, adaptive, and interdependent partnership.

Historical Reckoning as Democratic Infrastructure

This recalibration cannot be understood without acknowledging the pasts each nation struggles to fully confront. The visit to the Whitney Plantation brought into sharp relief how historical memory, or its absence, shapes democratic capacity. Many Americans learn little about the history of slavery in their own country, revealing a national reluctance to face the violence foundational to its development. Germany’s postwar approach—imperfect yet deliberate in its public reckoning—stands in contrast to the U.S., where slavery’s legacy continues to be unevenly taught, contested, and politicized.

“The reinvention of the West is inevitable.”

This divergence is more than academic. Nations that avoid continued and honest self-examination weaken the moral imagination required to sustain democratic resilience—fueling the same populist pressures that challenge both countries today. And yet, the dialogues in New Orleans demonstrated that a more transparent transatlantic partnership is possible. A relationship rooted in truth, rather than selective memory, can better navigate shifting power dynamics and rising internal fractures.

A Vision Forward

The “end of the West” is not inevitable. But the reinvention of the West is. Strengthening the U.S.–German alliance in this era of instability will require clarity, humility, and a shared commitment to historical truth as democratic infrastructure. What emerged in New Orleans is a blueprint for such renewal: a partnership anchored in realism, informed by local realities, and strengthened through collective courage to confront the past in order to imagine a more stable and just future.

This report was written by New Bridge Alumni Omaima Afzaal, Janhvi Bhojwani, Mayra Cedanor, Maggie Salas Crespo, Mario Futh, Alyssa Lukpat, Chase Phillips, Khadidah Stone, Eddie Taveras and Samantha Williams.

The New Bridge Program is supported by the Transatlantic Program of the Federal Republic of Germany, funded by the European Recovery Program (ERP) of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWE), and by the Joachim Herz Foundation.

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„Trump may be a charlatan, but the people who voted for him are not.“

Pia Kauer — Tue, 25 Nov 2025 15:14:57 +0000

Julia Friedlander, CEO of Atlantik-Brücke, spoke on the topic of “Multipolarization, the West, and the Future of Transatlantic Relations” on the occasion of the third Crister S. Garret memorial lecture by the German American Institute of Saxony (DAI Sachsen). Read her full speech here.

Good evening. I am grateful to the University of Leipzig and the German American Institute of Saxony for extending me this generous invitation to speak with you this evening. It is in the spirit of a talented American professor who made his home here at this university, that I am honored to speak as an American whose professional life has also taken her to Germany, and as the first American CEO of the Atlantik-Brücke. Thank you to Sana Garrett for her heartfelt words about her father and his legacy in the transatlantic world, and to Jodi Breisler, the new Consul General from the US State Department here in Leipzig.

Let me start with a few words about my organization, which is over seventy years old. After the war, several Jewish refugees in New York returned home with the conviction that deep professional bonds with the United States were essential to establishing post-war West Germany as a democracy. One could argue there wasn’t much of an option, the US and its allies were occupying powers just as the Soviet Union was where we’re speaking today. Germany lay in ruins, and the only way back to growth and prosperity was to tie itself as closely to that occupying power. Yet our founders turned the circumstances of the American occupation into a strategic advantage. They were instrumental in convincing the Truman Administration to grant West Germany the Marshall Plan and to admit the new federal republic to NATO just a few years later.

“Protecting an institution means being willing to reform it.”

Since then, we have developed into Germany’s deepest professional network, with over a hundred events annually across Germany, the US and Canada, and increasingly throughout Europe. We also run four exchange programs for young professionals. The major changes underway in Germany, the United States, and globally are a focal point for our work and I am proud to say that our organization is booming. The fact that this network is a transatlantic one, is itself a product of West German history of the postwar period.

When you run a historical institution, you have to think back to the principles of its founding on a daily basis. What made your organization important then, how did it make its mark? But you also have to free yourself from the confines of its history. What makes an institution useful and powerful in one decade doesn’t necessarily translate in the decades that follow. Protecting an institution means being willing to reform it. That goes for all instructions, no matter how big and powerful.

A Small Economic Soapbox

Let’s stick with 1945 for a moment. It’s worth taking a few seconds to consider what the world looked like eighty years ago. The United States accounted for approximately half of global GDP. One quarter of the global population lived under British rule. A further twelve percent under the French. Global literacy rates hovered around 35%. There was no Israel. Dubai was just a pile of sand.

What’s the first thing that strikes you as I read down these facts? At the end of World War II, the world was still a Western world. Europe and America, and especially America, were able to craft a new global order and feel comfortable that the new institutions they created would remain fixtures of their own image. And that’s exactly what happened. We built the UN, which welcomed every country in the world, but it would be based in New York, and the permanent members of the security council would be the power brokers of that time: the US, France, UK, Russia, and China. The US would agree to pay by far the largest share of the UN, plus the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The lending institutions would be headquartered in Washington and issue credit according to Western standards, according to Western timelines, and in Western currencies. Generally speaking, we would be able to determine which projects deserved lending and which ones didn’t. It was multilateralism, but the kind where some voices simply count more than others. We were naïve to think it would remain that way.

“Western powers thought by granting China access to international privileges, it would follow directions. Boy were they wrong.”

How many of you are taking economics classes? One of the first things you learn about classical trade policy is Adam Smith and Ricardo. What do those guys say? That the opening of international markets and removal of trade barriers will bring an overall increase—and convergence—in public welfare, guided by market specialization and comparative advantage. It’s the trade bible. But our grandparents’ and parents’ generations failed to internalize that countries participating in this expanded global market would gain influence and clout over time. I suppose if you are standing in the shoes of postwar leadership, it’s not that hard to imagine being blinded by the overwhelming power of the United States and its allies. Even decades later, when China was admitted to the World Trade Organization, this kind of hubris still abounded. Western powers thought by granting China access to international privileges, it would follow directions. Boy were they wrong.

Today, the US is still the largest economy by far, but with a quarter, not half, of global GDP. The British and French empires have been gone for half a century. Global literacy is at 87%. And both Israel and Dubai certainly exist. When we talk about global power brokers, the list is a lot longer than the founders of the postwar institutions envisioned, and that weakens the inherent advantage of Western countries. They have started setting their own conditions.

New Kids on the Block

One of the most influential power brokers right now is another pinprick on the map: Qatar. In the long history of empire and geographic conquest, this one doesn’t fit the program. Enriched by oil and offshore gas, this tiny nation has positioned itself as mediator of the Israel-Hamas war. It has purchased shares of Western industries, entire stadiums and sports teams. It’s a tiny place, but it’s everywhere. Neighbor Saudia Arabia has rehabilitated its international reputation just a few years after facing sanctions for its brutal murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Just yesterday, the government gained concessions from the White House on major weapons sales that Washington had long opposed. The government is pouring itself wealth into a modernization of the state, drawing an astounding amount of global attention. Have any of you heard of “Neom,” the supposed futuristic 170 kilometer city-in-a-line that they are building in the desert? If that sounds like science fiction to you, then the effect is working. The more the buildings look like UFOs, the better.

[related]What about Asia? Japan used to be the only real rival to Western economies. The rise of Japanese vehicles in the 1980s was in fact what turned Donald Trump into a “tariff man” and convinced him that other countries were using open trade to suck up America’s wealth, a sentiment common today across the political spectrum. But now Japan is an old power like Germany, and growing economies Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia dominate supply chains and your product labels, take a look. And by that I don’t just mean your t-shirt, I mean your car and your iPhone. And if Taiwan stops producing microchips, the world will ground to a halt.

The meteoric rise of China was the biggest blessing to Germany in the aftermath the eurozone crisis ten years ago. If it weren’t for the so-called BRICS countries, as we called them then, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—who were growing rapidly and hungry for European products, then the stasis currently facing the Germany economy would have come to roost much sooner. But European producers thought they was just so good at making things that China could remain the factory floor for their own production. They didn’t foresee, and then they learned to actively ignore that Beijing would steal intellectual property, acquire companies to copy their patents. And, setting aside any specific malign intent, they might simply outcompete and make better products at a fraction of the cost.

So how about that Western world? It looks a hell of a lot more complicated.

Reboot, Reload

For younger generations, institutions like NATO and the European Union are self-explanatory, they are thing things that we read about in school and university, their founding is described like the Roman Empire, as if they have existed just as long as the Coliseum. They are fixtures in our lives. Institutions tend to build big imposing buildings to emphasize their permanence and their power. But the truth is, they all started out as somebody’s bright idea. NATO started with ten members, now it has thirty-two, and is the greatest military alliance in history. The EU started as an ad-hoc arrangement between France and Germany to regulate coal and steel production. Now, I don’t have to tell any of you, it has evolved into the greatest supranational organization in history.

The best institutions change over time, they adapt to new circumstances. If they don’t, they risk becoming empty shells and eventually losing legitimacy altogether. This is a real risk for what European leadership, and up until recently, US leadership liked to refer to as the “rules-based international order.” If the UN doesn’t amend the structures of the security council to reflect the wide field of geopolitical voices, then other formats of international negotiation will emerge. Right now, in fact, the negotiations on the margins of United Nations meetings are much more important than what happens in the plenary itself. Who will make room for Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation? Or Brazil, the powerhouse of Latin America? Those countries will look elsewhere, and who will blame them for it?

The WTO has lost tremendous influence over the management of global trade because its rules are no longer equipped for the economy it meant to serve. After all, there was no digital trade when it was founded, nor did the world’s second largest economy, China, so blatantly ignore so many of its principles. The WTO still exists in Geneva, it maintains a big staff and ambassadors, but global trade rules are being renegotiated by ad hoc arrangements between new constellations of countries. Many of these countries are no longer looking to send as many products around the world as quickly as possible at the lowest price. They are prioritizing security of supply and linking trade to national security. The United States, long discouraged by the framework it itself created in the 1980s, is seeking a new set of global rules, creating trade policy on a roller coaster: up and down and around, until every gets dizzy.

What comes next?

My grandmother used to tell me often, nothing in life is self-evident. She was referring to the unexpected turns in her own life, but she also talked a lot about politics. Many of the things you grew up with can change quickly. On the personal level, that could mean a death in the family, the loss of a job. But on a macroeconomic level, on a geopolitical level, it means that societal constants are not constants at all, and that we need to be ready for change. Because Germany is so exposed to the world economy, the multipolar shifts I’ve just described have a direct impact on how much money this university has to provide your education, not to mention the job you apply for when you’re done.

How are our politicians so far handling these multipolar shifts happening around us? It’s a mixed report card. No politician delights in delivering bitter pills to the electorate—it’s not an easy way to win an election by admitting the need to cut social services, raise taxes, or make economic reforms that will create losers in industry and the workforce. Most try to muddle through and mitigate losses on all sides, which is understandable. When you’re at the decision table that probably seems like sensible governance. But voters are not stupid—they can smell uncertainty and see bandages placed over big problems—and that’s when we come to a breaking point.

“It’s ok to demand a little revolution..”

Frustrated with the broken promises of traditional leadership of both parties in the United States, voters went for Donald Trump–twice. To be clear, Trump may be a charlatan, but the people who voted for him are not. Here in Germany, I struggle to see a concrete offering from the AfD, the “alternative” seems like a destructive force built on the amplification of prejudice, with nothing behind it. AfD voters, I fear, are buying a false set of promises, just like in America.

To be clear, it’s not wrong to question how governments function or whether politicians are in touch with the interests of voters or lost in their own internal logic; it’s not wrong to question how the private sector functions and whether employment opportunities are as good as they should be; it’s not wrong to question if you think big tech is a good thing or a bad thing, if you think journalists are doing their job or becoming click-baiters, and my current favorite: it’s not wrong to question whether artificial intelligence is making you smarter or more stupid.

Why are centrist political forces losing steam? For one thing, politicians are now answerable to us on an hourly basis. Social media has democratized reporting and made everybody a legitimate public critic—you, me, the guy on the corner, everyone. The Bundestag has a glass dome to signal that you can look down inside it and see what your government is doing. But the architects never envisioned Instagram as a new form of transparency. More than ever, it’s clear that politicians are no titans, they’re just people.

And if politicians are not titans, then I wish they has the self-confidence to say: look, we have to decide between two bad options, a and b. This is where we stand, this is the problem we have to solve, and this is why we are choosing a, and not b. Instead, they often pretend that their chosen path was self-evident from the beginning. In this age of new transparency, everyone knows that’s not true. That makes them seem disconnected from reality, to the benefit of the political extremes.

Institutions need honesty. And institutions need reform. As I’ve learned in over a decade in public service and now in Berlin running a historical institution, it’s ok to demand a little revolution. Let me leave you with a few mantras that I say to myself whenever I feel challenged, especially challenged by the current political environment.

If someone rejects your idea because “we’ve always done it this way,” challenge that person. You may end up being wrong. But more likely, you will end up with a compromise.

Show up where you are not expected. The best conversations I have had are with people I know don’t agree with me, who are outside my bubble. Not everyone is who you think they are. Picture somewhere where you don’t feel in your element. Go there, sit down, and talk to whoever is next to you. You may end up with a beer in your hand.

The louder someone yells, the weaker the argument is. People don’t yell if they can get their point across without yelling, and intimidation is a form of weakness. If someone yells at you, keep your voice steady. If you can avoid escalation, you’ve already won.

Be the person who explains the difference between a and b. Don’t be a slave to your algorithm, you won’t hurt its feelings. Simple explanations for big problems are almost always not the whole story.

Be resourceful. The current moment demands ingenuity, and it’s unlikely the opportunities in life will appear twice. We lead lives of great privilege, in a democratic society. All of the big issues we’re talking about today are not cause for desperation or a blame game—that’s the cheap route. They demand persistence and creativity. And I hope we’ll all do our part. Thank you for your attention today, and I look forward to any questions.

Der Beitrag „Trump may be a charlatan, but the people who voted for him are not.“ erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Move the world towards freedom

b.wild — Wed, 12 Nov 2025 12:37:13 +0000

At the Brandenburg Gate, President Reagan’s 1987 call to “tear down this wall” captured the universal aspiration for freedom. While the physical wall that once divided Berlin has long vanished, a metaphorical one now divides the world between freedom and autocracy. Around the world, Berlin and the United States continue to stand as symbols of freedom, uniting people in their struggle against oppression. In honour of this shared commitment, the Atlantik-Brücke brought together leading global voices of freedom, as well as representatives from the US and the city of Berlin, at the Berlin Freedom Week on 11 November 2025. Together, they reflected on the past and explored the meaning of liberty today.

We were delighted to welcome the following speakers:

Rushan Abbas, Uyghur American activist and Chairwoman, Campaign for the Uyghurs
Masih Alinejad, Iranian women’s rights activist and President & Co-Founder, World Liberty Congress
Leopoldo Lopez, Venezuelan opposition leader and Secretary General & Co-Founder, World Liberty Congress
Daniel Rothschild, Director of the Center for Civics, Education, and Opportunity, Ronald Reagan Institute
Florian Hauer, State Secretary for Federal, European and International Affairs, Senate Chancellery of Berlin

Read Daniel Rothschild’s keynote speech here:

Three months after Natan Sharansky was freed from the gulag in 1986, he paid a visit to President Reagan at the White House. The president had long advocated with the Soviet leadership for the release of Sharansky, as well as other refuseniks and religious minorities held captive within the Soviet Union. Somewhat to President Reagan’s surprise, he learned that Sharansky and other dissidents in Soviet prisons knew in real time about his 1983 speech where he called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” and “the focus of evil in the modern world.” Soviet news agencies reported on the speech in a way designed to inflame public tensions against the United States and rally public opinion to the side of the regime. A jailer gave Sharansky a copy of the edition of Pravda with the coverage on the front page. It had the opposite of the intended effect.

[related] “By tapping on walls and talking through toilets,” Sharansky later recalled, “Word of Reagan’s ‘provocation’ quickly spread throughout the prison. We dissidents were ecstatic. Finally, the leader of the free world had spoken the truth.” Reagan was thrilled to learn this. The evening of their meeting, he wrote in his diary: “Met with Anatoly Sharansky. It was fascinating to hear the story of his imprisonment by the Soviets. “I learned that I’m a hero in the Soviet Gulag. The prisoners read the attacks on me in TASS and Pravda and learn what I’m saying about the Soviets and they like me.” President Reagan knew that words mattered. He knew that presidential rhetoric mattered. He knew that moral clarity mattered. He knew that what a president says—or does not say—doesn’t just move markets: It could move the world to freedom.

Another president, Theodore Roosevelt, famously referred to the presidency as a “bully pulpit,” a venue to use rhetoric to advance an agenda and a view of the world. President Reagan knew that the power of the presidency, especially in the age of mass media and global telecommunications, was not merely found in the powers granted the office by the U.S. Constitution. And so he used that power, that bully pulpit, to advance the cause of freedom around the globe. It was that moral clarity that led to the Brandenburg Gate speech, and what historian William Inboden calls “the most famous four words of the Cold War.”

In writing that address, the speechwriting personnel in the White House and the leadership at the State Department came to an impasse: the diplomats wanted a reserved message, and the speechwriters wanted a broadside against the Soviets. Diplomats dismissed early drafts as “sentimental fluff” with too much “good-guys versus bad-guys.” Drafts flew back and forth up until shortly before the president left for Berlin. President Reagan settled the dispute by telling his team, “That passage about tearing down the wall. That’s what I want to say to the people on the other side.”

The President knew how this message would land. In the car on the way to the Brandenburg Gate, he told his deputy chief of staff, “The boys at State are going to kill me. But it’s the right thing to do.” President Reagan knew his audience wasn’t just the crowd assembled to hear him speak. He had been told that the speech would be broadcast and, depending on if weather conditions were favorable to signal propagation, might be heard as far east as Moscow.

“Tear down this wall” was more than a mere rhetorical flourish. It was a statement of American policy: that America would not seek peace with totalitarianism, America would seek its end.

Reagan knew from Sharansky that his speeches were heard in the gulags. And he knew that he would be speaking not just to those in front of the wall, but those behind it in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and even the USSR itself. “Tear down this wall” was more than a mere rhetorical flourish. It was a statement of American policy: that America would not seek peace with totalitarianism, America would seek its end. Within three years, the wall that President Reagan called “as ugly as the idea behind it” had been torn down.

Today, Western societies, including the United States, are beset with a new moral relativism that denies the universalism of human freedom. This view, long associated primarily with the politics of the left, today infects parties and people of both the left and the right. Unfortunately, too many so-called leaders treat relativism as a sophisticated position, or suggest that certainty about moral claims implies certitude about strategic or tactical considerations. They imply, or even directly claim, that moral clarity implies strategic naiveté. When presented with political imprisonment, hostage taking, and ethnic or gender repression, they equivocate.

President Reagan shows that one can have a strong moral compass—a clear sense of right and wrong—but not deny the shades of gray in the world. Throughout his presidency, he faced many questions where there was significant moral and strategic nuance. But he never lost sight of the fact of good and evil in the world—and he never lost the ability to call out the latter for what it was.

Let me close on a note of optimism. As President Reagan predicted in his 1982 address to the British Parliament, Marxism-Leninism today lies “on the ash-heap of history” along with other “tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people.” And as these totalitarian “isms” have fallen one by one, there have been no new all-encompassing competing worldviews to take their place. Most of today’s “new bad ideas” are in fact “old bad ideas.”

Call evil by its name, support dissidents, and speak so the imprisoned can hear.

Communism, Nazism, fascism, and religious totalitarianism still have their redoubts—and if we are honest, they are growing in size. But a quarter of the way into the twenty-first century, there have been no new grand ideological innovations with the power to intoxicate. Our charge is to reclaim the moral high ground for freedom—and to use it: call evil by its name, support dissidents, and speak so the imprisoned can hear.

As Peter Robinson, the author of those famous four words, noted in his back-and-forth with the State Department, it was not enough for the president to say, “One day, this ugly wall will disappear.” The Berlin Wall wouldn’t just fall on its own. It had to be torn down. It was. And it was helped in that process by an American president willing to say to his Soviet counterpart, “Öffnen Sie dieses Tor! Reißen Sie diese Mauer nieder!”

For a glimpse into the event, watch Leopoldo López impassioned speech:

Der Beitrag Move the world towards freedom erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“Hard power, alone, is never going to be the path to peace”

b.wild — Mon, 03 Nov 2025 10:07:07 +0000

In this interview Lieutenant General (ret.) Ben Hodges and political scientist Dr. David Ranan discuss the battlefields of Ukraine and the complexities of the Middle East. They illuminate why Europe must redefine its global role, confront uncomfortable contradictions, and navigate the limits of American leadership.

The weakening of Hezbollah, successful strikes in Lebanon and Iran, and Israel’s military dominance in Gaza have all contributed to Hamas’ eventual acceptance of Trump’s peace plan. Meanwhile, after decades of attempts to integrate Putin’s Russia into the international community of values, the mainstream consensus has shifted toward supplying Ukraine with advanced weapons, rearming its European allies, and imposing new sanctions. Is hard power becoming the new path to peace?

Ben Hodges: I’m not sure that Hamas has accepted President Trump’s peace plan. They have agreed to release hostages and are working to return the remains of those hostages who were killed or died in captivity. There is still a lot of fighting so we can’t yet say that there is even a full ceasefire which I think will be a prerequisite for any lasting peace. But the point of your question is valid.

Hard power, alone, is never going to be the path to peace. But hard power, or the threat of employing it, is an essential component of achieving and protecting peace, when properly balanced with diplomatic, economic, and informational power. Achieving peace in Ukraine starts with #1 a diplomatic effort resulting in a unified effort by the West, hopefully with the US included, acknowledging that Russia is the aggressor and recognizing that it is in the strategic interest of the West that Ukraine successfully defends its sovereignty, forcing Russia to live within its own borders. #2 is the employment of the full weight of the economic power of the West, including sanctions, without loopholes and which are fully enforced, which will actually change Kremlin behavior. It also includes the use of frozen Russian assets as proposed by the European Commission to help pay for Ukraine’s defense and reconstruction. And it includes the disruption of Russia’s shadow fleet vessels which are transporting Russian oil to China and India. #3 is the provision of all the weapons and ammunition and capabilities, without restrictions, that Ukraine needs to successfully defend its sovereignty, including Taurus and Tomahawks.

David Ranan: Europe is emerging from an era of hopeful belief in peaceful diplomacy and must now confront a new reality, with its own demands and shifting priorities. Hard power – once protected under a U.S. security umbrella that can no longer be fully relied – has, at least under the current U.S. administration, become Europe’s own responsibility. Still, the notion that hard power could serve as “the new path to peace” seems overly optimistic. Let us not forget that the Cold War, for all its tensions, nevertheless managed to preserve peace.

Neither the recognition of Palestine by several European countries nor Chancellor Merz’s show of solidarity with Israel seems to have influenced the course of the Middle East war—credit for the Israel-Hamas deal largely goes to Donald Trump. And while Europe remains a key donor to Ukraine, the country still relies heavily on U.S. weapons, with Trump sidelining it in his decisions. With all eyes on Washington, is Europe still seen as a significant player in the U.S. and the Middle East?

Hodges: I don’t agree that there is an Israel-Hamas deal yet…only the return/exchange of the hostages and Palestinian detainees. For there to be a lasting peace in the region, the nations of the Middle East, Türkiye, and Europe will have to be a part of the comprehensive effort.

Europe is only sidelined because it has allowed itself to be sidelined. A more forceful policy that uses all the elements of national and coalition power, to include sanctions and provision of security forces, will give Europe a ‘seat at the table’. Germany in particular must lead by example….defending principles of democracy and human rights while balancing its sense of historical responsibility. Use clear language and be consistent in actions. It cannot assume that the US, under this Administration, will take care of everything.

I do agree that the Trump Administration has done much to help bring the region to where it is now, particularly with the work it did during the first Trump Administration. But it’s going to take more to achieve the goal of a lasting peace and that means a two state solution. Europe can play a key role here.

Ranan: As Russia’s aggression intensifies, Europe concerned for its own security – has a clear self-interest in strengthening its defenses and supporting Ukraine. This is not only about helping Ukraine resist Russia but also about sending a strong message to President Putin. That is the essence of its significance. The Middle East, however, presents a far more complex challenge. Europe has long supported Israel – a stance Germany has particularly championed – but this creates a somewhat paradoxical situation, raising fundamental questions of principle: how can Europe back both Israel, an occupying power, and Ukraine, a nation defending itself against Russian aggression? If Europe were guided strictly by international law, it would instead support Palestinians resisting Israeli occupation since 1967. With Israel effectively a client state of the United States, Europe remains a secondary player in the region. Yet by moving beyond Germany’s rigidly pro-Israel position, Europe could potentially gain meaningful influence and play a more constructive role in Middle Eastern affairs.

Russia’s war on Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East are currently dominating the headlines. In your view, which other conflict or crisis is receiving too little attention?

Hodges: The US government is shifting its military priority away from Europe and apparently, possibly, the Indo-Pacific region and towards South America, especially Venezuela. I’m not against taking firm measures to stop the flow of drugs from Central and South America to the United States. Thousands of Americans every year die from Fentanyl. But Fentanyl is actually coming from Mexico, not Venezuela. So the strikes on so-called Venezuelan drug boats with the use of expensive Hellfire missiles are not actually addressing the Fentanyl problem. This is being done without Congressional oversight and without explanation of the necessity for the use of military force to the American public. This should receive much more scrutiny.

Ranan: The combined effects of war and climate change-induced famine in Sub-Saharan Africa are causing immense human suffering and staggering death tolls, including an appallingly high rate of infant mortality. This crisis is not only a profound humanitarian challenge for the Western world but also a matter of strategic self-interest for Europe. Ensuring that these countries – whose citizens understandably seek refuge in Europe – become safe and sustainable places to live is both a moral imperative and a practical necessity. While it may be challenging to convince China, Russia, and other global powers to act purely for Europe’s benefit, it should be entirely possible to forge an international pact grounded in humanitarian responsibility, uniting nations around the urgent need to save lives.

This interview took place after the event „David & Goliath: Debating War, Peace, and the Fragility of Global Order“ with Ben Hodges (on the left), Lieutenant General (ret.), U.S. Army; FBH Geostrat Consulting GmbH & Dr. David Ranan (on the right), Political Scientist & Author.

Der Beitrag “Hard power, alone, is never going to be the path to peace” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“At least a third of all armed conflicts end without any settlement“

Pia Kauer — Thu, 23 Oct 2025 12:46:15 +0000

On October 22, 2025, the most recent edition of our virtual event series “Better Be Prepared” took a look back at past conflict settlements and drew conclusions for the possible settlements for today’s conflicts.

We were happy to welcome two renowned political scientists, Prof. Dr. Nicole Deitelhoff, Professor of International Relations and Theories of Global Order at Goethe University Frankfurt and Executive Director & Head of Research Department at PRIF – Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, and Prof. Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School, to discuss the continuities between armed conflicts in the 20th and early 21st century and the wars in Ukraine and Gaza.

Watch the full webinar to gain insight into how a lack of reliable information in war zones can hinder successful peace processes, the relationship between European heads of state and Donald Trump regarding diplomacy, and why a change in leadership is often necessary to end a war.

Der Beitrag “At least a third of all armed conflicts end without any settlement“ erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Waiting for the Big Bang: Executing the European Defense Build-Up in Germany

r.fehrenbach — Mon, 29 Sep 2025 07:48:50 +0000

Two German Eurofighters fly over the German North Sea as part of a military exercise.

by Robin Fehrenbach, Jakob Flemming, and Julia Friedlander

Since Germany’s reunification, defense spending has been a taboo topic in the country. Russia’s war with Georgia and incursions into Ukraine in 2014 raised relatively few strategic concerns in Berlin, and it took until February 2022 to shake the system loose. From guns versus butter debates to the unwinding of spending orthodoxies and industrial transformations, the last several years have witnessed a small revolution in the national dialogue as well as in the broader economy. The country has begun building a military-industrial complex essentially from scratch and exploiting all means to finance it—including using the public purse, commercial banking, and private capital. Policymakers and industry leads must deliberate what will be financed nationally, in consortium or through European Union (EU) and NATO mechanisms. It is all new.

European institutions are also expanding their mandate. The European Commission appointed Lithuanian Andrius Kubilius as its first commissioner for defense in a bid to draw defense consolidation into the technocratic machine best known for streamlining trade and financial regulation across the bloc. In November 2024 at the Berlin Security Conference, then-Commissioner-Designate Kubilius called for a “Big Bang” approach in defense policy, which would entail “producing a clear Industry Output Plan, based on the analysis of capability gaps according to NATO evaluations and covered by European production of defence equipment where we have capability gaps, with a clear target date to fulfil this Plan around 2030.” [1]

The political will is there – and the private sector is ready to contribute

The June 2025 commitment of NATO Allies to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on security and defense until 2035 provides the new baseline and blueprint for European defense [2]: 3.5 percent is to be invested into weapon systems and ammunition, 1.5 percent into critical infrastructure. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte articulated this shift after pre-summit consultations with President Donald Trump, but he already had the facts to back up his assertions to the US president [3]. Just weeks earlier, Germany had upended its constitutional debt brake for security and defense investments and created the Sondervermögen for infrastructure.

After years of circuitous debate, the presumed new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, invoked the outgoing German Bundestag mandate to relax the debt brake [4]. The move ultimately gained support across the centrist political spectrum, ensuring that both state-driven and external financing mechanisms would be used to reach NATO pledges. The drastic increases in defense spending remain broadly in line with fiscal principles, requiring what some would call an accounting trick, and others a compromise. Defense investments are now exempt from the constitutional debt brake and can total up to 1 percent of GDP [5]. Anything beyond 1 percent of GDP for defense investments requires credits in special funds, usually referred to as Sondervermögen. While on-budget expenditures and investments in security and defense depend on the incoming tax revenues of the German economy, discretionary spending is effectively freed from these constraints, imposing no specific limit on such extra funding. Defense spending has gone from a crawl to a sprint, overnight.

It is a sea change that the government will now rely on private funding to uphold its national security obligations.

Government stimulus tends to trigger private sector interest, which is poised to play a crucial role in scaling up defense-related resources, increasingly billed as a reliable, growing, and even socially responsible investment sector. Commercial and investment banks as well as private equity and venture capital firms are rapidly developing products for both institutional and private clients, reflecting broader awareness among decision-makers from the public and private sectors that capital is needed to meet defense spending goals. As Deutsche Bank Chief Executive Officer Christian Sewing put it, “we need to efficiently combine public funds with private capital to finance expansion. Banks and investors are ready for this – for example, Deutsche Bank’s corresponding loan portfolio amounts to a mid-double-digit billion-euro amount.” [6]

Two recent high-level events that the Atlantik-Brücke hosted in Berlin brought together stakeholders from the military and private sector to discuss how private capital can fund the German defense build-up, sending a clear signal that private investors are ready to channel capital into Germany’s defense capabilities. It is a sea change that the government will now rely on private funding to uphold its national security obligations.

From incrementalism to joint European procurement

NATO’s 5 percent goal, and the financing behind it, is an aspirational figure without the hardware. Effective procurement is the ultimate test whether Germany and its partners can develop a modern defense capability. The strategic priorities for armament stem from the general planning processes in the alliance’s North Atlantic Council. These priorities range from modern tanks and air missile defense systems, such as the Patriot, to fighter jets, such as the F-35; unmanned drones; battleships; submarines; and the latest defense and intelligence satellites for space and cyber operations [7].

So far, the incremental procurements of military assets by individual NATO allies and EU member states are hardly the breakthrough the European defense architecture so desperately needs. European defense procurement does not take advantage of scaling effects in procurement and maintenance, and the various procured systems are not interoperable, artificially inflating operating costs [8].

For the time being, nation-states and private capital will provide the lion’s share of required funding, largely due to the direct economic impulse defense spending gives to national economies and their flagship contractors.

The problem has been long recognized by EU officials. Jiří Šedivý, chief executive of the European Defence Agency, noted in a briefing to the defense industry in February 2025 that “the European defence base remains fragmented” and that “it is only by cooperating more that Member States can strengthen the defence technological and industrial base, create economies of scale, and develop the defence capabilities our Member States need.” [9]

Based on this assessment, the EU created a program, SAFE (Security Action for Europe), to provide €150 billion in long-maturity loans for procurement efforts and fund projects based on common procurement [10]. SAFE projects should involve “at least one Member State benefitting from SAFE and another Member State, as well as Ukraine and EEA-EFTA [European Economic Area-European Free Trade Association] countries,” but will also temporarily fund individual member states’ procurement in acute security crises. It remains to be seen whether SAFE can fulfill Commissioner Kubilius’ big promise from September 2025 to “unify our fragmented defence procurement.” [11] For the time being, nation-states and private capital will provide the lion’s share of required funding, largely due to the direct economic impulse defense spending gives to national economies and their flagship contractors.

Through defense, Germany’s economy can change in shape and scope

Increased investment in military systems will impact the overall industrial and economic landscape in Germany. In addition to defense allocations, the Sondervermögen also includes €500 billion for infrastructure and climate protection [12]. It has not escaped the governing parties that the security crisis in Europe provides an opportunity to ignite a long-needed growth stimulus for the German economy. Germany remains the third-largest economy in the world, but is poised to record a third consecutive year of zero or negative growth. This year most likely will not bring the turnaround: In the second quarter of 2025, Germany’s economy decreased by 0.3 percentage points compared with the first quarter [13]. All major economic institutes in the country as well as the International Monetary Fund predict hardly any economic growth for Germany in 2025 [14].

Germany’s defense industry will also play a crucial role in building Ukraine’s deterrence capabilities.

Germany’s economy has developed formidable strengths in the automotive, machine engineering, and chemical industries over the past few decades, leading to its export-oriented position in the global economy. This has changed significantly, especially over the past five years, as global competitors have improved their research and development in all kinds of industrial sectors, their labor force skills, and their knowledge. More robust supply chains and much lower energy costs have also contributed to the successes of foreign economies, mostly in the Indo-Pacific region and in South America.

The stimulus of the defense sector lands at a decisive moment for Europe’s industrial powerhouse. In the near and midterm future, development and production in German defense industrial capacities will change the economic landscape and help maintain industrial output and employment levels. They could even ensure long-term economic growthgiven Germany’s extended NATO commitments [15], so long as the country focuses on defense technologies of the future (such as drones) as well as industrial stalwarts that can draw on current production capacities (such as tanks). Germany’s defense industry will also play a crucial role in building Ukraine’s deterrence capabilities—which European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen refers to as Europe’s “steel porcupine.” [16] This will provide opportunities for the defense industry beyond NATO’s borders.

From Zeitenwende to Kriegstüchtigkeit

[realted] NATO planning structures are responsible for analyzing allied readiness in Europe, the United States, and Canada in varied crisis scenarios, including if Russia were indeed able to attempt a full-scale attack on the alliance’s territory by 2029, as predicted by recent war games. Acknowledging that Germany is far from reaching this goal, Germany’s federal minister of defense, Boris Pistorius, has coined the term Kriegstüchtigkeit, or “war readiness,” for the Bundeswehr [17]. This is a sea change. As minister, he has spearheaded an about-face in the security identity of Germany, from enjoying the fruits of a peace dividend under the United States’ nuclear umbrella to becoming a European leader and transatlantic partner in security and territorial defense. Germany’s new role is even now visible on the streets. There are widespread advertisements for both drone-warfare technology and recruitment for the armed and intelligence services.

Although public attitudes are changing, we must continue to wait for the “Big Bang” at both the EU and German levels—and perhaps we need to come to terms with the idea that the outcomes produced by the EU always reflect the intricate balancing of diverse interests. Instead, the process will be arduous. However, first steps have been made, and we can learn from them to meet the urgency of the moment:

Private capital is waiting to be leveraged. Private capital will play an ever-increasing role in funding the capability to innovate and will assume some risk-taking propensity in new technologies. This paradigm shift has already occurred but too often lacks the mechanisms to effectively translate private assets into tangible capabilities.

Europe and Germany should seize this moment as an opportunity to avert deindustrialization. While demand can also stimulate production beyond Europe’s borders, it also presents Europe with the chance to boost its struggling industrial base into a defense industry of scale.

Joint European procurement is the goal, but not an end in itself. Despite NATO force posture requirements, there is still too little incentive to streamline the patchwork of European military structures. Defense procurement must become more flexible, faster, and more aligned among EU and NATO partners. However, absent a common debt mechanism, European security architecture will depend on national defense spending and defense contractors.

While Germany cannot straighten out these problems single-handedly, it can—and should—be the first mover. Ideally, the German armed forces will become a technology driver in a competitive European environment, capitalizing on defense research and development, start-up willpower, and effective exchange between public and private stakeholders. Military threats are unfortunately a central pillar of Europe’s geopolitics. Now, executing the European defense build-up is key to making the spirit of the Zeitenwende a new reality.

Check out our other policy briefs for the Transatlantic Forum on Geoeconomics:

„Points of Vulnerability in the Battery Cell Industry“ by Kai Müller, Chief Financial Officer at PowerCo SE. and Sören Pippart, Senior Expert for Public Affairs at PowerCo SE.

„The dollar in the fight for US primacy“ by Martin Mühleisen, former International Monetary Fund (IMF) official and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

“The Road to Turnberry” by Elizabeth Baltzan, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center.

„How to dismantle a reserve currency“ by Daniel McDowell, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

„The summer of AI action plans“ by Alisha Chhangani, assistant director at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center and Ananya Kuma, deputy director, Future of Money, at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center.

Sources

[1] Andrius Kubilius: Keynote Speech At The Berlin Security Conference. November 11, 2024. https://andriuskubilius.lt/en/keynote-speech-at-the-berlin-security-conference/

[2] North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Defence expenditures and NATO’s 5% commitment. 27. August 2025. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm

[3] Chris Lunday: NATO’s Rutte embraces 5 percent defense spending goal. In: Politico. May 26, 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/mark-rutte-embrace-5-percent-defense-goal-nato-summit/

[4] Deutscher Bundestag: Mehrheit für Reform der Schuldenbremse: 512 Abgeordnete stimmen mit Ja. 18. März 2025. https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2025/kw12-de-sondersitzung-1056916

[5] Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Grundgesetzänderung für Verteidigung und Sondervermögen. 28. März 2025. https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/hintergrund-aktuell/560839/grundgesetzaenderung-fuer-verteidigung-und-sondervermoegen/

[6] Christian Sewing: Private capital can strengthen Europe’s defence. April 28, 2025. https://www.db.com/news/detail/20250428-private-capital-can-strengthen-europe-s-defence?language_id=1 (Originally published in German in Handelsblatt on April 28, 2025.)

[7] Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: Kampfjet F-35: Beschaffung und Baumaßnahmen im Zeitplan. 25. Juni 2025. https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/kampfjet-f-35-beschaffung-baumassnahmen-im-zeitplan-5958376

[8] Luigi Scazzieri: Towards an EU ‚Defence Union‘? January 30, 2025. https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2025/towards-eu-defence-union

[9] European Economic and Social Committee: No more ‘national preference’: fragmentation is threat to security, EDA tells EESC forum. February 12, 2025. https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/news-media/news/no-more-national-preference-fragmentation-threat-security-eda-tells-eesc-forum

[10] European Commission: SAFE | Security Action for Europe. July 30, 2025. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/safe-security-action-europe_en

[11] European Commission: Remarks by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen and Commissioner Kubilius on the allocation of loan amounts to Member States under SAFE. September 9, 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/da/speech_25_2050

[12] Die Bundesregierung: Investitionsoffensive für das ganze Land. 24. Juni 2025. https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/sondervermoegen-2356240

[13] Statistisches Bundesamt: Gross domestic product: detailed economic performance results for the 2^ndquarter of 2025. 22. August 2025. https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2025/08/PE25_310_811.html

[14] International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook Update. July 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/07/29/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2025

[15] Moritz Schularick und Niall Ferguson: Schuldenbremse und Verteidigung: Den Schuss nicht gehört. In: Kiel Institut für Weltwirtschaft. Juli 2024. https://www.ifw-kiel.de/de/publikationen/kiel-focus/schuldenbremse-und-verteidigung-den-schuss-nicht-gehoert/

[16] European Commission: Doorstep by President von der Leyen at the leaders’ meeting on Ukraine in London. March 2, 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_653

[17] Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: Verteidigungsminister: “Wir müssen kriegstüchtig werden!” 10. November 2023. https://www.bmvg.de/de/mediathek/verteidigungsminister-wir-muessen-kriegstuechtig-werden-5701664

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“You have to concentrate on cyber today”

b.wild — Thu, 18 Sep 2025 12:31:38 +0000

At an event held by the Frankfurt regional group on September 16, 2025, General Christian Badia spoke on “New threats – new responses? The future of NATO in a constantly changing security environment.”

Following the event, he emphasized in a video interview with Atlantik-Brücke the need for increased defense spending – specifically 5% of GDP or 3.5% for military investments – in order to meet the requirements of modern warfare, especially in the areas of cyber and space, which will be central to the future. In the past, the focus was on land, air, and sea forces, Badia said, but today cyber and space operations are crucial for dominance, which is why significant financial resources are needed for holistic capability development.

Despite the differing national interests of the 32 NATO member states, Badia emphasizes the alliance’s shared values. He describes how consensus-based decision-making is based on the search for alternatives, so that a rejection (“no”) often leads to an “alternative yes.” Over his 41-year career, the security policy landscape has changed constantly – from the Cold War to German reunification and out-of-area operations to new threat scenarios. Nevertheless, the community of values of the “free Western alliance” has always remained capable of action.

Badia is optimistic that, despite tensions between national sovereignty and common alliance interests, actions will always be taken in the interests of the West and that NATO plus its 35 partners stand on a stable, value-based foundation.

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Europe’s unity is not an end in itself

Lea Berger — Mon, 25 Aug 2025 10:43:20 +0000

By Jakob Flemming

These and other questions, as well as Germany’s contribution to a capable Europe, were at the heart of the side session. The contributions of experts from four EU member states and the United States led to three key insights:

1. Europa is not united

The demand that Europe must “speak with one voice” in foreign and security policy, but also in (external) economic policy, is neither new nor particularly controversial in the political mainstream. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel was already using this phrase in 2019. Six years later, the formulation is probably even more common and is employed across the political spectrum, from EPP Chairman Manfred Weber to the Greens. Behind it lies the conviction that only a Europe acting in unity can wield geopolitical weight.

[related]Yet the reality is often quite different: Europe does not speak with one voice on many issues. Slovakia blocked new sanctions against Russia for weeks; on the question of security guarantees for Ukraine, not only Hungary and Slovakia break ranks; Spain refuses to commit to NATO’s 5% goal; Germany and Poland are at odds over border controls; and in Middle East policy, Europe is split into at least two camps. Across nearly all policy areas, one thing is clear: genuine unity looks different.

2. Europe does not unite through mere invocations.

Following this assessment, the question arises: how can Europe’s unity be achieved? One thing became clear during the side session: the constant repetition of incantations such as “Europe must now speak with one voice” or “Europe United” in response to “America First” will not bring about the desired outcome. The call to abolish the unanimity principle in favor of majority voting in the Common Security and Defense Policy may well be justified, but it is simply unrealistic.

Instead, participants voiced a desire for more leadership from the center of Europe, particularly from Germany. In the past, euphemisms such as “leading from the center” or “leading from behind” were often used. However, as one participant put it, what is truly needed is for Germany to lead plainly and directly from the front.

3. Informal alliances or “coalitions of the willing” are new options.

Yet even the best leadership cannot create unity where fundamental conflicts of interest prevent it. Therefore, unity must not be an end in itself if it comes at the cost of a diluted or entirely unclear position. Where possible, the alternatives are informal alliances or “coalitions of the willing.” In foreign and security policy in general, in Ukraine and Russia policy in particular, and also in trade policy, the message from the discussion was that informal coalitions of interest should form—capable of acting decisively and effectively.

An example of this emerged recently during the visit of European heads of state and government, together with Ukrainian President Zelensky, to the White House. From this meeting, a coalition could take shape that is prepared to guarantee Ukraine’s security after the end of the war. This path is the right one, because perhaps the most important insight of the GLOBSEC side session was this: an informal European alliance that acts decisively can be stronger than an ostensibly united but paralyzed Europe.

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“As long as we remain fragmented, we will always rely on Washington”

Pia Kauer — Wed, 16 Jul 2025 13:43:19 +0000

Within a shifting global landscape, foreign intelligence services are coming into sharper focus – not only as instruments of national security, but also as influential actors in international politics. Under the title „The Power of Intelligence: How Information Shapes Global Politics“ our Chairman and former vice chancellor Sigmar Gabriel and Sir Richard Dearlove, former Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service MI6, discussed this development with our Regional Chapter Hamburg. The event was hosted by Nagila Warburg and Max Warburg and moderated by Anahita Thoms.

In the following interview, Sigmar Gabriel discusses the development of intelligence services since the end of the Cold War, Europe’s dependence on US intelligence information, and greater resilience against cyber attacks.

How has the approach and influence of secret intelligence services changed since the end of the cold war?

After the Cold War, the role of intelligence services changed fundamentally. During the East-West conflict, it was mainly about military intelligence and strategic deterrence. Today, the threats are much more diverse — ranging from international terrorism to cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, and state-sponsored disinformation.

This has expanded the influence and scope of intelligence agencies significantly. But with that comes a real challenge for democracies: how to ensure proper oversight and accountability. Intelligence work must remain bound to the rule of law and democratic principles.

We also see that no single country can effectively respond to these complex threats alone. International cooperation—especially among democratic nations—is more important than ever. Intelligence must not become a tool of unchecked power, but a part of a responsible security strategy in service of our democratic values.

[related]Following the dispute between Trump and Selensky at the White House, the U.S. briefly withdrew Ukraine’s access to intelligence information on Russian troop movements and the early detection of missile attacks in March. Ukraine’s other allies were unable to provide this information. How can Ukraine and its European allies reduce its dependence on US intelligence services?

The mentioned incident shows how fragile reliance on a single partner can be — even when that partner is the United States. We should not misunderstand this: the transatlantic alliance remains essential, and the U.S. contribution to Ukraine’s defense has been decisive. But this moment also reminds us in Europe of a painful truth: we are still far too dependent on American intelligence and defense capabilities.

To reduce this dependence, Europe must strengthen its own strategic autonomy — not in opposition to the United States, but to be a more capable and reliable partner. That means investing in our own satellite systems, surveillance capacities, early-warning systems, and better coordination among European intelligence services.

Ukraine should also be more closely integrated into European defense structures. But for that to work, Europe itself needs to become more unified and capable. As long as we remain fragmented, we will always rely on Washington in moments of crisis. The goal should not be independence from the U.S., but resilience and partnership at eye level.

Cyberattacks are becoming increasingly frequent. In March, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution warned non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and scientific institutions of potential attacks. Politicians are also being targeted more often, including through phishing emails designed to gain access to their passwords and confidential information. How can democracies effectively defend themselves against this threat?

Cyberattacks are not just a threat to democratic institutions, they’re an economic and geopolitical risk. When NGOs, research institutions or politicians are attacked, it’s often part of a broader strategy by hostile states to weaken democratic societies from within.

But let’s be clear: behind many of these attacks are state or state-sponsored actors pursuing strategic interests, economic espionage, political disruption, or technological sabotage. Democracies must respond in kind—not naively, but with clear-eyed realism. We need to build serious cyber defense capabilities at the European level, including for critical infrastructure and key industries. That means investing in our own digital technologies, reducing dependence on non-European providers, and ensuring that companies and research institutions are part of the security network.

At the same time, we must increase deterrence. That includes naming and shaming aggressors, applying sanctions where necessary, and defending our digital sovereignty. In the 21st century, the resilience of democracies will depend not just on tanks and treaties, but on cybersecurity and technological self-reliance.

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Canada and Europe Deepen Defense Ties Amid Rising Global Instability

Pia Kauer — Tue, 15 Jul 2025 14:51:31 +0000

By Dr. Kim Eduard Lioe and Pia Kauer

In times of geopolitical uncertainty, reliable partnerships are more crucial than ever. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, China’s geopolitical rise, and the U.S. retreat from its traditional leadership role are forcing Western democracies to rethink their security policies. Against this backdrop, the newly signed defence partnership between the European Union and Canada marks a strategic milestone — and an opportunity to reshape security dependencies.

While Germany remains primarily focused on Russia’s war against Ukraine and Moscow’s use of hybrid warfare, Canada is also looking northward. Canada faces several emerging threats: increased Russian activity in its airspace, the regular deployment of Chinese dual-use research vessels, and a general uptick in Arctic maritime operations.

In light of Canada’s deep dependence on US military technology, a shift toward greater strategic autonomy is long overdue.

Encouragingly, this sense of urgency has already spurred several promising developments:

[related]1. Ongoing Partnership in Ukraine

Canada remains one of Ukraine’s most committed allies, having pledged $4.5 billion in military assistance since 2022, and contributing to Germany’s Immediate Action on Air Defence (IAAD) initiative, which pools resources from the international community to speed up the delivery of air defense systems for Ukraine. Both Canada and Germany lead NATO battle groups in Latvia and Lithuania, respectively, and are working to scale these up to full brigade strength.

2. Increased Military Spending

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine revealed that Europe was not prepared for a high-intensity, prolonged conventional war. Canada, like Germany, has historically underinvested in defense. However, Mark Carney’s government is ramping up its defense spending. While Justin Trudeau had promised to reach the 2% target by 2032, Mark Carney announced that it would be achieved in March 2026, up from 1.4% in 2024. At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, this target was increased to 5% by 2035 in a joint agreement with European NATO members.

“The new agreement adds a parallel channel — a distinct European-Canadian defence architecture.”

3. New Procurement Initiatives

On the margins of the EU-Canada summit 2025, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Anita Anand and Minister of National Defence David J. McGuinty announced a new European-Canadian Security and Defense Partnership (“SDP”), which will open the door for Canada’s participation in the EU joint procurement program SAFE („Security Action for Europe“). At its core lies a deeper cooperation on military logistics, cybersecurity, and technological innovation. Until now, cooperation in these areas has primarily taken place within NATO. The new agreement adds a parallel channel — a distinct European-Canadian defence architecture. This development is more than symbolic; it reflects a genuine strategic shift, acknowledging that democracies must build new networks to confront evolving threats.

SAFE’s loans for the purchase of defense technology are only open to EU member states. However, Ukraine, EEA/EFTA countries, EU candidate nations and third countries with a Security and Defense Partnership can participate in the joint procurement process – lowering prices for all.

This is especially attractive for Canada which seeks to dramatically decrease its reliance from US defense technologies. Right now, Canada is spending around 70% of its military equipment appropriation on US-made gear.

For instance, Canada announced that it is considering buying European fighter jets in a move to reduce their dependence on US suppliers. And a trilateral letter of intent signed by Norway, Germany and Canada at last year’s NATO summit aims not only to strengthen maritime security co-operation in the North Atlantic but might also pave the way for Canada to join the existing German-Norwegian partnership, in which the two countries are deepening their strategic relationship, with a focus on addressing shared security challenges and enhancing their capabilities in key areas like maritime security and space.

While Canada not only aims to be a buyer but also a supplier under SAFE, participation comes with strict eligibility rules. To qualify, at least 65 % of the total value of a weapon system procured under SAFE must originate from manufacturers located in the EU, an EEA/EFTA state, or Ukraine.

Foreign suppliers can only be included in the 65 % threshold if their governments have a Security and Defence Partnership with the EU, and they then conclude a further bilateral agreement granting access to SAFE procurements. Since the EU and Canada have already agreed to swiftly launch negotiations on a new bilateral agreement, Canadian defence firms are optimistic that their products will soon comply with these requirements.

“Interchangeability of key equipment turns fragmented capabilities into collective strength.”

4. Increased cooperation

In addition to granting Canada access to SAFE, the Security and Defense Partnership between Canada and the EU will increase cooperation on military assistance for Ukraine and aims to enhance the compatibility of Canadian and European military equipment and the cooperation of military personnel.

Of particular promise is the deepening of defence-industrial ties. This not only opens economic opportunities but also promotes technological exchange and industrial innovation.

Both partners face similar challenges: modernizing outdated equipment, building resilient supply chains, and protecting critical infrastructure. A coordinated approach to procurement can eliminate redundancies, reduce costs, strengthen interoperability between armed forces and interchangeability of equipment.

And for Junghans Defence, a long-standing partner of Canada in the field of fuzes for various types of ammunition, business and cooperation models are evolving. Local production of interchangeable fuzes e.g. for artillery ammunition in collaboration with partners in Canada is the logical result.

Interchangeability of key equipment such as fuzes and ammunition turns fragmented capabilities into collective strength by ensuring that ammunition is not just available but usable, by anyone, anywhere, without delay. Interchangeability therefore is not just a convenience – it’s a matter of battlefield readiness.

In conclusion:

Despite its promise, the EU-Canada partnership still faces significant challenges. Implementation details are still to be worked out. Long-term success will also depend on political consistency on both sides of the Atlantic. Another question is how this partnership will coexist with NATO. How can overlapping efforts with the U.S. be harmonized? What role will post-Brexit Britain play in a landscape where it is neither fully in the EU nor closely aligned with Canada?

Yet the deepened EU-Canada cooperation sends a powerful message: that democratic nations can build resilient, innovative, and independent security structures without depending on volatile bilateral relationships. It would be naive to believe that Europe and Canada could replace the US as a protective power and supplier of military technology for each other. Nevertheless, efforts to strengthen cooperation are promising, and in the best-case scenario, they will enhance security in Europe and North America while bolstering their respective economies through friendshoring.

In a world where security is increasingly networked, technology-driven, and global in scope, this partnership is both timely and necessary. The EU gains a reliable partner across the Atlantic. Canada gains strategic autonomy and access to major markets and innovation platforms. For both, this is more than an agreement — it is a strategic promise for the future.

Dr. Kim Eduard Lioe is the CEO of JUNGHANS Defence, a global leader in the manufacture of igniters and ignition systems. He is the author of the book “Armed Forces in Law Enforcement Operations? – The German and European Perspective” and spoke on a panel at this year’s German-Canadian Conference.

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“I refuse to cede my patriotism”

b.wild — Fri, 13 Jun 2025 08:05:57 +0000

By Julia Friedlander

After fifteen years in Washington, serving in the US government under three presidents, it has been an honor to come to Berlin to lead the Atlantik-Brücke. While my mentors admitted this was not going to be a traditional move for an inside of the Washington political system, it would be the right move. One of them said to me: how does the transatlantic relationship become a functional thing in the 21^st century, and not a relic of the Cold War?

Our founders were Jewish Germans who escaped persecution to the United States and returned after the war with hopes of rebuilding the country after the devastation of the war. They weren‘t sentimental people dreaming of joint folk festivals—they were realists. They made a strategic move in founding the Atlantik-Brücke. Only by convincing Truman to extend the Marshall Plan to West Germany and expediting NATO accession (just several years after the Grundgesetz and the East German uprising of 1953) could the Federal Republic return to growth and avoid the risk of further occupation by the Soviet Union. Germany was unconditionally defeated, and the United States catapulted to global predominance. How else was this going to work? No way else.

[related] Of course, this history is the history of post-war West Germany. But neither Germany, East or West, would remain the standoff of all standoffs— a Soviet-American political tinderbox. My husband is from West Berlin, and at the age of 11, as the Wall fell, he biked to the Brandenburg Gate guided by a Mickey Mouse radio and took photos of his surroundings. The first bomb of WWIII won’t fall on our heads anymore, was the first thought. But what parents allow their child to bike alone into that kind of situation? The ones who had grown up protected by Allied soldiers (and Mickey Mouse). For America, ensuring that Germany became less of a geopolitical problem child meant “Europe whole free and at peace.” In other words, reunified, and subject to the two-plus-four agreement. The bilateral ties between Germany and the US were an existential foundation of global order—until they weren’t.

America’s Unipolarity Foregone

Fast forward to my professional lifetime: trade-fueled globalization, the financial crisis of 2008-10, the disaster of the Iraq War and neoconservative nation-building in Afghanistan—and we have an economically strained populace and an American empire in overreach. Empires have to pay it forward to maintain their status—and the US gladly contributed the largest share of the UN, NATO, and created the developing country status of the WTO. But the US was also ill-prepared for the world that it propped up to begin asserting itself. Western nations overlooked trade basics, that open markets create an overall increase of welfare for all participants, but also a convergence of wealth. And for America, Europe was no longer an aspiration project that provided the framework to keep Europe at peace once the Iron Curtain fell. As the US began to lose relative global influence, the EU signed the Lisbon Treaty. Through consolidation and regulatory power, the EU gained influence. The relationship between the US and Germany modernized as markets expanded and integrated. No longer the subject of foreign policy and divided by a wall that could start a nuclear war, Germany, and the European Union writ-large, became both a partner and a competitor to the United States.

Washington has long expected Germany to assume responsibility in global security commensurate to its GDP —and it’s fair to say Germany missed that message for a long time.

In my professional lifetime, no one in the United States has tried to “keep Germany down.” Washington has long expected Germany to assume responsibility in global security commensurate to its GDP as the world‘s third largest economy—and it’s fair to say Germany missed that message for a long time. Perhaps, one underestimated this power, or didn‘t realize, in medias res, how the bloc was growing in power and influence. The European Union transformed from a set of basic industrial agreements between a handful of Western European states into a regulatory market force that spans a population of 450 million—again, a sign of normalization and progress among advanced economies. Yet the leading “narrative” of the transatlantic world in Germany felt more like a beer tent friendship treaty than a modernized form of cooperation among equals in a competitive global environment. Conveniently, anything that wasn’t for the beer tent (like Obama‘s „pivot to Asia“or renewable energy subsidies through the Inflation Reduction Act) was not “in the interest of transatlanticism.” Kicking up dust on old points of contention and adding his own manufactured problems, Trump has broken the old narrative, definitively.

Maybe some of you followed the leak of the now-infamous Signal chat a few months ago. Besides divulging classified information they shouldn‘t have, Trump‘s cabinet engaged in a health round of Europe-bashing. Not only because one shouldn’t expect more from a bunch of insecure officials who prop themselves up by pushing others down, but because “where are the goddamn Europeans on this?” has been a question I was never fully able to answer when asked (or grilled) by my bosses.

By asking Allies to join the American security umbrella—in political lockstep with Washington and by purchasing American kit, the US has been able to have its cake and eat it at NATO.

Germany alone is not responsible for this dynamic—the American system has engaged in its own brand of self-delusion. By asking Allies to join the American security umbrella—in political lockstep with Washington and by purchasing American kit, the US has been able to have its cake and eat it at NATO. The arrangement has unquestionably paid dividends for the US over decades, ranging from extended nuclear deterrence to cheap basing rights. But (maybe by squinting) one can also see how null-sum thinkers like Trump view NATO as a protection racket where others were past deadline on their “dues”. Trump embodies a unique form of narcissism and myopia, but the status quo ante doesn’t make sense, either. As America, one can either buy fealty and accept “underpayment” or have an alliance among equals in a multipolar world. Through all of its criticism of Europe, the US has laid bare its own duplicity. And in doing so, it has demonstrated its need for European strength.

Economic Powers are Shifting

It is the result of a specific set of geographical, financial, and political factors that have allowed a country of 84 million people to become and remain the third largest economy in the world, especially after the global financial crisis and the multiple debt crises within the Eurozone just several years later. The integration of the European single market broke down barriers in investment, production and transport, quickly incorporating countries of the Warsaw Pact, and creating the world‘s most integrated supranational governance structure. And Germany acquired a huge domestic market without trade barriers and shielded from currency risk—non-euro currencies are pegged to the euro.

The eurozone crisis, spurred by overspending and overborrowing, put an abrupt end to unfettered European market expansion. Corporate and state lending dried up and austerity measures cut deeply into citizens‘ spending power. But Germany found a solution. Global markets were entering into a period of rapid expansion and offered a welcome platform for Western multinationals—German and American companies were equally grateful for the emergence of the so-called BRICS countries. Chinese demand scooped up Germany‘s export zeal just at the right moment when Southern Europe was in distress. Agenda 2010, Gerhard Schröder’s economic reforms–effectively surpressed domestic wages to keep production in Germany competitive, and prevented outsourcing of labor. Supplemental social services in Germany were bolstered by tax revenues from overseas expansion— gross national income instead of gross domestic product.

It was a clever but precarious set of circumstances. That golden moment restructured the German economy and its global dependencies, reorientating German industrial growth towards China in just a handful of years, but it proved fleeting. China has glaringly abused its status as a developing country to the detriment of advanced industrials—from the theft of intellectual property to forced joint ventures to state subsidization that distorted the entirety of global production. But it is not only China poised to limit our range of motion. Miniature trade arrangements between emerging economies and developing regions are cropping up through a web of bilateral and trilateral ad-hoc arrangements. While this behavior, in time, might help force new international trade rules, right now it looks like growing economies around the world are carving out new advantages while the heavyweights who drew up the rules revisit their own history.

The United States will likely do a lot less world policing than it has over the past several decades.

If the initial euphoria of economic integration was the first phase after reunification, the eurozone crisis and the embrace of global markets was the second. The third is hard to quantify, because we’re in it. China’s embrace of global trade imbalances as a national growth strategy is like the German export engine on overdrive. Add to this massive state subsidies of emerging technologies, the supply chains dislocations of the pandemic, and now the erratic, self-destructive trade policy from the United States, and we are witnessing a rapid global reconfiguring of economic power. Again, over the long view, this doesn’t have to be a bad thing. It’s not clear that the US needs to maintain a quarter of global GDP indefinitely in order to keep a lid on world stability— in fact, the United States will likely do a lot less world policing than it has over the past several decades.

What’s unsettling is that it’s not clear where this inquiry is taking us. The Trump administration is itself a symptom of a country not sure how to redefine its role in the global power balance when its own unipolar moment is irreparably gone. How often do Americans yell these days? Rarely do you find leaders screaming into the nothingness of the internet if they truly feel like they have everything under control. As the US grapples with declining power in a multipolar environment of multiple comparative advantages running criss-cross all over the map, there is clearly a big opportunity for Germany.

Germany’s Role

The peace dividend in Europe is long over. Not merely because of Russia’s brutal war, although that is and surely will remain the greatest security challenge for Europe. It has been over in parts and pieces for quite some time now. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, the failed revolutions of the Arab Spring in 2012, and regional instability from Assad’s brutal civil war in Syria, to Erdogan‘s crackdown on democratic institutions in Turkey, and the struggle to restrain nuclear proliferation in Iran all demonstrate that Europe’s world has been far from peace. There has been a de facto ring of fire around Europe for quite some time. In that sense, Olaf Scholz‘s Zeitenwende speech was the long-awaited moment we knew had to come: that the largest nation in Europe and the world‘s third largest economy now had a new role to play when that ring of fire is suddenly much closer.

The reality is, however: if Ukraine falls, so could its NATO neighbors.

Building Europe’s largest standing army is not the outcome anyone asked for. This is not how anyone wanted 2025 to look. Germany is putting its normative foreign policy aside and embracing Realpolitik—getting back to basics. For three years, support for Ukraine was often justified with the argument: we are helping the victim, defending global democracy and the rules-based world order. That in itself is admirable. But taking a step back, we have to ask ourselves: was this approach supposed to convince society of its moral duty or rather reassure it that the war was a concept and not a brutal thing just a few hours away? The normative argument kept the war as far away from themselves as possible. By making the argument that if Ukraine falls, Taiwan falls, politicians were able to invoke moral principles and repress the physical proximity of war. The reality is, however: if Ukraine falls, so could its NATO neighbors. Trump’s sell to the highest bidder approach to handling international relationships has ended America’s traditional view of its responsibilities in Europe. America will remain a strong military partner to Germany in Europe and remain at the core of NATO. That depends on Germany not seeing a figurative border between war and peace just a few hours east of here, but showing that Berlin will be the European leader, not an American follower. It means stating firmly: Ukrainians are defending Germany against Russia, full stop.

A new form of national pride

I was in graduate school in Washington when Obama was elected. I stood with several hundred thousand others in front of the US Capitol for hours at negative temperatures to see him take the oath. Some eager youth organization was distributing flags, and when I returned home from that very cold day I hung this flag in my window. When Trump was elected, my first order of rebellion was to stash this flag in the basement—I was not in a patriotic mood and didn‘t want implicitly to show support for a government I did not want to see elected. I didn‘t see the flag again for four years until Biden‘s victory was announced. I strapped the thing to the back of my bicycle and raced down to the White House to wave it in the direction of anyone looking. Predictably, Trump‘s reelection this past fall was a great disappointment, and the tumult of the past months certainly haven‘t reassured me in the trajectory of the country and how it will be governed. But I reached a different conclusion regarding my little flag. It didn‘t go back in the basement this time, I have it in the window of my office in Berlin. I refuse to cede my patriotism and belief in my country to an administration that views slash and burn as a legitimate tactic, employs racist provocations as a means of control, and creates an oligarchic cult of personality around the President. The flag is not the property of nationalists, they don‘t get to claim it.

I myself am a student of German history and belong to a German family. I know that displaying the flag—along with other symbols of national pride— has been politically wrought and often societally discouraged. Taking US behavior as a blueprint is naïve and uninformed. But the geopolitical environment demands greater stakeholdership in the structure of German and European societies— a contemporary form of national pride. Competing in a multipolar global environment requires investment in education, public infrastructure, defense and innovation. They are irreplaceable for the resilience of our political system, and to avoid the appeal of sloppy nationalism that takes easy versions of a complicated story, choosing scapegoats over substance. The new government and state-level leadership are well-placed to foster a new form of national pride in what Germany can offer itself and offer the world, and not let sloppy nationalists own the flag. Its colors, after all, represent democratic principles and liberal values of 1848, not in German nationalism.

Conclusion

The US had a peace dividend, too. The last time the government attempted to make drastic cuts to public spending was during the Clinton Administration— the cuts were drastic, albeit without the circus ride of Elon Musk. There were serious conversations (hard to imagine now) whether the US still needed the CIA. After all, the Soviet Union had collapsed, and former nuclear enemies were extending the olive branch. If that proposal had truly seen the light of day in the early 1990s, or been subject to review by today’s media landscape, it very well may have garnered a great deal of public support. In both the US and Germany, there will always be a reflex to pull back. As much as you may read about “great power competition” between the US and China, the global economy and power balance is beginning to look much more like a patchwork quilt than a standoff between rival blocks—Germany is only caught in the middle if it chooses to be. At this moment of disruption, Germany and Europe are well-positioned to take on global leadership at a time where America is lagging—and over the horizon, both nations will be grateful for it.

Julia Friedlander gave this lecture as part of a lecture series at the Thuringian State Parliament on the topic of “Renegotiating the World Order” on Tuesday, June 10, 2025.

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“Is the EU still important to Ukraine?”

Lea Berger — Wed, 11 Jun 2025 14:10:31 +0000

In this month’s edition of Atlantik-Brücke’s web series Better be Prepared, titled “The Ukraine Negotiations”, we spoke with distinguished speakers from the United States and Germany about the evolving dynamics introduced by President Donald Trump in the negotiations for a peaceful resolution to the Ukraine-Russia war.

Our speakers– Melinda Haring, Senior Advisor at Razom for Ukraine and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Dr. Tobias Lindner, former Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office; and Angela Stent, Professor Emerita and Senior Advisor at the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University — tackled pressing questions such as: What could a peaceful settlement look like? And can we clarify the often ambiguous position of the U.S. administration in this process? The discussion was moderated by Mareike Müller, Foreign Correspondent for Ukraine, Russia, Eastern Europe, Handelsblatt. One of the key takeaways was that much will depend on the willingness of both the United States and the European Union to increase political pressure on Russia — not only through enhanced sanctions, but also by stepping up military support if the Kremlin fails to pursue a genuine ceasefire.

Click through the picture gallery to see highlight quotes from our speakers or watch the full webinar below.

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“We can leverage AI to save soldiers’ lives”

Pia Kauer — Mon, 26 May 2025 15:06:58 +0000

This year’s German-American Conference brought together high-ranking experts from the worlds of politics, business, and security to discuss the challenges facing the transatlantic partnership. Following opening speeches by Atlantik-Brücke chairman Sigmar Gabriel and John B. Emerson, chairman of the American Council on Germany, experts discussed issues such as the reorganisation of the global balance of power, the significance of outer space for modern warfare and the economic aspects of security policy across six panels. The event concluded with a keynote speech by H. R. McMaster, former US National Security Advisor, who emphazised that 2025 represents a turning point in transatlantic relations, and that Europe must take responsibility for its own defense.

On the sidelines of the conference, we interviewed five panelists about the challenges of our time:

Dr. Norbert Röttgen, MP and Co-Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke
Prof. Charles Kupchan, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, and Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University
Dr. Fritzi Köhler Geib, Member of the Executive Board, Deutsche Bundesbank
Sven Weizenegger, Head of Cyber Innovation Hub, German Armed Forces
Prof. Peter Neumann, Professor of Security Studies, Department of War Studies, King’s College London

“I’m convinced that the European interest is to uphold the transatlantic alliance” – Norbert Röttgen on global power rebalancing, America’s pivot to Asia and the shift in the dynamic of war and peace.

“I wouldn’t go so far as saying that Cold War 2.0 has already started – but it’s a little bit too close for comfort” – Charles Kupchan on the crisis of Western Democracies and why the war on Ukraine reminds him of WWI.

“The cost of the tariffs will mainly hit American consumers” – Fritzi Köhler Geib on digital sovereignity, the cost of US tariffs for Europe and how Europe could reap the benefits of its common currency.

“Security agencies need to understand that the internet is a place, just like the street is a place” – Peter Neumann on how to deal with right-wing extremism, the threat of online radicalisation and why we should pay closer attention to Iran.

“We can leverage AI to save soldiers’ lives” – Sven Weizenegger on the role of cyber weapons in modern conflicts and why technology alone cannot tackle disinformation campaigns.

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DKK 2025: “Canada and Germany need closer relations”

b.wild — Mon, 19 May 2025 09:16:05 +0000

The 38th German‐Canadian Conference took place in Ottawa on May 5 and 6, 2025, bringing together leaders at a timely moment in Canada‐Germany transatlantic relationship. This year’s agenda dealt with a range of topics spanning trade, diplomacy, technology, immigration, defense and climate. An overarching theme was navigating the global shifts in these areas as global affairs are rapidly evolving, and the necessity to reevaluate the institutions that have provided a solid foundation in the last 80 years led many of the discussions. One thing was clear throughout: Germany and Canada are still strongly aligned in their values and goals and 2025 is shaping up to be the year in which both countries may see some of the untapped potential, such as LNG trade through Germany’s new terminal in Wilhelmshaven, being realized through new partnerships and trade relations.

Post election challenges in Canada and Germany

The outcomes of the elections in Germany and Canada present many challenges and opportunities in the emerging political landscapes. The main consensus in the discussions was that the democratic process in both countries worked, but each country has been facing increasing polarization with the rise of populism. In Canada, election results produced a clear mandate for new Prime Minister Mark Carney, but showcased a strong urban/rural divide between the electorate with many domestic challenges ahead for the new government. Meanwhile, in Europe, the German election of a new government and Chancellor unfolded in real time with the election of the new Chancellor taking place on May 7. Between sessions, attendees gathered around a live stream of the second round of voting that ultimately made Friedrich Merz the Chancellor of Germany, to great relief.

Delegates noted a new form of multilateralism emerging. Bringing Canada closer to the EU, for instance, was brought up as a potential pathway. And while full EU membership may be out of the question, a relationship similar to the Norwegian model was floated. Canada and Germany share many common values and challenges and the relationship has, at times, been taken for granted. Deepening the relationship through stronger economic and defense partnerships will require significant investment and willingness on both sides.

Global trade and defense in the new World order

Another thread was finding ways to tackle the zero‐sum nature of the emerging global trade war – a result of the economic and trade instability that has arisen since the implementation of wide‐spread American tariffs. This new economic order has reinforced commitments to diversify and strengthen trade agreements with reliable alliances. The sessions underlined a stronger commitment to cooperation and a renewed focus on multilateralism. Economic security cannot be achieved through overreliance on one economic partner, as it can lead to stagnation and atrophy of certain economic sectors and supply chains. The way to navigate this new world will be complex and likely come at a higher cost, especially because of the geographical limitations. Mobility of talent and capital was seen as another possible area for improvement to support a move away from reliance on a single foreign market for much of the economic activity in Canada.

Defense strategy was another topic of particular concern for both countries. The lack of modern and digital weapons represents a potential area of development and cooperation for both Canada and Germany. New and accelerated procurement processes could also better prepare Canada for potential Arctic threats.

Navigating Technology, Media and the new AI era

At least some aspect surrounding the use of AI made its way into most panels at the conference. In a relatively short amount of time we’ve seen specifically Generative AI reshape the way people create and consume news and entertainment. In the eyes of the public, lines are starting to blur between content with a high factual quality and content that is convincing, but lacks any footing in reality. The effects of this are beginning to affect democratic institutions that find themselves undermined by factually inaccurate or false, but highly emotionally engaging, and viral content. The ease with which this is achievable on a global scale also invites adversaries to take up this powerful tool into their arsenal.

Additionally, most digital services currently rely on US-based hyperscalers to provide the compute and storage that powers their business model. This is starting to be seen as a growing concern of sovereignty for both businesses and countries. Models such as “Sovereign Clouds” were mentioned as a way for nations to protect their digital assets and integrity within the confines of their own legal and regulatory systems and prevent a possible overreach of other governments.

A forum for changemakers that allows for space to ask tough questions

If there was ever a year where strengthening the ties and understanding between Canada and Germany has been more important, 2025 was certainly it. The German-Canadian Conference has proven to be a forum where the free exchange of thoughts and ideas can thrive. With an eclectic selection of delegates, drawn from many areas of government, industry and academia, as well as the ten participants of Atlantik-Brücke’s Young Atlantiks program, discussions were lively, dynamic and action‐oriented. For delegates of this year’s exchange – that call to action is at the forefront.

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„An annexation is highly unlikely“

Lea Berger — Wed, 30 Apr 2025 16:16:33 +0000

With his raw display of interest in Greenland, U.S. President Trump has put the island in the North Atlantic and Arctic Ocean at the top of the geopolitical agenda. Yesterday’s edition of Atlantik-Brücke’s virtual event series “Better Be Prepared” explored the strategic and economic significance of Greenland.

Our speakers, Luke Coffey, Senior Fellow, Center on Europe and Eurasia, Hudson Institute and Jonas Parello-Plesner, Executive Director, Alliance of Democracies (Copenhagen), discussed Greenlands importance in terms of economic, environmental and security policy. The conversation was moderated by Anna Schiller, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ).

Watch the short version, highlighting key moments — including these central questions:

Why is Greenland relevant for geopolitics?
What’s next for the U.S.-Greenland relationship?

To watch the full webinar, which took place on April 29, 2025, view the video below:

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„Putin certainly sees Trump as an easy mark“

Pia Kauer — Mon, 28 Apr 2025 09:11:55 +0000

In his guest commentary for Atlantik-Brücke, John Bolton, former national security advisor to Donald Trump, talks about Trump’s relationship with Putin and the threat his disdain for NATO poses to Europe – and urges us not to give up on the transatlantic alliance just yet.

Judging a US president’s first hundred days began with Franklin Roosevelt. For Donald Trump, however, certainly on national-security issues, comparison to Napoleon’s hundred-days campaign may be more apt, ending as it did in disaster for both the emperor and France.

[related]Trump’s indifference to Ukraine and his conciliatory approach toward Russia are only one of several shocks to trans-Atlantic relations. Disdain for NATO and the ever-present specter of US withdrawal, or even substantial disengagement, like renouncing the supreme European command, are also dangerous. Combined with Trump’s chaotic, incoherent, economically illiterate trade decisions, there is reason to despair.

The good news, such as it is: Trump is not pursuing a grand strategy, or even “policy” as we normally understand that word. He sees everything transactionally, through the prism of personal ties, and how he benefits from them, politically or economically. If he and Vladimir Putin have good rapport, he believes America and Russia have good state-to-state relations. This is not unique to Putin. Trump said about North Korea’s Kim Jung Un: “We fell in love.”

Putin certainly sees Trump as an easy mark, not a friend, manipulating him on Ukraine, for example, by agreeing that Trump was correct to say that the Ukraine war would not have happened had he been president. Putin then released a US hostage, followed by Belarus also doing so, always a winner with Trump. Moscow has just recently exchanged yet another US citizen, even as Russia has been slow-rolling cease-fire negotiations. This is not about a Trump strategy, but about his susceptibility to flattery and exploitation.

Trump is an aberration in American politics, someone entirely absorbed with himself. That he has been elected twice says more about his opponents’ weaknesses than voter devotion to Trump personally, or his actions as president. His public support is dropping and will drop significantly more if his newly launched trade wars cause an economic downtown. Republicans in Congress are finally beginning to distance themselves from Trump and will steer further away as the 2026 elections approach. Democrats, by contrast, still have not regained a pulse since last November’s election.

The answer is not to panic or do things that give Trump further excuses to quit Europe. During the Cold War, Soviet leaders sought to split the Atlantic alliance. Their failure to do so contributed significantly to Moscow’s defeat. This is not the time for us to do to ourselves what the Kremlin could not.

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Economics of a Global Market Mudpit

Pia Kauer — Thu, 27 Mar 2025 11:23:03 +0000

Julia Friedlander, CEO of Atlantik-Brücke, at the Munich Economic Debates. Credit: CES Ifo.

Our CEO Julia Friedlander was a guest at the Munich Economic Debates of the ifo Institute for Economic Research in Munich on March 24th. She spoke about the tension between US President Trump’s tariff policy and economic sanctions in the interest of national security.

By Julia Friedlander

Democrats and Republicans find little common cause, but both parties have one idea in common: economic statecraft. From sanctions to export controls to investment screening, the toolkit soared to new heights under the first Trump administration and continued into the Biden years, mostly targeting China. Europe was a free-rider, but ultimately a likeminded party to be brought on-side when facing Beijing—friendshoring was the explicit goal, whether by nudge or by force. Now, Donald Trump is taking matters lightyears further – and using tariffs not as trade remedies, but as a form of sanction-like coercion, against the world. And in doing so, instead of building a ring of fire around China, America risks forcing one against itself

Sanctions vs. Tariffs

When the president announces tariffs on Mexico and Canada because of drug flows and immigration, and then turns around and threatens BRICS countries with tariffs because they are “de-dollarizing” he is reaching far beyond trade platitudes – he is seeking concessions or revenue or both. Two week before the implementation of “reciprocal tariffs,” no one seems to know what he means, or stranger yet, he doesn’t seem to know what he means, either. For decades, politicians of all persuasions have threatened financial sanctions on many things and people in a “don’t-do-this…or” format—from small-fry Balkan agitators to entire nations, so Trump-ist modalities are not as unfamiliar in American policy vernacular as many believe. But sanctions and tariffs are apples and pears—mostly because physical things and money (now rarely a physical thing) move about the world differently. And America will ultimately be ill-suited for a standoff based on the latter.

[related]I have always argued that unprecedented measures against Russia beginning in February 2022 risked crossing the boundary between economic penalty and economic war. The sanctions—and particularly the blocking of sovereign assets—could have shattered the Russian economy or sent it into uncharted economic survivalism. The US and its partners acted with such resolve that the actions of 2022 tested whether sanctions could steer the course of live military conflict or sever a major global economy from its financial lifelines.

While the Russian economy has undoubtedly suffered and the government reaches further into emergency economic measures, western policies forced Moscow towards a new form of creative resilience. It has done so through the worst set of bedfellows including Iran and North Korea. But more importantly, it has elevated a broad set of third parties, close partners of the US such as India and the United Arab Emirates, who are happy to generate trade diversion tactics and alternative patterns of trade settlement to their benefit. Russia’s war economy cannot churn forever: it is massively inflationary, but Putin’s military has more capacity than it did before the war.

Still, the massive sanctions escalation on Russia was worth risking. For all its complications, the collective G7 showed it was willing to deliver the heavy hammer. The move was a strategic success because it surprised Putin – and President Xi – while the risks to Western markets were low—and especially low for the United States.

But that rationale does not apply to China, or to trade barriers more broadly deployed as a form of coercion in the US national interest. Building economic resilience requires prioritizing trade challenges, building alliances and offering incentives to emerging markets and industrial competitors alike. The sarcastic quip at the US Treasury has always been: don’t sanction everything at once so you have something left to sanction. That is, choose your targets wisely.

In the new administration, prudence may not advise the tariff onslaught, and the risks of a backlash are real. Donald Trump and a subset of his economic team seek a wide swath of tariffs on the world, as well as steeper investment controls on China. They are pursuing a theory—hence untested in the modern era—that the purchasing capacity and consumer market of the world’s biggest economy have amassed enough leverage to force a reindustrialization of the country, and to charge a premium for those seeking to buy US debt, effectively reducing what the US currently owes the world in interest. However, even before the shots have been fired, countries have quickly begun to question: just how indispensable is the US market—and for how long?

Sanctions are first and foremost the territory of financial markets, where the dollar governs all major global transactions. Trade flows and settlement are another matter —who moves what and where is a murkier target for US tariffs than financial flows are for the US dollar. With global supply chains morphing in the aftermath of the pandemic, new sudden jolts to the trading system will lead to fragmentation, higher costs for US consumers, and question the business models of many of the US’ most globally competitive companies. Trump and some advisors are starting to argue that a short recession is a necessary sacrifice for the longterm structural gain for industry, while other advisors look like they’ve been losing sleep. Leaving voter interests and the price of eggs aside, how long can this “economic detox” last before it becomes a structural loss? Or how long will the country hold out politically for this experiment to bear fruit?

Someone Else’s Trade Rules Now

From an eagle-eye view, creative thinking is welcome. Global trade rules are not working properly, and tariffs can have their usefulness. Both parties in Washington acknowledge that WTO rules do not suit the 21^stcentury economy due to the rise of digital trade and because China has so glaringly abused its developing country status to the detriment of advanced industrials. Most parties in Europe agree but are not as eager to flaunt the rules in return, nor were they ever of the opinion that blocking the appointment of judges to the appellate body has ever helped.

But it is not only China poised to limit our range of motion. Miniature trade arrangements between emerging economies and developing regions are cropping up through a web of bilateral and trilateral ad-hoc arrangements. While this behavior, in time, might help force new international trade rules, right now it looks like growing economies around the world are carving out new advantages while the heavyweights who drew up the rules revisit their own history.

At the G20 in Brazil—a group heralded by the United States to navigate through the global financial crisis— the summit’s hosts avoided hot-button foreign policy issues such the Gaza War to account for country positions that starkly differ from those of the United States. Almost in parallel, Peru christened a Chinese-owned megaport on the heels of the APEC summit, which could bypass US trade routes entirely—no wonder Trump forced a US hedge fund into the ownership structure of the Panama Canal. Now, the US administration will not show up to South Africa’s meeting of the Group—citing mistreatment of white South Africans. That may sound like a gripe of Elon Musk, but to many others it sounds like the cry of a sore loser. No, the G20 isn’t just there to solve Western problems anymore, so it’s not worth showing up if it’s not our show.

Since the second half of the Obama Administration, Washington has tried various tactics to cope with the relative loss of economic power. With post-NAFTA globalization taking hold, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the disaster of the Iraq War and neoconservative nation-building in Afghanistan—we witnessed an empire in overreach. Such empires have to pay it forward to maintain their status—and the US was ready to contribute the largest share of the UN, NATO, and recognize the developing country status of the WTO. But the US was also ill-prepared for the world that it propped up to begin asserting itself. Overestimating the staying power of Western economic advantage, we overlooked trade basics, that open markets create an overall increase of welfare for all participants, but also a convergence of wealth. There are of course easily parallels to be found in Germany’s expanded trade and investment relationship with China.

Unwinding the Unique American Problem

Given the predatory behavior by China, and to a much lesser extent, imbalances with the European Union and in the Western Hemisphere, there is understandable bipartisan consensus to address the disadvantages felt by the American workforce. There is nothing wrong with selective protectionism—every country has it—but it is worth understanding that these moves are risky business. Despite its market power, energy independence, and consumer base, the United States can still become an outsider. When countries try to work around US sanctions (and they do so all the time in very creative ways), we call it evasion. When countries work around the US market, it’s called trade diversification.

The core problem with accelerating a tariff standoff with the world all at once is that the US economy generates 25% of global GDP. This may come across as a massive point of leverage- or an indication of how intertwined the economic health is with the world. Cheerleading China’s economic slowdown as a chit for team America, which the Biden Administration often did to demonstrate that its chosen policies were working and Chinese GDP would never overtake the US, is misguided. Global GDP is not a zero-sum game.

Increasing barriers to entry will force some firms to reshore intermediate production to the United States, but also incentivize many to reduce their footprint in producing US exports. Discussions have already begun in earnest among traditional allies and competitors how to ringfence their trade flows around the United States. New York functions as the global financial center not only because of the depth of its capital markets but because of trade financing. And if there’s any comparative advantage the United States has over others for the foreseeable future, it is our broad and deep marketplace.

It is true that the US also pays a price for protecting the world’s reserve currency. The capital markets contribute a predominantly large share of GDP compared to our closest partners, and our rising debt is financed by cheap interest rates. That sounds very advantageous at first. However, other countries have bought this debt to underpin their own export markets. At this point, Germany has always been a thorn in the side.

Because no one has provided a sufficient answer to address America’s entrenched vulnerabilities, creative, fringe theories gain traction. Combine the calculations of a few brainiac economists no one use to listen to, Musk’s penchant for creative destruction, Vance’s millennial-generation populism, and Trump’s ability to give concessions to his negotiating partners and call it his own victory, and here we are today.

Friendshoring without America

The evidence of diversification away from the United States is still anecdotal because it is still so fresh, but it is also happening fast. Canada is poised to join the EU’s new military funding mechanisms and call off its orders of F-35 fighter jets, right at the time when tariffs will damage American aerospace manufacturing. Chief economists at European banks are full of bright ideas how to leverage Germany’s massive spending bazooka to create new credit markets for European investment, and already have colorful graphs showing investment flows moving to Europe to avoid US whiplash and “buy European” before valuations rise higher. It is mid-March. Two months ago, I spoke at a conference in New York where I was met with skeptical glances when I encouraged investors not to ride off Germany entirely.

Again, tariffs can be a necessary measure, even when there are potential drawbacks. The debate last year over Germany’s refusal to back EU tariffs against Chinese electric vehicles felt like gazing into the funhouse mirrors at a carnival—every time you see an odd new reflection of yourself and you’re not sure which one is the real you. Was allowing China to flood the market with cheap electric cars worth the bet on a dwindling number of luxury diesels going in the other direction? It was the dregs of mercantilism. Two months later, deficit spending, defense, and industrial policy are clearly back, and at just the right time for industry. Biden’s justification for the Inflation Reduction Act had a three-pronged message: create jobs, accelerate the energy transition, and compete with China. Germany just passed its own version, and the prongs are: defend Europe from Russia, save German factories, and compete with the United States.

For the Biden crew, every policy was about friend-shoring, near-shoring, or ally-shoring. The tool of choice was export controls, which relied heavily on the participation of likeminded partners to be successful, despite the size of the America market. Admittedly, no one knew how “small” the “yard” would remain or how “high” the “fence” was to become. If the semiconductor industry was the core, high-end technology and dual use goods radiated out like a weird sun. The result was not to delay China where it might really matter, in artificial intelligence; the result was DeepSeek, so it’s fair game to say this wasn’t a watertight strategy.

For the Trump administration, round two, it’s not clear that it matters what goods are sold to the United States and what for, only that there is too much of them. This is a weakness. Once you are in dodgeball territory, friendshoring around the United States can be successful every time investment is diverted or prices rise. Everything becomes a Mexican avocado.

Conclusion

The tenor of political debate has become rough and frankly hard to listen to. I tell my team repeatedly that the louder a leader screams or threatens, the less power he or she will have. One rarely yells out of a position of strength, but out of a feeling of perceived loss. I’m not only talking about America, of course.

Trade relations between the US and the EU are going to get worse before they get better. I was part of the team that designed the meeting between Trump and Jean-Claude Juncker in July 2018 that led to a trade truce, and the European “price for peace” was low. A few months later Germany received a reprieve from automobile tariffs, also by not giving all that much. That’s the Trump surrounded by a more traditional set of advisors. Now we will see trade deficits, taxation and technology regulation thrown into one bucket and a taste for further escalation. But escalation creates vulnerabilities, and the global trading environment is not America-centric, is a free-for-all, global market mudpit. As an American, I see the problems with the status-quo with clear eyes and will hear out any theory that addresses entrenched structural problems in our economy. But as a European (or soon to be, at least) I see how disruption has given Europe much to gain.

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“The demolition of Hamas must be the first phase of Gaza’s future“

Lea Berger — Thu, 13 Mar 2025 15:15:54 +0000

The most recent edition of Atlantik-Brücke’s virtual event series “Better Be Prepared” explored the ongoing crisis in the middle east.

Our distinguished speakers, Bradley Bowman, Senior Director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Dr. Avner Golov, Vice President Research & Alliances, MIND Israel, and Dr. Bente Scheller, Head of the Middle East and North Africa Division, Heinrich Böll Foundation, discussed the latest developments in the conflict and the future of Gaza. The conversation was moderated by Jakob Flemming, Program Manager, Atlantik-Brücke.

Watch the key statements from our speakers on the question: Is President Trump’s proposal for Gaza’s reconstruction helpful, and who should take leadership in Gaza once Hamas is removed from power?

To watch the full webinar, which took place on March 11, 2025, view the video below:

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„Wake up Europe and get your act together!“

b.wild — Tue, 18 Feb 2025 12:54:01 +0000

Atlantik-Brücke’s traditional Opening Reception at the sidelines of Munich Security Conference provided a platform for dialogue and exchange on transatlantic relations and pressing foreign policy issues.

Wake up Europe and get your act together!

A timely and passionate discussion on Ukraine, European security guarantees, and the future of transatlantic cooperation set the tone for what promises to be a decisive Munich Security Conference.

Gen. Keith Kellogg, Assistant to the President and Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine, underlined the importance of European unity to keep the transatlantic alliance vital. As representatives of the Weimar Triangle Pierre Heilbronn, French Special Envoy for Ukraine’s relief and reconstruction, Norbert Röttgen, Member of the Bundestag (CDU/CSU), former Federal Minister, Vice Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, and Aleksandra Uznańska-Wiśniewska, Member of Parliament of the Republic of Poland, discussed different approaches but agreed: bravery and boldness are essential!

Special thanks to our partners at KPMG, the US Embassy in Berlin, the State Department, and our hardworking colleagues at MSC.

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Beyond Victims: Women as Architects of Lasting Peace

b.wild — Tue, 18 Feb 2025 12:52:54 +0000

For the third consecutive year, Atlantik-Brücke’s Female Network convened a high-level discussion on the eve of the Munich Security Conference, cementing its place as a vital platform for dialogue on gender and geopolitics. This year’s theme, “Beyond Victims: Women as Architects of Lasting Peace,” underscored a crucial shift in the global discourse: women are not merely casualties of conflict; they are essential to its resolution.

[related] The fireside chat brought together Yael Braudo-Bahat, Co-Director of Women Wage Peace, and Tirana Hassan, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, in a conversation moderated by journalist Katja Gloger. Their discussion explored the critical role of women in international peace negotiations, emphasizing grassroots movements and cross-border collaboration as indispensable tools for sustainable conflict resolution. Sawsan Chebli, speaking on behalf of Atlantik-Brücke’s Female Network, set the stage with opening remarks that reinforced the urgency of female inclusion in diplomacy.

The imperative is clear. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted 25 years ago, laid the foundation for women’s participation in peace processes. Yet, progress remains uneven. Both speakers underscored that real transformation requires not just policy commitments but tangible action—placing women at negotiation tables, amplifying their voices, and ensuring their leadership in shaping peace agreements.

As the world grapples with escalating conflicts, this discussion was more than symbolic; it was a call to action. And as Atlantik-Brücke’s Female Network looks ahead, one thing is certain—these conversations must continue, not just as a tradition, but as a necessity.

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“A successful deterrence of China requires collaboration“

Lea Berger — Thu, 19 Dec 2024 13:06:24 +0000

Ben Hodges, Lieutenant General (ret.), U.S. Army, and Senior Advisor at FBH Geostrat Consulting GmbH, shares his insights on how Trump and the new administration might address current geopolitical challenges and their potential impact on the transatlantic relationship.

General Hodges, President-elect Trump has regularly criticized NATO, especially when it comes to the financial imbalance of the national defense budgets in the USA and in Europe. How will the U.S. commitment to the alliance alter under the new Trump administration and what would this mean for NATO’s credibility?

It’s not helpful that the incoming President creates doubt and uncertainty about US’s commitment to NATO and Europe. But my sense is that he won’t actually pull out of NATO or turn his back on NATO because enough of the GOP leadership in Congress understand how important it is for US security and prosperity and I think President Trump will as well. But he’ll continue to be harsh and demanding in his interactions with some Allies, especially since he believes he’s the one who forced many countries to increase spending.

How will the new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and the new U.S. President get along?

I think Secretary General Rutte will do very well. He’s already demonstrated a strong, savvy understanding of Mr Trump and his visit to Mar a Lago was a good example. But he’ll be tested throughout, especially if nations like Germany continue to fall short. And a divergence on how to deal with Ukraine and Russia could be a source of friction.

Lieutenant General (ret.) Ben Hodges

How may Trump’s cabinet picks, Marco Rubio for Secretary of State and Mike Waltz for National Security Advisor, affect the incoming administration’s commitment to the transatlantic alliance?

The good news is that both Rubio and Waltz are pro-NATO and Russia hawks. But will they be able to achieve policy successes if others who influence Mr Trump disagree, for example, DJT Jr, Elon Musk, etc?

Trump has already announced to once again leave the Paris Climate Agreement. Which value will alliances in general, treaties, Western and rules-based institutions have, if the United States pulls this democratic international framework into question?

I think most nations and agencies are already expecting it and should be adapting, preparing for it.

Would Germany, the United Kingdom, France and other major European countries be able and willing to tremendously increase their military support for Ukraine, if the new Trump administration decided to stop supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia?

They certainly have the economic power to do it…but I haven’t seen that they have the political will to do this. But I would expect that countries like Poland, Italy, Finland and the Baltic countries will do this…they do have the political will…because they are not confused about the threat from Russia. The center of gravity of resistance to Russia is shifting to the East.

Which political approach will the new U.S. government most probably follow in Israel’s war against Hamas, Hezbollah, Huthis and other proxies from Iran in the Middle East?

I don’t know yet…signals from Trump about not getting involved in the post-Assad Syria are not encouraging. But clearly we should try to influence what happens there…no Russian or Chinese influence, no export of terrorism, and return of Syrian refugees to Syria. We should strengthen our relationship with our NATO Ally, Turkey. And of course I expect a Trump Administration to be very close to the Netanyahu government in Israel.

Since America’s pivot to Asia the Indo-Pacific has become the most important world region for the USA from a geopolitical and geostrategic standpoint. What U.S. strategy for China do you expect in the next four years with regard to the rising tensions surrounding Taiwan?

This is not clear…there is a divide even in the GOP about how to do this. A successful deterrence of China will require military as well as economic and diplomatic strength, all of which requires collaboration with Allies, including our European allies. But the best way to deter China now is for them to see that we are willing to do whatever it takes to help Ukraine stop Russia. I fear that China sees that we in the West don’t have the political Will to defeat Russia and so they are emboldened to do what they want to challenge the international rules based order in the IndoPacific region.

Frederick Benjamin “Ben” Hodges III is a retired United States Army officer who served as the commanding general of United States Army Europe. He has been a Senior Advisor to Human Rights First since June 2022 and also serves as NATO’s Senior Mentor for Logistics. He previously held the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis. He retired from the U.S. Army in January 2018, is a board member of Atlantik-Brücke, and lives with his wife in Frankfurt, Germany.

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The challenges of our global security

Lea Berger — Fri, 05 Jul 2024 10:55:48 +0000

At this year’s Members Meeting’s panel discussion “China, Russia, the Tech Race, and Western Resilience,” several experts shared their insights on the critical geopolitical landscape and its impact on global security. The panel included David E. Sanger, White House and national security correspondent for The New York Times and author of “New Cold Wars”, Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Beth Sanner, Senior Fellow at the Intelligence Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. The discussion was moderated by Christian Mölling of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.

The experts highlighted the pressing geopolitical issues that significantly influence our interests, particularly in terms of security. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, nuclear nonproliferation efforts in the Middle East, and tensions with North Korea were discussed, with an emphasis on the IAEA’s critical role in ensuring stability in these regions.

A major threat highlighted was Iran’s power in the Red Sea, especially after the Iranian attack on Israel, which escalates the risk of further conflict in the Middle East. This escalation poses a serious threat to global security. Panelist David E. Sanger emphasized that the threat from Iran should not be underestimated and stressed the importance of avoiding past mistakes in dealing with Russia. He referred to the mistakes Europe has made with Russia and pointed out several critical points. There were warning signs as early as 2007, when Putin talked about the territory he wanted to invade, but no one took his statements seriously. Even in 2014, Germany continued to trade with Russia. Just before the invasion of Ukraine, most people did not believe it would happen. Our perception has changed since then, and we must learn from this experience to avoid making the same mistakes with Iran or China, Sanger argued.

They also discussed the options available to Germany, and Berlin in particular, to rebuild the basic consensus in the international community. An understandable reaction in Europe and Washington is the desire to avoid a Cold War. However, it is crucial to consider how this desire is perceived by adversaries. The panelists noted that while it is essential to avoid a new Cold War, we must also plan for the possibility of failure in ways we have not done before. The message should be clear that accommodation is not an option, and we must be prepared to meet these challenges head on. The panel explored the potential use of nuclear weapons in conflicts between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states

Beth Sanner remarked, “all the assumptions we had about how the world works have been destroyed,” prompting the audience to question whether our current assumptions about global dynamics still hold true.

[related]

The Role of China

Understanding China’s intentions and actions is a critical issue. Contrary to the common belief that China is primarily concerned with economic interests, its strategy includes significant geopolitical considerations. China is making strategic moves and has clear interests in regional and global expansion. The interconnectedness of global threats was emphasized. Japanese Prime Minister Kishida significantly increased the defense spending of his country not only because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but also because of China’s actions in circumnavigating the island of Japan and standing on Russia’s side in the war against Ukraine. In particular, the Kuril Islands dispute between Japan and Russia has prompted Japan to take a clear stance on the conflict.

The Iran Nuclear Deal

The discussion also touched on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the challenges surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. Despite the initial compliance and economic benefits, the deal has faced significant setbacks, especially after the U.S. withdrawal in 2018 and Iran’s subsequent violations. Since then Iran has acquired dangerous characteristics and developed nuclear power. Panelist Rafael Mariano Grossi urges that efforts should be made to revive the JCPOA through diplomatic negotiations or a new type of agreement to ensure regional and global security. Efforts should be made to rebuild a basic international consensus to ensure global security.

The New Power Structure and Western Resilience

Another point of discussion was the emerging power structure, characterized by a coalition of interests between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which seeks to establish an alternative system to that led by the United States and its European allies. This requires a strategic response from the West to maintain stability and security. The role of Artificial Intelligence and strategic weapons in this new geopolitical landscape was also addressed, with insights into the Pentagon’s plans to increase the number of strategic weapons and the implications of these developments.

Strengthening European Defense

The need for a stronger European defense industry was underlined, with calls for joint efforts to protect national interests and reduce dependence on American weapons. Beth Sanner explained the ambivalent position of the US. On the one hand, they want a stronger European defense industry, but on the other hand, they benefit from Europe’s dependence on US weapons. Nevertheless, it is important to strengthen the transatlantic relationship between the US and the European Union. In conclusion, the panelists stressed the importance of re-evaluating existing assumptions, understanding the interconnected nature of global threats, and developing comprehensive strategies to address these challenges. In closing, Beth Sanner advised, “Europe has a great story to tell, just believe in your own story.”

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“Democracy comes with responsibilities”

Lea Berger — Thu, 13 Jun 2024 09:39:03 +0000

Foto: Jürgen C

Outgoing Consul General Norman Thatcher Scharpf talks about the development of transatlantic relations.

Dear Consul General Scharpf, when you took over the position as Consul General in Frankfurt in summer 2021, the world was a different place and Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine on full scale. How have the transatlantic relations developed since Russia’s attack on Ukraine, have the United States and Europe moved closer together in your view? 

When I arrived in Frankfurt, we were just starting to come out of the COVID pandemic, so there has been a lot of evolution since my arrival. With respect to the transatlantic relationship, Germany and United States have been strong partners for a long time, based on shared democratic values, and on cooperation regarding security, trade, and research. It’s important to remember that Russia had already invaded Ukraine in 2014 and annexed Crimea. But I do think that since Russia’s 2022 attack, there is a sense that the post-WWII rules-based international order – which has given us unprecedented security, stability, prosperity, and peace – is fragile and must be defended. I think that the U.S.-German relationship has become stronger because of the realization that so much of our security and prosperity is mutually dependent, and that there are adversaries – like Russia, China, and Iran – who want to dismantle that rules-based order.

The impression may often arise that the transatlantic partnership seems to be losing importance, especially among younger generations. Do you perceive a similar development, or do you have a different impression?

I would disagree. In my travels around southwest Germany, I have – particularly over the past year – found a growing awareness that our partnership is something very special, to be treasured, and that it benefits both sides of the Atlantic tremendously. But we cannot repeat this often enough. With all the foreign manipulated information out there and the misinformation and disinformation that tries to sow divisions, we have to constantly remind the public – particularly young people – and talk to businesses and civil society organizations about why democracy and human rights are fundamental to our societies and speak clearly about what is at stake.

The close relationship between Germany, Europe and the US has grown historically and is characterized by the experiences of the post-World War II period and the Cold War. How should transatlantic relations change in the 21st century in order to become more resilient vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes and terrorist groups and not to lose significance on both sides of the Atlantic?

As a result of our adversaries’ ability and intent to manipulate information, our democracies are under threat in the United States and in Europe. We have a responsibility to inoculate our citizens by training our young people in critical thinking, by talking constantly about the importance of democracy, and by reminding our citizens of the benefits that the post-WWII rules-based order has brought. Democracy is not the natural order of humanity. Governance throughout most of human history has been characterized by feudalism, autocracy, and various forms of authoritarianism. We have benefitted from democracy for only a brief period of the entirety of human history, and we need to keep investing in it and constantly improving it. We have to talk to young people about why democracy is not just a privilege, but that it also comes with responsibilities, including taking an active role.

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The US and Europe have to further increase pressure on Russia – and China

b.wild — Mon, 10 Jun 2024 13:36:49 +0000

Thank you, Julia, for the kind introduction and thank you to Atlantik Brücke and TBI for hosting me here today. I have visited Germany more often than any other country during the Biden Administration. This speaks not only to the depth, but also the breadth of the U.S.-German partnership on economic, climate, and national security, issues. But as you all know, the foundation of our partnership is deeper than our shared interests. Our people share the same values, including a deep and abiding commitment to promoting democratic values at home and abroad.

I’ve come to Berlin on the back of a trip to Kyiv, where I had a chance to meet my counterparts and brave Ukrainians who have been resilient in the face of unyielding war. I was reminded that Ukraine remains a democratic country today because its people are willing to fight for freedom.

[related]Over two years ago, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin expected to be in control of Kyiv within days and the entire country within weeks. But Ukraine stood up, and our coalition stood beside them, denying the Kremlin the quick victory it expected. And as the Ukrainian people fought off advancing Russian troops, we put in place unprecedented sanctions that cut off Russia’s largest banks from our financial systems and shackled the Kremlin’s war chest by immobilizing its sovereign assets held abroad.

In response to its strategic failure, the Kremlin has now committed nearly half a million troops to this unprovoked invasion and imposed a set of draconian capital controls to prevent money from escaping from Russia. As Russia’s strategy evolved, so did our approach.

On one end, the United States, Germany, and our coalition provided Ukraine with weapons to defend against Russia’s aggression on the frontlines and economic support to bolster its resilience on the home front.

On the other, we took steps to isolate Russia from the global financial system and cut off the Kremlin’s access to the goods they need to build everything from tanks to bombs. Simultaneously, we went after Russia’s main revenue source through a price cap that reduced Russia’s oil profits. Putin’s own spokesmen openly acknowledged that our sanctions and enforcement actions are impeding Russia’s ability to get the goods they need, limiting their profits, and further restricting their remaining financial channels.

One of our objectives in taking these steps was to force the Kremlin to make the hard choice between preserving the potential of its economy and continuing to fund its war of choice. Well, the Kremlin has made its choice. It has chosen to wage its illegal war over investing in the Russian people.

The War Economy

Putin has decided to turn Russia into a war economy, where the entire industrial base is geared toward his war in Ukraine. Gone is a commitment to building a prosperous Russian middle class connected to the world and expanding opportunity. The Kremlin is instead creating an economy inspired by the Soviet era—prioritizing guns over butter and military ambition over the welfare of its citizens.

Within this economy, Russia allocated 29 percent of Russia’s total budget this year for defense spending, more than double its 2021 level. Production of military-industrial goods has risen by 35 percent.

To do this, Russia is depleting its economic buffers, draining foreign exchange reserves and driving up inflation. Over a million young workers have left the labor force because of conscription or emigration. The Russian economy is less diversified today than prior to the war and will continue to move backwards. Meanwhile, Russia is nationalizing a wave of companies, including the autotrader Rolf, the chemical company Metafrax, and the metals producer Kompaniya Etalon. And the international private sector exodus shows no sign of reversing as Russia has revealed itself to be an unreliable trade partner for investors.

Beyond the data, you can see the Russian economy transforming in small but illustrative ways. A Russian bakery stopped baking desserts and started producing drones. A company that made camping gear for hikers pivoted to making sleeping bags for soldiers.

Perhaps the clearest example of the fundamental change in how Putin views the importance of industry to his military ambitions is the fact that he named an economic advisor, Andrey Belousov, to lead the Russian Ministry of Defense. What this should signal to us all is that Putin is focused on making sure the Russian economy can power Russia’s war machine.

Throughout this war, our actions have forced Russia into making difficult economic choices. First, it was to accept geopolitical and financial isolation in order to wage its war. Now, it is to abandon its domestic economic priorities to prolong its war. Each time Russia has made one of these choices, we have adapted our own policies in response to further increase pressure. We must do so again.

We must recognize that while the reconfiguration of Russia’s economy has real costs for the Russian people, it has the potential to make the Russian military stronger than it was before this war started. Russia’s ambitions are not just to replenish its war equipment but to build a stronger, more powerful military that surpasses what it had before the invasion began. Putin’s goal is to subjugate Ukraine, with his troops stationed at the border of Poland, Finland, and the Baltics. Failure to stop Putin now risks a resurgent Russia directly threatening NATO.

That’s why this war is not just an existential threat to Ukraine, but to Europe and our national security. And that’s why this is not a moment for incrementalism, but a time for our coalition to take decisive steps to cut off Russia’s access to the goods it needs to build the weapons the Kremlin wants. This includes looking to expand our sanctions and export control regime to capture the fact that Russia’s entire economy is now on a war footing.

Russia’s Main Partner

To be successful, we have to be clear-eyed about how the Russian military-industrial complex works. Right now, we know the Kremlin does not have the ability to build its war economy without external support. Russia has always needed goods from abroad to support its industrial base. For many decades, companies in this room and across the G7 provided the electronics, engines, and other components that powered Russian machinery. Our decision to cut Russia off from these goods made it more difficult for the Kremlin to build the tanks and bombs it needs to sustain its war of choice.

Russia has now adapted by deepening ties with Iran, North Korea, and particularly, China. Last year, Russia imported $5.2 billion worth of sensitive, dual-use goods from China-based suppliers, an increase of over 40 percent in just one year. The Kremlin knows it can only meet its military goals with China’s assistance. This is why President Putin was in China two weeks ago. It’s why he toured the Harbin Institute of Technology, which is known for research of rockets, missiles, and UAVs, and which recently opened a joint campus with St. Petersburg State University.

No other country has the capacity to supply Russia with the quantity of machine tools, microelectronics, and other goods the Kremlin needs to build weapons. Beijing may not be sending tanks or missiles to Russia, but the Kremlin cannot produce these weapons at scale or continue its war without the assistance of companies and financial institutions in China.

In addition, many of the goods from our coalition’s countries that are still being found in Russian military equipment are largely being transshipped through China. There is more we can and must do in our countries to prevent transshipment through third countries, but we must recognize that Chinese firms today are Russia’s indispensable partner in building weapons.

I want to be clear: our goal is not to shut down all bilateral trade between Russia and China. Our goal is to convince China to stop sending Russia a set of dual-use goods that are actively being used to prosecute a war Beijing has told us they want to see end. We have provided China and other countries around the world with a list of these dual-use goods that are being used to make weapons for the battlefield. Many countries have stopped selling these dual-use goods to Russia, but the partnership between China and Russia has only deepened.

And this partnership may seem like a distant threat to our companies and our countries. But we should remember that before this war started, we often talked about our concerns with Europe’s dependence on Russian gas and the need to diversify supply chains. That too was once a distant threat. But the consequences of inaction became apparent when Russia weaponized its energy exports. Once again, there are warning signs flashing. This time because of Chinese support for the Russian military-industrial base. We should not be blind to the fact that a growing Russian military with material support from Chinese companies will only grow in ambition.

Our Response

That’s why we must be explicit with every individual, company, and country that providing the Russian military-industrial complex with support is unacceptable.

This needs to start at home, including with companies within our countries. As Ukrainians have directly raised with me, Russian weapons found on the battlefield have American- and European-branded components. The United States is engaging with our manufacturing, distribution, and freight forwarding firms to build out better compliance regimes to prevent our goods from ending up in Russia. We need our allies to do the same housekeeping with their private sectors, and we need companies around the world to take similar steps.

When the private sector doesn’t act, we are ready to. That includes taking action against companies in countries that are facilitating transactions to help the Russian military industrial complex get these goods. We must also strengthen our domestic customs and export control enforcement in order to make sure that unscrupulous companies in our countries cannot support the Russian war machine.

Every country in our coalition and every member of NATO must also consistently and clearly communicate to Beijing that it is unacceptable for Chinese to abet the Russian military-industrial base. President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and Secretary Yellen have joined with European leaders to raise this issue in varying degrees with PRC leadership.

And while our words matter, our actions matter more. The EU as a whole is China’s largest export market, and China remains the largest exporter in key sectors like chemicals and machinery to the EU. We recognize the EU’s economic relationship with China is mutually significant, and we must make the choice stark for China: Chinese firms can either do business in our economies or they can equip Russia’s war machine with dual-use goods. They cannot do both.

We must make clear to Chinese companies that we are all prepared to use our sanctions and export controls to hold them accountable. And the United States, Europe, and all of our allies have to act together in following through by using our economic tools so that there is no daylight between our policies.

Of course, our preference is to not have to use these tools. Our economies are intertwined with China’s. We do not seek to decouple from China. We want a healthy economic relationship with China that benefits both sides. But if China does not put a stop to the trade of dual-use goods to Russia, we will have to take action to hold them accountable.

I recognize that if we are forced to take these steps, many in this room may worry about the economic repercussions to our companies and our economies. But my view is that failure to convince China to stop selling dual-use goods to Russia poses a significant threat to Europe’s national security – to global security – which in turn will disrupt our economic futures. A resurgent, militarized, and mobilized Russia would mean greater geopolitical challenges to our economies. It would mean a greater threat of economic coercion. And it would mean tough trade-offs between defense spending and other priorities at home.

When he was in China, Putin said that cooperation between the PRC and Russia “serves as one of the main stabilizing factors in the international arena.” I am doubtful that many of you think that an emboldened Russia would be stabilizing for the German, European, or global economy—that a Russian victory in Ukraine would be an economically preferable outcome for your companies. That’s why we have to take concerted actions to scrutinize our supply chains, adapt our business models, and stop Putin’s military ambitions.

And we don’t have endless time to deliberate. The Russian military-industrial complex is growing in size because Putin has gone all in. He is confident that with a reconfigured economy he can overpower Ukraine and challenge NATO. His confidence stems from the fact that he thinks he can wait us out—that our support for Ukraine will wane and that we will grow complacent in our response to his aggression. Let us prove him wrong.

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Sweden has finally come home

p.busse — Thu, 18 Apr 2024 07:24:12 +0000

by Veronika Wand-Danielsson, Sweden’s Ambassador to Germany

Sweden’s application for NATO membership and its accession is a historic paradigm shift. Since Sweden is leaving behind more than two centuries of military non-alignment – this is a Swedish “Zeitenwende”. After Russia´s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the then Social Democratic government under Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson immediately appointed an inter-parliamentary working group to analyze the new security policy consequences of the attack for Sweden and for Europe. The working group concluded that Russia would pose a serious threat to European and Swedish security also in the long term and that it was therefore in Sweden’s national interest to join NATO together with Finland.

[related]Joining NATO is a paradigm shift for Sweden and for the Swedish people. Our Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson recently stated, “Sweden has finally come home“! As a new NATO member, our population now feels safer thanks to NATO’s defence guarantees. And Sweden is, of course, prepared to protect also the common security of the NATO alliance. Moreover, joining NATO is seen as a natural and final step after three decades of ever closer partnership with NATO. In 1994, Sweden joined PFP (Partnership for Peace) and one year later, in December 1995, Swedish troops were under the command of NATO-SFOR in Bosnia for the first time. Since then, Sweden has made a significant contribution to all major NATO crisis management operations, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, often in close cooperation with Germany. In this respect, we have long been a close partner. Since 2014 Sweden has been part of a group of Enhanced Opportunities Partners, participating in most NATO Ministerial meetings and also participated in numerous NATO-led exercises.

Our membership has strong and broad support both in parliament and among our population. The application to join NATO was made with broad parliamentary support – six out of eight parties were in favour of the decision. Membership is also supported by the population. Between 2021 and 2022, the Russian full-scale invasion led to the biggest and fastest change of public opinion in Swedish history: in 2021, only 29% supported NATO membership, today the support is stable at 67%.

Sweden and Finland will extend NATO’s operational depth in the Baltic Sea region and link the far north, the North Atlantic, more closely with the Baltic Sea region.

Following the accession of Finland and Sweden, political cooperation in the north and with the Baltic states will deepen. Today, all Baltic Sea countries – except for Russia – are members of the Alliance. This will fundamentally change the security context in our part of Europe. Sweden and Finland will extend NATO’s operational depth in the Baltic Sea region and link the far north, the North Atlantic, more closely with the Baltic Sea region.

Sweden’s geostrategic position will make a decisive contribution to being able to deploy also reinforcements from North America in Europe

With Sweden as a member, our sea, airspace and territory can be used for reinforcements to be deployed quickly from Swedish soil to the Baltic states. In addition, Sweden’s geostrategic position will make a decisive contribution to being able to deploy also reinforcements from North America in Europe.

At the same time, this means also a greater responsibility for Sweden in protecting sea transports through the Baltic Sea, above all to secure supplies for Finland. We will assume this responsibility in our neighbourhood and contribute to the deterrence policy of the Alliance and all Allies.

Sweden also has some unique military capabilities. Our fighter planes will participate in NATO’s Baltic Air Policing and Sweden’s unique naval forces, which are particularly suited to the conditions of the Baltic Sea, will be able to jointly with the German navy control the Baltic Sea approaches.

The Swedish government recently decided to reinforce the Canadian-led Nato presence in Latvia with a battalion. All in all, our defence spending has been doubled between 2020 and 2024. This means that Sweden has already reached the NATO standard of 2% of GDP this year.

To conclude: NATO is making Sweden safer – and Sweden is making NATO stronger!

About the author: Veronika Wand-Danielsson is Sweden’s Ambassador to Germany since September 1st of 2023. Prior to this position she was Director of the department for Europe and North America and of the department for America in Sweden’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs. From 2014 until 2020 she was Sweden’s Ambassador to France and Monaco.

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The bedrock of European security has British DNA

p.busse — Wed, 17 Apr 2024 07:15:25 +0000

by Jill Gallard, British Ambassador to Germany

On 4 April 1949, delegates from 12 countries – including the UK – gathered in Washington, D.C., to commit their nations to one another’s defence in the hope of avoiding another devastating war and to safeguard the democracy and freedom of their peoples.

Ever since NATO’s foundation, the United Kingdom has played a leading role at the heart of this transatlantic Alliance. It could even be said that NATO has British DNA: its first headquarters were in London; its first Secretary General British; and the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was instrumental in negotiating its establishment.

Three quarters of a century later, NATO is now the most successful defensive Alliance in history. NATO is bigger, stronger, and more united than ever, keeping its one billion people safer and more secure with its “one for all and all for one” security guarantee. It is essential for the maintenance of peace and security of its members and has been the bedrock of European security for 75 years.

NATO is bigger, stronger, and more united than ever, keeping its one billion people safer and more secure with its “one for all and all for one” security guarantee.

[related]Two of the leading members of this Alliance are the UK and Germany. Indeed, Germany of course plays a unique role in enabling NATO’s defence capabilities. For example, more than a quarter of the British Army’s collective training takes place in Germany, leveraging the country’s strategic location at the heart of Europe. Additionally, Germany’s role as the “Drehscheibe” allows the UK to effectively prepare, deploy, and support forward defence forces along the NATO Alliance’s Eastern Flank.

Furthermore, Germany and the UK are the only NATO countries that conduct fully integrated air policing operations. This seamless integration of air defence capabilities across the Alliance is a testament to our strong defence cooperation.

As British Ambassador to Germany, I am also particularly aware of the pivotal role Berlin played in the formation of NATO. The Berlin Blockade which began in 1948 by Soviet forces cutting off links to West Berlin and the subsequent Allied airlift efforts may have ended peacefully after nearly a year. However, a few weeks after the end of the blockade, East and West Berlin officially separated. Over a decade later, on 13 August 1961, the world awoke to over 100km of barbed wire encircling West Berlin. This was one of the darkest days for post-war Europe.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and challenged global security

This year marks not only NATO’s 75th anniversary, but also 35 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yet, the optimism and hopefulness in the early 1990s that followed its fall is now only a faint memory. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine two years ago has shattered peace and stability in Europe and challenged global security.

This security crisis, of Russian President Putin’s making, threatens our way of life. The UK, Germany and our NATO allies must act to protect our societies – and both resource and resolve are required. Germany’s support of Ukraine since the Russian invasion began – a total of €28 billion in military support provided or pledged (including at least €7 billion in 2024) – has therefore been invaluable. It is however clear that if Russia succeeds, the outcome will be far more expensive than helping Ukraine now. Ukraine is not only defending its right to exist as a sovereign and democratic country; it is defending the right of peoples of all nations to live in freedom, without fear of aggression.

Putin has underestimated NATO. When he invaded Ukraine in 2022, he said he wanted less NATO – what he got was more.

Putin has underestimated NATO. When he invaded Ukraine in 2022, he said he wanted less NATO – what he got was more. Finland and Sweden becoming allies makes NATO stronger and all of us more secure. NATO continues to deter Russia, strengthen its defence industrial base, and build its partnerships.

2024 will be a historic year for NATO. As the Alliance celebrates its 75th birthday, the combination of the ongoing war in Ukraine, growing geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific, and emerging technologies will require NATO and its allies to show it can adapt to meet the challenges of the next 75 years.

In this more contested and less secure world, NATO’s importance is only set to expand. This anniversary is the moment to renew our historic pledge to this Alliance and to say that no matter what or who tests us, we will not waiver.

About the author: Jill Gallard was appointed British Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany on 11 November 2020. Before joining the Embassy, she was the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Deputy Political Director (2018-2020) and Director of Human Resources (2014-2018). From 2011 to 2014 Gallard served as British Ambassador to Portugal.

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Finland in NATO is a Security Provider

p.busse — Fri, 12 Apr 2024 13:25:03 +0000

by Klaus Korhonen, Ambassador of Finland to NATO in 2023, when Finland officially joined NATO

A brief but dignified ceremony in front of NATO Headquarters, Brussels, marked Finland’s accession to the Atlantic Alliance on 4 April 2023, NATO’s 74^th anniversary. Secretary General Stoltenberg and then president Sauli Niinistö gave speeches that reflected the significance of the day. “The era of military non-alignment in our history has come to an end. A new era begins.”, said the President of the Republic.

The Finnish flag was raised to the new flagpole that had appeared among those of existing Allies. After that, the yellow-blue identity cards of an Invitee Country were taken away from the staff of the Finnish Delegation and the all-blue Member State IDs were given to replace them. Finland had become the 31^st nation to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Joining NATO was a big step, but also in many ways natural development in Finland’s foreign and security policy. Finland and Sweden already for years had been NATO’s closest Partners. Technical and military interoperability was at a high level, and Finland had participated in almost all NATO-led crisis management operations after the end of the Cold War. Democracy, human rights and international law are important for Finland, and these are the very things that NATO is defending.

We had excellent relations with all members of NATO already before our accession but now we are part of the Transatlantic Community like never before.

Finland became a member of the European Union already 29 years ago, and a large majority of our fellow EU members were also members of NATO. What is really new is that Finland for the first time in its history is also allied with the United States and Canada. We had excellent relations with all members of NATO already before our accession but now we are part of the Transatlantic Community like never before. Advancing cooperation between the European Union and NATO is now one of the main goals of Finland as an Ally.

[related] Northern European landmass is framed by the Baltic Sea, North Atlantic and the Barents Sea, and Finland and Sweden have been all the time there in the middle. In practical terms Finland has been protecting NATO’s Northern Flank already as a Partner. Joining NATO makes geostrategic sense both to the Alliance and to our two nations. Finland’s accession to NATO increases Finland’s security and the security of NATO.

After the Cold War Finland never cut back on its defence

NATO is a defence alliance and is trying to advance peace in the world. Finland’s accession to this Alliance is not aimed against anybody. Alexander Stubb, the new President of Finland, noted in his inaugural speech on 1 March this year, that “as an ally, Finland will contribute to NATO’s collective deterrence and defence”. Certainly, Finland intends to be a security provider. We continue to be responsible for the defence or our own territory and sovereignty.

After the Cold War Finland never cut back on its defence. We continue to have a conscription army with a wartime strength of approximately 280.000 soldiers, and the number of trained reserves is close to one million – in a country of 5.5 million people. Finland’s air defence will be enhanced by the 64 new F-35 jet fighters, that beginning from 2026 will replace the F-18s as fighters of our Air Force. Our defence spending is well above the target of 2 percent of GDP that NATO members have committed themselves to. According to NATO’s figures, Finland’s defence spending is currently sixth largest among 32 Allies. Finland will also bring to the Alliance a lot of expertise on countering hybrid threats and on strengthening the resilience of our societies. We have been able to engage the public sector and private enterprises to cooperate in resilience and safeguarding the critical functions of the society in a way that interested NATO already during our status as a Partner Country.

Finland’s values, interests and goals have not changed. NATO is a new forum in which to promote them together with 31 like-like minded Allies. It has been said, that we now live in the age of maximum danger and minimum agreement in international relations. Managing and preventing risks in such a situation is as necessary as it is difficult. NATO is very important for my country, and Finland’s accession makes NATO stronger.

NATO is about solidarity

After Russia’s brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine 24 February 2022, Finland immediately joined the large group of countries that are giving robust assistance to Ukraine, especially the urgently needed heavy weapons and ammunition. Finnish aid to Ukraine per capita is today among the highest of NATO Allies.

Russia’s attack was also the decisive factor that changed Finnish public opinion in favour of joining NATO. It triggered an intensive political process to adapt Finland’s orientation to a changed security environment.

NATO is about solidarity. According to a recent poll, 91% of the Finnish population is willing to defend another NATO Ally in case of an aggression. We are committed to the security of every Member of NATO. One of the first solidarity steps as an Ally is participation in NATO’s peacetime missions. In 2024, the Finnish Navy will participate in Mine Countermeasures mission in the Baltic Sea, and the Air Force will take part in NATO’s Air Shielding mission in Romania, Bulgaria and the Black Sea.

On 4 April 2024 Finland celebrated its first anniversary as a NATO Ally. One for all, all for one.

About the author: Klaus Korhonen, Ambassador for Policy Planning at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Helsinki. Mr. Korhonen was previous Finnish ambassador to NATO during the accession process.

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How to Trump-proof Europe

p.busse — Mon, 19 Feb 2024 13:32:18 +0000

by Steven Hill

The US presidential election is fast approaching, with anxiety rising on both sides of the Atlantic. The political resurgence of the orange-haired, hockey-masked, Friday the 13th assailant who keeps rising again and again has everyone on the edge of their seat.

2024 already is looking to be a challenging year, from Ukraine to Gaza to North Korea. What’s at stake for Europe if the Real Donald Trump once again becomes president?

[related]Pretty much everything. Russia, Ukraine, NATO, climate change, bilateral trade, the Middle East, China, Viktor Orban, digital security, the very stability of the European Union itself, all of these major policy dimensions will be dramatically impacted if Trump returns. Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, says even Russian interference in American democracy didn’t stop Trump “from being less confrontational with Putin than with European leaders.”

And this time around it will be the Donald 2.0 version. Rather than Trump having been chastened by the disaster of his first term, instead his recent speeches and social media messages show that he has become a Macbeth-like figure, consumed by sociopathic fantasies of revenge and domination of all who do not genuflect to his authority – whether individuals or nations. He has said that in a second term, his alliances and appointments would be prized above all for their loyalty to his rule and dictates.

How might this affect the EU’s security and economy?

Let me count the ways. In a replay of his previous “America First” policy, Trump has suggested that if he is reelected in November 2024, he will negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine “in 24 hours,” and demand that Europe reimburse the US for ammunition used in Ukraine and kill Ukraine’s bid for NATO admission. Author and foreign policy expert Anne Applebaum says Trump may well abandon NATO entirely, and “faith in collective defense could evaporate quickly…The prospect of America leaving NATO would force many European countries to keep their military resources at home; after all, they might soon face invasion as well.” Most recently, Trump outrageously claimed that he threatened NATO allies who he viewed as delinquent in paying NATO support with encouraging Russia to attack them.

Trump has also said he will withdraw from all climate agreements, and impose a ten percent tariff on all imports from Europe and other nations, even if it unleashes a global economic war. That’s no small threat, since the EU’s $16 trillion economy is heavily reliant on trade with the United States. The US is the EU’s biggest source of foreign direct investment and the $1.3 trillion in tradebetween America and the EU is the largest bilateral trade and investment relationship in the world, 40 percent greater than the EU’s trade with China.

In short, Trump is already threatening to overturn the transatlantic relationship and the global order even more than he did last time. Surrounded by sycophants and loyalists, there would be no “adults in the room” to rein in the tantruming childish Trump.

Key areas where the EU needs to prepare for the worst

So what can Europeans do to prepare – to “Trump-proof” Europe, as it has been called? It won’t be easy. Europe will have to be more united than ever. And it will have to fill the enormous American leadership void, learning to help Ukraine defend against Russia, promote human rights, keep open trade flowing, safeguard its own borders (including its digital borders), fight climate change and champion democracy. Here are some key areas where the EU needs to prepare for the worst, even as it hopes for the best:

Trade: Europe can shield itself from Trump’s protectionist policies by forging trade agreements with other nations and regional markets. It also should deepen its single market, particularly the financial, digital and service sectors. European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde says a more robust single market that better ensures the free movement of goods, services, people and capital across 27 member states would make it easier for smaller companies to raise funding and “facilitate and encourage innovation.”

China: Trump might well threaten sanctions on major telecom operators who use Chinese equipment, so the EU should anticipate that possibility by reducing any critical dependencies on Chinese telecommunications products. Failure to do that might result in fragmentation of the EU telecommunications market.

Energy: On the plus side, the share of EU pipeline gas imports from Russia declined from over 40 percent in 2021 to about 8 percent in 2023. But in the meantime, imports of LNG gas from the US tripled to over 50 percent of LNG gas imports. Might Trump pull a Putin on the EU? The EU must speed up its world-leading efforts at conservation and producing renewable energy.

Digital security: EU member states manufacture relatively little of their own cloud-computing systems and telecommunications infrastructure. They depend heavily on both American and Chinese products. Fortunately France, Italy, and Spain are leading by accessing cloud-computing services which are provided by firms headquartered in the EU.

Effective governance: The EU would be wise to address the institutional weaknesses that limit its ability to lead on the global stage. These vulnerabilities include requirements for unanimous vote approvals rather than majority votes. Francis Fukuyama, noted geopolitical strategist and Stanford University professor, laments how the EU’s consensus requirements “allow a single small country to block action by the whole.” Encouraged by Trump, Viktor Orban can be counted on to wield his frequent veto to undermine the EU unless the decision-making rules are changed.

Military and defense: This is a tricky one. A number of defense experts and strategists strongly recommend that Europeans “establish a level of military readiness it has not possessed since the Cold War” and become ”a strong actor, militarily.” But the EU does not have a unitary federal government with a highly visible president who is viewed as the legitimate chief of the armed forces and whose military authority is recognized by all member states. So this comes off as wishful thinking. Nevertheless, in the middle of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Europe’s combined military and financial aid to Ukraine now exceeds that of the United States.

European values: Perhaps the greatest threat that Trump represents to Europe is to its values: multilateralism, environmental responsiveness, the rule of law, and democracy itself. Through his actions and his rhetorical attacks, Trump tramples on these principles and sways public opinion. The EU needs to think hard about how, in order to withstand that pressure internally, it is necessary to defend the rule of law within its own borders.

In short, the EU member states must act as unified as possible. Is that possible?

Past crises have unified Europe

Europe has often needed a crisis to mobilize and to some extent unify its fractious member states. The European debt crisis in 2009-10 motivated the EU toward greater levels of federalism and to more fully integrate its banking systems. The immigration crisis in 2015-16 forced Europe to deal with its border issues and confront issues of member state solidarity. In the COVID-19 pandemic, member states empowered the EU Commission to buy vaccines, and for the first time the commission borrowed on a large scale to fund Europe’s economic recovery.

Steven Hill

In a counter-intuitive way, Trump 1.0 also had a galvanizing effect on Europe, spurring efforts toward greater self-reliance. Trump’s previous tariffs on EU steel and aluminum not only mobilized the EU to respond with tariffs on $3 billion worth of US goods, but to strengthen the euro by further integrating EU banks and financial systems. It led to the signing of trade agreements with new partners in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Trump’s threats over Europe’s defense spending levels nudged the EU to help reinvigorate NATO under the Biden administration, and led to institutional incentives for member states to spend more on defense. In response to Trump, the EU created the European Peace Facility that supports the armies of partner countries and EU member states with infrastructure, training and equipment. When Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022, the EPF was employed to provide military aid to Ukraine.

So EU unity is the best remedy to any Trump 2.0 reckless brinksmanship. But what could incentivize more unity?

Josef Braml from the Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy in Berlin recommends that the EU incur debt together to build more defense capability and European cohesion. “Europe must act as a united player. We have to think bigger,” he says, to “support individual states financially, and impose conditions on them in return. With money from shared European borrowing, we could also afford our own defense.”

In that light, Trump’s reelection becomes a test not only for transatlantic relations, but also for European cohesion. For the foreseeable future, Europeans will have to wonder which America will emerge next November – and what Europe will emerge in response.

Steven Hill is editor and main author of DemocracySOS and the author of the book “Europe’s Promise: Why the European Way Is the Best Hope In an Insecure Age.” You can reach out to him under @StevenHill1776.

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Statement by the Board of Directors on the attack on Israel

p.busse — Mon, 09 Oct 2023 18:39:10 +0000

Few institutions in Germany are so closely linked with Jewish history as Atlantik-Brücke. Despite the devastation of the World War II. and the Holocaust, it was Jewish refugees who had fled the country, then returned to Germany. They founded Atlantik-Brücke to forge new partnerships and friendships out of bitter animosity. Just as the founders of our organization played a crucial role in integrating the Federal Republic of Germany within the West and anchoring transatlantic relations at the core of German identity, they also played an active role in the creation and establishment of Israeli institutions. This common history binds us today: the extraordinary relationship and the advocacy for freedom and peace in Israel are key fixtures of our transatlantic identity.

With this special legacy in the forefront in our minds, the devastating terrorist attacks by the terrorist group Hamas seize us with horror and grief. Comparisons to the Yom Kippur War 50 years ago or even to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 help us to digest the severity of the situation, and we have read and heard much of this over the past several days. But the atrocities from this weekend stand on their own: terror, murder, abduction.

The State of Israel has a right to its military strength and defense. As close partners, Europeans and Americans bear responsibility to debilitate the capabilities of Hamas, a recognized terrorist organization. We stand with Israel and the many friends, family members and colleagues who are affected and wish them strength and endurance during this terrible time.

With deep respect,

Board of Directors
Julia Friedlander, Sigmar Gabriel, Prof. Dr. Michael Hüther, Dr. Norbert Röttgen, Ute Wolf

_________________________________________________

GERMAN VERSION

Nur wenige Institutionen und Vereine sind in unserem Land so sehr mit der Geschichte jüdischer Bürgerinnen und Bürger verbunden wie die Atlantik-Brücke. Trotz der Zerstörungen des 2. Weltkrieges und des Holocausts waren es aus Deutschland geflüchtete Juden, die nach Ende des Krieges zurück nach Deutschland kamen und mit der Atlantik-Brücke die Idee verbanden, aus ehemals erbitterten Feinden neue Partner und Freunde werden zu lassen. So wie die Gründer unseres Vereins einen großen Beitrag dazu geleistet haben, die Bundesrepublik in den Westen zu integrieren und die transatlantischen Beziehungen als Grundpfeiler der deutschen Identität zu verankern, haben sie auch eine aktive Rolle bei der Schaffung und Etablierung von Institutionen in Israel gespielt. Diese gemeinsame Geschichte verbindet uns bis heute: Die besondere Beziehung und das Einstehen für die Freiheit und den Frieden Israels sind integraler Bestandteil unseres transatlantischen Selbstverständnisses.

Auch vor diesem besonderen Hintergrund blicken wir mit großem Entsetzen auf die verheerenden Angriffe der Terrorgruppe Hamas und sind in tiefer Trauer. Vergleiche zum Yom-Kippur-Krieg vor 50 Jahren oder gar zu den Terroranschlägen des 11. September 2001 dienen dazu, die Ernsthaftigkeit der Lage zu verdeutlichen; darüber haben wir in den letzten Tagen sehr viel gehört und gelesen. Aber die Gräueltaten vom Wochenende stehen für sich: Terror, Mord und Entführung.

Der Staat Israel hat das Recht auf seine Wehrhaftigkeit und Verteidigung. Als enge Partner haben Europäer und Amerikaner die Verantwortung, die Handlungsfähigkeit der offiziell als Terrorgruppe eingestuften Hamas zu entkräften. Wir stehen an der Seite Israels und den vielen Freunden, Familienmitgliedern und Kollegen, die betroffen sind und wünschen viel Kraft in dieser furchtbaren Zeit.

Im Namen des

Geschäftsführenden Vorstandes
Julia Friedlander, Sigmar Gabriel, Prof. Dr. Michael Hüther, Dr. Norbert Röttgen, Ute Wolf

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“Canada’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific is year-round”

r.fehrenbach — Fri, 25 Aug 2023 10:11:22 +0000

Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, explains Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. In this conversation he stresses the relevance of free, open and secure maritime routes and outlines the global operations of the Canadian fleet. The interview took place in the aftermath of the German-Canadian Conference in Ottawa.

Vice-Admiral Topshee, what role does the Indo-Pacific play in strategic planning?

The Indo-Pacific region will play a critical role in shaping Canada’s future over the next half-century. Encompassing 40 economies, over four billion people and $47.19 trillion in economic activity, it is the world’s fastest growing-region and home to six of Canada’s top 13 trading partners. The Indo-Pacific region represents significant opportunities for growing the Canadian economy and advancing the interests of Canadian workers and businesses for decades to come. In terms of strategic planning for the Royal Canadian Navy, the current deployment model ensures the RCN is meeting commitments to both NATO and the Indo-Pacific region.

In accordance with the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the RCN will be sending three frigates dedicated to upholding the international law of the sea, including the UN convention through forward naval presence operations, in the waters of the Indo-Pacific to demonstrate that Canada’s commitment to that region of the world is year-round.

What are the biggest challenges the RCN has in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific?

[related]One of the Royal Canadian Navy’s most critical roles in the Indo-Pacific region is to contribute to overall security and support the international rules-based order at sea. Stability in the Indo-Pacific is essential to global stability. The region is home to numerous security hotspots with potential global repercussions, and Canada must engage as a regional security partner to protect our national interests and security. The RCN as per the Indo-Pacific Strategy will additionally seek to address the climate change portion of the security spectrum in this region; and will collaborate with regional fisheries, the Canadian Coast Guard and allied coast guards to deter illegal, underreported, or unregulated fishing occurring within economic zones.

What is the status of the Royal Canadian Navy? Tell us more about Ship maintenance and availability.

The Royal Canadian Navy is currently conducting operations across the globe, with Maritime Coastal Defense Vessels HMCS Summerside and Shawinigan having just departed in early July to join Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG1) in European waters, frigates HMCS Ottawa and Vancouver deploying in August on Operation HORIZON in the Indo-Pacific region, and the first in class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessel HMCS Harry DeWolf departing for Operation NANOOK throughout the Canadian Arctic this fall.

Security at home starts on the high seas. As the RCN works together with like-minded nations, we underpin stability for all. To ensure our fleet can fulfil our Navy’s commitments, strategic choices are made to match appropriate platforms to specific responsibilities, and scheduling of deployments aids to avoid lengthy transit and allow for force generation time, accommodates force generation training, and builds crucial experiences and skills for our professional sailors. Overall, in terms of ship maintenance, the RCN is examining the level of investment needed for the length of time required for ship service life and is planning accordingly for maintenance periods to allow for preventative maintenance and the upgrading of new systems and/or equipment.

The RCN is also undergoing the most comprehensive fleet modernization in its peacetime history. Three new platforms are at various stages of entering the RCN fleet. The Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) class are entering operational status in the fleet, with HMC Ships Harry DeWolf and Margaret Brooke already having deployed, and HMCS Max Bernays soon to be turned over to the RCN for sea trials. The remaining three AOPS are under construction.

As indicated in Canada’s defense policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, the Government is acquiring 15 surface combatants. The Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) is the largest, most complex procurement undertaken by the Government of Canada. Secondly, Joint Support Ships will form the core of the future fleet of the RCN. As auxiliary oiler replenishment vessels, they will surpass the operational capabilities of their predecessors. Together with the Joint Support Ships, the CSCs will form the core of the RCN’s future fleet.

The work our ships and sailors undertake overseas reinforces Canadian diplomatic efforts, promotes Canadian values, and reinforces our national credibility on the world stage, a challenge which we are proud to tackle.

What are some of the challenges with maritime security situation and the like?

Canada, at its heart, is a maritime trading and seafaring nation. In 2019, roughly $336 billion (28%) of Canada’s approximate $1.2 trillion in total goods trade was transported by sea. By working to ensure free and open trade on the world’s oceans, the RCN has a direct impact on our economy. Stability at sea helps Canada thrive, economically, socially and politically. One of the Navy’s critical roles is to make sure that peaceful exchange of goods occurs and follows the fundamental structure under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Because of this, the RCN is called to serve and patrol across the globe.

The work our ships and sailors undertake overseas reinforces Canadian diplomatic efforts, promotes Canadian values, and reinforces our national credibility on the world stage, a challenge which we are proud to tackle.

What is the RCN doing about personnel issues and retention with regard to the Naval Experience Program?

The Navy — like the rest of the Canadian Armed Forces — has encountered challenges with recruiting, training, and retaining diverse Canadian talent. Therefore, the Navy is rethinking the way we attract, recruit, and train sailors. The Naval Experience Program (NEP) is the newest tool in the Royal Canadian Navy’s toolbox to help accomplish this. The overall concept is to reduce the amount of time it takes to train civilians into sailors while allowing them to experience life in the Navy before choosing a trade. The Naval Experience Program’s aim is simple: to foster the development of sailors who love their work and who enjoy the unique lifestyle that the Navy offers. After a one-year Term of Service, participants can either choose to continue to serve with the Navy, either full or part-time. The program also allows the Navy to assess the suitability of new recruits with the Canadian Armed Forces ethos and Code of Conduct. As of July 5, 2023, 326 applicants have begun their recruiting journey through the NEP.

Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee is the 38th Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy. Here you can learn more about him.

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Russian Propaganda in the Southern Hemisphere: A Simplistic Scapegoat

r.fehrenbach — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 14:59:11 +0000

by Gavin Wilde

As Russia’s war on Ukraine drags into its second year, a certain narrative has taken hold among the Western foreign policy commentariat: “Russia is winning the information war in the Global South.” The case is relatively simple: states throughout Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia are relatively permissive environments for Russian state-backed media—both traditional and online. Many of these states have meanwhile largely refrained from full-throated condemnation of Moscow’s brutal and illegal invasion of neighboring Ukraine and have largely sidestepped adoption of (or adherence to) Western sanctions regimes. Surely, as the thinking goes, there must be a causal link between the former and the latter. Surely Western governments, in league with civil society organizations, can bring these states and their publics around to the truth through improved counter-propaganda efforts. Right?

[related]However alluring this narrative may be to decision-makers in Western capitals, its simplicity should lend them pause – particularly because it demands so little of them, ascribes too much credit to Moscow, and dismisses so much about the rest of the world. Blaming Russian propaganda for the southern hemisphere’s relative ambivalence toward the war is colonialism by any other name. Ironically, such misplaced focus risks reinforcing the very ambivalence it aims to counter.

Beyond the empirically faulty view that humans are mere byproducts of the media they consume, overemphasis on Russian propaganda assumes that its prevalence within a given population equates to persuasion among that population. When it comes to Russia’s war on Ukraine, there are reasons to be skeptical of such logic. Last April, a Gallup poll of 137 countries indicated Russia’s image has indeed suffered globally. In fact, the largest majority in Gallup’s history of rating world leaders now disapprove of the Kremlin. These figures include Latin America, where median disapproval climbed from 31% in 2021 to 61% in 2022. Meanwhile, approval of Russia’s leadership in sub-Saharan Africa fell from a median of 45% in 2021 to 35% in 2022. Disapproval among those polled in the Asia Pacific region jumped by 11%. While far from diagnostic, such indicators are at least sufficient to counter sweeping statements about public sentiment toward Russia in the so-called Global South.

The degree to which Russian propaganda is formative—or merely reflective—of public opinion in these regions is a much broader question. But it hardly explains attitudes toward the war, say researchers. Most media coverage in the southern hemisphere focuses on the war’s domestic implications – on food prices, exchange rates, and other everyday impacts. To the extent that translates into “pro-Russian” sentiment, “not all of that is a result of Russian information campaigns,” says Rachel Rizzo of the Atlantic Council. Particularly in states where healthcare, climate, infrastructure, terrorism, famine, and fiscal instability are ever-present concerns, the mosaic of lived experience is far more complex than media messaging. In this regard, Russia (and China) often “show up” in ways the West fails to – diplomatically, economically, and otherwise.

In this regard, Russia tries to capitalize upon historical memory of the Cold War-era in the southern hemisphere, drawing on legacy ties between these capitals and Moscow, and on painful reminders of Western colonialism. But even this dynamic may be fraying, says Centre for Liberal Strategies chair Ivan Krastev. In terms of soft-power, contemporary Russia is a shadow of post-war Soviet empire—which “paradoxically…leaves the non-western world relatively unmoved by what Moscow is doing in Ukraine,” less a signal of active support than of passive indifference. “The customary privilege of regional powers is to not be hated outside their region,” Krastev notes, drawing an implicit contrast with the great power status of a bygone era. “Moscow now enjoys this privilege.”

This is likely cold comfort for Western leaders seeking to galvanize support for Ukraine, encountering the same unfamiliarity and emotional distance toward a European conflict as many Westerners have long held toward regional conflicts in the southern hemisphere. But this signals less a need for better messaging and media, more for better statecraft—the type of which Kyiv appears to now be undertaking. For polities around the globe, norms, ideology, and regime-type are only animating to a point; the practicalities and lived experience of policy and engagement are far more compelling. As International Crisis Group CEO Comfort Eros notes, “Western leaders often now view policy elsewhere through the lens of Ukraine. That could be good if it helps with things the rest of the world cares about; less so if countries feel forced into camps.”

This is not to dismiss the brazen perfidy of Russian propaganda on the global stage, but a reminder that it is never as omnipotent as advertised. Too often, it serves as a convenient scapegoat for deeper policy problems in the community of developing nations, and a distraction from a greater Western role in addressing them.

Gavin Wilde is a Senior Fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Before joining the Carnegie Endowment he worked in the National Security Council at the White House. You can learn more about Gavin Wilde here.

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De-risking as an economic strategy

r.fehrenbach — Thu, 29 Jun 2023 14:35:37 +0000

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the EU Commission, has proposed a “De-risking” strategy for Europe vis-à-vis China in contrast to a “De-Coupling” approach. Bruegel’s Senior Fellow Maria Demertzis analyzes the prospects of success. You can read the original article here.

by Maria Demertzis

Using a strategy of de-risking to deal with an increasingly fragmented world makes good economic sense. President von der Leyen first launched the strategy in a speech in March 2023. Since then, both the Biden administration and the G7 have embraced the idea.

[related]Naturally, just one word is not enough to capture the real intentions of any given strategy. But as a way of summarising the motivation and predicting what it could achieve, de-risking constitutes a considerable improvement to both notions of decoupling and strategic autonomy.

The US continues to advocate decoupling as a way of dealing with China. The motivation behind this is to exclude China from the US market and therefore cut an important source of income for the Chinese economy. But a protectionist agenda is not easily justified on economic grounds, and it feeds into a vicious cycle that is sure to be harmful.

The EU had never believed that decoupling was either possible or desirable. But limiting dependence on China was a key part of the EU’s thinking. Strategic autonomy became the catchphrase to capture the need to react to Chinese power. But the term itself is very elusive and soon started reflecting protectionist instincts like ‘buy European’. On top of that, autonomy as a concept does not resonate well with the urgency for global cooperation.

By contrast, de-risking is motivated by the need for diversification and leads to greater resilience. Borrowing from management science, de-risking is a way of caring for business continuity.

For example, energy diversification and accelerating the energy transition helps to minimise the dependence on one supply source or one geography. The Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrated how vulnerable the EU became because of its reliance on cheap energy from Russia. While the cost motive for establishing partnerships was satisfied, a great part of the EU’s economy relied on one source, greatly endangering Europe’s ‘business continuity’, in other words, the ability to run its economy at the desired pace.

Shortening supply chains is another act of diversification that can be explained well by the need to guarantee business continuity. If a supply chain is too long and complex, it becomes unreliable and it therefore makes good economic sense to shorten it. Diversification is a good economic principle, without needing to invoke political motives.

But if de-risking is a strategy for moving away from optimising on costs only to optimising also on resilience, it can also be used as a cover for protectionism.

On this point, both the US and the EU have advocated policies that aim to re-shore some of their production, with little consideration of the damage done in terms of efficiency or, worse, in terms of upholding international agreements.

The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provides a subsidy that has a local content component. It is a subsidy given to companies conditional on a component of the good (i.e cars) being produced in the US. This is in violation of global trade rules and greatly damages the ability to have a global system that is governable. Moreover, it stimulates protectionist reactions in a race to the bottom, which is detrimental to economic efficiency.

The Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA), put forward by the European Commission on 16 March 2023, has elements that can be seen as a protectionist reaction to the IRA. The NZIA aims to have 40% the EU’s cleantech deployment needs produced domestically by 2030. These targets are not credible and are possibly counterproductive. The EU may be able to meet these targets for some technologies, but it will be extremely difficult to do so for others and may even delay the green transition.

Globalisation allows businesses and countries to minimise costs by sourcing from further away. But as the world fragments politically, companies need to think about continuity as well as costs. De-risking is a way to create resilient economic systems and is a good strategy to follow. But it must not be a tool for de-globalisation.

Maria Demertzis is a Senior Fellow at the Brussels-based thinktank Bruegel. Before joining Bruegel she worked for the EU Commission and at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. You can learn more about Maria Demertzis here.

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“No one is safe from repression by the Chinese Communist Party”

Atlantic Bridge — Fri, 02 Jun 2023 11:01:24 +0000

Samuel Chu has experienced what it can mean to speak out publicly for human rights and democracy and against China. The Hong Kong authorities have issued arrest warrants against the founder and president of The Campaign for Hong Kong, a Washington, DC, based organization, and he has been sanctioned by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2021. Samuel Chu spoke at an Atlantik-Brücke event on May 23, 2023, about what signals the events in places like Hong Kong send to policy makers for a transatlantic policy toward China. We conducted the following interview with Mr. Chu after the event.

The mass protests in Hong Kong in 2019/2020 were met with massive repression. Many opposition members and activists left the city as a result. What were the long-term effects on the political situation in Hong Kong?

The crackdown in Hong Kong has been swift and total. In a matter of months, Hong Kong went from one of the freest cities in the world to one of the most restricted regarding public and political freedom and dissent, even compared to the standard of any mainland Chinese city.

While Hong Kong never had a fully democratic political system, there were nonetheless long-standing democratic institutions, civil society, and a robust political opposition that thrived – until now.

Public protests have all but been banned. The election process has been rewritten to ensure that only pro-Beijing parties and individuals can participate. All local independent media outlets have been shut down or forced to close as their publishers and executives sit behind bars. The civil society space has closed – not only protest groups but trade unions, student associations, and charitable organizations – all shuttering or risked facing arrests. Almost every pro-democracy activist and opposition politician is now in jail or exile.

The PRC has broken the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and all the guarantees made to Hong Kongers and the world. Beijing has proven once again that they are not to be trusted.

The collapse of “one country, two systems” might be a temporary blow – but it also frees us from the facade of trying to defend partial freedom with an expiration date. There will not be a free Hong Kong until there is a free China.

Following the passage of a new security law, an arrest warrant was issued for you in 2020. How has this affected your work as an activist?

One thing for certain is that it has not stopped me from continuing to speak out.

But I suspect that the Beijing and Hong Kong authorities knew that they would not be able to silence me. Their goals were broader and more insidious. By targeting me, they are sending a warning to not just my family and friends that they are potential hostages and could suffer because of my actions but also to anyone who might have personal or economic interests in or with China or Hong Kong. It is an attempt to isolate me from the people in Hong Kong and a warning to those outside that any connections or affiliations with me could put a target on their backs.

At the same time, what has happened to me only proves and strengthens the case I have made – no one is safe from CCP repression and interference. I might be the first foreign national to be targeted, but I am surely not the last.

How can Western countries support the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong?

First and foremost, do not accept that Hong Kong is lost forever, and do not buy into the government’s claim that Hong Kong has returned to normal.

Western countries can also continue to support the movement by

Offering asylum and immigration protection for Hong Kongers
Pressing the legal obligations under the Joint Declaration and pursuing all legal and appropriate channels to hold the PRC accountable for violating the treaty
Highlighting the cases of political prisoners in Hong Kong
Issuing up-to-date warnings for businesses operating in Hong Kong and travel advisory for individuals and businesses
Support the Hong Kong diaspora and dissident communities and invest in responses against CCP-sponsored transnational repression
Doing due diligence on PRC investment and “de-risk” from over-reliance on PRC supply chain, market, technology, or investment

China has greatly expanded its geopolitical influence in recent decades, among other things, through massive financial investments abroad, especially in countries of the global South. Can China’s global influence be curtailed, and if so, how?

Any deal with the PRC comes with unwritten “strings” attached, and terms can be changed and ripped up without warning or recourse. The “investments” the PRC has made in developing countries are exploitative – leading to mounting debt, loss of natural resources, and often unwanted or unfinished infrastructures. At the same time, the PRC has been aggressively investing and acquiring critical infrastructures in the West – from 5G networks to power stations, from port terminals to technology manufacturing.

There must be stronger foreign investment screening mechanisms in place. In addition, any decisions to approve investment domestically or abroad must be based on the principle of reciprocity.

But we must also focus on long-term investment and development aid that would provide alternatives to the PRC. Economic development only works in the long term if they are accompanied by democratic political development.

The dependence on Russian gas has made Germany aware of the strategic importance of supply chains. In your opinion, what steps are necessary to avoid becoming similarly dependent on China?

Waking up from its overreliance on Russian gas has been a painful lesson for Europe since the invasion of Ukraine. Still, it is nothing compared to the impact of breaking from a similar overreliance on China.

Businesses are already taking notice and assessing the potential risks of a withdrawal or economic sanctions of the PRC based on what has happened to Russia.

Governments must become more proactive and diligent along the same line. Last year, Germany took a small step in capping guarantees of investments in projects in the PRC. Yet earlier this year, Deutsche Bahn awarded a 64 million Euro contract to supply the components for its new IP network to a company using technology from China’s Huawei.

Notably, the PRC has been actively curtailing its overreliance on the West with its “Made in China 2025” and “Buy China” campaigns for almost a decade. They understand the importance of investing in domestic technology and manufacturing – we should do the same.

Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the conflict over Taiwan has also come more into focus for Germany, and there is growing concern about a Chinese attack on Taiwan. What similarities and differences do you see between these two cases?

Ukraine is to Putin what Taiwan is to Xi. In their quest for “reunification” with sovereign states that they never ruled or controlled, Putin and Xi have crafted false narratives of historical wrongs and national shame that they must rectify.

Moscow and Beijing have also invested heavily in interfering and manipulating the political processes and public discourse in Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively, over the years – only to watch both increasingly reject closer ties and embrace the West.

The crackdown in Hong Kong has served as a double-edged sword for Xi in Taiwan. On the one hand, no one will ever buy into the “one country, two systems” trick and lie again, least of all Taiwan. But on the other hand, the international response to the closing of Hong Kong has hardly been a strong deterrent.

How we continue to stand with Ukraine against Putin (and his “no limits” partnership with Xi) will be paramount when it comes to the fate of Taiwan. The most powerful and important deterrent to China attacking Taiwan is the complete victory of Ukraine against Russia.

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A vicious politicization of everything

p.busse — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 12:46:25 +0000

By Elisabeth Zerofsky

Earlier this year, a prominent conservative writer in the US prompted an outpouring of rage and sympathy from his readers with a long reportage, published in a new journal that has become influential on the American right [1]. In the story, the writer warned that a “Christian nation,” that had been the victim of “modern genocide,” faced “extinction in a territory stippled by their churches and crosses.” This nation-state, he wrote, “risks being downgraded to a rump state,” due not to “ancient, mythical hatreds, not initially, at any rate,” but rather from a dispute whose “origins lie in the rise of modern nationalism amid the breakup of one imperial order—and the birth of a new one.”

The writer was not referring to Ukraine, but rather to Armenia. As for Ukraine, that conflict, according to him, was being morally oversimplified by liberal Washington. Vladimir Putin should be given concessions, so as not to overly provoke him, and the general backlash against all things Russian in America was silly.

This kind of doublethink will unfortunately not be terribly surprising to anyone who has been paying attention to US politics over the last few years. A vicious politicization of everything has prevented the country from reaching coherence (forget about consensus) in its response to multiple crises. As with Covid, the Russian war in Ukraine seems poised to become another casualty in the 2024 presidential election campaign. The facts about Ukraine will, tragically, be largely irrelevant, as the debate between the two sides in the U.S. is, at this point, purely about power – who knows best, and who gets to make decisions.

If liberals or Democrats are in favor of something, you can be certain that Republicans will be against it.

These public relations battles do obscure some more complicated dynamics. Notably, in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the years-long war in the eastern part of the country, the Obama administration declined to send lethal aid to Ukraine. It was the Trump administration that reversed course, sending $47 million worth of lethal weapons (although Trump was impeached the first time, in 2019, for withholding that aid in order to gain campaign favors). There is an old guard among the Republican Party that still sees Russian imperialism as a threat: Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell, for all the damage that he has done over the last years to the rule of law in the United States, made a speech in February, on the anniversary of the war, in which he encouraged his colleagues to “wak[e] up from our holiday from history.” That was in response to calls from Republicans to scale back US aid to Ukraine, or end it altogether. The Republican Party has continued to radicalize over the last few years, and it seems difficult to foresee how that will change. Tucker Carlson, the former Fox News host who is said to have a great deal of influence over the party, recently falsely told his 3.5 million viewers, based on faked intelligence documents, that “seven Ukrainians are being killed for every Russian.” Those who would claim “America First,” sadly, care little about creating a world in which American values flourish.

There are important shifts happening in Europe, too. Poland has emerged since the beginning of the war as a new force in European defense and foreign policy, a role that may increase proportionately to its military, which is slated to become the most powerful land force in Europe in 5 to 10 years. There are Polish parliamentary elections this fall, which could see a change in government in Warsaw, with a new administration that would be friendlier to the German government. Or, if the current Polish government wins reelection, it could find itself faced with a Republican US administration in 2024 that it gets along with better politically and ideologically, but disagrees with on Russia policy. These are all potentially consequential rearrangements.

Some members of the Republican Party argue that the US is spreading itself too thin and should focus on China as the greater adversary. Perhaps this is a way to still appear strong to their voters, while opposing what the Democrats are doing, but the Biden administration is correct to treat Russia and China as related pieces of a greater challenge. From a European vantage point, the only predictable certainty is that the realities that we rely on today cannot be counted on for tomorrow.

Elisabeth Zerofsky is a journalist and Contributing Writer at the New York Times Magazine, based in Berlin. She writes frequently about European and American politics and society.

[1] Armenia’s Race for Survival – Sohrab Amari, Compact, December 22, 2022

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“China should be afraid of us”

p.busse — Thu, 27 Apr 2023 10:17:36 +0000

Bill Browder was the largest foreign investor in Russia—until he became a thorn in Putin’s side because of his activism against corruption. Browder was denied entry to Russia in 2005, and his Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky was murdered in prison in 2009. Browder has warned against Putin for many years and has lobbied for the passing of the Magnitsky Act—a law that provides for the punishment of human rights abusers. Browder was a guest of Atlantik-Brücke in Hamburg and joined a panel with Atlantik-Brücke Vice Chairman Norbert Röttgen and journalist Katja Gloger. Before the event, the Atlantik-Brücke team interviewed Bill Browder about Ukraine, Russia, and the cohesion of the West in the face of an uncertain global situation.

You’ve known President Putin for a long time, and you have been called his number one enemy. You have stressed again and again the danger that he poses. Do you feel that the war against Ukraine has changed the degree to which your warnings about Putin have been taken seriously?

Well, first of all, let me correct the record. I’m no longer his number one enemy. I think that we can all safely conclude that Volodymyr Zelensky is his number one enemy, and probably Alexei Navalny is his number two enemy. I probably occupy the number three spot. And absolutely; the circumstances of the last 12 months have completely changed the way in which people view what I’ve been saying for the last 13 years since Sergei Magnitsky, my lawyer in Russia, was murdered by the Putin regime for uncovering a corruption scheme. I’ve been going around the world announcing very loudly and very clearly that Putin is not a normal head of state. He’s a cold-blooded killer. He’s a financial criminal, and he doesn’t operate using the same values, rules, or anything else that we do. My message was very inconvenient for many people, particularly in Germany, to be honest. Nobody in Germany really wanted to hear what I had to say. There was this—I guess now disgraced—philosophy of peace through trade, that if Russia was making enough money off Germany and vice versa, there would be no possibility of war. Just the opposite happened, which is that Germany for many years was benefiting from Russia to such an extent that the German foreign policy was essentially designed to appease Putin. I don’t blame Germany alone. Here in the UK where I live, everybody loved the oligarch money so much that nobody wanted to rock the boat. It was very difficult to get my message through. People would pay lip service to the issues that I brought up and then carry on appeasing Putin. When the war began, it was an ugly, terrible wake-up call to everybody who had been benefiting or trying to benefit, to those who had been used to sweeping such issues under the carpet. Now, there’s full recognition that what I’d been saying was correct, and full engagement with me regarding some of the issues and policies and my thoughts on what to do about them. But that only began a year ago.

Would you say that the Western sanctions against Russia, which were put in place very quickly after the war started, have been effective? And why have they not managed to dissuade Putin from waging this war?

Sanctions serve one of two purposes. They’re either a deterrent or a punishment. We have never used them properly as a deterrent. If sanctions had been used liberally and aggressively after Russia invaded Georgia, perhaps Crimea wouldn’t have happened. If we had used sanctions after Crimea, perhaps this full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022 wouldn’t have happened. Now that Putin has started the war, he’s not going to be deterred by sanctions. He has to win. If he doesn’t, he faces terrible problems at home, which potentially include losing power, going to jail, and dying. The question then is, what is the purpose of sanctions? And the answer is that sanctions also serve as a punishment. Specifically, we want to punish Russia in such a way that it doesn’t have the financial resources to continue to fight this war. But to do that, it’s a much more all-encompassing project than what we’ve done so far. What we’ve done up to now is terribly painful for the people who have been sanctioned. I can tell you that any oligarch who is sanctioned is feeling extreme pain and the average Russian is feeling extreme pain. They can’t use their iPhones anymore. They can’t go onto Instagram. They can’t travel to Europe. They can’t open bank accounts. Just about everything in their lives is upside down, difficult, and frustrating. But has this starved Putin of his financial resources to execute this war? To a certain extent, yes. Russia can no longer borrow money on the international capital markets so it can’t fund the war that way. About 60 % of Russia’s central bank reserves have been frozen, so it can’t dip into those. But Russia continues to sell oil and gas to a number of countries, particularly China and India. We haven’t figured out a way of stopping that from happening. As a result, money continues to flow in every day, to help them fight this war. And that will carry on until we figure out a way to cut off those financial flows as well.

What are your propositions in terms of how to go about that?

I think that we can go about that in a number of ways. We could say that anybody who buys Russian oil is in violation of U. S. sanctions; as a result, nobody would want to put its oil on their boats in case the boats were in violation of sanctions. There’s a lot of really nasty stuff that we could do, which we haven’t done yet—and we should think about doing it. This is a really ripe area for policy.

Are you worried at all about the consequences of stricter measures, particularly against China? Could this lead to a new Cold War? Or are we already in the middle of a new Cold War?

We have to exert our influence. We were so busy trying to placate Putin that we ended up with the current situation. If we do the same thing with Xi Jinping in China, then he’ll invade Taiwan. China should be afraid of us. If the United States, the European Union, the UK, Canada, Australia, and Japan were to band together and say that any boat carrying Russian oil will be sanctioned along with its owner, then what’s China going to do? I think that we need to be aggressive about this. China is a business-oriented country. If it wants to really get involved in this thing and upset its own business interests, then it’s going to have real problems at home. We have a huge amount of leverage that’s not been used, and we should use it.

Let us get back to Russia and its domestic situation. You already mentioned that the average Russian person’s life has been affected by the sanctions. How does both the effect of the sanctions on Russia and the effect of the war on Russia play out in the political climate within Russia?

There’s a very great assumption in your question that there is a political climate. Russia is now a totalitarian state. Anybody who has an alternative idea is either killed, imprisoned, or exiled. There is no political climate. It doesn’t really matter what people think in Russia. Of course, the regime tries to do whatever it can to bring and keep people on its side. The way they do this is by drumming up fake information and propaganda and by repeating it over and over again. And a lot of people believe it. So you end up with many people supporting the dictator. But anyone who has an alternative idea is not allowed to express it.

To rephrase the question: Do you think that Putin will eventually need to be afraid?

I think Putin has been afraid of everybody from the moment he came into power, and he’s been trying to sideline anybody who has any kind of charisma. He killed Boris Nemzow. He tried to kill Alexei Navalny. He imprisoned Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin. And then within his own circles, he regularly demotes, puts out to pasture, and in some cases kills people whom he views either as threats or as being disloyal. Any dictator has to worry. And Putin in particular, because he’s been around for so long and he’s caused so much trouble for so many people. There is the possibility of a coup. But I think the more likely scenario is that Putin is successful in keeping all of his competitors at bay. He’s been very successful so far, and there’s no reason to think that he won’t continue.

If this war continues at its current level for several years to come, what do you think will be the outcome for Russia and for Putin?

There’s no question that Putin has set Russia back multiple decades, first and most importantly for him in terms of military might. Something like 3,500 tanks have been destroyed in this war. So far, 165,000 soldiers have been killed and probably an equal number or even a larger number have become disabled. Infrastructure has been destroyed. Planes have been destroyed. And beyond that, you’ve had a brain drain of unprecedented proportions. The smartest people in Russia have left the country. Anyone who has capability and economic flexibility has left. And of course, it will take multiple decades before the West finally forgives Russia after Putin is gone. There’s a huge reparation bill that’s going to come up after this war is over, assuming the war will ever end. And there’s going to be a huge accounting for the injustices of the crimes that were committed. All that’s going to take decades before there’s any chance of Russia entering the democratic, free world. It’s been a terrible tragedy. And I know many Russians who don’t support Putin. Most of them, of course, are outside of Russia and are so ashamed of their country and so sad about its future because of this.

The consequences of this war on the global security architecture have already been quite significant: Finland will join NATO; Sweden has also expressed the wish to do so. Germany has significantly upped its defense spending. What do you think the effect of Russia’s war against Ukraine will be for the world in the long run?

I came of age when the Berlin Wall came down. I had just graduated and started my career, and we enjoyed something called the peace dividend. The idea of the peace dividend was that the amount of money spent on defense was diminished because we didn’t have this Cold War anymore. If you put money into the economy, it has a greater multiplier effect in terms of good economic outcomes than putting money into soldiers standing guarding a border. Now, we no longer have a peace dividend but a war cost, and it will reduce economic growth; it will reduce prosperity. Hopefully, whatever we have is going to be other than this terrible hot war in Ukraine—a cold simmering conflict with China or elsewhere with Russia, as opposed to a hot conflict. But it’s not a very optimistic set of assumptions that we have to work with going forward.

Do you think that the West’s consolidated answer to Russia will act as a deterrent to any future aggressors?

I think it will act as a deterrent. In the best case, we have cold conflicts, not hot ones. You know, China probably wanted to invade Taiwan and looked at all this lockstep alliance of the West and said, maybe we need to reconsider that or put it on the back burner. And I hope that that’s the ultimate perception of what we’ve done. But to all of a sudden spend 1 % or 2 % more of GDP on defense still involves a lot of money—money that could have gone to other purposes. Unfortunately, we don’t have that luxury anymore. We have no choice.

So in order to deter autocratic powers from using force, the West has to keep up very high levels of defense spending in the long run.

The bubble of peace and harmony that we have been living in has now been popped by Vladimir Putin. It’s going to cost us a lot more to make sure that we don’t suffer more of these wars in the future. And that will require peace through strength.

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A Taiwan Crisis Looms on the Transatlantic Horizon

r.fehrenbach — Mon, 27 Mar 2023 13:35:03 +0000

The status of Taiwan is increasingly preoccupying the states of the democratic West. What are the current risks of escalation by China? And what could possible sanctions look like in response? This was the subject of a group of high-ranking experts at the Atlantik-Brücke.

by Robin Fehrenbach

The island of Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China have a tense relationship. China sees Taiwan as an integral part of its national territory, while the island strives for autonomy. Should these opposing goals develop into a conflict, this would also have far-reaching consequences for the transatlantic partners. On this occasion, a roundtable of high-ranking experts was organized by Atlantik-Brücke in cooperation with the Atlantic Council and the Rhodium Group in Berlin. The discussion took place under the Chatham House Rule.

From the perspective of the United States, the European Union, and the G7, the first thing to do with respect to Taiwan’s future is to consider the various risks and trigger points of an escalation. The focus of such considerations is basically an attack by China on Taiwan. It seems clear that this cannot only be an obvious military attack, for example in the form of a comprehensive invasion from the air and water. In the gray zone of types of attacks on the island, cyberattacks and other forms of hybrid warfare in particular may play a role. Quarantining Taiwan or imposing a blockade of the republic also falls within this range of the escalation ladder.

Even experts cannot accurately assess the specific ways in which China might attack Taiwan. This is due in part to the fact that decision-makers in the West are unable to comprehend the full range of the political dynamics of the Communist Party of the People’s Republic. What is certain is that China’s leader Xi Jinping needs economic growth to be as stable as possible in order to remain in power. But regardless of more rational considerations as to China’s economic performance, the future status of Taiwan represents a key issue for President Xi in his narrative of China’s future as a national entity.

The semiconductor industry as a silicon shield

Of outstanding strategic interest both for China and for the transatlantic partners is currently the position of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). Large parts of the global production of advanced technology are heavily dependent on the elaborate industrial production of semiconductors by TSMC. An attack of any kind on the Taiwanese company would hit this industrial sector very hard. However, since China would also be directly affected, TSMC’s strong position in the global market serves as a silicon shield for Taiwan, so to speak. One consequence, for both the United States and the EU, is to reduce existing dependencies in terms of supply chains and raw materials such as rare earths in particular. The U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), for example, offer an opportunity to make progress here.

The second important step in anticipating a Taiwan conflict is to consider possible sanctions by the G7, U.S. and EU in response to the crisis. To do this, it is important to keep in mind that the economic setbacks of economic and financial sanctions would be severe for the democratic West. After all, economic ties with China are extremely strong for most of the countries concerned – the German economy in particular is dependent on exports to China, on supply chains with the People’s Republic and on raw materials there.

It follows that punitive measures are always accompanied by costs and restrictions. Based on previous experience with sanctions, various approaches and objectives are conceivable, with each constellation having to be considered specifically in terms of the states, actors and resources involved. One objective could be to keep one’s own costs as low as possible. This can be achieved, for example, by imposing a price cap on a particular commodity from the penalized state, as can be observed in the case of Russia in response to its war of aggression against Ukraine in the case of oil. Furthermore, it is conceivable to target individuals, groups or organizations, but not the broad center of a society.

Tools and impact of “Economic Statecraft”

In addition to the sanctions already mentioned, other tools of so-called “economic statecraft” – i.e. foreign and security policy related to the economy – can also come into play. These include, above all, export controls and the screening of investments. Restricting and closing market access and imposing new or higher import tariffs on trade in goods and services are other important types of sanctions. The G7, U.S., and EU are attempting to bundle such measures into sanctions packages in the respective rounds to create both a targeted and effective impact. This also makes it clear that it is necessary to prepare and apply sanctions in a coordinated manner; it makes little sense for an individual state to push ahead with them on its own.

As far as the specific case of China is concerned, the People’s Republic is particularly vulnerable in the supply chains with lithium, and products of the chemical and pharmaceutical industry. These would be sectoral sanctions. Ultimately, sanctions should lead to a change in behavior on the part of the state subject to the sanctions. The fact that this does not always happen can currently be seen in the case of Russia. Even after eight rounds of sanctions by the EU alone, President Putin is still waging a war in Ukraine that violates international law. The logic of sanctions also includes the fact that the sanctioning states need patience and perseverance to achieve a change in the behavior of the sanctioned state. It is generally accepted in the West that China’s leaders are closely studying Russia’s reaction to the sanctions in order to draw conclusions for their own policy regarding Taiwan.

In summary, the key finding is that a deeper discussion among transatlantic partners on scenarios, risks of escalation, sanctions and planning on the Taiwan issue is of fundamental strategic importance. Transatlantic partners have a great need for scenario analysis in this context, and at the same time it is necessary for democratic industrialized countries to prepare for an acute crisis around the island and conceivable responses.

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The Potential of a German-Canadian Partnership in Energy Security and Energy Transition

Atlantic Bridge — Fri, 03 Mar 2023 10:58:46 +0000

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the issue of energy has become more central than ever to global security dialogues. Recognizing the need for reliable partners who share similar values, the German government has turned to Canada to establish an energy partnership. Having the fourth largest oil and gas reserves in the world and being the sixth largest oil producer in the world, Alberta accounts for 82 percent of Canada’s oil production and 62 percent of Canada’s natural gas production, underscoring its importance within the Canadian energy system. At the same time, a resilient and lasting partnership can only be established when looking beyond short-term energy supply and addressing questions of sustainability, as well.

To take stock of the current global energy system, discuss the future of a German-Canadian partnership in energy security and sustainability, and assess Alberta’s unique role in particular, Atlantik-Brücke convened a roundtable featuring Pete Guthrie, Alberta’s Minister of Energy, Grant Sprague, Alberta’s Deputy Minister of Energy, Jerry Bellikka, Chief of Staff, Klaus Büttner, Managing Director of Alberta United Kingdom Office, and Julia Friedlander, CEO of Atlantik-Brücke.

Status Quo

Russia’s war on Ukraine revealed the deep dependencies inherent to global energy markets. Inflationary pressure continues to impact consumers on both sides of the Atlantic. With Canada being the fourth largest producer of oil and the sixth largest producer of natural gas in the world and Alberta being the country’s largest oil and gas producer, the province has the potential to be a key piece in the puzzle of replacing Russian energy sources. Central to the province’s strategy in providing a reliable stream of energy to customers in Canada and abroad is supplying energy while keeping in mind a multitude of environmental and social standards, like its carbon footprint and responsibilities to indigenous populations. This year, Alberta will be closing its last coal plant. Renewable energy currently makes up 20 percent of the province’s electricity mix. Alberta is committed to meet Canada’s federal emission reduction targets for 2030 and 2050, but a reliable base load of electricity is needed. Given these circumstances, Minister Guthrie called for pragmatism and described finding a balance between affordability and sustainability as the key goal for future energy sector strategies.

Emission Reduction Technology

As the largest producer of hydrogen in Canada, Alberta produces around 2.4 million tons of hydrogen annually. Alberta has developed a hydrogen roadmap to provide steady supply for provincial and global markets. Closely connected to the development of hydrogen as an energy source, the provincial government wants the exploration of Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS) technologies to be a part of that strategy. There are currently two large-scale CCUS projects in Alberta. The Shell Quest Project situated near Edmonton which was opened in 2015 and the Alberta Carbon Trunk Line operating since 2019. Participants discussed the role of industry and government regulation to further emission reduction technologies. In this context, Minister Guthrie views industry as innovators that drive technological development and underlines the need to plan more collaboratively with industry and think tanks to achieve climate goals.

Infrastructure and Transport as Main Challenge

Aligning policy priorities of Alberta’s conservative provincial government with those of a liberal-led federal government poses challenges within the energy sector. While the federal government currently pushes for the development of green hydrogen, Alberta wants to focus on all available energy resources. According to Minister Guthrie, Alberta cooperates closely with British Columbia in the west and Manitoba and Saskatchewan in the east to establish energy corridors to move Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) among others. Common ground with the federal government could be found in tackling the lack of infrastructure to simplify Alberta’s access to national and global markets and transport of resources to customers. Here, the federal government could support Alberta in terms of energy grid, pipeline and railway infrastructure.

A Partnership Based on Shared Values

When asked about Chinas influence on the Albertan energy sector, Minister Guthrie referred to the example of the light metal Lithium, an indispensable component of any battery which plays a key role in sustainable transport and energy concepts. The market is dominated by Chinese companies and even though the raw material is available in Alberta in great quantities, there is little possibility to circumvent China in the supply chain. This case exemplifies an underlying reoccurring problem in global supply chains where business decisions are above all based on price points. Against this backdrop, participants agreed that shared standards and values should weigh more heavily into the choice of suppliers. Applied to the energy sector, this approach has the potential to catalyze existing strong German-Canadian relations into a stable and sustainable energy partnership.

Der Beitrag The Potential of a German-Canadian Partnership in Energy Security and Energy Transition erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

On Board! Finland and the New NATO

Atlantic Bridge — Wed, 21 Sep 2022 08:46:34 +0000

Russia’s attack on Ukraine has brought forward the biggest transformation in European security policy since the end of the Cold War. Most notably, Finland and Sweden have requested accession to NATO, ending their traditional military non-alignment. To better understand the High North’s views regarding current security challenges and NATO, Atlantik-Brücke hosted a discussion with Ambassador Kai Sauer, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Security Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland that was moderated by Erika Solomon, Berlin Correspondent at the New York Times.

A focus of the discussion was the changing security landscape, which, in large part, is due to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. This has represented a “sea change” for Finland. The war has also had a profound effect on Finnish public opinion, a country that shares a more than 1,300 km-long border with Russia: whereas previously around 30% of the population was in favor of joining NATO, this number has since increased to almost 80%. One of the crucial strengths that Finland would have to offer NATO as a member state are the country’s military capabilities, chief among them hardware and artillery, as well as a large military reserve.

Furthermore, partly due to the increasing geopolitical significance of the Arctic, Finland is also faced with greater expectations and stressors than before. The importance of technology and the possibility of Swedish and Finnish 5G-manufacturers being more closely aligned with NATO were also discussed.

Another question was concerned with how Finnish civil society thought about the war and support for Ukraine. The high degree of solidarity in Finland with Ukraine and a commitment to support Ukraine was stressed.

The topic of energy independence was also brought up, and the concerns many Finns still have despite the country’s new nuclear plant, intended to reduce Finnland’s reliance on energy imports.

We would like to thank Microsoft for hosting the event and for the kind support.

Der Beitrag On Board! Finland and the New NATO erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

„The defense of democracy is the defining challenge of our time.“

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 04 Aug 2022 14:56:17 +0000

In a moving speech at Atlantik-Brücke, Dr. Amy Gutmann, U.S. Ambassador to Germany, addressed the continuing importance of transatlantic relations and, against the backdrop of the Ukraine war, emphasized the need to work together to protect democracy against attacks by its enemies. The diplomat, whose father was forced to flee Nazi Germany because of his Jewish heritage, also spoke about the deep personal meaning her role in Germany has for her: “I know my father would be immensely proud that his daughter returned in his stead as the U.S. Ambassador.”

Der Beitrag „The defense of democracy is the defining challenge of our time.“ erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“The State of Trust and the US-German Partnership: A Transatlantic Survey”

atlantikbruecke — Mon, 13 Jun 2022 05:52:57 +0000

A Survey conducted in late May 2022 finds that majorities of the general populations in both countries consider the US-German partnership crucial for the world’s stability
Defending democracy, climate change, and economic growth are priorities for both Germans and Americans
Measures taken by both governments to respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have created trust
Younger generations in both nations think that the best days of the partnership are ahead

You can find a pdf of the survey results >here.

“The State of Trust and the US-German Partnership: A Transatlantic Survey” was released on the occasion of the 2022 German-American Conference hosted by Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany.

The study, surveyed a total of 4,000 Americans and Germans – nationally representative of their respective general populations – to understand their confidence in the stability of the US-German partnership, their attitudes towards the role of government and business to restore trust in democracies, and their views on global challenges facing both countries.

The survey was jointly commissioned by the American Council on Germany and Atlantik-Brücke, both in their 70^thanniversary year. It was conducted by the opinion research institute Edelman Data & Intelligence (DxI) and underwritten by Allianz SE.

Key findings include:

Trust in the transatlantic partnership is high in both nations. However, American participants have greater trust in the Federal Republic of Germany and its institutions than vice versa. (Business: USA 58% / GER 51%, Government: USA 55% / GER 54%, NGO’s: USA 55% / GER 51%, Media: USA 53% / GER 44%).
The vast majority in both countries (USA 70%, GER 75%) believe that the partnership is needed today more than ever and plays a crucial role for stability in the world.
While American participants are more optimistic on the partnership and believe its best days are ahead (USA 55% vs. GER 46%), positive scores in each country are mostly driven by younger generations, particularly Millennials in the US and Gen Z in Germany.

A United Defense

Survey participants recognize that the foundations of the partnership are rooted in its military and defense alliances (USA 74%, GER 76%), with trade and commerce also being foundational (USA 74%, GER 79%). The pooling of military resources is a top priority for nearly 30% of American participants and 39% of German participants.

The response to the war in Ukraine and the actions of the relatively new administrations in the U.S. and Germany have helped to strengthen trust in the partnership.

Prioritizing Climate, Jobs, and Democracy

There is alignment that addressing climate change is a current top priority (USA 31%, GER 39%), though more American participants say economic growth and job creation should be the future focus (42%), when asked to choose among a list of top three priorities. By contrast, an overwhelming number of German participants view climate change as the top priority of the future.

Strengthening democracy is a core common value. In Germany, it is the second biggest priority, only behind addressing climate change. For Americans, it is the second biggest priority, only behind economic growth and job creation. Defining and articulating a common view on democracy will only further strengthen trust between the two nations.

The data reveals opportunities to demonstrate how addressing climate change can benefit economic growth, create jobs, and in turn stabilize and strengthen democratic societies.

Business Competence and Long-termism Build Trust

Participants in both countries report positive perceptions of each other’s business competence and reliability. Trust in businesses is built on three pillars: historic trade relationships, high perceptions of the quality of the products and services delivered, and the ability to innovate. However, for Germans, differing views on free trade undermine trust in US businesses, and a lack of confidence to regulate fairly and transparently was the leading source for Germans’ distrust in the US government.

The majority of respondents expect governments and businesses to co-lead the partnership and continue to build trust with transparency and a focus on long-term, shared goals that balance both economic growth and climate responses.

Next-Generation Optimism

The survey found that men, older and more affluent groups are generally more trusting of the partnership. Notably, however, a majority of younger Americans and Germans, especially Millennials in both countries, expressed trust in the partnership (Millennials in both USA and GER 69%).

Der Beitrag “The State of Trust and the US-German Partnership: A Transatlantic Survey” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

In Search of a New World Order

atlantikbruecke — Fri, 27 May 2022 08:55:50 +0000

by Sigmar Gabriel and Michael Hüther

Russia’s war against Ukraine will have consequences extending far beyond the European Union and our country’s security and defense policies. In fact, this war is the most visible and tragic proof to date that the world is in a dramatic process of change. The Old Order, forged by the momentous events of two world wars originating in Germany and Europe and designed first and foremost by the United States of America, is losing its power to shape global events. This “Wilsonian era” began at a time when China, India and the African nations were still referred to as “third world countries” and looked down upon by the paternalistic old European powers, and the USA.

[related]Those countries have long since evolved into more than merely cheap marketplaces serving the economic interests of their former colonial rulers. And justifiably so, because the Indo-Pacific nations alone represent around 60 percent of the global population, generate 60 percent of global GDP, and are responsible for around two-thirds of global economic growth. Since the establishment of a free trade zone Africa, too, has been showing the first signs of geopolitical confidence. The former European colonial regimes are largely responsible for the failure of decolonization and, for many years, their former colonies in Africa were unable to find an answer to their problems.

A tectonic shift of global power axes

We are contemporary witnesses to a tectonic shift in our world’s power axes – a shift that is affecting both economic and political powers, and models of social organization. The Euro-Atlantic region is no longer the single global center of gravity today; it competes with the Indo-Pacific region. We are nearing the end of a European age spanning some 600 years in which Europe has been the origination point for global developments, both good and bad. Enlightenment, colonialism and slavery all have their roots in Europe. European technical revolutions and economic upheavals have shaped the world, and even though China certainly had the potential to have a similar impact, it chose protectionism instead. Then two world wars plunged Europe into chaos and America became a European power despite a distance of several thousands of miles separating the two continents – partly because of experiences in the first half of the 20th century. Pax Britannica was replaced by Pax Americana, with the United States stepping up to play an important role in protecting Europe from itself and replacing Great Britain as the Western guarantor of international order. It was a very convenient arrangement for Europe as a whole and especially for Germany, because we were able to focus on building a strong economy and society. With the exceptions of France and the United Kingdom, Germany and the rest of Europe evolved into soft powers that believed economic ties could help them achieve the integrative outcomes they sought. But what happens when Europe’s integrative strategy clashes with a diametrically opposed, confrontational strategy like Russia’s, and a country that is willing to accept significant economic disadvantages in order to expand its geopolitical power base? Up to now Europe has been able to count on the support of the USA as the leader of the free world, and President Biden’s willingness to clash with a foreign power on European soil in the interest of transatlantic relations.

In the long run, however, we may not be able to take that support for granted because the United States of America were first to recognize and put a name to the global power axis shift. George W. Bush was the first U.S. President to call his country a “Pacific nation” and Barack Obama coined the term ”pivot to Asia”. The change of perspective associated with the shift in the political and economic power axes is rooted in a second westernization process in the USA, which has permanently moved the population center towards the Pacific. The rising power that is China has long been seen by the USA as its main rival for global influence and economic strength. The United States no longer believes itself capable of being both the world’s leading economy and a globally indispensable nation. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Middle East, from Afghanistan and – if Ukraine hadn’t been invaded – also from Europe, happened so that America could focus on its rivalry with China. At the same time, it symbolized the end of the Pax Americana era in which, at least since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States had deployed overwhelming power to shape and direct global events. We have now reached a “turning point in history”.

But what will the new world order look like? What principles will it be founded upon and who will ensure they are upheld? It is still unclear what the new world order can or should be. U.S. political scientist Ian Bremmer coined the phrase “G-Zero” to describe a post-Pax Americana world with an absence of clear leadership and no “hegemon” or guardian of international order: A volatile world with multiple pivot states.

We only have think about how our leaders deal with global crises to realize how much the world has changed in the space of just a few years. At the apex of the financial crisis in November of 2008 the G20 quickly and efficiently reached consensus on a crisis strategy. There has been no such meeting – if you discount online formats – to discuss a collective strategy for beating the coronavirus pandemic. Although we face an increasing number of issues that can only be resolved by international collaboration – the pandemic, climate change and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology – it seems that we are losing our ability to act collectively. We aren’t even capable of establishing a common understanding of the status quo and the associated challenges, let alone agreeing upon and coordinating necessary political measures.

Turning point: geopolitics replace geoeconomics – hierarchies regain dominance over networks

The next decade will be characterized by various nations vying for influence in a new global order. And the outcome may not be what we Germans and the majority of Europeans are expecting because having the economic advantage is no longer the single deciding factor. In fact, the age of geoeconomics is being replaced by a new age of geopolitics. Power interests will supersede economic strength as the “currency” of international politics. Potential political power gains and geopolitical influence on the creation of a new global order are more important than the economic advantage of an efficient, conflict-free global economy based on the division of labor. Geopolitics is replacing geoeconomics. Russia views western sanctions as a kind of “superpower tax” that has to be paid in order to be an architect of the new global order.

Yet global power competition is also fundamentally defined by a new dominance of hierarchies over networks. According to Niall Ferguson, major historical episodes can be interpreted as conflicts between networks and hierarchies. The first phase of globalization after the dawn of the industrial age was followed by the first world war, which meant a setback for the hierarchies. In the decades that followed the networks gradually gained in strength, despite some setbacks, until they achieved widespread dominance after 1989.

Globalization is a phenomenon that creates networked economies based on free trade in goods and services, capital mobility and risk exchange, knowledge diffusion and information sharing, migration and human capital mobility. Networks are to some extent anarchic systems because they are fundamentally unstable and draw strength from weak, non-institutional and liberal connections. The political power hierarchies, whatever their constitutional status, perceive that as a latent threat. This explains why conflicts within societies resulting from perceived or real weaknesses in hierarchies often play into the hands of radicalized political powers – conflicts such as the ones we have seen in the USA (Trump), France (Le Pen), and the United Kingdom (Brexit).

After a lengthy phase of constantly accelerating economic globalization and increasing external and foreign influence, the turning point is characterized by an emerging dominance of hierarchies. In domestic policy it is represented by a shift in the political spectrum, and in foreign policy by emerging nationalism (America First) and competition between world powers. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is part of this process to the extent that Putin perceived the emerging dominance of hierarchies as a chance to restore his nation’s superpower status in the transatlantic West – particularly in light of the domestic policy conflicts and tensions in western democracies.

Until now two world powers have dominated the geopolitical arena: China and the USA. The war in Ukraine is likely to be Russia’s attempt to elevate its status to that of a superpower in the new world order, especially since it is taking place in a region called ”Eurasia” in Russia. With the USA so focused on its domestic policy divisions, its own affairs, and competition with China, Russia saw a good opportunity with calculable risks to flex its muscles in Europe again. Even NATO was recently described by a European head of state as “brain dead”, and Europe is afflicted by both a north-south and an east-west divide. In this context, Russia’s war is more a reflection of the transition to a new era than its cause. However, Russia made a number of assumptions that have proven to be incorrect. NATO is more united than it has been for a very long time. The USA and President Joe Biden have stepped up again in their role as a “European power” and the people of Ukraine did not react with the restraint to be expected in this “post-heroic age”. Instead, they have been willing to sacrifice much, even their lives, for their country’s freedom.

As a result of the Ukraine war, Russia will be reduced to a shadow of its former self. Instead of increasing its influence in Europe, it will lose that influence altogether. All that will remain is an economic, political and military cooperation with China – although Russia will be in a position of dependency rather than an equal partner. As an economic partner it will lose status by having to take a technological step backwards, and in the framework of progressive global decarbonization, there will be a permanent degeneration in value of the country’s natural resources. An historic slump in prosperity seems unavoidable and, even if the political regime does change, by then Russia will be lagging so far behind in terms of technological capability that it will take decades to establish a new prosperity base.

China’s position on the war in Ukraine and the Chinese COVID-19 strategy are a related puzzle.

The Chinese leadership initially appeared to be observing the Ukraine war with a certain gratification. After all, its old rival Russia – and sparring partner in violent border conflicts during the second half of the 20th century – had seemingly fallen into its lap like a “ripe fruit”. At the same time the USA’s renewed involvement in European affairs took its focus and attention away from the Indo-Pacific region, making it easier for China to pursue its maritime interests there. This could also explain why China initially seemed disinterested in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, although the Ukraine war initially seems to offer advantages, these could quickly turn into a significant risk. More than anything else China is dependent on the continuous growth of its economy. Even though the vast Chinese population, with 1.4 billion citizens, offers immense growth potential, China remains a nation that can only achieve its dream of prosperity for all through global trade in goods, services, and technologies. In recent years, despite increasingly obvious ideological regression and the centralization of political power in one person’s hands for an unlimited term, the Chinese leadership has managed to hold on to its political dominance by promising the comprehensive completion of a moderately prosperous society in return for the lack of democracy and human rights. There are indications that this promise will be replaced by a pledge to achieve an historic victory over the coronavirus. In return Chinese citizens have to live with extreme restrictions on elementary freedoms and accept shortages of basic supplies, even the citizens of the supposedly more liberal city of Shanghai. It is impossible to foresee the end of China’s lockdown policy because the country has a low vaccination rate and less effective vaccines. So the historic victory can only be achieved through permanent isolation, such as has been imposed by the quarantine rules.

The anti-COVID-19 strategy that China is propagating as the only possible way forward, as well as its position on the Ukraine war, are prompting people to ask themselves if China can still be depended on as a partner in international relations and in the global division of labor. There have already been some quite dramatic consequences of the Ukraine war. Since the war began there has been an unprecedented capital outflow as foreign investors turn their backs on China and, in Shanghai, for example, 85 percent of foreign specialists want to leave the country. It seems increasingly likely that this fits in with the dual circulation strategy – to boost domestic consumption and lower dependency on exports – in conjunction with the concentration on the Indo-Pacific economic partnership (RCEP). However, it doesn’t mean that Chinese globalization is coming to an end; it is simply changing regional direction. China’s regional divergence, lack of social capital, capital market inefficiencies, and ageing population mean it has to continue to be a dependable and calculable global economic partner in order to strengthen its own economy and develop the economic regions where it hopes to exert its influence.

Global trade has been thrown into disarray by the Ukraine war. There have been dramatic consequences for Africa, a continent dependent on supplies from both Russia and Ukraine, and the food security crisis there has worsened. This development certainly doesn’t serve China’s interests on the African continent and, on top of that, parts of the “New Silk Road” from China pass through Russia to Europe. Sanctions and counter-sanctions are likely to render these trade routes impassable for a considerable time. On a more general note, the massive global economic disruptions cannot be in China’s interest either. Anyone following the energy independence debate will have soon realized that it is associated with a general call for de-globalization. Even though deglobalization may seem unrealistic for Germany, a country more closely intermeshed in the international value chains than any other, except China, the country that will be most affected by debate on re-shoring and decoupling is China.

With that knowledge, it is difficult to understand why the Chinese leadership is not attempting, at least externally, to adopt a “neutral position” on the war in Ukraine. The Chinese leadership interprets the Ukraine conflict as a “proxy war” between the USA and Russia in which China does not want to take sides. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is actually more about a breach of the minimum standards of international law, one of those being that no nation should be permitted to launch a military attack on a neighboring country.

Russia is violating China’s foreign policy principles

The war being waged in Ukraine isn’t “just” a conflict between “the West” and Russia, nor is it a “proxy war” between the two “old” superpowers. Essentially, the issue at stake is whether a country – in this case Russia – should be permitted to breach one of the main pillars of international law and get away with it unpunished. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also violates the United Nations Charter, which is a very important document for China. The Charter codifies the principles for international relations that were fought for so hard in early modern Europe’s Thirty Years War: the non-intervention in domestic affairs of another country, and the sovereign equality of all countries under international law, irrespective of their size or internal constitution.

Fundamental principles of international order have been violated. To uphold a stable international order the powerful nations and global institutions, particularly the UN and its Security Council, must be able to guarantee the common principles of: territorial integrity, national sovereignty, the non-use of force, and the resolution of conflicts by negotiation and treaties. The People’s Republic of China has always emphasized that these principles are an important part of its foreign policy because a stable and peaceful world order is central to the realization of the “Chinese dream”. Or could it be that China has set its sights on defining, realigning, and securing its sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific region? That would mean the beginning of bi-polar globalization.

Russia has brutally violated all of the previously mentioned principles with its invasion of Ukraine. However much the Chinese view of this conflict is shaped by its own antagonisms with the United States of America and its former allies, the violation of these fundamental principles cannot be in the interest of the People’s Republic of China.

After all, 141 countries attending the United Nations General Assembly voted to demand a prompt end to Russia’s military operations in Ukraine. And, even though China, India, and South Africa abstained from voting – as did 31 other countries – this is the biggest ever majority vote on such an issue.

The United Nations’ clear position on Ukraine poses crucial questions for China, a country whose history and international image is closely linked to the United Nations General Assembly. A resolution passed by the UN General Assembly in 1971 recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations, even though the USA and other nations voted against it. From then on the People’s Republic began to cultivate its international influence. This, too, is reason alone not to go against the UN’s unequivocal decisions.

Russia’s war against Ukraine not only violates the principles of international order that are so crucial to China’s continued development, but also directly violates the Chinese interests because China imports raw materials and technologies from Ukraine. The war in Ukraine will also stop exports to other countries for some time to come, which will cause famine in parts of the world that are dependent on the World Food Program (WFP) and are also China’s partners. So it is in China’s own best interests to deploy and build its “soft power” and “public diplomacy” efforts. Past examples of China’s positive interventions in crisis situations include its handling of the Asian economic crisis at the end of the 1990s, and the global financial crisis of 2008. In other words, it has plenty of experience that it could be putting to better use.

If China were to assume a more proactive role in easing the conflict or, at least, in achieving a permanent ceasefire, it would have a far better chance of securing significant reputation gains – measured in terms of previous strategies for economic development and political positioning – and this would fundamentally change and improve its opportunities for closer economic and political collaboration, particularly in Europe. Until the Ukraine war is stopped, European-Chinese relations, especially German-Chinese relations, will suffer because Chinese “neutrality” is interpreted in Europe as tolerance of Russia’s aggression.

China has every right to exert influence on the global order. It has long since evolved into one of the global economic and political powers, a status that comes with certain responsibilities. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has co-responsibility for global stability and peace. It should be ready to exert that influence and shoulder the responsibility, even when it is inconvenient.

China and Germany are the main beneficiaries of globalization

Germany and Europe should also avoid becoming too complacent in their dealings with China. Despite all our efforts to make our economies more resilient and pursue a diversification strategy in South-East Asia, decoupling ourselves from China is not in the political or economic interests of Europe and Germany. We can never put a country with a population of 1.4 billion under a kind of “house arrest” and Europe should be taking geopolitical advantage of its influence over China, however moderate it remains in the long run. Bearing the Chinese leadership’s COVID-19 policy in mind, all efforts should be restricted to exploring the scope for future cooperation – not least in order to discover whether and to what extent it is associated with a fundamental change in the political program.

Germany could play an important role in this respect because China and Germany both have developed economies with integrated (i.e. reciprocally dependent and supportive) industrial value chains. The two economies differ in terms of their main industries, their pace of innovation, and their business culture, and they have very clear divergences in regional development, as well as differences in other areas. Nevertheless, both economies are fundamentally based on access to raw materials and energy, and export-oriented. For that reason the two countries, their economies, and their companies are interested in free market access, including the secure supply chains on which the international division of labor is based. In the last 30 years China has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of globalization, but so has Germany – in fact, Germany is the biggest beneficiary in the developed world.

Germany’s exchange of goods and services with China is very important for both countries: in terms of the continuous growth in volumes in recent years and the quality of the integrated value chains. In 2021 the European Union exchanged goods in the value of around EUR 695 billion with China (around EUR 472 billion EU imports and around EUR 223 billion EU exports). In that same period Germany exchanged around EUR 245 billion in goods with China (almost EUR 104 billion exports from Germany and almost EUR 142 billion imports from China). Modern-day globalization – the globalization of supply chains – has created dependencies for all participants. We have to remember this, because the disruptions caused by Russia’s war against Ukraine give the impression that the dependencies are the problem and that unbundling and de-coupling is the answer when, in actual fact, unbundling and de-coupling would have a negative impact on prosperity and limit action capabilities in the transformation to climate neutrality. However much we call the Chinese strategy into question, we face the unavoidable challenge of finding a cooperation formula that works in this maze of contradictions and conflicts of interest. The failure of the simple concept of “change through trade” doesn’t necessarily mean that isolation and self-sufficiency are the answer.

Despite all the cultural and historical differences between China and Germany, they are both strongly integrated into the international division of labor and value chain. So perhaps we should be considering China’s history, culture, and social development to a greater extent rather than focusing exclusively on disassociation and exclusion. It is certainly possible, as is evident by recent developments in South-East Asia, despite serious political and security policy conflicts.

Is Europe being sidelined?

On January 1, 2022 the RCEP entered into force, creating the world’s largest free trade zone. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership presents Europe with one of the biggest challenges it has yet faced. The new free trade zone encompasses around 30 percent of global domestic product, 30 percent of the world’s population and 30 percent of global trade. The European Union, which also represents around one-third of global trade, looks set to be overtaken by the RCEP in the near future. The RCEP comprising Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Chinaand the ASEAN states, which are all very different nations, was established to explore and realize common economic opportunities. The deal was signed despite many of the nations being involved in tough political conflicts, which are evident by the political and, in some cases, military tensions of recent months. What can Europe learn from this?

Firstly, the process of economic globalization and international division of labor always has and always will be a regionalization process involving regional markets that are in line with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. These markets are gaining in significance, not least due to the need for resilient supply chains and regional integration, which is why they have gained a lot of momentum over the last 25 years (Article 24 GATT unites the idea of regional trade agreements with the concept of a global order). One impressive example of such a trade agreement is USMCA, which replaced NAFTA, the former trade agreement between the USA, Canada and Mexico, or CPTPP, a trade agreement that the Obama administration was keen to push through, which went ahead during the Trump administration without the USA. The United Kingdom and China have now applied to participate in membership.

The EU has still not ratified a negotiated trade agreement with Mercosur, the common market of South American nations, and the CAI, an investment agreement that doesn’t cover trade issues negotiated with China in December 2020, has been put on ice. Even the most modern and progressive trade agreement in the world between the European Union and Canada, CETA, has not yet been fully ratified by all EU Member States in the last five years – one of those being Germany. The Europeans have always been fixated on social and ecological standards. This is the reason why the free trade agreement between the EU and the USA failed. Europe tends to view itself as the measure of all things and forget that European standards were established in a step-by-step process and not in one giant leap. Increasing differences between Member States as a result of its expansion to include very different countries, as well as the pending new memberships, are diluting the EU’s future powers of negotiation.

We may not need a new European entity (as recently suggested by President Macron), because that would never work, but the EU does need to focus on its essential functions and issues: democracy, rule of law, the common market, currency stability, infrastructure networks, the investment union, and the defense union. These are the strong foundations of civil society and democratic institutions on which the EU could base a more modest negotiation strategy that helps it to mobilize the benefits of open markets. Instead, we are seeing obvious and disconcerting egocentricity on the part of the European Union and some of its Member States. They appear to believe that the sun revolves around our planet and especially the continent of Europe, even though the 500 million Europeans only account for a bit more than 5 percent of the global population.

Perhaps the EU representatives should engage with Australia and New Zealand for a change. Both countries are developed democracies. Both countries have firm security partnerships with the USA, and both are RCEP signatories. Australia and New Zealand also have significantly different positions on China – relating to policy, security policy, ecology, and many other issues. However, these two countries are also “close”, and not just geographically speaking. They practice a value-based Realpolitik in an attempt to achieve alignment, explore new options, and make fundamental differences of opinion “manageable”.

And what about the USA? Although the confrontation with China has become a focal issue in U.S. foreign (and domestic) policy, there is no talk of “decoupling” from China. Only 10 percent of U.S. companies have cut back on their business with China. 50 percent are still doing the same level of business and 40 percent have actually increased their level of business. The United States is now planning to supply American climate protection technology to China so that it can step up its climate protection efforts. Last but not least, the USA closed a deal with China a few days ago making the USA China’s second-largest supplier of liquid gas behind Australia.

Striking a new balance: confrontation, competition, cooperation

For a while now the USA and China have been focusing on relativizing three areas of their relations: confrontation on the issues of human rights, Taiwan, and the freedom of international maritime traffic, competition on the issues of innovation, economic success, and technology, and cooperation in global challenges such as the battle against COVID-19, climate change, and the control of nuclear weapons, which can only be achieved together. They have not yet struck the right balance of confrontation, competition, and cooperation, but this is an objective of both U.S. President Joe Biden and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping. However, it would be fatal for Europe if these efforts were based on a silent consensus to focus on the U.S.’ and China’s respective spheres of interest rather than having a global focus.

If that happens, the EU could easily be sidelined. Supply chains would shift, with products from the new RCEP economic area having a distance advantage and a cost advantage, because they would be exempt from customs duties. Machines and electrical goods, optical and IT products, vehicles and their parts – which are manufactured in Japan, South Korea, or China – would have it “easier” than they did in the past. Products originating from the EU would lose some of their competitiveness. The existing free trade agreements between the EU and Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, and South Korea will not change that, nor will the ongoing negotiations with Australia, New Zealand, or Indonesia.

It would be better for all sides to stop the spiral of reciprocal sanctions that are currently blocking the further ratification of CAI because both sides – the EU and China – would gain a great deal, despite losing out on some fronts. It would be possible to apply CAI rules without ratifying it – which is what happened with the EU-Canadian free trade agreement. This is about more than an economic strategy and economic policy that makes good sense. It is also about building trust in a new economic framework and political process to exploit common opportunities This new political process is in the global interest, not just the interests of the two sides involved. No global challenge, be it climate change, weapons of mass destruction, peace or terrorism, can be effectively overcome without China or even against China.

The EU should manage its own interests more effectively, particularly by being more focused and not attempting to Europeanize every single issue. Germany and France, but also other Member States are called upon in this respect. The work of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) which was established last year as a replacement for the investment and trade agreement between the EU and the USA, which was looking increasingly unachievable, has begun to take shape and step up pace. Despite being a poor substitute for a trade deal, the TTC shows the joint actions that are possible, involving specific issues that are in the interest of both nations such as the transformation to renewable energy, chip manufacture, and the regulation of artificial intelligence. At the end of April this year the EU and India established a similar council. The underlying idea, which is a bit like setting up debating clubs to discuss specific topics, could also be an approach to reshaping and adding more substance to the cooperation with China.

The European Union should also be more flexible when it comes to incorporating standards in trade agreements if it wants to achieve a realistic solution that isn’t beyond any of the other partners’ reach. It would definitely be worth Europe’s while to try a new approach. What is the use of being strong on rules and standards, but having a weak grasp of reality when it comes to economic and industrial policy? The potential is there. Europe just has to leverage it. The world will not wait for Europe, but it would lose many things without Europe because Europe is the only place where everything that typifies the modern world works: minority-resistant democracy, a society capable of integration, and an innovative, transformative market economy. It is a club of unpredictable democracies.

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Germany needs to protect Europe

atlantikbruecke — Mon, 21 Feb 2022 13:02:54 +0000

by Peter Rough

There is a growing sentiment among analysts that Germany’s new government, after a shaky start, has found its footing on the European stage. The story, in this telling, is one of redemption. In the early stages of the Ukraine crisis, Germany’s new chancellor, Olaf Scholz, appeared taciturn and equivocating. But when it mattered most during trips to Washington and Moscow this month, Scholz delivered convincing, at times emphatic, performances. In the span of a few weeks, so the narrative goes, Scholz steadied his image and that of his government. “Germany is back,” announced one headline last week.

[related]Alas, while Germany has gone back, the world has moved forward. After three decades, the post-Cold War era of globalization, underwritten by American power, has given way to a confrontation of competing blocs, most jarringly between Russia and the West. By now it is plain to see that Russian President Vladimir Putin views himself in an advanced stage of conflict with the West.

That conflict is defined at present by hard power. Putin has issued a military challenge of Europe, and in the process has caught Berlin mostly unprepared. For all its economic strength and multilateral ideals, Germany has proven unwilling to exert leadership in the area that now matters most: the defense of Europe.

If U.S. defense capabilities must be diverted to check Russia in Europe, Washington will be stretched thin

Traditionally, the United States has assumed this responsibility. But Russia is not the only challenger the West faces today. The rise of China is occupying more American attention by the day, making it urgently necessary for Germany to relieve the United States in Europe. If U.S. defense capabilities needed to deter China in Asia must be diverted to check Russia in Europe, Washington will be stretched thin. As the most influential, prosperous, and powerful country in Europe, it is up to Germany to take the baton.

Germany has been slow to grasp that it is in the midst of a conflict

To date, however, Germany has been slow to grasp that it is in the midst of a conflict. The new government has framed a further invasion of Ukraine as a choice between war and peace, as if Putin has not already made his decision. After the invasion of Georgia, annexation of Crimea, conflict in Donbass, blockade of Ukraine, intervention in Syria, and manifold hybrid attacks across the West, including the use of chemical weapons in the United Kingdom, can anyone honestly say that Putin is interested in partnership or peace?

In fact, Russia’s stated demands in the present crisis are so outlandish that they are best understood as a pretext for invasion. Indeed, the steady stream of Western leaders, Scholz included, who have traveled to Moscow in recent weeks have not met a counterpart interested in problem-solving or off-ramps. Instead, Putin has exploited the attention to extol himself as a leader without peer while seizing on their desire for de-escalation to weaken Kyiv. Only since his military buildup began, for example, have Western leaders so regularly and publicly made clear that NATO membership for Ukraine is off the table for the foreseeable future.

Germany requires regular “coaxing” to stand strong on the current sanctions package

The grim reality is that the next act in Putin’s war against the West is coming to Ukraine. The U.S. and Germany should be levying widespread sanctions against him now, not waiting until after military operations have begun. Instead, the U.S. national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, recently briefed congressional leaders that Germany requires regular “coaxing” to stand strong on the current sanctions package—measures which will only come into effect after an invasion anyway.

No matter how the coming days and weeks unfold, Putin’s absorption of Belarus alone should give NATO leaders pause. Just as it makes little sense to wait until after Russia launches a further incursion into Ukraine to sanction Putin, it is foolhardy to wait for the encirclement of Kyiv or Odessa to contemplate the upgrading of NATO’s presence in the Bucharest 9 states of Eastern Europe. The greatest deterrent to Putin is strength. It is the only message that can truly stop war.

Olaf Scholz and the traffic light coalition took power with ambitious plans to modernize Germany in discrete areas, from digital policy and climate change to the global minimum tax, which the chancellor personally negotiated while still finance minister. Vladimir Putin has now shot a hole through those plans. For the sake of the West, Scholz will have to lead Germany into a more confrontational posture toward Russia, including by upgrading Germany’s military. That will take much more effort than any press conference or television interview in Washington or Moscow. If he succeeds, however, Scholz would go down as a chancellor very much worth celebrating.

Peter Rough is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., and an Alumnus of Atlantik-Brücke’s Young Leaders program. The contributions of our guest authors reflect their opinions and not necessarily the position of Atlantik-Brücke.

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Rebuilding Trust: How Germany Can be a Reliable Partner

atlantikbruecke — Mon, 07 Feb 2022 10:53:37 +0000

by John B. Emerson and Sigmar Gabriel

British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was once asked what had been the primary influence on his government when he held office. His response was: “Events, dear boy, events.” We are reminded of this as we watch tensions flare over the Russian troop build-up along the border with Ukraine and the international response.

Governments are always confronted with unforeseen events, and these can serve as catalysts to shape policies and positions, but they can also be a litmus test of leadership. Barely 50 days into office, the new German government has been confronted with its first stress test – and its response has raised doubts about whether Germany is a reliable partner in facing international challenges.

With a transatlanticist in the White House who is committed to multilateralism, Germany has the opportunity to step up.

These events will provide the backdrop for Olaf Scholz’s first trip to Washington, DC as Chancellor, and the tensions with Russia over Ukraine will be at the top of the agenda when he meets with President Joe Biden. With a transatlanticist in the White House who is committed to multilateralism, Germany has the opportunity to step up. After weeks of waffling, this will be a chance for Germany to show leadership and commitment to the common cause. Germany cannot be complacent in the face of Russia’s instigated crisis on Europe’s doorstep.

With more than 100,000 Russian soldiers on the border of Ukraine, full-scale war is once again possible in the center of Europe. This should be impossible. The United States, together with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom has conveyed to Russia that an invasion would carry a very high price, but also that it remains committed to diplomacy. Russia cannot doubt that the West is open to dialogue – indeed, this is one of the two pillars of NATO: deterrence and the defense of member states’ freedom and security, along with a conduit for cooperation and dialogue. While Ukraine is not a NATO member, western allies believe firmly in any European nation’s sovereignty.

While Ukraine is not a NATO member, western allies believe firmly in any European nation’s sovereignty.

It is important to remember that the Ukraine crisis is not new. There has been an ongoing war since the spring of 2014 and the Russian incursions into the Donbas region and Crimea – but tensions between Russia and the West about Ukraine have been simmering for much longer than that. Russian President Vladimir Putin has seized the opportunity to drive wedges between partners in the West. But, instead his actions can serve as a catalyst to shift German public opinion (to see the threat posed by Russia) and shape the new German government’s policy toward Russia.

So, what can Germany realistically do?

Germany has done a great deal for Ukraine in terms of security and development. Since 2014, it has provided 1.8 billion US Dollars in economic aid and supported rule of law and anti-corruption programs for Ukraine. Jointly with France, it leads a diplomatic effort to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian issues called the Normandy format. As a member of the European Union and its largest financial contributor, Germany has financially supported the Ukrainian government since 2014 with 17 billion Euros.

Due to its history, Germany is restricted in its ability to deliver weapons. Berlin could immediately consider providing more than helmets – to show support for Ukraine. This could take the form of protective Kevlar vests, equipment for radio communications, as well as transportation and logistic support. However, there needs to be a frank and open debate in the Bundestag about the contours of German foreign and security policy – and the tangible contributions Germany is willing to provide in the future.

Rather than finger-pointing, a strong transatlantic partnership is built on trust and an unconditional willingness to strengthen cooperation, especially when the partnership is challenged or called into question.

President Biden and Chancellor Scholz need each other. This should give Germany political courage.

In Joe Biden, the United States has a president who, unlike his predecessor, is once again ready to unite and lead the world’s democracies. However, it needs allies in the face of 21st century challenges and volatility – and Germany and Europe also need the United States. Only together can they keep the world in balance while defending and strengthening the world’s democracies.

In short, President Biden and Chancellor Scholz need each other. This should give Germany political courage. Courage to represent its own view of things and to assume a role for Germany and Europe in the negotiations with Russia. Courage, however, also to respond to the expectations of the Biden administration that Germany be prepared to take on more responsibility for Europe’s defense.

The new German government can make a strong commitment to nuclear sharing and announce that it will buy American F-35 aircraft to prevent a looming capability gap until Europe’s own Future Combat Air System is operational. It can pledge to substantially increase German defense spending – but allocate a portion of these additional funds to strengthening the military operational capability of NATO members in Eastern Europe.

In light of the common challenges facing Europe and the United States, we need to come together and present a united front.

While in Washington, Scholz should also make very clear that Berlin is willing to use Nord Stream 2 as a bargaining chip. Russia (and the Soviet Union before that) has been a reliable source of gas for Germany for decades, but that is no longer assured. This crisis underscores that Germany must further diversify its energy supply chain – regardless of whether or not Nord Stream 2 goes online. Wavering on using Nord Stream 2 as possible leverage plays into Putin’s hand. Furthermore, it is worth considering that Putin may already have accepted that the pipeline might never become operational.

In taking such steps, the German Chancellor would move toward the United States and the hand that Joe Biden has held out to Germany for so long. He would put an end to the current blame game and lay the foundation for a constructive new chapter for transatlantic cooperation. Scholz would also deliver an important domestic and foreign policy win to Joe Biden, who could then say that he succeeded in achieving what no U.S. president has been able to do since the end of the Cold War by recognizing that Europe – and Germany in particular – is taking on more responsibility for itself and its defense. This would be courageous and wise: In light of the common challenges facing Europe and the United States, we need to come together, figure out how to address them, and present a united front. Hopefully, when Biden and Scholz meet, they will be able to find consensus and a path forward.

Sigmar Gabriel, former German Vice Chancellor and Federal Minister, has been Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke since 2019. John B. Emerson, former U.S. Ambassador to Germany, has been Chairman of the American Council on Germany since 2018. The German version of this article was published in the Tagesspiegel on February 5, 2022.

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The priorities of Germany’s new government

r.fehrenbach — Tue, 01 Feb 2022 15:03:06 +0000

Former U.S. Ambassador to Germany John B. Emerson, Chairman of the American Council on Germany, and Chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke Sigmar Gabriel, former Federal Foreign Minister, spoke about the domestic and foreign policy priorities of Germany’s new government represented by the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Free Democrats. They analyzed the political handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, the international fight against climate change and the appropriate reaction to the tensions with Russia in the Ukraine crisis. Juliane Schäuble, U.S. Correspondent, Der Tagesspiegel, moderated the discussion. The event was held in cooperation with the American Council on Germany and the Los Angeles World Affairs Council & Town Hall.

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Keynote by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony J. Blinken

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 20 Jan 2022 11:52:21 +0000

Atlantik-Brücke, the American Council on Germany, the Aspen Institute Germany and the German Marshall Fund of the United States were honored to host U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken for a lecture on the transatlantic partnership. In light of Russia’s threats, Secretary Blinken issued a strong warning against invading Ukraine. “Once the principles of sovereignty and self-determination are thrown out, you revert to a world in which the rules we shaped together over decades erode and then vanish,” he said. Russia should not be allowed to violate these principles with impunity, he added. The fate of Ukraine is not a local conflict, he said. “At its core is Russia’s rejection of a united, free and peaceful post-Cold War Europe.” Blinken stressed that the U.S. and its partners cannot allow this to happen.

The U.S. Secretary of State was welcomed by Atlantik-Brücke Chairman Sigmar Gabriel.

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“Britain has to be careful not to be sidelined by the US on the world stage”

atlantikbruecke — Mon, 06 Dec 2021 20:56:09 +0000

President Biden took office almost a year ago; Brexit came into effect only a few weeks earlier. How have these developments impacted the transatlantic relationship? At a recent Atlantik-Bruecke event in London, Philip Collins, former speechwriter to Tony Blair, and journalist Ulrich Oppold of RTL, provided their insights into the matter. In this short interview, they have summed up their thoughts.

„America is back,“ President Biden announced to the world upon taking office. Has there been a divergence between what European leaders understood this to mean, and the de facto foreign policy agenda of the Biden administration?

Philip Collins: Yes, I think there has. Biden really meant this in a domestic sense and the world has taken it to mean that American isolationism would cease. It is true, on the home front, that American democratic norms are being respected in a way they were violated under President Trump. And there have been some significant changes in foreign policy but the rather botched withdrawal from Afghanistan shows that President Biden does not really see a very active America in the world.

Ulrich Oppold: I think European leaders are certainly relieved that President Biden has promised to repair the relationship to the European partners. He reinstated the US to the Paris climate agreement. US Tariffs on steel and aluminum, imposed during the Trump administration, have been rolled back. This has also put an end to retaliatory tariffs that the European Union had imposed on American products. Europe and the United States agreed to resolve the long-running trade dispute over aid for the plane makers Airbus and Boeing. These are some encouraging examples for a change in the US foreign policy. But the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan blindsided the European allies and makes it clear that there is still a lot of diplomatic work to be done in order to rebuild a trustful transatlantic relationship.

The rift between the UK and the EU seems to deepen continually, with Brexit in effect for almost a year. Most recently, the security pact AUKUS has caused conflict, and now tensions run high between France and Britain over migration policies. What does this divide within Europe spell for transatlantic relations?

Ulrich Oppold: Before Brexit the US strategy was to influence the EU with diplomatic support from London – this is over now. Britain has to be careful not to be sidelined by the US on the world stage. But so far, both the UK and the US try to keep the relationship somehow “special”. Biden called Boris Johnson right after being elected and only later he spoke to other European Leaders, such as Angela Merkel. In September the US, the UK and Australia announced AUKUS – a trilateral security partnership aimed at confronting China. This military pact only increased the tensions between France and Britain and it also has strained transatlantic relations.

Philip Collins: Clearly, Britain used to play an important role as an honest broker in the relations between the US and Europe. After Brexit, that is impossible. So there has been a clear diplomatic loss for Britain. The British government has yet to realise that Brexit can only be a success if its relations with the rest of Europe are good. There are rumours of a significant treaty between Britain and France to cover defence co-operation and other things and it is to be hoped that this does not get lost in the furore over illegal crossings of the Channel.

Before he became president, Joe Biden referred to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson as a “physical and emotional clone” of then-President Donald Trump, certainly not intending to compliment Johnson. The two leaders have since met several times, and both Biden and Johnson have stressed the strong bond between their countries. But what is really left of the “special relationship” between the UK and the US?

Philip Collins: It is worth pointing out that Biden is wrong about Johnson, who is nothing as dangerous as Trump was. That said, relations are not especially good at the moment and that is, in part, the result of the poor personal chemistry between the two leaders. But much more important than that is that Britain has, because of Brexit, voluntarily given up influence in this relationship. The supposedly “special” relationship was always asymmetrical; even more so these days.

Ulrich Oppold: President Joe Biden has met Prime Minister Boris Johnson three times in person this year – in Cornwall, Rome and Glasgow. It is not clear if this has helped to improve their chemistry. It could well be that Biden still remembers the disrespectful remarks of Boris Johnson in 2016, when he wrote in a column about the “part-Kenian heritage” of President Obama and his “ancestral dislike of the British empire”. Biden opposes Brexit because he thinks it is a strategic mistake. The US President has Irish roots and will probably never be a big fan of Boris Johnson. A British-American trade deal is not a priority for Washington. The UK is not “in front of the queue “, as former President Trump once promised and the relationship between the US and Britain remains complicated.

Ulrich Oppold is currently the UK-Correspondent and Bureau Chief for the RTL Group in London. Previously, he has worked as a TV-Journalist for RTL Television since 1990 – during which time he has covered many major news events such as the German reunification in Berlin. He has written and produced over 2000 news-stories and documentaries for RTL Television – the most successful commercial broadcaster in Europe and the media partner of CBS in the U.S.

Philip Collins is a columnist for The New Statesman and Evening Standard Times and was Chief Leader Writer at The Times for almost a decade. He served as Tony Blair’s Chief speechwriter for five years, leaving Downing Street Number 10 on the same day as the former PM and penning his last speech in office. He now casts an insider’s eye over Westminster events as well as analysing what makes persuasive communication.

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“We need alliances – now even more than ever”

atlantikbruecke — Wed, 17 Nov 2021 11:21:49 +0000

Atlantik-Brücke was honored to welcome U.S. Consul General Thatcher Scharpf to Frankfurt. Before coming to Frankfurt, Mr. Scharpf was Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the Secretary of State. As a U.S. diplomat, he has served in various roles, both in the U.S. and internationally. Among others, he served as Counselor for Management Affairs of the U.S. Tri-Missions in Vienna; as Deputy Chief of Mission of the American Embassy in Bratislava, Slovakia; and as Deputy Director of the Office of Specialized and Technical Agencies in the State Department’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs. He has received numerous Superior and Meritorious Honor Awards from the State Department.

“Our transatlantic ties remain the strongest foundation we have for realizing a better future for ourselves and the world.” [quoter]U.S. Consul General Thatcher Scharpf[/quoter]

At the Atlantik-Brücke dinner, the Consul General gave his views on the transatlantic relationship: “Over the last 75 years, the United States and our European allies and partners have built a durable, democratic, and prosperous transatlantic community. Our alliance shaped the 20th century for the better. It delivered security and opportunity not only for our own people, but for people everywhere. However, the world looks very different than it did decades ago, when we forged many of our alliances. Threats have multiplied. Competition has stiffened. Power dynamics have shifted. Trust in our alliances has been shaken. Yet none of this changes the fact that we need alliances – now maybe even more than ever. The challenge we face is to adapt and renew those alliances so that they can meet today’s threats, and continue to deliver for our people, as they have in the past. The only way to meet these challenges is by working together. Our transatlantic ties remain the strongest foundation we have for realizing a better future for ourselves and the world.”

The Consul General does not only have diplomatic ties to Germany; it is also a big part of his family history: three of his four grandparents were the grandchildren of Germans who immigrated to the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century.

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AUKUS – an Australian Perspective

atlantikbruecke — Mon, 01 Nov 2021 12:34:39 +0000

Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America recently announced the formation of a new military alliance in the Indo-Pacific: AUKUS, named for the acronyms of its member states. There has been a lot of debate around the pact in Europe. In order to understand the regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and especially Australia’s perspective, Atlantik-Brücke hosted a discussion with Australia’s Ambassador in Germany, H.E. Philip Green and Atlantik-Brücke Chairman Sigmar Gabriel.

The Indo-Pacific is at the center of great power rivalry. Australia’s analysis of this strategic environment led to the country’s decision to join AUKUS. While AUKUS is of military nature, Ambassador Green stressed that Australia first and foremost pursues a diplomatic approach in the region with three aims: Freedom of navigation, freedom of trade, and freedom from the multitude of cyber-threats. In pursuing these aims, Australia strongly engages with its regional partners and supports solutions through multilateral fora like ASEAN and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

To balance China’s revisionist efforts to control and dominate the region, Australia does not only seek cooperation with its regional partners in the Indo-Pacific, but also with its natural liberal democratic allies. This includes Europe and Germany. Developing a stronger strategic interest and understanding of the region and making use of its soft-power leverage could well be beneficial for European interests. One example for such European soft-power export that was discussed were joint investment efforts into sustainable infrastructure and the production of vaccines in the region.

The discussion provided insights into Australia’s perspective on the dynamics in the Indo-Pacific – and how the region affects the transatlantic relations: “It is high time for Europe and Germany to develop a better understanding of the dynamics in the Indo-Pacific for the future of the transatlantic relations”, Sigmar Gabriel observed in his closing remarks.

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Changing Views of and in the United States

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 14 Oct 2021 15:15:46 +0000

Internationally, confidence in the U.S. president has increased significantly from Trump to Biden. At the end of Trump’s term, only 17% of polled publics in 16 different countries were confident in the U.S. president, whereas this year, 75% said they were. Similarly, confidence in the U.S. president’s ability to manage international affairs increased.

Jacob Poushter, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research, Pew Research Center, presented these and other insights from the latest Pew survey results.

Most of the polled international publics do not think that the U.S. is taking their country’s interest into account when making foreign policy decisions. In Germany, about half of respondents, 51%, thought so.

Domestically, President Biden’s approval rating had decreased significantly: 44% of Americans approved of the job Biden is doing, which is worse than presidents Bush and Obama fared during the same timeframe in their terms, and down from 54% at the beginning of his time in office. His approval rating is similar to that of President Clinton and higher than President Trump’s. According to Poushter, lower approval ratings for presidents have become more common: the deep polarization in American politics means that presidents now rarely get above 55%.

In Biden’s case, the 10% decline in approval since the beginning of his term is to a large degree due to foreign policy – a policy area that is “generally not the top priority for Americans,” says Poushter. Yet, 69% of Americans, both Democrats and Republicans, feel that the U.S. has failed in achieving its goals in Afghanistan and 42% say that the Biden administration has done a poor job handling the crisis in Afghanistan.

You can take a closer look at the survey findings in this Pew Research Center Slide Show.

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Election Readout 2021

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 30 Sep 2021 17:39:31 +0000

On the day after the German election that ended the era of Angela Merkel, Atlantik-Bruecke teamed up with the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the American Council on Germany for three rounds of election readouts with renowned experts and politicians.

Panel 1: The Pollster and the Policy Expert

Janina Mütze, Co-Founder and CEO, Civey

Julia Reuschenbach, Lecturer for Poltical Science,
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn

Moderator:
Sudha David-Wilp, Deputy Director Berlin Office, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States

Panel 2: The Politicians

Marieluise Beck, Director for East-Central and Eastern Europe, LibMod and Former Member of the German Bundestag (Alliance 90/The Greens)

Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman, Atlantik-Brücke and Former Member of the German Bundestag, Vice Chancellor and Secretary of State (Social Democrats)

Ruprecht Polenz, President, The German Association for East European Studies and Former Member of the German Bundestag (Christian Democrats)

Moderator:
Ambassador John B. Emerson, Chairman, American Council on Germany; Former Ambassador of the United States to Germany

Panel 3: The Pundits

Steven Erlanger, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent in Europe, The New York Times

Dr. Anna Sauerbrey, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Der Tagesspiegel

Moderator:
Dr. David Deißner, Executive Director, Atlantik-Brücke

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“The more stable our democracies are, the less terrorists can harm us”

Atlantic Bridge — Wed, 29 Sep 2021 10:13:10 +0000

Mr. Gabriel, on September 11, 2001, you were Prime Minister of Lower Saxony. When the news of the attacks in the U.S. reached you, did you have any idea of the impact they would have on the world?

I remember this situation very clearly because I had an Israeli friend as a guest in the Lower Saxony State Chancellery, with whom I wanted to celebrate my birthday on September 12. Of course, nothing came of it after the terrorist attacks in New York. We were sitting in my office when an employee rushed in and told us to turn on the TV. When we saw the live pictures, we thought it was some kind of disaster movie. When we realized that we had just witnessed these gruel attacks, we, like probably everyone else, sat front of these images, stunned and horrified.

In response to the attacks orchestrated by Al Qaeda, the U.S. and its allies invaded Afghanistan in October 2001; NATO declared an alliance emergency for the first time. Now, following the withdrawal of NATO troops a few weeks ago, the Taliban have immediately regained control of the country. What has the 20-year mission in Afghanistan achieved?

After the attacks, the UN Security Council approved a mandate for an international military mission in Afghanistan to dismantle Al Qaeda’s terrorist structures. That was a remarkable decision because it is normally very difficult to get veto powers like Russia, the U.S., and China on the same page in the UN Security Council. Following this decision and invoking the mutual assistance clause in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, Germany also participated in this operation with its Bundeswehr. In sometimes heavy fighting with many dead and wounded, also in the Bundeswehr, it was finally possible to actually dismantle the structures of Al Qaeda and to eliminate its leader, Osama Bin Laden, in 2011. In this respect, the UN’s mission has been fulfilled. What the international military mission did not succeed in doing, and perhaps never could, was to engage in nation-building in Afghanistan by establishing democratic structures based on the model of Western societies.

The longer a war lasts, the deeper hatred and the desire for revenge dig into the souls of those affected. We see the result today.

The idea, of course, was not simply to leave the country to its own devices after Al Qaeda had been crushed, but to transfer it to reasonably stable state structures. Germany was one of the main proponents of this “nation building”. But as in Iraq, it became clear in Afghanistan that this idealistic approach could not be fulfilled. Anyone who asked the Bundeswehr soldiers and the police officers we had on the ground, was always reminded of the instability of this new “nation of Afghanistan.” This was truly no secret. Establishing a democratic society in almost medieval tribal structures proved impossible. There was simply a lack of democrats, however, especially among women and in large cities, many were very invested in democracy. But without the backing of international forces, they were unable to stabilize the country.

When, after a trip to Afghanistan in 2007, the then SPD chairman Kurt Beck expressed the conviction that it was also necessary to talk to the Taliban, he was laughed at, especially here in Germany. It would have been wiser to follow the advice he gave at the time and involve the Taliban. Of course, that would have been neither easy nor necessarily successful. But it would have given a chance to end the war ten years earlier. The longer a war lasts, the deeper hatred and the desire for revenge dig into the souls of those involved. We see the result today. And whether the new Taliban rule will not once again create a basis for international terrorism is an open question. There are parts of the Taliban movement that definitely do not want that, but there are also others who do.

Where do you see the greatest opportunities for countering extremism and terrorism today? What can the U.S. and Europe learn from each other when it comes to fighting and preventing the root causes of terrorism?

We are not helpless in the face of international terrorism, and recent years have shown that we are able to prevent attacks, at least here in Europe. But one thing is unfortunately also true: there is no such thing as absolute security, and attacks can also occur again. Not only by Islamist assassins, by the way, but also, as we have seen, by right-wing radicals.

The most important tool in the fight against fundamentalism and terror is a resilient and strong democratic society.

The most important tool in the fight against fundamentalism and terror is a resilient and strong democratic society. After all, the goal of these attacks is always to create chaos, in a perverse strategy aimed at shaking up democracy. The more stable our democracies are, the less terrorists can harm us. And, of course, it’s also about prevention: working with young people from the radical-religious milieu, better educational and advancement opportunities for young immigrants, breaking up radical Islamic mosque communities, and, of course, exchanges between intelligence agencies so that we know who is moving in our countries – something that we Germans view with skepticism and that is nevertheless necessary. Prevention and repression are two sides of the same coin in the fight against terror.

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“Allies, allies, allies”

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 19 Aug 2021 10:11:34 +0000

General James Mattis, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, spoke at Atlantik-Brücke’s Young Leaders Conference 2021 via Zoom.

James N. Mattis is a retired U.S. Marine Corps four-star general who served as the 26th Secretary of Defense. During his more than four decades in uniform, Secretary Mattis commanded forces in the Persian Gulf War, in Afghanistan after 9/11, and in the Iraq War in 2003.

From 2007 to 2010, he commanded the United States Joint Forces Command and also served as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation. He was commander of United States Central Command from 2010 to 2013.

After his retirement, Secretary Mattis served as the Davies Family Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He co-edited the book, “Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military.”

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“A 1949 Moment”

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 01 Jul 2021 14:50:22 +0000

Ambassador Victoria Nuland, Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, spoke with John B. Emerson, Chairman of the American Council on Germany, and Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, about President Biden’s recent trip to Europe, the common challenges ahead and the priorities for U.S. foreign policy.

Under Secretary Nuland highlighted some key points of President Biden’s trip to Europe, the G7, NATO and EU-US summits as well as Biden’s meeting with Putin:

The goal of the trip was to create an architecture of the future; it was “a 1949 moment”.
Democratic countries need to demonstrate unity in the face of challenge from autocracies like Russia and China.
Democracy needs to show it will deliver for its own people as well as for people around the world.

These ideas, Nuland argued, became manifest in the outcomes of the various summits:

The G7-pledge to donate a billion vaccines to countries in need with no political strings attached
The Build Back Better World initiative of the G7 countries, in which they provide medium and lower income countries with an infrastructure fund as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road initiative and other autocratic measures
The G7’s decision on a corporate minimum tax of 15% to emphasize fairness
The G7-climate-pledge to transition away from coal
The decision to make NATO stronger and more resilient, and to focus more strongly on China and cyber security
The launch of the EU-US Technology Council to address challenges in tech and to demonstrate unity vis-à-vis autocracies

All of these initiatives provided the backdrop for President Biden’s meeting with President Putin. The United States offered Russia cooperation on a number of issues, including strategic stability, the fight agains ransomware attacks and Syria.

The Fireside Chat with Ambassador Nuland kicked off our German-American Conference in cooperation with the American Council on Germany.

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“A good starting point”

atlantikbruecke — Tue, 29 Jun 2021 14:13:22 +0000

Phil Mattingly, Senior White House Correspondent, CNN, spoke to Atlantik-Brücke about the outcome of President Biden’s first trip to Europe in June 2021. The journalist was part of the press delegation that accompanied the president.

Mr. Mattingly, before President Biden’s visit to Europe, he wrote in an op-ed in the Washington Post that he intended to “rally the world’s democracies” to “defend our values, which cannot be separate from our interests.” Is Joe Biden reuniting the West?

Phil Mattingly: It’s certainly President Biden’s goal – no question about that. But it’s important to recognize there are levels to the effort. Yes, in the view of White House officials I’ve spoken to, the G-7, NATO and U.S.-EU meetings were a net success – perhaps even more so than they were expecting going in. But they are also clear-eyed that given their predecessor’s view on many of those long-standing allies – and most certainly the alliances themselves – it wasn’t exactly a high bar to clear. Biden cleared it just by showing up and reiterating his support for baseline elements (think Article 5, which no U.S. president ever questioned before the previous four years.)

A very deliberate and concerted effort to thrust the U.S. back into a leadership role led to some tangible outcomes.

But this isn’t a short-term effort – there’s a recognition that the West isn’t a monolith and on so many issues, be it China, or trade, or concerns with the U.S. domestic position, that it will take sustained focus for the entirety of their time in office to keep things together. Western allies spent a lot of time the previous four years weighing the reliance on the relationship with the U.S., the stability of it, the merits of maintaining it to the degree it has existed for decades. A positive nine day trip doesn’t wipe all of those issues away. I think Biden’s team knows that. That said, a very deliberate and concerted effort to thrust the U.S. back into a leadership role led to some tangible outcomes, whether on vaccines or a sharper focus on China, or starting to move to reverse or resolve certain trade issues, that U.S. officials believe are a good starting point for that effort.

Based on the results of the G7-, EU-USA- and NATO Summits: What can we expect for the transatlantic relationship going forward?

I don’t mean to sound like I’m undercutting a point I made on the first question – that one trip doesn’t undo the prior four years or solidify a return to the prior relationship – but I do think this trip is a really solid model for what officials describe as what Biden’s approach will be in the years ahead. The general idea is to agree on the baselines that have been the bedrock for those alliances for decades, but seek to update them to match a more 21^st century approach (there wasn’t a lot of nuance in the signing of the new Atlantic Treaty document with Prime Minister Johnson before the G-7. It was the symbolic embodiment of this approach.)

So on areas of mutual agreement, the idea is to show a consistently united front and use that unity as leverage on challenges throughout the region – and beyond. On areas where there are disagreements, keep them behind closed doors and see if a middle ground can be agreed upon before anything spills out into the public that could undercut the relationship in front of competitors (that’s particularly prevalent on areas like trade and technology – there are differences there, but the goal is to seek to address them in a private, and diplomatic, manner.) The goal, as its been explained to me, is to maintain relationships to a degree where nobody is surprised by anything and issues can be addressed and resolved to the best degree possible behind closed doors.

Biden’s focus on China brings about very real differences on how its rise should be addressed.

I do think, and this isn’t a secret, that Biden’s approach will lead to some natural tension – trade issues aren’t going away and Biden’s focus on China, while addressed in both the G-7 and NATO communiques, brings about very real differences in views on how its rise should be approached and addressed. That will be a constant issue that needs to be managed and addressed. But the process of drafting those communiques, while probably viewed as trite by normal people, is one that U.S. officials viewed as a positive development in the ongoing process to bring allies into unified approach. Will it ever happen entirely? No, and there’s no expectation it will – domestic equities for the various players simply don’t align perfectly on the issue…at all. But, like a lot of what we saw through those nine days, it’s a model of the general approach to come.

How is Joe Biden’s policy towards the United States’ allies greeted at home, after four years of a U.S. president with a decidedly antagonistic rhetoric towards Europe? How does the concern about the domestic political rift play into the Biden administration’s foreign policy?

It won’t be a surprise to anyone when I say it’s not a unified view, but overall the polling in the wake of his foreign visit has reflected solid majority support for the efforts Biden undertook. But there were certainly those who viewed Biden’s diametrically different approach to Europe as the U.S. wandering its way back into relationships that have been too one-sided (the long-stated view of Trumpism, to the degree that’s a defined approach.) That, however attractive to more populist strains domestically, is far from a majority viewpoint.

That said, and I think this gets to the second part of the question, Biden’s team is keenly aware of the very disconnect that made Trump’s view attractive – the idea that U.S. foreign policy was, to so many Americans, foreign. They didn’t see the benefits. They can’t tangibly point to why those alliances made their lives demonstrably better at home. Sure, it makes sense to those who have studied the post-war era and all of its elements. It is unquestioned by the vast majority of those who consider themselves foreign policy professionals. But one of the things Biden’s national security team has keyed in on is that in the wake of President Trump’s rise, that’s just not enough anymore. It is an animating feature of Biden’s diplomatic approach – this idea of making U.S. foreign policy work for the middle class. It sounds a little strange on its face, certainly amorphous, and to some degree it is still being fleshed out in terms of the policy approach. But a good roadmap of sorts comes from a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report released in 2020 titled “Making Foreign Policy Work Better for the Middle Class.” A co-author of that report is the current national security advisor, Jake Sullivan.

The alliances that serve as the backbone of the West need to also show they can deliver for their populations.

From a more 30,000 foot level, I’d point to an off-the-cuff remark Biden made during one of his press conferences, which I’ve notated below, that really struck me and gets to the core of this question. He’s so upfront about his framing of this moment as one of “Democracy versus Autocracy” – and it’s not a communications strategy, by all accounts of his senior aides he genuinely believes it (with China by far marking the primary autocracy he means, but it broadly applies to various countries across the globe.) But in order to “win” the construct he’s laid out, he knows the U.S. – and other Western allies – needs to demonstrate it can still operate as designed. It’s the basis for the global minimum tax push, and the B3W initiative [the G7’s “Build Back Better World”, a global infrastructure plan as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative], obviously the vaccine distribution effort etc.

Biden said: “You know and I know they’re wrong. But it doesn’t mean we don’t have to work harder than ever to prove that democracy can still deliver for our people. For the many who think things are changing so rapidly, democracies cannot get together and form a consensus to respond like autocrats can, but you know better than anyone that democracy doesn’t happen by accident. We have to defend it. We have to strengthen it, renew it.” (From the Remarks of President Biden to U.S. Air Force Personnel and Families stationed at Royal Air Force Mildenhall, June 9, 2021)

In that he means he needs to show the government can work on the domestic front – prove to those disaffected or disenchanted that pursuing the line of the last four years isn’t the most productive path. But he also means the alliances that serve as the backbone of the West, need to also show they can deliver for their populations. It is a high-stakes bet – and he has a limited window to achieve a pretty dramatic goal given the current environment. But he is all in on the idea of it as he made very clear during his trip.

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America’s Image Abroad

atlantikbruecke — Fri, 18 Jun 2021 08:09:42 +0000

On the occasion of the release of Pew Research’s latest survey on America’s image abroad, we spoke to Richard Wike, the Director of Global Attitudes Research at Pew. You can find the full report on the website of Pew Research.

In Pew’s latest survey of America’s image abroad, you look at how the international perception of the United States has changed after the election of Joe Biden. Within the transatlantic community, there has certainly been a feeling of renewal and optimism after November 3. Has this feeling reached the broader publics in Europe and Asia that you surveyed?

Richard Wike: This survey highlights a big change in how people in Europe and Asia view the United States, with attitudes turning much more positive. In fact, these are some of the largest shifts we’ve seen since we began surveying on this topic two decades ago. For example, if you look at 12 nations that we polled both in 2020 and this year, a median of just 17% across those nations had confidence in Trump last year, but 75% have confidence in Biden this year. The percentage across those 12 countries with a favorable view of the U.S. overall rose from 34% last year, when we saw all-time lows in many nations, to 62% in this survey. So there’s been a big change in how key allies and partners of the U.S. view who is in the White House, and that’s had a big impact on America’s overall image.

What, ultimately, is more important for Joe Biden’s positive rating in the international community – his policies or his personality?

Both are important. Part of the approval is about personality and personal leadership characteristics. Not many people thought that Trump was well qualified for the job. They do tend to think that Biden is well qualified. The majorities typically thought that Trump was arrogant and dangerous, and not many people say that about Biden. Trump’s best trait according to our polling when he was in office was that he was a strong leader. But even there, Biden gets better ratings than Trump did. So, regarding leadership characteristics and personality characteristics, Biden does better than Trump. But beyond personality it’s also about policies. During the Trump presidency, there was a lot of opposition to his key policies, people did not approve of the US withdrawing from international commitments, they didn’t like the US putting a barrier between themselves and the rest of the world. People now welcome the turn to multilateralism that they see from the Biden administration. Climate is a good example. There was a lot of opposition to President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris climate accord, and a huge majority say they approve of President Biden’s reentry into the Paris Agreement. Similarly, people welcome the US rejoining the WHO, they approve of Biden’s policy to allow more refugees into the United States. Overall, there is a much more positive view about the Biden administration’s policies so far compared to what we saw during the Trump years.

Would you consider the upward trend in America’s image abroad sustainable, even if Joe Biden, due to the close majorities in Congress, is not able to put all his policies into action?

There is always a certain reservoir of good will towards the United States, even during times when people are frustrated with the United States. But it also matters what the US does, whether it is able to deliver on its promises. Even in this survey with high ratings for President Biden, there are still concerns about America’s promises. There is a sense that the US doesn’t always act in a multilateral fashion. Majorities in every public that we surveyed said that they don’t think the US considers the interests of countries like theirs when it makes foreign policy decisions. That is a consistent finding that we’ve seen over the years, no matter whether it’s a Democrat or a Republican in the White House. There is a sense that the US does not always live up to its ideals or listen to other countries.

You show that a similar uptick in Western European’s trust in the US President happened when President Obama was elected. Are we seeing the very same trend today as 12 years ago, or are different factors at play?

There are some similarities between the rebound in America’s image today and what we saw in 2009 after President Obama had come into office: in both cases, people reacted positively to a more multilateral approach to foreign policy compared to the predecessor. It is important to note that although Obama was pretty popular overall, there were certain policies that people did not like during the Obama years, as well. What has changed since then is that the world has changed in many ways. The rise of China has changed the geopolitical environment in which an American president is operating. The pandemic has changed the world, and there has been a continued economic anxiety in many countries. So despite the similarities in numbers, it is important to note that Joe Biden is inheriting a world that has changed since the Obama years.

With the significant shifts in global dynamics that you described, what are the major differences you are seeing between the perception of the United States among publics in Europe and those in the Asia-Pacific region?

We do a lot of polling on views about China. A couple of things that are interesting have come out of that in recent years. One is that people very much see China’s power on the rise. And the other is that views towards China have turned negative in many of the countries where we do our surveys. 2020 in many ways was a low point in America’s image. There was a widespread perception that the US mishandled the pandemic and that, among some other things, led to record lows in ratings for the US. At the same time, there were also record lows for China in many countries. That was driven by concern about how China handled the pandemic, in some cases concerns about China in the security realm, in others China as an economic partner. So both superpowers, the United States and China, have been seen in an increasingly negative light over the past couple of years. The US’ image has now rebounded, and we will have some new numbers on China, soon.

How has the political divide in the United States and especially the events of January 6^th of this year influenced the international community’s view? Has America’s image and credibility as a world leader been compromised by this development?

That was one very interesting finding of this survey: the overall rating of the US improved, but people have concerns nonetheless, including concerns about the health of American democracy. We asked people: “Do you think the US is currently a good example of democracy? Or was it never a good example of democracy? Or did it use to be a good example, but hasn’t been in recent years?” In most places, people say that the US used to be a good example but is not any longer. Fewer than one in five say the US is currently a good example of democracy. We didn’t ask specifically about the events of January 6^th, when a violent mob stormed the US Capitol, but certainly that’s the kind of thing that will affect how people are feeling about the health of American democracy. And there is great concern about that in the publics we’ve included in this year’s survey. That is an important finding for America’s overall soft power, in which being regarded as a model democracy played a big role.

Later this year, we’ll release more survey results on views of the U.S., with a particular focus on how people see various elements of American soft power. And soon we will also release a report updating many of our key trends on attitudes toward China.

Richard Wike is director of global attitudes research at Pew Research Center. He conducts research and writes about international public opinion on a variety of topics, such as America’s global image, the rise of China, democracy, and globalization.

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The Challenges of Future War

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 17 Jun 2021 15:57:48 +0000

General Hodges, let us talk about your book „Future War and the Defence of Europe” that you co-authored with General ret. John Allen and Professor Julian Lindley-French. In it, you outline what is changing in warfare and what this implies for the transatlantic alliance and the security of Europe. To start off, could you give us an overview of the changing nature of war?

The book is an attempt to look at the character of future war, and what we need to do to prepare for it. The likelihood of being in conflicts with Russia and China at the same time is not something that anybody wants, but we don’t get to choose that. We have to prepare for that, to deter it, to prevent it. And because of our great alliance of thirty nations, as long as we stick together, that’s a formidable deterrent force. It’s when we’re not cohesive and coherent that we become vulnerable.

The Kremlin and the Chinese Communist Party see advantage in using technologies that undermine our capabilities.

The Kremlin and the Chinese Communist Party see advantage in asymmetrical approaches, using technologies that undermine our advantages and capabilities. Chief among these are things like drones – unmanned systems, both in the air, which are more common, but also underwater maritime systems, and unmanned vehicles or robotics. When you add to that the use of cyber as a weapon to cripple infrastructure, as we recently saw against the Colonial Pipeline in the United States, it is a reminder of how vulnerable we are. We wanted to draw attention to the importance of cyber defense and cyber protection, but also to the need to be able to use cyber offensively, if necessary, for deterrence.

Other issues to which we have adapt are:

Artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence and machine learning in tandem will enable our IT systems to adjust rapidly to what’s out there, faster than humans could possibly think. That means that we must set the parameters for what we need, bearing in mind legal, moral and ethical considerations, which our potential adversaries will not be bothered with.

The speed and range of weapons. This exceeds anything that we have experienced before, and the precision of these weapons that are nuclear as well as non-nuclear, hyper velocity, and can avoid detection, these are real challenges; particularly for large ships, but also for critical infrastructure, airports, and seaports.

And then finally, quantum calculations, the speed of how fast machines can learn. There is great potential to help us understand intentions better. We’re currently not able to find intentions, for example, behind how the president of the Russian Federation is thinking or the leader of the Chinese Communist Party. So, perhaps, much like the business world already does, quantum learning may help us figure this out more quickly.

Where do you see the biggest weaknesses in European preparedness for these challenges?

The principal target audience for our book are European political leaders and strategic thinkers because the United States alone does not have the capacity to do everything. Even with the largest defense budgets in history, significant Air Force, Navy, land forces, and all the other capabilities that we have, it’s not enough. You can’t deter Russia, contain the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts, contain Iran, contain North Korea, deal with Islamic extremism, protect the global commons, and take care of regular business. That’s why our president has emphasized the importance of alliances and multilateral institutions, to help deal with all these threats.

The defense of Europe is going to rest largely on the shoulders of our European allies.

In the event of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region, or even as we shift more and more assets there, our European allies cannot assume that the US will provide the bulk of security in Europe. We are going to remain invested in Europe, our economic prosperity depends on European prosperity. The EU is the biggest trading partner for North America. Plus, we need the access our European allies give us in terms of air bases, naval bases, land training areas and so on. But overall, the defense of Europe is going to rest largely on the shoulders of our European allies.

There are a couple of vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. Number one: there is a reluctance on the part of many political leaders, in Germany, in France, in the Netherlands, in Italy, and some other Western European countries to look at the Kremlin as a real threat. That doesn’t mean that you can’t have dialog, that you can’t buy gas, it doesn’t mean that you can’t have trade and relations, but you have to acknowledge there’s a threat and you have to explain to your citizens that we have to protect ourselves and that means you have to invest in your own security. And the same thing is true for China: all of us, including the United States, want to be able to take advantage of the Chinese market, all of us depend on various products from China. But that comes at a price. We must be very clear and hold China accountable for respecting sovereignty and living up to international agreements and international law. That’s job one and it falls on the shoulders of our elected civilian leaders in Europe.

Number two: Cyber vulnerability. We have to acknowledge, even within federal systems like in Germany or the US, where so much power is devolved down to states or Bundesländer, that cyber may be one of those things that is best handled at a central level. Clearly, many businesses are not taking adequate responsibility, as we saw from the Colonial Pipeline.

A third vulnerability that our European allies have to address is air and missile defense, which are about protecting European citizens, protecting European infrastructure. This is where Germany in particular, but also the Netherlands, should play a leading role protecting the Baltic region, working with Sweden, Finland, and Norway. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania do not have the capacity to provide high-end air and missile defense.

The final point is military mobility. We must show that we can move as fast or faster than Russian Federation forces to be able to convey to the Kremlin that we are prepared. The ability to cross borders, the ability to move equipment quickly in peace time conditions –many people don’t realize the importance of this. This is again something where Germany and the Netherlands can play a leading role.

With the new US administration, which changing priorities in American foreign policy should Europe be specifically aware of?

First, the United States has to remove all doubt about its commitment to security, stability and prosperity in Europe. Not just during the Trump administration, but even during the Obama administration, there was talk about a pivot to the Pacific, and well-intentioned but unsuccessful attempts at having the proper sort of relationship with the Kremlin. So, it’s very important that our president addresses this.

There is a huge responsibility and high expectations of Germany.

Germany is the most important ally for the United States. Germany has earned a moral authority of sorts over the last seven decades – which took hard work – that gives it a strong voice that is respected around the world. The brand “Made in Germany” is so respected. Your focus on the environment, on climate change, these things give Germany authority. Obviously, the economic power makes Germany the leader inside the European Union. The United States is depending on Germany. The Biden administration has made it clear that the relationship is very important. With that come high expectations that Germany will hold the EU together when it comes to having the necessary leverage to deal effectively with China, that Germany will hold the EU together on sanctions against Russia and press the Kremlin to respect international law and Ukrainian sovereignty, for example. There is a huge responsibility and high expectations of Germany. The Biden administration is probably a little disappointed because we haven’t seen a manifestation of that. But, of course, the administration recognizes that Germany has elections in September.

The UK is in a unique situation, no longer inside the EU. It’s a critical security partner and a critical economic partner, it has global aspirations, and the United States is going to work closely with the UK as always on how to deal with China and with Russia.

The French, obviously, are a critical ally and important leader within the European Union, but they do not seem at all interested in holding the Kremlin accountable for what it has done in Georgia or anywhere in the Black Sea, particularly in Ukraine. This will also be a point of emphasis for the administration.

In the past, between Europe and the United States, there has always been an emphasis on our common values. What role do these values play for the alliance today, and what is the relation between common values and interests?

The Biden administration is correct in emphasizing the importance of strong liberal democracies, of ensuring that the institutions that make up liberal democracies, such as the electoral process, a free media, a judiciary that is in fact fair, respect for international law, respect for other nations. If the United States wants to hold others accountable, we must get our own house in order.

Europeans have always criticized American policy decisions, that’s to be expected. But Europeans tended to have respect for American institutions, the ideal of these institutions. And when we don’t live up to what we say our values are, it significantly undermines our credibility as an ally and as a leader. That is something that the Biden administration is working hard to address. You can expect that the United States will have similar expectations for our allies, so that we can be strong and cohesive. We are going to have different policy views, each nation is going to have its own agenda, but it’s the values that are so clearly laid out in the preamble to the Washington Treaty which created NATO. That’s what helps us stick together and get through the policy differences.

Are you optimistic about the future of NATO? Macron famously called the alliance “braindead” – was he wrong?

Think about our alliance, created 1949, twelve countries at the beginning. Here we are in 2021, 30 countries and at least three in the queue wanting to come in. So, despite all the changes in the security environment, from the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, through the Cold War, the breakup of Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and now back into an era of Great Power competition, the alliance has only grown, because people know that their best chance for security lies with being a member of NATO. When you take a longer-term strategic view, it’s useful to remember that.

We have been through a lot of tough times: during the time of de Gaulle, France withdrew from the military structure of NATO. France and the UK were very unhappy with the United States when we did not support them in Suez. Germany was extremely unhappy after the US went into Iraq. Turkey would not let the US go through their territory into Northern Iraq back in 2002/2003. So, there’s been a host of issues, and then President Macron said that NATO was braindead. I completely disagree with him, but it was useful. Secretary Jens Stoltenberg created the Strategic Reflections Group to take a look at where we’ve been and where we’re going. And they provided several recommendations for the alliance, which are being worked on now and which are being addressed by NATO’s leaders.

Let me just highlight a handful of key points:

There is the topic of burden sharing. Two percent is a useful metric, but it should not be the only metric. We need a much more sophisticated approach to what it means. Germany is not a frontline state anymore in the traditional sense. It is the hub for logistics, for air and missile defense, for commanding control. Therefore, anything that improves NATO’s ability to respond quickly, such as rail, air transport, wheeled transport, cyber protection, and infrastructure, that should count towards two percent because that’s what we need from Germany. We are going to figure out a way to improve burden sharing.

We need a much more sophisticated approach to burden sharing.

The Asia-Pacific region: I don’t envision a NATO mission to the Indo-Pacific region, although there will be allies such as France and the UK who will provide maritime capabilities, even Germany is doing this, in the Pacific. Everybody has an interest in freedom of navigation and stability in the Pacific. But the alliance has to figure out how to deal with China. An important example of this is that NATO now tracks what infrastructure in Europe is controlled by Chinese business. The port of Piraeus in Greece is one of the most well-known examples – the Chinese own about 99% of that port. Recently I saw a report that said that about 40% of the port of Hamburg’s capacity may be owned by the Chinese soon. We talk about being in a crisis with Russia, and now you have China controlling transportation infrastructure. We have to be considerate of that.

The alliance is going to look at its role with climate change. Not only in terms what we can do to contribute to reducing human impact on the climate, but also what the implications are for security, the most obvious being the changing Arctic. Ships are going to increasingly be able to transit the Arctic throughout the year. We have to think about how Russia tries to control that, about Chinese competition – the alliance is going to have to respond. Our Norwegian allies pay attention to this very closely.

The alliance has to figure out how to deal with China.

Finally, what we started off talking about: is the alliance fit for purpose in the future? Do we have the tools and the political support necessary to operate in a cyber domain? Have we figured out how to accommodate each nation’s concerns about ethical issues with drones and artificial intelligence? That’s the future of our alliance. I’m actually very, very optimistic.

Let us look at the situation in the United States: The US has become a lot more domestic-oriented over the past few years. There is this deep political rift that seems to accelerate this look inward. Do you agree with this assessment and if so, what does that mean for the United States’ foreign engagement and for its allies?

Up until the Second World War, the United States always had a strong isolationist tendency. Blessed by incredible geography, with only Canada to the north and Mexico to the south – that affected how people thought. The United States was formed by people that left other continents to focus inwardly. That’s in our DNA. But after the Second World War it was clear that we should adopt a more forward leaning posture when it comes to global security to prevent conflict. That has been largely successful, especially within Europe.

As I mentioned, our economy depends on prosperity around the rest of the world so that there are markets for American products, as well as the things Americans want at very low prices. That has caused us to become much more globally oriented. But every president has to think about domestic issues. We have gone a little bit too far in the globalization effort, so that jobs were leaving the United States and production was happening elsewhere. That’s what was part of the appeal for President Trump, he focused on getting these jobs back in the United States. Even President Biden has said: “Buy American.”

Our political leaders have the responsibility to explain to their populations how we are going to take care of our own population, but why we also depend on other nations as well. COVID-19 has been an example of that. We depend on each other and that includes security. The United States cannot do it alone, Germany cannot do it alone, but your readers can appreciate that Americans will be a little bit annoyed if they see an ally who benefits from American security, not contributing.

Thank you very much for your thoughts!

Thank you.

Lieutenant General (Retired) Ben Hodges holds the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis. The last assignment in his military career, which spanned almost four decades, was as Commanding General, United States Army Europe (Wiesbaden, Germany) from 2014 to 2017. He retired from the U.S. Army in January 2018. His book is Future War and the Defence of Europe by Gen. John R Allen & Lt Gen. Ben Hodges & Prof. Julian Lindley-French (Oxford: Oxford University Press)/German Edition Sept 2021 (Stuttgart: Franckh Kosmos)

Der Beitrag The Challenges of Future War erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The Transatlantic Alliance after Afghanistan

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 03 Jun 2021 10:12:44 +0000

The withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan has begun, and is currently set to be completed by the 4th of July. In the wake of the decision, the immediate impact of the withdrawal on the outlook of Afghanistan has received widespread attention. However, it also marks a milestone for the NATO alliance, ending its largest mission after almost 20 years. Therefore, it seems pertinent to consider what the withdrawal means for NATO, and the transatlantic alliance as a whole. Bruce Jones, Director, Project on International Order and Strategy and Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution, discusses with Dr. Markus Kaim, Senior Fellow, Research Division International Security, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs). The conversation is chaired by Siemtje Möller, MdB (SPD), Defense Policy Spokeswoman of the SPD Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag.

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“Little Time for Major Foreign Policy Projects”

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 03 Jun 2021 09:34:51 +0000

Bojan Pancevski

Bojan Pancevski, Journalist, Author, and Germany Correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, joined Atlantik-Brücke as a guest speaker at the Frankfurt Luncheon to talk about transatlantic relations under the Biden administration. After the event, we caught up with him for a quick interview.

Mr. Pancevski, as a correspondent for an American newspaper, what do you find most remarkable about German reporting on the new U.S. administration?

I find the reporting generally unremarkable, given the wall-to-wall coverage of the previous administration, which was basically treated like a domestic story in Germany. Because of that, however, it is perhaps unusual that the Biden Administration’s continuation of some Trump Administration policies, such as the de facto ban for vaccine exports (the U.S. is even sitting on 60m doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine, which will never be used in the country) and the steel and aluminium tariffs on EU exports. Indeed, the present U.S. government has even upped the ante with new tariffs on five European countries in response to their taxes on U.S. technology companies such as Google and Facebook.

With so many political resources dedicated to dealing with the aftermath of a pandemic and trying to heal a severe rift in American society, how much of a foreign policy president can Joe Biden really be?

Joe Biden took office with the most extensive foreign policy experience of, perhaps, any president in recent time. However, his focus will most likely remain firmly set on the domestic political arena, at least until the midterm elections, which means that he will probably have little time for major foreign policy projects.

China is one of the defining topics of transatlantic relations. Do you see a chance for EU-US cooperation vis-à-vis China?

The U.S. and the EU are bound by common values and, broadly, common interests, not least in relation to trade, and the Biden Administration is clearly attempting to forge an alliance with European allies and establish a modicum of a common stance towards China. Yet when it comes to China, the short-term economic interests of major EU economies, such as Germany, are opposed to those of the U.S.: Berlin wants to preserve and enhance its close trading relations with China, while Washington sees Beijing as a rival to be contained. The EU-China investment agreement, which was spearheaded by Germany and signed before the incoming U.S. administration could object to it, neatly encapsulates that divergence of interests which will be a challenge to any transatlantic alliance aimed at checking China’s geopolitical expansion.

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A Conversation on Relations between China and the West: A Perspective from Beijing

Atlantic Bridge — Wed, 26 May 2021 12:14:49 +0000

The virtual event entitled “Conversation on Relations between China and the West: A Perspective from Beijing” was held in cooperation with the Munich Security Conference as part of the MSC’s “Road to Munich” campaign.

The speakers were H.E. Wang Yi, State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman, Atlantik-Brücke; Former Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany, and Federica Mogherini, Rector, College of Europe; Former Vice President of the European Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European Union.

The discussion was moderated by Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman, Munich Security Conference and Member of the Board of Atlantik-Brücke.

The discussion ranged from Europe’s relationship with China, the US’s role in that relationship, to the value of multilateralism.

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Reaffirming and Reimagining the Transatlantic Alliance: Facing Shared Challenges Together

Atlantic Bridge — Tue, 11 May 2021 08:01:21 +0000

Earlier this year, President Biden declared at the Munich Security Conference that “America is back!”. Since coming into office, the Biden administration has demonstrated its interest in renewing the United States relationships with allies. This is a historic and pivotal time for strengthening the transatlantic alliance and addressing NATO’s shared problems, but we also face challenges and potential pitfalls.

At the virtual event “Reaffirming and Reimagining the Transatlantic Alliance: Facing Shared Challenges Together,” Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, gave a presentation on the upcoming challenges the transatlantic partnership faces. Dr. Anna Sauerbrey, Member of the Editorial Board; Head of Opinion Section at Der Tagesspiegel, moderated the discussion.

This event was held in cooperation with the American Council on Germany.

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More Ambition, Please!

atlantikbruecke — Mon, 18 Jan 2021 14:13:16 +0000

This text is a recommendation for action to the German government and the Bundestag with the aim of strengthening transatlantic relations. The text reflects the opinions of the authors, whose names you will find at the end of the text.

Find the website of the initiative here.

1. A New Beginning: Why and How?

The erosion of transatlantic relations is a strategic crisis for Germany. The Trump years revealed Germany’s vulnerabilities and the indispensability of the alliance of Western democracies. Without this alliance, a stable and united Europe cannot be sustained, and neither can the international order be renewed.

Joe Biden’s presidency offers a unique opportunity to overcome the crisis and to revive and preserve the Western alliance long past the next four years. The German government should immediately approach the incoming administration with initiatives to reach a new consensus with the United States.

A new consensus must confirm shared goals and necessary implementing measures. Germany and the United States will need to accept their responsibility for the cohesion and creative power of the community of liberal democracies. In particular, they must agree that a new consensus must be reached, especially regarding the United States role and presence in Europe and Germany, aiming to fortify the alliance well beyond the new president’s term in office. Common solutions are urgently needed to combat the scourges on humanity caused by the coronavirus pandemic and global warming. This collaboration on the challenges of our time should attract a new generation and new civil society actors to the transatlantic relationship.

The moment to act is now. Germany’s government needs leadership, political will, ideas, and a plan—all rooted in the country’s vital interest in the United States remaining a European power.

This interest is not set only for the short term because of Germany’s limited military means; even together with its European partners, it will only be able to defend itself independently of the United States in the distant future. Rather, it is rooted in Washington’s often overlooked roles as a guarantor of European unity and peace.

After centuries of European wars, the most profound distrust of European states was frequently directed at their neighbors. Only the United States’ presence and engagement as a European power have managed to limit geopolitical conflict on the European continent. This engagement remains a condition for European integration.

No country has benefited more from the United States’ role in Europe than Germany. Because of its size, history, and economic power, the country draws more neighborly scrutiny, interest, and mistrust than any other in Europe. The United States’ role as a re-insurer of Europe’s stability and unity is the essential geostrategic foundation of Germany’s postwar success. The United States’ opening up to Europe helps guarantee that the “German question” remains closed.

President Donald Trump’s tactic of exacerbating European divisions and undermining European integration violated the inner core of Germany’s vital national interests. In essence, he undermined the project of European integration. Despite all appeals for European unity in response to Trump, the opposite has happened. The cracks across the continent only deepened without the United States’ pacifying and unifying influence. Europe’s bitter lesson from Trump’s presidency is the rediscovery of its deep divisions and fragility.

That is why Germany—together with the Biden administration and with its European partners—will need to focus on redefining and reinforcing the United States’ long-term role in Europe. This process will take place within a dramatically changed geopolitical environment. Germany, like all of Europe, will need to learn to live with the reality that the world’s strategic center has moved to East Asia. After 500 years, the center of the world is no longer the European continent. Hence, the United States’ priority will be Asia and its resources will not be directed primarily to Europe. There is no plausible scenario of a Europe’s future in which its countries—first and foremost Germany—do not have to do significantly more to ensure the continent’s security and stability.

Whatever changes the United States will make to its European posture, European countries can count on the incoming administration to stop administering such modifications in an intentionally disruptive fashion, without much strategic reasoning, and in a tone that resembles military commands. Now, Germany and Europe should develop and balance a new transatlantic set of tasks and responsibilities together with the new administration.

In the long run, the United States can only maintain its role as a global power through close cooperation with a stable, democratic, prosperous Europe capable of acting collectively. Similarly, Europe can only maintain and strengthen its collective ability when working with a transatlantic partner in place. Hence, devotion to European integration and transatlantic engagement will continue to be two sides of the same coin.

The German government could choose the easy path by assuming a wait-and-see attitude toward cooperation. It would simply wait for the new president to present ideas and plans. This attitude would at least not seem to be harmful since much of Biden’s agenda sounds as if it had been conceived in Berlin: reentering and strengthening the Paris Climate Agreement, starting arms-control initiatives, resuming negotiations with Iran, and making the defense of democracy once again a focus of foreign policy.

But a wait-and-see-attitude is simply not enough. Germany has to be active and innovative. In cooperation with its European partners, it should quickly present a package of ideas aimed at building a new German-U.S. consensus in key areas of the transatlantic future. The time window for such conversations is alarmingly small. It will take Biden months to appoint most of his essential staff members, some of whom will have to be confirmed by the Senate. Meanwhile, the German elections campaign will begin. Next year, France will hold a presidential election and the United States congressional ones. Between all of these events, openings must be found and concrete agreements finalized.

Germany’s package of ideas should include five topics important for future cooperation with the United States: climate, NATO, China, trade, and technology.

Climate: A political rapprochement on climate change is foreseeable and promises added value quickly—as long as it is intelligently managed. Germany and Europe should answer the United States’ aspirations with their own efforts for a new consensus. After Washington’s re-entry into the Paris Agreement, the transatlantic partners should aim for close coordination of common goals for the Climate Change Conference in Glasgow in November. Various joint initiatives should support structural change—from a European-U.S clean-energy bank to a transatlantic battery alliance.
NATO: The United States’ strategic focus shifting to the East Asia will lead to the redefinition of the roles and the burden shifting between it and its European allies. The transatlantic security partnership needs a new consensus: the United States’ renewed engagement with NATO must be combined with a significantly higher contribution for Europe’s defense from the other allies, especially Germany. An ambitious plan for capabilities and the necessary spending for it should be put forward.
China: The Archimedean point of future transatlantic relations will be China policy. Here, too, a new consensus is needed. The United States should warm to the idea that in a world of interdependence there will be no economic decoupling with China. Germany, on the other hand, will need to accept that trade with China will be subject to technological and security reservations. Together, the transatlantic partners should apply their human rights as well as regulatory principles to their China policies.
Trade: The German government—together with the European Commission—should urge the United States to stop blocking the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute-Settlement Mechanism. In return, the EU must be willing to consider U.S. ideas concerning the reform of the organization more fully. This new consensus will sharpen a potent instrument to enable a crackdown on China’s undermining of the international trade order.
Technology: Europe and the United States miss their opportunity to shape the future by not cooperating enough on digital policy and new technologies. What is needed here is the protection of open societies’ shared values against Chinese claims of technological leadership based on Beijing values. Therefore, the EU and the United States should quickly agree on the methods of transatlantic data exchange, develop common guidelines for handling fake news and propaganda, and align regulation on artificial intelligence.

Taken together, these measures (set out in more detail below) have the potential to update the transatlantic relationship and adapt it to the new geopolitical realities.

However, a new consensus can only be sustainable if it recognizes and considers recent developments in our countries’ civil societies. Especially the young people and diverse minorities that can now collectively command a majority in the United States have formed new political movements in recent years and have gathered a political energy that will have a lasting effect on the country. Irrespective of the details of their domestic policy positions, such emancipatory movements have always been attractive to the rest of the world because, in their quest for a more perfect participatory democracy, they made the United States strong—and made it the role model that others wished to see in the United States.

Such movements—groups fighting man-made climate change, racism and sexism, and aspiring to new forms of work—do connect with Germans and Europeans, especially the younger generation. Above all, they reach far beyond and enrich the “classical” transatlantic elites that have focused on topics like trade and defense. It will be a task for German politics as well as civil society to reach out to such groups.

Approaching younger, more diverse, and less “classical” actors will update the transatlantic narrative. That will be necessary as it is no longer sufficient to tell a younger demographic about the United States’ role in liberating Germany from the Nazis, its support for Germany on its path to democracy, prosperity, and unity. Those born after 1980 have a very different but no less accurate picture of the United States than their predecessors. And image of Germany for Americans has also changed—its now predominantly characterized by dwindling knowledge and waning interest.

Any new transatlantic narrative should be grounded in the idea of solidarity among democracies—aware that shared responsibility for human rights at home and globally is only realistic when governance is informed by the Enlightenment principles of individual freedom, rule of law, separation of powers, and free and fair elections. And such a system based on Western and universal political values will have to be fought for and defended against domestic and foreign adversaries time and again. It is this democratic kinship that connects citizens on both sides of the Atlantic, now and in the future.

While the plan proposed here cannot be implemented instantaneously, President Biden will need early successes too. He must demonstrate to voters that cooperation with allies yields better results than confrontations with them. Concrete and early action should allow for the vicious cycle of the past four years to be transformed into a virtuous circle.

The coronavirus pandemic and the dissatisfaction of many voters with the government’s reaction to it helped Biden win the election. He must and will want to show that international cooperation is more successful in controlling and combatting the pandemic than isolationism and vaccine-nationalism. Germany’s own national interest should guide it toward supporting Biden quest for international action on this front, but it needs to act fast. Immediately after the president’s inauguration, Germany should launch a G7 initiative—together with the British presidency—for international cooperation in the fight against the pandemic. This should also be picked up and pursued by the Italian G20 presidency.

This initiative would be a launching pad for Germany’s renewed close and daily cooperation with the United States. It will prove the usefulness of this relationship in a changed global environment.

2. Coronavirus: Practicing New International Cooperation

A G7 initiative to fight the pandemic has been all but impossible because the Trump administration insisted on calling the coronavirus the “Wuhan Virus.” The dispute about the name of the disease symbolizes a deeper-seated problem. The G7 has been in a state of hibernation since the Trump administration did not consider a global coordinating body necessary or useful, especially, as President Trump explained , because the most powerful industrial countries are not represented and instead only the most significant industrial democracies.

However, Joe Biden wants to strengthen the community of values that is the West. It would be in Germany’s interest to upgrade the G7 into the most relevant consultative body of global governance in order to allow for building more international cooperation on this core of democratic nations. The United States’ symbolic return to multilateralism may allow for vaccine-nationalism to be replaced by a new appreciation of global public goods. In combatting a pandemic, supplying global public goods is not only an option, but a condition of success. Subsequently, international cooperation can lead to the coordination of related economic measures—which has been lacking so far. It is these collateral benefits that make a G7 initiative so attractive.

The most crucial goal of the G7 should be to prevent another pandemic from striking an unprepared world. That is why more countries must be won over to establish a system for the early detection and monitoring of global infections and for response, one that is comparable to the early-warning system developed after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. This initiative should include enhancing the Bluetooth-based collection and A.I.-supported analysis of anonymous contact data (“corona app”) for voluntary use in G7 countries in order to understand and contain future infectious diseases.

The G7 should work toward enabling the most important industrial nations to adopt joint doctrines and protocols of action—a “pandemic playbook”. In the event of an infectious-disease outbreak, the G7 could help create a joint medical rapid-response team and advocate for the “responsibility to report” as part of a pandemic early-warning system within the World Health Organization. Collective stockpiling or at least shared information about stockpiling of essential medical protective goods and medicine should also be a goal. Here, too, coordinating with the G20 is required.

Coordination between universities, businesses, and national research institutions should also be improved to foster joint vaccine development.

Especially from the new U.S. president’s point of view, international cooperation must lead to immediate results. That is why the G7 could agree to end export bans, customs duties, non-tariff barriers to trade, and national procurement rules for medical goods and equipment parts. Joint action of this sort could lead to a new effort for improving the World Trade Organization Pharma Agreement. The Biden administration should join the COVAX vaccine platform so that vaccines, including for Covid-19, can be made accessible and affordable for all nations and a distribution network for new vaccines can be established.

The United States’ re-entry into the World Health Organization would be another vital step. This would provide an opportunity to discuss and pursue shared reform goals for the organization within the G7. A U.S. commitment to COVAX and the World Health Organization would signal that the United States again takes multilateralism seriously—and again enjoy its benefits.

3. Climate: Responding to Ambition with Ambition

Effective climate protection should be central to a modern transatlantic agenda. It is an investment in the future and, at the same time, in transatlantic convergence that promises a quick return. After all, Biden has presented an ambitious agenda that links climate policy to social justice and economic rejuvenation. Germany should respond to these far-reaching plans with an ambitious climate foreign policy of its own.

By investing in green growth, the incoming administration will seek to build its international credibility. It will thus try to avoid the yo-yo effects of the past, when the United States’ international partners acquiesced to compromises that took account of its sensitivities only to soon discover that these carefully crafted compromises had not been accepted by the U.S. Congress or other player in the domestic policy arena.

Yet, the signals from Washington are clear. Now, it is Germany’s and Europe’s turn to reciprocate by presenting their own ideas, supported by resources. The United States’ return to the Paris Climate Agreement offers the opportunity to work jointly on an international regulatory framework that would include the mandatory evaluation of climate risks in the financial markets as well as investment security for renewable energies. Proceeding together will ensure that decarbonization goals can be met and withstand pressure from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries as well as energy-hungry China.

With the Green Deal and the climate-protection law that the European Parliament passed in 2020, the European Commission set goals that are mostly compatible with U.S. ideas. Both strive for climate neutrality of the entire economy by 2050.

The EU and the United States can achieve these objectives more efficiently and better contribute to an effective global climate policy if they collaborate. There are many areas in which stronger cooperation is possible and necessary.

A structured exchange on these joint policy goals can create more dependability. Relevant forums must be revitalized or created. The U.S.-EU Energy Council should be utilized for a high-level exchange on questions concerning energy infrastructure, cybersecurity in the areas of energy and climate protection, and the development of offshore wind turbines. Establishing an EU-U.S. clean-energy bank that would support such a sustainable transatlantic policy is also conceivable.

Despite the blockage by the Trump administration, useful transatlantic exchange and cooperation formats have been established on the sub-national level. These forums should be strengthened. They include the existing Transatlantic Climate Bridge as well as networks like the regional Under2Coalition, founded by the states of Baden-Württemberg and California, or the city network C40Cities.

Many climate-friendly technologies require the use of rare-earth minerals that often originate from China. To reduce geostrategic dependency, a transatlantic strategy is needed for the development of resilient supply chains and production cycles, for example, within the framework of a transatlantic battery alliance.

Green structural changes can hardly be accomplished without cooperation on research and development. Based on BioNTech and Pfizer’s cooperative model for developing the corona vaccine, there are many opportunities to collaborate in supporting projects from the ideas stage to marketing. Just think of smart grids, climate-forecast systems, and AI applications in the service of climate protection.

In working with the United States, it will be essential to establish climate and human rights standards for world trade and for large international infrastructure projects. That includes a conversation about appropriate World Trade Organization rules as well as joint minimal standards for the EU’s connectivity strategy and the U.S. Blue Dot initiative. Such an agreement would have strategic relevance with regard to relations with China.

As soon as a solid dialog and trust are reestablished, controversial issues can be discussed. The European Commission’s announcement of a carbon border tax has caused apprehension in Washington. An important task will be to shape this central building block of Europe’s Green Deal cooperatively with the United States and make it an effective instrument against climate dumping by actors less interested in climate protection.

It would send an important signal if the new U.S. administration could agree with Germany and the EU ambitious objectives for the international climate conference in Glasgow. Nationally determined contributions have to be accompanied by credible timetables. And transatlantic commitments to global climate financing, especially for the most impoverished nations, are also needed. With these kinds of agreements, the Glasgow Climate Conference can serve climate protection and transatlantic relations.

4. NATO: Shouldering More Responsibility

In the course of two world wars, the United States has learned that its fundamental interest in a stable Europe not being dominated by one power necessitates a military presence on the old continent. That allies are necessary to maintain the liberal international order is another enduring lesson from past decades. Hence, the security alliance continues to be the core of the transatlantic partnership. Not only can Germany and Europe hardly ensure their own defense without the U.S. security commitment in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is Russia’s conflictual strategy and growing military potential that require U.S. balancing.

The past years’ crisis grew mainly from doubts about whether the core strategic assumptions concerning the nature and value of the security partnership were still shared on both sides of the Atlantic. These doubts were not only nourished by the harsh rhetoric and the solo efforts of the U.S. president but also by German neglect and failures: the lack of reliability (moving away from the 2 percent promise), the lack of strategic coherence (the Nord Stream 2 project), and the lack of initiative (stabilizing the Mediterranean region).

Germany now has the opportunity—together with President Biden and the other NATO allies—to fortify and future-proof NATO as the most important institution of the transatlantic partnership. An ambitious new consensus is needed. It should say: The European NATO countries—first and foremost Germany—increase their conventional defense capacity considerably. As a result, they shift the burden from the United States in Europe, make it easier for Washington to concentrate on the Indo-Pacific, and protect the interests of liberal democracies there. In return, the United States affirms its commitment to defend allied territory and substantiates this commitment through its nuclear guarantee and permanent military presence in Europe.

An essential recognition must underlie this new consensus: Strengthened and unified European allies serve the transatlantic alliance’s overall interest. It also means that Europe and its institutions must become more potent. As a partner of the United States and a central pillar of the transatlantic community, Europe must be capable of acting. It is not a matter of getting rid of the United States (something that seems to be implied in some interpretations of “European sovereignty” and “strategic autonomy”) but quite the opposite. It is fundamentally a matter of keeping it in Europe—and keeping all the advantages this brings for political stability and equilibrium of the continent, not least for Germany.

Such a new consensus will require Germany to take on a critical role. Allies, partners, and adversaries look to it based on its size and power. Therefore, it is Germany that will need to muster the political will to increase the conventional capabilities of NATO in Europe. Germany must deliver on the agreed NATO force goals and, in fact, move the timeline up. This requires further substantial increases in the defense budget, the modernization of the procurement processes, and increased dependability of procurement cooperation within NATO. Above all, it requires consensus in the German government that a readily deployable military is of the highest priority. A deployable military gives weight to diplomacy, adds an indispensable contribution to transatlantic credibility, strengthens the deterrence capability of NATO, and consequently defends the freedom of German citizens.

Germany must continue to be included in NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements. To this end, it will need to carry out necessary modernization steps. The U.S. nuclear shield is essential to all non-nuclear NATO countries in Europe. It should exist for as long as nuclear weapons exist and the nuclear threat looms. Nuclear sharing is the expression of a remarkable degree of solidarity within the alliance because it symbolizes the willingness to share risks and burdens between allies. NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement is a core element of the strategic connection between transatlantic partners, which the new consensus would underscore.

Beyond significantly upgrading military capabilities, increased political will is needed to ensure that Germany is ready to shoulder an equivalent and just part of the overall burden, especially on the periphery of the EU and NATO. From the far North, across the Baltic Sea and Ukraine, the Western Balkans, and the Caucasus to the Mediterranean and the Middle East and North Africa—crises and even military conflicts are all around. These could be addressed and eased or even prevented through greater engagement and better political collaboration within the alliance. More German creativity and a more substantial commitment to lead would not only lighten the weight on the United States but make Europe more secure. There is room for improvement when it comes to the coordination of the instruments of the EU, NATO, and individual member states.

To increase the alliance’s utility for all member states, Germany should remind itself and others that NATO is not just a military but also a political alliance. Two proposals from the NATO 2030 reflection group (co-chaired by Thomas de Maizière and Wess Mitchell) deserve to be highlighted. First, Germany should support the NATO secretary general in updating the 2010 Strategic Concept, in which Russia is merely a partner and China is not mentioned at all. Second, the North Atlantic Council should become the actual center of political and strategic debates among the transatlantic partners—discussions concerning all regional and global developments related to the collective security of member states. Instead of omitting difficult topics or squelching them in diplomatic rituals, the North Atlantic Council should seek an open, possibly informal, exchange concerning all security-related questions. This is the way to forge a consensus that allies see as relevant and will defend politically at home.

Germany should encourage NATO to intensify its partnerships with liberal democracies worldwide, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Instead of a rather passive offer, it needs tailored, proactive programs to bring strategic partners like Australia, Japan, and South Korea closer to the West’s core. With these measures, too, utility and reciprocity—rather than a trite declaration of friendship—are sought.

For too long, too many in Germany have understood NATO to be a U.S. institution. Germans should realize this: NATO is their NATO, the alliance of all member states. It is in Germany’s hands—more than in any other European nation’s—to shape the alliance through initiatives and substantial participation so that it continues to be the core of the West and continues to provide answers to Europe’s security challenges.

5. China: A Challenge Best Addressed Jointly

China policy is the Archimedean point of future transatlantic relations. Whether the United States judges its European allies as useful and reliable will depend on the continent’s stance vis-à-vis China. The United States’ engagement and goodwill on a range of unrelated transatlantic policy issues will be seen through the prism of Europe’s willingness to cooperate on China policy.

From a German perspective, the U.S. focus on China may seem exaggerated, even excessive. Yet the logic of great-power relations suggests it is imperative. The United States, which has been in relative decline for a number of years, views China as a strategic challenger and does so on a bipartisan basis. From an economic perspective, but increasingly also from a military and political one, China is gaining international influence—at the expense of the United States and the West. This competition is grounded in an ideological and systemic competition, which is why allies are always seen as valuable to the United States when they take an unequivocal position.

The question for Germany as well as for all of Europe is whether European interests vis-à-vis China fully align with U.S. interests? And if that were not the case across the board, how should differences be assessed and managed given the unquestioned relevance of the alliance itself?

Against this background, a reevaluation of China policy is currently underway in Germany and all of Europe. The time when China was regarded merely as a lucrative market and a trading partner is over. Also gone is the assumption that China’s rise will lead to a new middle class that will quickly push for political liberalization. Instead, a more comprehensive view of China seems to take root. More and more, China’s challenge to the West and the liberal order is emphasized.

These challenges can be summed up in a few key phrases: a lack of fairness and rule acceptance in economic and trade relations, increasingly closer cooperation with Russia, the threat to trade routes in the Indo-Pacific, the warning to annex Taiwan by force, legally questionable expansionism in the South and East China Seas, undermining the EU’s unity by pursuing a politically motivated investment strategy in Southern and Eastern Europe, engaging in dubious relationships with creditors in Africa and Latin America , and committing a great many human rights violations in the territory of the Uighur minority as well as in Hong Kong and Tibet.

Germany’s re-evaluation of China leads to a convergence with the mainstream U.S. view of China. Simultaneously, it is likely that the U.S. policy toward China will correspond with German views as Joe Biden bids farewell to Trump’s conflict-laden strategy of pursuing economic decoupling of U.S. and Chinese economies. Should Biden seek a relatively open trade relationship with China, limiting caveats to advanced technologies and security-relevant products, it should be much easier for the transatlantic partners to act largely in unison vis-à-vis China.

To use and direct this process politically, the German government should aim to upgrade the European-U.S. forum on China policy. The goal of this forum should be to coordinate transatlantic partners China policy where possible. Of particular significance are intellectual property rights, investment protection, the balance of trade flows, and the enforcement of global standards and norms. In future, the United States and Europe should scrutinize compacts like the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment in advance to consider their geopolitical relevance and impact, including from a Chinese perspective and with regard to their potential impact on the transatlantic relationship. To lend weight to this forum, high-ranking leadership is necessary; for example, by a vice president of the European Commission and the new U.S. vice president.

It is particularly urgent to identify security-relevant technologies and to come up with more stringent guidelines for interaction with Chinese buyers, investors, and suppliers. The German government will need to use a wide-angle lens here to broaden the view and to consider aspects beyond business and technology—crucially security, defense, and alliance policy. Germany should propose criteria for defining “security-relevant” and for protecting such technologies from the wants of authoritarian regimes, among them China. Moreover, the process for setting international standards and norms cannot increasingly be entrusted to China.

Together, Germany and the United States should make reciprocity the guiding principle of relations with China. It is no longer acceptable that China utilizes the perks of international rules and agreements without being penalized for violating these. Reluctance—be it out of fear of retaliation or in hopes for leniency from China in future—is no longer suitable. It is dangerous.

Whether the issue is market access, the protection of intellectual property, or the treatment of journalists and non-profit organizations, wherever China does not act in a manner it expects from others, the transatlantic partners should take concerted countermeasures. They will have to pay a price for such robust behavior, but it will be relatively small compared to the price an increasingly assertive China will demand when it no longer accepts any international rules.

China’s challenge to the West is not only about power; it is, first and foremost, about ideology. Even as Germany, Europe, and the United States struggle to live up to their norms and ideals, the liberal democracies need not be timid: open societies, characterized by freedom, democracy, and separation of powers, remain a successful model with formidable attraction—as long as they strive to appeal to their better angels.

For that reason, Germany should strengthen its relations with Taiwan. And it should not be shy about criticizing massive human rights violations; for example, in Hong Kong. When confronted with such fundamental issues, treading lightly is not pragmatic wisdom but rather water running in the mill of authoritarians who consider the West weak, hollow, and duplicitous. Above all, a false restraint misjudges the source of strength that direct support bestows on those fighting for their freedom.

Germany must also intensify its relations with like-minded democracies like Australia, Japan, and South Korea; the best way to do so would be, as suggested above, through NATO’s modernized partnership program.

China challenges Germany like no other country. It is concomitantly a trading partner, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival. China plays the long game; naivety gets punished. In relations with China, the United States and Europe, especially Germany, can amplify each other’s power. But this can only work when transatlantic alignment is purposefully sought.

Therefore, a new consensus between the United States and Germany is needed. It is based on the understanding that transatlantic China policy will need to cover a wide array of joint interests: security policy and human rights, international law, and trade. The West need not be more confrontational than necessary, but decisive enough to ensure a future in prosperity and self-rule—not against but with China.

6. Trade: Getting Past the Deadlock

Over the past four years, trade policy has turned into a transatlantic graveyard. Given that President Trump categorized the European Union as a foe on trade, levied punitive tariffs on steel and aluminum, and issued threats of special duties on European cars, the situation can only improve. And it will certainly improve with a U.S. president who appreciates Europe, respects international organizations and rules, and wants to repair the United States’ reputation in the world.

But lowering the temperature after a heated argument, normalizing conduct, and bidding farewell to the excesses of Trump’s term in office cannot be sufficient goals for a new beginning. A significantly higher level of ambition in trade policy (as in many other policy fields) is needed.

That is easier said than done since the United States and the European Union (which is responsible for trade policy instead of national governments) have a long history of disputes that have little to do with Trump. The sixteen-year-old conflict over subsidies for Boeing and Airbus is but one such dispute. That is why trade policy needs an ambitious plan. This plan needs to be nuanced and targeted enough to avoid domestic pushback on either side of the Atlantic.

Major foreign trade agreements are not at the top of Biden’s agenda. On the contrary, they seem remote for at least the first two years of his presidency. And he is not immune to the protectionist temptation, as his proposals for the protection of international supply chains and public procurement demonstrate. In fact, Biden seeks to bring manufacturing back to the United States, a strategy that failed under Trump.

Adopting a failed policy from a predecessor suggests that there is significant domestic pressure to do so. The pressure is indeed real: Biden won the presidential election not least because he took three Rust Belt states away from Trump’s column. He managed to do so, among other factors, because he adopted Trump’s protectionist tone instead of betting on a strategy of improving education, infrastructure, and overall competitiveness from which the manufacturing sector would benefit. He yielded to the pressures from sone unions and the progressive wing of his party.

It makes little sense, therefore, to restart the project of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Such an attempt is bound to fail at present because the differences of opinion that caused the project’s failure during President Obama’s term have only increased, especially regarding EU agriculture and food standards. There is also concern that Germany’s political elite will once again lack the energy and leadership to campaign effectively for a significant trade agreement. A repeated failure would do new damage, which would be worse than not trying. But bidding farewell to an unfinished projected does not mean bidding farewell to political ambition for a trade policy; it only means new paths have to be discovered. EU-U.S. agreements for industrial sectors would be such a path.

Biden spent his political life in the Senate forging compromises and may be ready to find a new equilibrium on trade relations. Trump’s customs duties on steel and aluminum were based on the idiosyncratic notion that imports from allied countries posed a threat to the United States’ national security. These duties are not compatible with Biden’s goal to repair alliances. Similarly, threatening punitive tariffs on cars has never been popular with Democrats.

Biden will likely view trade policy through the prism of the political and technological rivalry with China, and he will evaluate multilateral cooperation accordingly. Therefore, the European Union (including Germany) may be in a good position to partner with the United States to reform the World Trade Organization (WTO). Much stands to be gained if the United States were willing to give up its blockade against the appointment of new members to the appellate body of the organization’s dispute-settlement mechanism. In doing so, the appellate body, which is currently paralyzed, would consist of the required number of arbiters and would once again be capable of acting.

In return, the European Union would have to continue to open up to U.S. reform ideas, a process that has already started during the Trump administration. The dispute-settlement procedure needs tighter deadlines for its rulings and stricter conditions for appeals proceedings in order to shorten the unacceptably long duration of proceedings. The position and power of the WTO director general could be strengthened. Based on the example of the most recent Japanese-U.S.-EU proposal to tighten the rules for industrial subsidies, additional plurilateral agreements between like-minded nations could be aimed for to prevent market distortions. Such agreements would have to address and change the rules for state-owned enterprises, technology transfer, intellectual property, and digital trade.

Making the appellate body functional again will be a precondition for a more robust and more decisive course of action against China’s systematic and continued violations of WTO rules. Holding China accountable and committed to the agreements it signed could become a core aspect of cooperation between the United States and the European Union. It could lead to a comprehensive WTO complaint or several smaller ones against China. This course of action was proposed during the Trump presidency, but never signed off on.

The more the United States opens up to a rules-based response to Chinese rule violations, the more the German government, as a member of the EU, should become receptive to U.S. security concerns regarding advanced technology and critical infrastructure. That would also serve Germany’s national security interest. The dispute surrounding Huawei as a supplier of 5G networks in various European countries is only the first of several conversations about the appropriate balance between security and free trade.

Europe and the United States must be sure to avoid undermining multilateral agreements by way of bilateral disagreements. This could happen if Europe—for example, in the name of “strategic autonomy”—entertains protectionist interventions. Already, the European Union is considering new rules on data flow, on taxation of digital services, and on climate border adjustments, all of which could create tensions with any U.S. administration.

Limiting tensions is a worthy but not sufficient goal. A positive agenda is needed. In lieu of a comprehensive trade agreement, plurilateral sectoral agreements present opportunities; for example, on environmental goods or e-commerce. Cooperation on technology issues, as well as on standard-setting for new technologies, should be bilateral. A Transatlantic Technology Council would be a good start. Establishing rules to control the export of new technologies would also be a promising topic for negotiations.

The European Union, supported by Germany, should raise sanctions issues with the United States by citing the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control as a model to create a European sanctions agency. Sanctions will permanently belong to the toolkit of coercive economic action. The world’s major actors especially feel comfortable using these instruments, as various European countries experienced when they were exposed to Chinese and U.S. extraterritorial sanctions in recent years. Currently, the EU has neither the means to respond nor the ability to deter such activities. But the conversation about acquiring such means has started recently in various European capitals. A consensus about the desirable tools has not been reached yet.

A European sanctions agency would benefit transatlantic relations and strengthen mutual respect. The United States would no longer have to be concerned about European susceptibility to outside economic pressure.

The trade agenda with the Biden administration should be ambitious; it needs nuance and smart agenda choices. With skillful sequencing, the current deadlock can be overcome. Such an outcome requires a proactive German approach within the European Union.

7. Technology and Digital Policy: Setting Joint Standards

The rapidly advancing digital transformation is geopolitically significant. Whoever leads technologically and set the rules of digital communication gets to decide about the competitiveness of industrial sectors, the resilience of societies, and the protection of individual rights.

In this area, Germany and the United States fall far short of exhausting all options to cooperate. Instead, national or Eurocentric perspectives dominate the debate. As a consequence, everybody loses because both sides face the same challenges—from transatlantic data traffic to IT business regulation to 5G infrastructure. The same is true for artificial intelligence, robotics, and digital platform economics as well as topics like “fake news,” vote-rigging, and other digital security threats by authoritarian regimes and extremist actors.

Close transatlantic cooperation on all these topics is possible and beneficial, starting with best practice exchanges. European-U.S. competition and digital demarcation weakens both sides. China benefits. Yes, the United States and Germany have some different economic interests and their approaches to data protection and the private sphere also differ. But both sides should try harder to find compromise. Given China’s resolve to achieve technological dominance, the players within the transatlantic space—still the largest economic region in the world—must urgently come together to avoid being pushed around by outside actors.

When shaping and regulating conditions for digital business, the goal is not simply a competitive advantage; it is just as much the economic, political, and social participation of citizens and the protection of fundamental rights. When it comes to access and rights, Germany, Europe, and the United States are natural partners; the transatlantic technological partnership rests on its shared values. With an eye towards China, it is imperative to maintain and nourish these values.

In concrete terms, Germany must press the European Commission to agree on new regulation for transatlantic data exchange with the United States immediately. Ever since the “privacy shield” agreement fell foul of the European Court of Justice, legal uncertainty prevails, to the detriment of the pandemic-stricken transatlantic economy.

New rules for the exchange and storage of data are needed in order to strengthen the rights of the individual. This should be a transatlantic, not just a European project in order to avoid that European sovereignty leads to European data protectionism. Such an outcome would run counter to the idea of a free and open internet, which is worth preserving given increasing tendencies toward fragmentation of the internet. European data regionalism would hurt individual users just as much as the economy as a whole.

Germany and the United States should develop guidelines on handling propaganda and disinformation that is currently disseminated digitally on a vast scale and has developed into a means of democratic erosion. Unsurprisingly, social media companies feel overwhelmed by the task of preventing incitement. Sometimes their tasks border on the responsibilities of public administration. A framework based on democratic values is needed. Regulators on both sides of the Atlantic should persuade social media firms to be more transparent regarding their content-management practices and managing inappropriate content. Such frameworks should be coordinated across the Atlantic to be more effective.

Further development and regulation of artificial intelligence will be a key challenge at the intersection of economy, technology, and fundamental rights. Germany should work more closely with the United States’ relevant authorities to create “trustworthy AI.” That is impossible to do with an authoritarian country like China. Trustworthiness can only be established when the transatlantic partners join forces with other like-minded nations to set uniform standards and norms to be certified uniformly. Such an alignment would prevent discriminating against specific users as well as violating individual rights—another example of how useful the transatlantic partnership can become.

Because the network infrastructure is so significant for how we will live in future, firms like Huawei, with its blurry boundary between corporate decision making and the authoritarian state’s dictate, must be kept away from the lifelines of free societies. Such a decision is in the interest of democratic nations.

8. Making Transatlantic Relations Last

Nice words and gestures will not suffice if the transatlantic partnership is to last. It needs structural reform rather than patchwork solutions. It will have to be rebuilt from the ground up so that it can provide future generations of Germans, Europeans, and Americans with as much security and personal fulfillment as past generations.

It irritates to see an argument gaining ground in Germany according to which the difference between the old and the new president is primarily rooted in style and tone. The imperatives of international politics, the constraints of domestic politics in the United States, and U.S. expectations of Germany are supposed to be comparable in the Trump and Biden administrations. Nothing is going to be what it once was. Joe Biden is said to be like Donald Trump, only more friendly and with better manners.

Whoever accepts this proposition will argue in favor of German passivity. But the hypothesis is incorrect. The president most critical of NATO over the past decades leaves office only to be replaced a president with an affinity to NATO. An isolationist is followed by an internationalist; a bilateralist by a multilateral institutionalist; a climate skeptic by a climate activist; one who understands allies to be freeloaders by one who sees them as power boosters; an anti-democrat by a defender of representative democracy; a president who wants to destroy the liberal world order by one who wants to preserve it while applying a smaller U.S. footprint.

These are starkly different worldviews. Whoever argues for cooperation with the United States will no longer support the transatlantic relationship “despite everything,” but with a sense of joint purpose.

The proposed renewal must be for the long term. This paper addresses how that is achievable and especially what it needed from Germany. In the end, it does not come down only to this or that measure. What counts is their cumulative effect. New initiative should be designed with an eye toward bipartisan support. That way, they will be difficult to reverse and thus durable.

Of course, there is no panacea that will make the German-U.S. alliance everlasting. Trump has shown how fragile such a relationship can become when exposed to the forces of destruction. But barriers to destruction can effectively be raised, especially if the added value of a partnership is tangible. Its utility must be practical, economical, scientific, security-enhancing, value-preserving, and palpable in citizens’ daily lives.

To this end, Germany’s transatlantic initiatives should be inviting and inclusive. The connection with the United States’ opposition party should be improved and their support for transatlantic projects be sought in parliament. In order to gain opposition support, a transatlantic agenda should rather be designed more narrowly, but lastingly.

9. Something is at Stake: Act Now, Please!

A lack of ambition is the worst enemy of this new transatlantic beginning. In Germany, this danger comes from de-familiarization. Dealings with President Trump were simple in a way: One had no reason to be pro-active and did not respond in detail to certain U.S. rumblings. And the German public would have opposed any deeper cooperation with President Trump.

But the problem runs deeper. President Obama mocked European as free riders who expected much but preferred to contribute too little too late. This seemingly clever attitude is shortsighted; German decision-makers have held on to it for too long.

Now, the transatlantic partnership has eroded. It has to consist of more than a security guarantee—and even this guarantee is tarnished. In future, this relationship will need to seek broad based support, on many levels of society.

This spirit can only emerge through deeds, not through incantation. It needs action, joint projects that prove their value by making citizens on both sides of the Atlantic more secure, more prosperous, and more self-determined. Some of these projects are proposed in this paper.

Results cannot be achieved without effort. Transatlantic relations will not be improved simply by swearing in Joe Biden. Creativity and engagement are needed on the German side. For a new consensus to take hold, politicians will need the strength to dispense with cherished benefits and conveniences. Only under these preconditions will it be possible to renew and future-proof a relationship that has allowed Germany to prosper and live in peace for decades.

Authors and Signatories

Dr. Benjamin Becker, AmerikaHaus NRW
Deidre Berger, Außenpolitische Beraterin
James Bindenagel, Center for Advanced Security, Strategy and Integration Studies, Universität Bonn
Heinrich Brauss, Generalleutnant a.D., Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik
Dr. David Deißner, Atlantik-Brücke
Eric W. Fraunholz, Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut Sachsen
Dr. Patrick Keller, Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, German Marshall Fund
Dr. Anna Kuchenbecker, European Council on Foreign Relations
Rüdiger Lentz, Aspen Institute Deutschland
Rainer Meyer zum Felde, Brigadegeneral a.D., Institut für Sicherheitspolitik Kiel
Dr. Stormy-Annika Mildner, Aspen Institute Deutschland
Lena Ringleb, German Marshall Fund
Andrea Rotter, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung
Boris Ruge, Münchener Sicherheitskonferenz
Dr. Oliver Schmidt, Amerikanist und Experte für auswärtige Kulturpolitik
Dr. David Sirakov, Atlantische Akademie Rheinland-Pfalz
Dr. Constanze Stelzenmüller, Brookings Institution
Dr. Ellen Ueberschär, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

All authors write in their personal capacity.

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Transition: Review & Outlook on 2021

Atlantic Bridge — Wed, 13 Jan 2021 15:36:36 +0000

Elmar Theveßen, Washington Bureau Chief, ZDF, Susan Glasser, Staff Writer, The New Yorker; Global Affairs Analyst, CNN, and Sigmar Gabriel, Former Federal Minister; Former Vice-Chancellor; Chairman, Atlantik-Brücke, look back at 2020, and give an outlook on transatlantic relations under the incoming US administration.

The speakers also discussed the toll of the pandemic on the US, how foreign policy might and might not change under Biden, and a central takeaway from the Trump era, namely that US democracy is made up of traditions and norms that are more breakable than many had thought.

The discussion was moderated by David Deißner, Executive Director, Atlantik-Brücke.

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After the U.S. Election – What to Expect from the New Presidency?

Atlantic Bridge — Tue, 22 Dec 2020 14:29:33 +0000

Will Hurd, Member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Sigmar Gabriel, former Vice Chancellor; Chairman, Atlantik-Brücke, Günther H. Oettinger, former EU Commissioner, President, United Europe, Daniela Schwarzer, Director, German Council on Foreign Relations, and Anna Wieslander, Director for Northern Europe, Atlantic Council, discuss the future of the European-American relationship. The election results offer a chance to reorient transatlantic relations. In the coming months, it will be important for Europe to actively shape the relationship with the United States. But even under a President Biden, there will not be a return to the status quo ante. The panelists also discuss the kind of changes Europe can expect from the new leadership and which conflicts might persist.

The discussion was moderated by Natalia Drozdiak, European Technology Reporter, Bloomberg.

This event was held in cooperation with United Europe.

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After Trump: Rebuilding Anglo-European Relations in Challenging Times

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 17 Dec 2020 12:35:08 +0000

https://vimeo.com/491546071

What will transatlantic relations, and UK-US relations more specifically, look like after the Trump era and which of Trump’s policies are here to stay? Josh Glancy and Rachel Rizzo discuss how Europe can trust the US again, how the transatlantic relationship can become a true partnership, and the need for a joint approach on China.

Josh Glancy has been Washington bureau chief for The Sunday Times since 2018, covering both the midterm and presidential elections. Rachel Rizzo is an adjunct fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), working in the Transatlantic Security Program. Her research focuses on European security, NATO, and the transatlantic relationship.

The above video is a shortened version of the discussion that took place as a virtual meeting of our London Regional Chapter.

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Reinventing the German-American Agenda in 2021

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 10 Dec 2020 14:04:19 +0000

As part of the virtual 2020 German-American Conference, Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman of Atlantik-Bruecke, and Ambassador John Emerson, Chairman of the American Council on Germany, look back at 2020 and ahead to see what 2021 might bring for German-American relations. They discuss the European and American strategy on China, the debate around Nord Stream 2, and Germany’s role in the multilateral order.

The discussion was moderated by Christiane Meier, Correspondent and Head of New York Office, ARD German Television.

This event was held in cooperation with the American Council on Germany.

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What Can We Expect from a Biden Administration?

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Nov 2020 15:02:49 +0000

What does the election of Joe Biden mean for transatlantic relations and for American society? Charles Kupchan debates these questions together with Michael Werz. Charles Kupchan was Director for European Affairs on the National Security Council during the Obama administration. He is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Professor of International Affairs in the School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown University. Michael Werz is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and Senior Fellow (2020/2021) at Stiftung Mercator. He is a member of the board of Atlantik-Brücke.

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Will transatlantic relations improve after the US election?

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 29 Oct 2020 15:25:36 +0000

Former US-Ambassador to the EU Anthony Luzzato Gardner presented insights from his latest book “Stars with Stripes: The Essential Partnership between the European Union and the United States.” He and Atlantik-Bruecke-Chairman Sigmar Gabriel, former Federal Minister and former Vice-Chancellor, also discussed the current and future state of the relationship between the U.S. and the EU. The discussion was moderated by Sarah Kelly, Anchor-at-Large, DW News (Deutsche Welle).

This event was a cooperation between Atlantik-Brücke and ESMT Berlin, initiated by Alexandra Oetker.

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“As a leader, you have to take the time to make a personal connection”

r.fehrenbach — Wed, 28 Oct 2020 13:50:26 +0000

General Jeffrey Harrigian, Commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, speaks about the crucial aspects of “connected leadership” within foreign and security policy. According to the General, trusted partnerships on both sides of the Atlantic play a vital role vis-à-vis the great power competition with China and Russia and the threat posed by violent extremist organizations.

General Harrigian, from your point of view and capacity, what are the key aspects of connected leadership in today’s complex foreign and security environment?

[related]In my role as the U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa commander, I find the key aspects to “connected leadership” include targeting communications, balancing inclusiveness, and strengthening relationships.

As a leader, it is essential to carefully target your communications and engagements in a way that builds buy-in from your people and ensures the team understands how they fit in the big picture. In today’s digital age of email and social media, one-on-one communication is imperative to build trust and empower individuals. You have to take the time to make a personal connection.

The second key aspect is inclusiveness. Leaders often face the dilemma of who to bring to the table, and in our case, this is a challenge because we have a wide range of stakeholders and partners. The key is to maintain an inclusive environment that brings together a diverse group of talented individuals and different perspectives to solve problems.

Taking the time to build personal relationships and keep open lines of communication has helped me more times than I can count.

The last aspect of connected leadership is building and strengthening relationships. In the military, we often focus on relationships up and down the chain of command. I find that reaching outside your organization and building support relationships is equally important. For example, during my time as the AFCENT commander, I experienced the importance of strong relationships in our daily operations. Taking the time to build personal relationships and keep open lines of communication has helped me more times than I can count.

Which security challenges for Europe and the European Union concern you the most at the beginning of this new decade?

We operate in a dynamic security environment and face a diverse set of challenges. As we look to the next decade, we must acknowledge that we’re already engaged in a global power competition. China and Russia are actively challenging international norms, democratic values, and our collective security interests. Additionally, the threat of violent extremist organizations, compounded by destabilizing social and economic issues, remains a persistent global problem. In the face of these security challenges, the air component must continue to evolve and provide decisive capabilities alongside our joint and coalition partners.

Trusted partnerships remain the key to successfully meeting these challenges head-on. I have often said you cannot surge trust. I truly believe the relationships between our people will serve as the cornerstone of our ability to operate together in a dynamic environment. I am confident our actions over the next decade will succeed through the efforts of our people.

Could you give us an overview of the current difficulties Africa is facing and how these challenges influence the U.S. strategy for Europe and Africa?

Africa presents a complex environment with many challenges but also an abundance of partners who are interested in working together to improve the security landscape. Our core mission on the African continent remains one of helping our partners strengthen their defense capabilities. We concentrate our efforts on assisting African nations and regional organizations build capable and professional militaries that uphold human rights, adhere to the rule of law, and more effectively contribute to stability in Africa.

AFAFRICA takes a comprehensive approach to the complex security challenges in Africa. We work closely with African, U.S. interagency, and international partners to develop capabilities necessary to ensure Africans can collectively address regional security challenges. Our primary tools for implementing this strategy are security force assistance programs, exercises, military-to-military engagements, and joint operations with partner African Air Forces. With all this said, the foundation of our partnership will continue to be the trust we have built over time.

What makes you confident that the transatlantic relationship is on a positive track as to foreign and security policy within the great power competition that we face?

I have the unique distinction of wearing three commander hats as the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe; Commander, U.S. Air Forces Africa; and Commander, NATO Allied Air Command. Being responsible for the air and missile defense of 29 NATO alliance member nations while commanding U.S. airpower across Europe and Africa affords me the opportunity to work closely with various partners.

It is through my experiences working with NATO forces that I have seen firsthand not only the importance of personal relationships but also the strength of our combined capabilities. Taking time to get to know our coalition counterparts helps us improve interoperability, gain basing and overflight access, and develop the trust and confidence to act decisively as a coalition.

A note from General Harrigian: The following interview took place prior to the global COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to cause significant interruptions and health concerns across Europe and Africa. Since then, USAFE-AFAFRICA has taken a deliberate approach to safeguarding our people while continuing to support our allies and partners. We remain ready and capable of meeting all of our mission requirements as we continue to develop new ways to fight through COVID-19. Despite the challenges, we have improved readiness, strengthened relationships, and maintained a competitive posture across Europe and Africa.

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The Need for a Transatlantic China Strategy

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 22 Oct 2020 10:43:31 +0000

Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed-columnist at The New York Times, discusses the US’s and Europe’s relationship with China at the invitation of Atlantik-Brücke. Friedman advocates for a transatlantic strategy. According to Friedman, until recently, American companies turned a blind eye to Chinese misbehavior because both sides were benefitting. However, this has changed.

Friedman argues that negotiating successfully with a country of China’s scale and economic power is only possible by using leverage, something Trump failed to do. Instead of building a united front with Europe, Trump made negotiations with China a bilateral affair.

While China and especially the renminbi might be considered stable today, this could change, since China is more closed off than it was in recent years, which is unlikely to make them thrive in an ever-more connected world.

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Foreign Interference in the Upcoming U.S. Election?

atlantikbruecke — Fri, 02 Oct 2020 09:37:16 +0000

https://vimeo.com/464131807

Clarissa Ward is one of the most renowned foreign correspondents in the USA. In a conversation with Simgar Gabriel and members of Atlantik-Brücke, the award-winning journalist discusses whether, after significant Russian meddling in the last US presidential election, foreign interference will once again be a factor this November. Other foreign policy dimensions of the election are also topics in this conversation.

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Röttgen: “Sanctions must never be used against partners”

r.fehrenbach — Fri, 04 Sep 2020 07:38:22 +0000

Norbert Röttgen, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag, criticizes the recent escalation of the U.S. Senate against Nord Stream 2. He also explains his reservations about Huawei’s expansion of the 5G network.

Interview: David Deißner

Mr. Röttgen, the US Senate is continuing to intensify sanctions against Nord Stream 2, and the Nawalny case also casts the project in a new light. Do you share the critical view of the Americans and what is the state of affairs regarding Nord Stream 2?

I share the American criticism from a European perspective. I believe that this project contradicts everything we have decided on in terms of energy policy, namely diversification instead of increasing unilateral sources of supply. It contradicts the assessment of our eastern neighbors like the Poles and the Balts that this projects affects their national security. Moreover, it contradicts our policy towards Ukraine. This has been my criticism for a long time, and it is shared in the United States.

[related]The brutal and inhumane poison attack on the opposition member Nawalny is a further argument against Nord Stream 2. If the gas pipeline were completed despite these developments, it would be the ultimate confirmation for Putin to stick to his course of action. The EU should jointly decide to stop Nord Stream 2. This has to be our own decision. It must not be a resonse to pressure from the US. My opinion on this point is clear: We in Germany and Europe have to determine our decisions on energy policy independently. Sanctions are an instrument that can be considered against opponents but must never be used against partners and friends.

The sanctions could also be directed against German officials. The German government has condemned this measure as a violation of international law. Which measures should Germany take to counter these sanctions?

First of all, one point must be clarified: The port in Sassnitz, which is currently under debate, is not subject to American sanctions. There is currently only a letter from three American senators on this issue. That should be noted.

It would change things significantly if US sanctions were directed against the German state, even if only in the form of regional authorites. Up to now, the focus has been on sanctions directed at companies. But these kinds of sanctions cannot be the basis for our transatlantic cooperation either.

How will things proceed from here, which scenario do you think is realistic? Will the whole project be abandoned with billions in losses, will there still be a political compromise or even a resolution to the conflict?

I do not expect a compromise, not even if there was a new president in the US. The American position will not change. That is why there will be no resolution of this issue. The question remains as to whether Gazprom is technically capable of laying the final pipeline section itself without foreign companies. I have my doubts about that. This will certainly cause a delay; I don’t know whether it is impossible.

The debate about Huawei’s role in the development of the 5G network is another big strain on transatlantic relations. Western democracies fear that Huawei could use its technology to carry out espionage and sabotage on behalf of the Communist Party. It is well known that you are a strong opponent of Huawei’s participation in Germany on the grounds of political principles. Could you elaborate on that?

My first message is a positive one. It is in our interest to find a European solution for creating a digital nervous system in Europe. We can do it. With Ericsson and Nokia, there are European companies that have an international market share comparable to Huawei.

The network providers in Germany counter that this will lose a lot of time in expanding the network.

There are countries that are already expanding 5G without Huawei and yet are more advanced than we are. So, it can be done. In addition, it is in our economic interest to apply this strategic technology industrially in our large and attractive single market. Foreign companies must only be allowed to participate in our market under a general set of rules. Such companies must not be allowed to use the influence they would gain in our country at the service of a foreign government. Especially not at the service of a non-democratic, authoritarian regime. This contradicts our national security interests.

In “Hart aber fair” (note: a German talk show), you repeated an argument by the German legal scholar Böckenförde, namely that liberal democracy is based on foundations it cannot create. You said that these foundations of democracy and democracy’s ability to function are currently under threat in the United States, as division and polarization have become such a big part of politics. With regard to both the United States and Germany, are you concerned that the moral basis of democracy is eroding and in jeopardy?

In Germany I do not see this tendency at all. In the United States, the democratic foundations of life are already under attack, and are slowly approaching this Böckenfördian threshold, so to speak. One must realize that democracy is not just the execution of procedures but has social and discursive premises. If hatred becomes part of the constitution of a society, so to speak, the democracratic way of life of that society is undermined. The division and antagonism, even the hatred in the American political system did not begin with Trump. This had already started a few years earlier, and I really consider this to be life-threatening. Moreover, such polarization also undermines any possibility of assuming international leadership.

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The ball is in Europe’s court

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 25 Jun 2020 08:43:06 +0000

By: Sigmar Gabriel (Chairman), Professor Dr. Michael Hüther (Vice Chairman), Dr. Norbert Röttgen Vice Chairman, Professor Andreas Dombret (Treasurer), Dr. David Deißner (Executive Director)

President Trump has affirmed a plan to cut the number of U.S. troops deployed in Germany by 9,500, and a reduction of the U.S. military footprint in Germany seems increasingly likely. This is regrettable in many respects. Germany welcomes the U.S. troops stationed in its country. Part of the reason why we are happy to have them here is because they contribute to the security of our nation, though only a small proportion of the U.S. armed forces in Germany perform a security function. The majority are stationed here for strategic or logistic reasons relating to the coordination of the United States’ military presence in the Middle East and in Africa. Whatever their function, members of the U.S. armed forces are welcomed members of society because they are the human face of the transatlantic alliance. The resulting interpersonal relationships are the bedrock of our partnership and no less important than the security aspect of the American presence.

Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Germany further erodes the foundations of trust

Even though a reduction in the number of U.S. troops deployed in Germany does not pose a direct threat to German or European security, the President’s plan nevertheless sends out an alarming signal. Washington’s decision damages the relationship of trust that has been built up over the decades between the transatlantic partners, undermining the cohesion of the Western alliance and its global political power. Authoritarian regimes and illiberal movements will be delighted at this development because many of them will profit from a weakened liberal order.

So what can we do? It will be impossible to change President Trump’s mind because he will be pursuing a foreign policy that reflects his campaign pledges until the November election. We have to accept this and deal with it as best we can by focusing on damage limitation and making preparations for the time beyond the election campaign, which will eventually be wound up.

Are we a credible partner?

We know that there have been contentious issues with the USA in the past, even before Trump won the presidential election, and that there will be other contentious issues extending across party lines in the future – such as the 5G roll-out, the Nord Stream 2 project and Germany’s trade surplus. We have to address all these issues with the USA. Whatever the outcome of the U.S. election, which we have to respect, we must ask ourselves whether we are acting as a credible partner to the USA, one that takes its obligations as a member of the alliance seriously. Germany’s comparatively low defense spending in terms of NATO’s 2 percent target has been criticized by both Democrats and Republicans in the USA.

We want to continue collaborating with the USA

We have to remember that our security is guaranteed by the USA. Even if we decided to change that, it would take Europe many years to replace U.S. military strength with its own resources. That’s why the transatlantic relationship is essential. We aren’t merely interested in collaborating with the USA as a foreign and security policy partner, but also in cultivating a close economic and cultural relationship. The coronavirus pandemic has shown us the importance of effective international cooperation and strong partnerships. Without cooperation none of us will be able to put the current economic crisis to bed or deal with the major repercussions of that crisis that lie ahead of us.

Europe has to steer the transatlantic alliance rather than simply going with the flow

In the past we have tended to make matters easy for ourselves by sailing in the USA’s wake. Europe has to play a bigger role in shaping the transatlantic alliance, also with a view to geopolitically relevant relationships with countries such as China. It is more important than ever before for us to actively maintain the transatlantic partnership while assuming greater responsibility for the task of safeguarding our own security and interests.

We have to bear in mind that the geopolitical map has fundamentally changed since the Cold War era and the United States’ interest in the Pacific region will continue to grow. Vice-versa, we also know that many people on the other side of the Atlantic, like us, believe in the importance of maintaining a close and trusting relationship for more than mere nostalgic reasons. The USA is not President Trump. The protests that are currently sweeping across the country make it clear that America is a divided nation. However, they also express one of the strongest public commitments to diversity and positive change anywhere in the world.

We will overcome the transatlantic alliance crisis

Conflicts can be resolved in any partnership that is based on shared values and interests. We are closer in that respect to Canada and the United States than to any other country outside Europe. The German-American relationship has been shaken by a number of crises over recent decades, yet we have managed to overcome them all as a result of our deep-rooted connections. We are therefore confident that this crisis also can and will be overcome.

This article was published in Tagesspiegel Online on June 19, 2020.

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Beyond Location: Germany’s Debate on NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Agreement

atlantikbruecke — Fri, 05 Jun 2020 13:10:26 +0000

A recent controversy about US nuclear weapons stationed in Germany has rekindled the debate about Germany’s role in NATO’s nuclear sharing. In a discussion hosted by Atlantik-Brücke, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of the United States Army in Europe, and Professor Götz Neuneck, physicist and expert on arms control, took a look at the larger picture.

The German debate on NATO’s nuclear sharing agreement is not new. Germans’ hesitations with regards to the topic sometimes appear to lack in rationality. Professor Neuneck observed: “The current debate works on fears and emotions, but not in consideration of the wider context, facts, or the weighing of alternatives.” It also does not consider the effects on the cohesion of the Alliance and the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent.

“The current debate works on fears and emotions.” [quoter]Götz Neuneck[/quoter]

General Hodges emphasized: “Germans need to regain trust in themselves, because it seems that Germany doubts itself: it’s foreign and security policy is timid, and often seems like cherry-picking. It is time for Germany for a much larger debate about its foreign, security, and defense policy.” Another point that was raised in the discussion was that the arguments being exchanged are those that dominated the debate during the Cold War, while the technological and political circumstances have changed profoundly since. Of particular concern in this respect are violations and withdrawals from the non-proliferation agreements that have provided strategic stability and greatly reduced the risk of nuclear war. While the view that the non-proliferation regime is in dire need for adaptation is widely shared, the trend to further undermine these regimes and increase the sharp end of deterrence, the second pillar of NATO’s strategic duality captured in the Harmel doctrine is hardly visible: diplomacy.

“German doubts in the Alliance can and will be exploited.” [quoter]Ben Hodges[/quoter]

For the German debate, all these aspects ought to be considered. Instead of picking and choosing in its foreign and security policy, Germany ought to consider the entire spectrum. To this end, a much wider review of Germany’s foreign, security and defense is required, a review that is careful to not rely solely on fears and emotions, is serious about its intent, and about leading transparently. General Hodges warned: “German doubts in the Alliance can and will be exploited by the adversaries.”

Professor Neuneck provided an outlook for a more constructive approach to a shared foreign and security policy: “A key initiative is the extension of New START and much more efforts to preserve the nuclear Arms Control architecture. A new arms race must be prevented through the much less expensive instruments of arms control, talks on strategic stability and reanimating treaties. This gives all parties more confidence, predictability and stability without spending gigantic amounts of money.”

The discussion was moderated by Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.

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COVID-19 in Russia and Belarus

atlantikbruecke — Wed, 20 May 2020 07:41:36 +0000

by Omid Nouripour

Last Sunday, Orthodox Christians all over the world celebrated Easter. Most of them did so in the seclusion of their homes: isolated yet safe. But not for Alexander Lukashenka. The president of Belarus personally went to mass in a small village church and encouraged his compatriots to follow his example, saying: “People with strength […] and guts will come to church.” This is but one of many memorable quotes recently produced by Lukashenka, who has also promoted tractors, ice hockey and baby goats as possible remedies to COVID-19. To date, Belarus is the only state in Europe which has not yet introduced any quarantine measures, despite rightful criticism from the country’s closest EU neighbors Lithuania and Latvia. In an interview on April 3^rd, Lukashenka made clear that in his view, the economy of Belarus – which is highly dependent on Russian oil export – simply cannot afford a quarantine. Yet many observers believe there is another reason behind the Belarusian nonchalance. Later this year president Lukashenka will be running for his sixth term in office (the elections are set for August 30). And in the faux democratic theater of his authoritarian state, Lukashenka does not want the show to be stolen by some virus.

Therefore Minsk is pushing ahead with the preparations with the May 9^th Victory Day Parade, the most important public holiday of the year, celebrating the victory over Nazi Germany in World War Two. Over 3000 people are “expected” to take part in the parade. In response to appeals by the WHO to cancel the parade and other mass events, the country’s health minister Vladimir Karanik contradicted that quarantine measures would lead to the elimination of the disease.

According to estimates by the Johns Hopkins University, there have been over 3,700 cases of COVID-19 in Belarus, and at least 36 people have died. Yet, numbers remain unclear, since the figures reported by the authorities are widely distrusted, even by Lukashenka’s own subjects.

There is, however, a bright spot amidst the gloom. Where the Belarusian state is failing to protect its citizens, volunteers, businesspeople and activists are stepping into the breach. Countless initiatives are raising awareness about the pandemic, stockpiling medical supplies and protective equipment, and reaching out to vulnerable minorities. It appears civil society in Belarus is unexpectedly gaining new momentum – raising hope that were looking at a new start for the country’s fledgling democratic movement. After all, the last time such a movement was successful in Belarus was in the slip stream of another health crisis – the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.

Another approach was chosen by Lukashenka’s counterpart in Moscow. Vladimir Putin has seized the opportunity offered by the pandemic to raise his international status – by sending military jets with medical assistance on board to Italy and the USA. This simultaneously gave Russian state media the opportunity to depict Western healthcare as incapable in comparison to the Russian system (a questionable claim). Evidence suggests that the number of Covid-19 cases in Russia was – and perhaps still is – kept artificially low.

But the Kremlin’s bravado now seems to blow up in its face. So much time and effort was wasted on producing disinformation that the government failed to act until COVID-19 had spread on a massive scale. In the first week of April the reported number of cases suddenly quadrupled and the statistics could no longer be swept under the carpet. At long last, the authorities launched an “all hands on deck” campaign against the spread of the virus and Putin called on residents countrywide to observe a “regime of self-isolation”. Strikingly, however, the president has decided to delegate the task of implementing concrete measures – and responsibility for their outcomes – to local governors in Russia’s regions. As a result, some federal subjects are pushing ahead with their own small-scale police state initiatives. The largest island in the Russian far east, Sakhalin, is testing a face identification system. Chechnya has introduced a complete lockdown. Meanwhile, in some regions quarantine remains without a respective enforcement mechanisms.

By shifting the burden of responsibility to the regions, the Kremlin expects Russians to blame their local governors for deteriorating living-circumstances. Last week saw the first outburst of popular unrest. ‘Virtual’ protests have been taking place in various Russian regions – users of Google Maps clones Yandex.Maps and Yandex.Navigator massively leave comments on the authorities’ pages against the self-isolation regime. In Vladikavkaz, just north of the Georgian border, where 145 cases of coronavirus infection have been recorded, residents went offline and took to the streets. Around 1500 residents gathered in the main square to demand the resignation of local government. They claimed massive job loss and lack of objective information about the epidemiological situation in the republic.

To prevent the country form going hungry, the Kremlin has started handing out money: every Russian citizen in ‘self-isolation’ has been guaranteed their income at least until May 4th. A substantial drain on the state budget, which is already being squeezed by a historical drop of the oil prices. This generosity is most likely not motivated by the sudden urge to create a welfare state. A more probable explanation are the planned amendments to the Russian constitution, which will allow Putin to stay in office until 2036. On April 22^nd, the nation was supposed to decide – at least formally – about the future of the regime. Now, this vote has been postponed without setting a new date, and the ‘reset’ of Putin’s presidential terms is suspended, too. Meanwhile, free money for all is supposed to keep public opinion on the regime’s side.

Whether this strategy eventually will work out remains to be seen. Even a guaranteed income is unable to address the socio-economic inequality between Moscow and the Russian hinterland, which has deepened dramatically over the last decade. Corrupt governance and poverty manifest themselves in a derelict public healthcare system, which is practically absent in most rural areas. For the mostly elderly people living there, COVID-19 is an existential threat. This growing tension is bound to undermine the smooth narrative of state-controlled media, even despite greater suppression of public life. The discrepancy between the two may well plunge the Putin regime into a political crisis.

The corona virus, it has been said, will play into the hands of autocrats. Authoritarian regimes are supposedly more fit to deal with crises of this order than democracies, by virtue of their capacity to enforce restrictions on their subjects and control resources. And the pandemic offers them an opportunity to expand their control even further. This is at least what seems to be the case in China.

It is too early to jump to conclusions about how the challenges of COVID19 will play out in Russia and Belarus. But two observations seem appropriate: 1. the epidemic is making the leaderships in Moscow and Minsk nervous; and 2. it is unleashing forces in their societies that they may not be able to control. Which raises the question: will this emergency shake the foundations of their authoritarian systems.

Omid Nouripour is a Member of the German Bundestag (Alliance 90/The Greens). He is the foreign policy spokesman of his party in the Bundestag. Nouripour is a member of Atlantik-Brücke’s board of directors.

The German version of this article was published by Spiegel Online on April 29, 2020.

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Covid-19 and its implications for transatlantic relations

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 23 Apr 2020 15:29:33 +0000

https://vimeo.com/411001378

Ambassador Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard University, discussed the effect the current pandemic has on the relationship between Europe and the United States with Atlantik-Brücke-Chairman Sigmar Gabriel.

Both Sigmar Gabriel and Nicholas Burns agreed that it is natural for governments to turn inwards during a crisis and to care for the health and well-being of their respective population. However, this should not distract from the fact that this is a global health crisis, which will be followed by a global economic crisis. Hence a global effort is not just desirable, but necessary. Ambassador Burns emphasized the need for cooperation within the G20. Meanwhile, Mr. Gabriel pointed out that the developing world now sees China as its main partner in fighting the corona virus, a role that the emerging superpower is happy to assume.

Although it is not too late for the transatlantic partners to lead the global effort in overcoming this pandemic and the economic shock, the current US administration gives little reason for hope that it will change its course, and on the other side of the Atlantic, Europe seems to be struggling to come to terms with its own internal divisions and export bans that prevented medical equipment from reaching Italy when the pandemic.

The discussion was moderated by Atlantik-Brücke’s Executive Director David Deissner.

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Finding Europe’s Way in the World

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 23 Jan 2020 17:33:34 +0000

For historical reasons, Europe has long remained in the strategic shadow of the United States, which itself has underwritten decades of globalization and rapidly expanding, argue Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, and Professor Dr. Michael Hüther, Vice Chairman, in an analysis for Project Syndicate. But the global balance of power is shifting rapidly. Europe must now find its own way to promote cooperation among Western partners.

Read the full article here.

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“To this day, many of us still wrestle with excruciating pain“

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 23 Jan 2020 10:46:45 +0000

On the occasion of the liberation of Auschwitz 75 years ago, we spoke with David Harris, CEO of the American Jewish Committee, about the significance of this date for the Jewish community. Harris discusses the growing anti-Semitism today, the roots of which he sees among Jihadists as well as on the right and left of the political spectrum. Both the state and civil society have a responsibility to take action against anti-Semitism, Harris says. He would like to see the EU take a clearer position on Iran and form a closer partnership with Israel.

75 years ago, Auschwitz was liberated. In the five years of its existence, almost one million Jews were killed there at the behest of Nazi Germany. What does the date of the liberation mean to the Jewish community today?

The anniversary evokes a range of intense, almost indescribable, feelings. Above all, for me, even after 75 years, I live with an anger that is quite primal, that wants to shout from the rooftops, how could people achieve such a level of bestiality and inhumanity? This is coupled with an enduring sense of incomprehension, as if to say it’s not possible that one human could commit such crimes against another. I still wonder how the administrators and the guards could go home after work, eat a normal meal, perhaps spend time with their family if their spouse and children were with them. How could they kill by day on such an unprecedented scale and live with themselves and their conscience by night? In other words, many of us still wrestle to this day with the excruciating pain and bewilderment, and questions about everything that Auschwitz-Birkenau represents. And yet, there is also a third feeling that necessarily coexists with the other two. Despite all the horrors and travails of Auschwitz, the few survivors found their faith, fortitude, and footing, built new lives after the war, and exemplified the indomitability of the human spirit, or, in this case, the Jewish spirit.

How could people achieve such a level of bestiality and inhumanity?

In Europe, but also in the U.S., populism is on the rise; anti-Semitic attacks have become a frequent occurrence. What should be done to counter this trend, by governments, but also by civil society?

I have to begin by revising the premise of the question. To be sure, antisemitism surfaces when populism mixes with illiberalism and xenophobia. That’s a real danger, as history has amply shown, and again poses a threat today. But there are two other sources of antisemitism in Europe (and beyond) that also threaten Jews. The first comes from jihadists. Indeed, with the exception of the attack at the synagogue in Halle on Yom Kippur, just about every single violent act of antisemitism in recent years on European soil has come from jihadists, whether in France, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Bulgaria, or elsewhere. And the other concerning source is the extreme left. Just imagine what would have happened had Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party won the recent election and governed the United Kingdom. Antisemitism, joined by anti-Zionism, is rife within the current Labour Party, starting at the very top. And what about all those other far left political parties and groups in Europe that would deny Israel, alone among the nations of the world, the very right to exist, much less to defend itself against those who seek its destruction? Therefore, any serious analysis of the menace faced by Jews in contemporary Europe must take into account each of these three sources: the extreme right, the extreme left, and jihadists. Otherwise, people are either living in denial or seeking to weaponize antisemitism for a larger political purpose, but surely not for the safety and security of Jewish communities.

In the U.S. in the last 18 months alone, we have had violent attacks from the extreme right, but also from other sources having nothing to do with populism or white supremacy, again underscoring the point that anti-antisemites must be open-eyed and swivel-headed in the fight against this age-old pathology.

Governments must acknowledge the serious and growing nature of resurgent antisemitsm.

In terms of the response, first, governments must acknowledge the serious and growing nature of resurgent antisemitsm. In some cases, this has proved harder than I would have thought. Second, they also need to recognize the multiple sources from which antisemitsm emanates today. Third, governments should work to adopt and implement the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism, as this provides a common understanding of what constitutes antisemitism. Otherwise, there is no standard baseline for even defining the issue. Fourth, no one speech or statement by political leaders will solve the problem. Instead, what’s needed is a sustained, multipronged focus on combating a hatred for which no vaccine has yet been discovered. Fifth, prosecutors and judges need to get more serious in sending a message that a crime motivated by hate will result in severe consequences, and not just a slap on the wrist. Sixth, longer term, children, in our increasingly diverse and multicultural societies, must be taught respect for the other and mutual understanding. Again, this is not one lesson one time, but needs to be a consistent theme throughout their education. And seventh, governments cannot do all the heavy lifting alone. There is a clear and compelling need for civil society to stand up for pluralism and intergroup respect, and against hatred and antisemitism.

You have expressed your concern in the past that the Iranian regime will take advantage of diplomatic ties and agreements with the West, in particular the JCPOA, and intensify its threats against Israel. Now that US-Iranian relations have escalated, what could be a path forward?

I have long believed that every effort must be made to find common ground between the United States and Europe. Obviously, there remains a great deal of work to be done to achieve that goal. Meanwhile, Iran takes advantage of our own differences in the West, playing off one against the other to maximum advantage. By now, it should be abundantly clear that the notion prevalent in 2015, in the U.S. and Europe, that Iranian “moderates” would be strengthened by the JCPOA at the expense of the “hardliners” was a self-delusion. Rather, the JCPOA did not soften the regime, nor did it encourage the regime to turn inward and pursue reform and social development. Not at all. To the contrary, it only emboldened Iran, enriched its state coffers, and fueled Iranian expansionism from Lebanon to Syria, from Iraq to Yemen, and beyond. I believe that the U.S. and Europe, as a matter of priority, must redouble the search for common ground in encouraging Iranian protesters risking their lives today across the country, in sending a clear message that uranium enrichment and missile development will not be tolerated, and in challenging, not appeasing, Iranian interference in one nation after another. The threat posed by Iran centrally includes Israel, of course, but it doesn’t end there. Iran poses a threat to nations across the Middle East and North Africa, and its terrorist tentacles have reached into Europe, directly or through its Hezbollah proxy, on more than one occasion. And speaking of Hezbollah, how much longer will the EU continue the illusion of bifurcating the terror group into “political” and military” wings?

The hope is that Europe will become more clear-eyed when it comes to the threat posed by Iran, and the importance to European interests of a closer relationship with Israel.

What is your hope for America’s European allies’ role in the unstable situation in the Middle East?

I have a short-term hope and I have a longer-term hope. The short-term hope is that Europe will become more clear-eyed when it comes to the threat posed by Iran, and, separately, when it comes to understanding the importance to European interests of a closer relationship with Israel. It is clear that there is no single view of Israel within European Union member states. That said, deepening ties with Israel should not be seen as a “gift” to Jerusalem. Rather, it serves the highest strategic interests of the EU.

I firmly believe that Europe can serve as a model for creating a new interstate paradigm in the Middle East.

Longer term, as far-fetched as it may seem today, I firmly believe that Europe can serve as a model for creating a new interstate paradigm in the Middle East. What’s needed are people today with the vision that Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet brought to post-WWII Europe 70 years ago. We are beginning to see the first elements of this in the Eastern Mediterranean around energy. Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt are forging closer links regarding natural gas, and at times they are joined by Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. Whereas for Schuman and Monnet it began as coal and steel, tomorrow’s coal and steel could be energy, joined by electricity and environmentalism as the driving forces of a new era of interstate cooperation, replacing interstate conflict. Europe could and should be the North Star, the guiding light, for that alluring vision. Will it?

David Harris is the Chief Executive Officer of American Jewish Committee (AJC). Follow him on Twitter @DavidHarrisAJC.

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Domestic instability and uncertainty with the U.S. may propel Canada closer to Europe

r.fehrenbach — Thu, 28 Nov 2019 13:53:15 +0000

The Canadian pollster Nik Nanos states that Canada stands at a historic milestone after the federal elections. Based upon latest data by his research institute Nanos points out that the second largest country on earth could increasingly seek for stable and positive relations in other parts of the world than at its home continent.

By Nik Nanos

In a world marked by political volatility and uncertainty, many wondered whether Canada was an outlier. In 2015, Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau swept to power on his proverbial “sunny ways” campaign, advancing a moderate, progressive, inclusive vision for Canada firmly fixed on helping Canada’s middle class. In the period between the 2015 and the 2019 federal elections, Canadians were unsettled by U.S. President Donald Trump’s drive to scrap the North American Free Trade Agreement and to remake the North American relationship. Indeed, for Trump, it was not just about remaking America’s role in the world, it was about shaking up the world order ranking from NAFTA, to NATO to America’s relationship with China.

[related]This brief will examine the political context in Canada ranging from the domestic political situation as manifested in the 2019 General Election through to the perceptions of Canada’s major allies. Together they paint a picture of domestic uncertainty coupled with a reaching out to economic and security partners that have a potential to provide stable positive relations.

Leading up to the 2019 General Election, the Liberals enjoyed a comfortable 10 to 15 point advantage over the Conservative Party. This consistent and prolonged honeymoon in the first three years of the mandate was more of a political Potemkin Village than a continuation of the warm embrace of Trudeau’s sunny ways. The two major opposition parties, the right wing Conservatives and the New Democrats which are a left-wing social democratic alternative to the Liberals were both leaderless for a significant portion of the mandate of the Liberals. In the absence of a clear counterpoint or alternative, the Liberals, on paper, looked strong. Fast forward to 2019, and the resignation of two senior women cabinet ministers over perceived interference in the SNC Lavalin legal proceedings which deal with corruption charges and the ‘sunny ways’ of the Trudeau Liberals turned into dark days. Indeed on the very first day the election writs were issued and the campaign began the Liberals were on the defensive responding to new revelations in the SNC Lavalin Affair.

With the Bloc surge in Quebec and blockbuster revelations about Trudeau wearing a brown-face 19 years ago, the Liberals scrambled to hold on to government.

The structural game changer for the Liberals was the rise of the separatist Bloc Quebecois in the French-speaking province of Quebec. Ahead of the campaign, the popular wisdom was that the Liberals would lose seats in many of Canada’s regions but gain in the province of Quebec at the expense of the sagging New Democratic Party. However, Bill 21, Quebec Provincial Legislation banning the wearing of religious symbols for public employees like civil servants, teachers and police officers, reignited Quebec nationalist sentiment which rallied around the Bloc Quebecois. With the Bloc surge in Quebec and blockbuster revelations about Trudeau wearing a brown-face 19 years ago, the Liberals scrambled to hold on to government.

Over the course of 37 campaign days of nightly tracking done by Nanos Research for The Globe and Mail and CTV News, the Conservatives led on 22 evenings and the Liberals led on 15 nights. The seesaw battle continued – with Trudeau being on the defensive and the Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer, also, on the defensive over his personal position on abortion, same sex marriage, holding dual citizenship and fuzziness about his professional accreditation as an insurance broker.

The Conservatives won the popular vote but the Liberals won the greatest number of seats and held on to power largely on the inefficient distribution of Conservative support which was highly concentrated in the energy rich Prairie provinces in the West. With that the Liberal majority was lost and the Liberals now have to work with other parties to stay in power.

The other major shift over the course of the last four years has been in the views of Canadians of their major allies. For the first time in memory.

Setting aside the election and the Liberal set back from majority to minority, the other major shift over the course of the last four years has been in the views of Canadians of their major allies. For the first time in memory. Among the key shifts is a lack of confidence in the ability of Canada to have a positive relationship with the United States. Views of Mexico are currently more positive than views of the United States with is in contrast to the historical public opinion trend. Canadians are more likely to self declare a greater affinity for Europe as a place of shared values, commitment to the rule of law and outright stability. The views that Canadians have of Germany, over the course of the past 15 years are steadily becoming more positive when it comes to perceptions related to shared business values and shared values on human rights.

The message for the Trudeau minority government is that with an uncertain domestic political situation and an unsettled relationship with the United States, greater and closer engagement with Europe represents a potential anti-dote to the anxiety that Canadians have about the future, who our partners will be and where Canada should look. Driven by geography and history, the relationship with the US will continue to be the foundational bilateral focus of Canada. However, given the current situation, Canada is at a moment in time where an increasing number of Canadians would welcome a diversification of Canada’s outward view of it’s economic and security partners. On that front, Europe now more than ever is positively on the radar of Canadians.

Professor Nik Nanos is the Chief Data Scientist at Nanos Research.

Hier sehen Sie die Präsentation der Studie von Professor Nik Nanos, auf der dieser exklusive Text für die Atlantik-Brücke basiert.

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“The U.S. has sold out the Kurds numerous times”

r.fehrenbach — Thu, 07 Nov 2019 15:47:38 +0000

Joshua Walker views the Turkish military offensive in northern Syria as tragic, but in its emergence, as inevitable. The Global Head of Strategic Initiatives at Eurasia Group discusses in Atlantik-Brücke’s Transatlantic Call America’s foreign policy credibility, the late response of the EU, and a comeback of ISIS.

Listen to the conversation:

https://www.atlantik-bruecke.org/app/uploads/Audiofile_TaCall_Walker.mp3

Interview: David Deißner

Joshua Walker, on October 9th of this year Turkey launched a military offensive in northern Syria which is directed against the Kurdish YPG militia. This step was facilitated through the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. What does this mean for the credibility of the United States in the Middle East?

American credibility and foreign policy have suffered not just in the Middle East. Although you could shrug and say American credibility has been suffering for a long time, not just under the Trump presidency, but ever since the so-called red line that was set by the previous administration in Syria. Nobody should have been surprised. The U.S. has sold out the Kurds numerous times. This was inevitable in coming, but it is still tragic to watch all the human suffering. It was not a matter of if but a matter of when. The surprising nature of this is how quickly it escalated and became a global crisis. To see the way in which the power vacuum that the United States has left in Syria has been filled by Russia, Iran, and now Turkey which used to be on different sides is particularly interesting to watch. October 9th joked at our military officials who have been working so closely with our Kurdish allies.

Which role does NATO member Turkey play in this situation in northern Syria regarding the Kurdish forces?

[related]From the beginning, the Turks have been the main protagonist. Turkey is the second largest military power in NATO in terms of the number of forces, and it is a sophisticated fighting force. The fact that it is also the Muslim majority power has always led Turkey to have a larger seat at the table. Turkey shares one of the longest land borders with Syria. From the very beginning of the Syrian uprising, Turkey has been very clear about its position: It is against Assad, but it also believes that the YPG or the PKK is a terrorist organization that represents an existential threat to the republic of Turkey. Turkey has been waging a war against this group for a good thirty-year period from the eighties onward. Thousands of lives have been lost.

There is a domestic context here for Turkey as well. President Erdogan, who has been flagging with his popularity, needs to find a reason to continue his policy given on what happened with the Istanbul municipal election recently. There is no political party in Turkey, with the exception of the HDP, that does not believe that this is the right course of action. There has been a steady drumbeat of war. Erdogan seized the opportunity.

There has been a steady drumbeat of war. Erdogan seized the opportunity.

What happens if Turkey invokes Article 5 of its NATO membership if it is attacked by some Kurdish forces?

First of all, a lot of us thought that because Turkey is a NATO member, perhaps it would not take these actions in Syria. Invoking Article 5 could cause an internal crisis in NATO. The bigger discussion in Washington is the following: With allies like this, what should we be thinking of NATO as we know it is no longer a relevant force inside of Turkey because of Turkey’s behavior, not just in this particular case with Syria, but also with the Russian S-400 weapon systems that have been bought? We as transatlantic friends struggle with this question.

Will Russia and Iran, which both protect the regime of President Bashar al-Assad geopolitically, benefit from the new reality on the ground in Syria?

Absolutely. The Astana process by which Russia, Turkey, and Iran have been negotiating these issues, even when there was a more adversarial relationship between the three capitals, has picked up to be one of the main deciding factors. If I am Syrian today, unlike in the past when I would need to go to Switzerland or New York to try to figure out what my fate would be, increasingly this is beginning to flow through Moscow and Teheran and to a lesser extent through Ankara. Because Ankara is playing much more like a regional player. Turkey seems to be focusing its energies on its regional aspirations and particularly protecting its sovereign territory, versus Russia, who is playing the role of a spoiler. Wherever it can really stymie unity or international efforts, it is doing so in a powerful way. It is really breathtaking to watch how Russia, which is from a purely numbers point of view a very weak power, is punching well above its weight. The difference between Russia’s actions and Iranian actions is that Iran has a much larger regional game here that is playing out with Hezbollah, Lebanon, and its antagonism of Israel.

It is really breathtaking to watch how Russia, which is from a purely numbers point of view a very weak power, is punching well above its weight.

Syria that has been in a civil war for more than eight years becomes once again a site of further combat operations. These cause an ever-increasing number of deaths and force tens of thousands of people to flee. Which responsibility does the West bear for this tremendous humanitarian crisis?

It is easy to point fingers. The West did not inspire the movements that led out of the Arab spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. However, if the West had lifted a finger and put it on the scales in the Syrian War on one side or the other, we would have clearly made a difference and changed the outcome. If we had had even half or a third of the political will, that the Iranians or the Russians had in protecting Assad, in eliminating him, it would be over. Ultimately, we are all to blame for where we are. We are in the worst of both worlds.

Where do you see the qualitative difference between the Obama administration’s approach to this issue and the current administration’s policy?

There is an amazing amount of continuity with our policies. Even when Obama decided not to enforce the red line, there were still American forces there: State Department, U.S. Aid, intelligence, and defense. With the “New Beginning” speech in Cairo, the Obama administration put the rhetoric out ahead of its actions. When the actions did not meet up to the rhetoric, there was a real disappointment and cynicism that developed about America’s intentions in the region.

When Trump came in, there was an initial honeymoon period. Trump does not seem to have any appetite for foreign intervention and seems to want to get everybody out of the so-called endless wars. Yet many of the agencies I described continued to do business as usual in the region. Until last month, when Trump telegraphed Erdogan that he is not doing anything more and pulling American soldiers out. Now you see a real anger and backlash when you look at the Republican response to President Trump’s abandonment of the Kurds. Almost all foreign policy professionals were uniform in saying this is a pretty significant and bad move on Trump’s part. This is a lose-lose situation in a worst-case scenario.

Now you see a real anger and backlash when you look at the Republican response to President Trump’s abandonment of the Kurds.

German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer suggested to establish an internationally controlled security zone along the Syrian-Turkish border in cooperation with Turkey and Russia. What is your take on this?

I am disappointed about what I am seeing because it seems like it is too late. If there is one silver lining, it is to see that Germany is realizing it has to play a larger role. But while this proposal sounds really forceful and it is a great talking point and headline, the Europeans should have been more proactive and focused on Turkish concerns beforehand. That is not even to mention the EU membership, which we do not even talk about anymore. That used to be the biggest driver of Turkish foreign policy. I am concerned that clearly the EU does not seem to feel like a real foreign or security power when it comes to Turkey.

If there is one silver lining, it is to see that Germany is realizing it has to play a larger role.

Is the EU at least to some extent prepared for new high numbers of refugees seeking shelter in the European Union? Or is this rather not the case, and Europe is very much depending on the agreement it has completed with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan so that more than three million Syrian refugees living in Turkish camps do not enter the European Union?

The EU is clearly dependent on Turkey. The EU has simply made the short term negative case of saying: We will pay you to keep the refugees there. There is no long-term solution. Turks are now literally piling refugees into trucks and driving them into Syria. Generally speaking, it would be a mistake to give up on Turkey. The Europeans are in danger of losing their relationship with Turkey over their fears related to national security concerns.

What are the ramifications of the latest developments for a potential reinvigoration of ISIS in the Middle East?

First of all, the killing of Baghdadi was a real blow. The fact that other top ISIS deputies were being knocked out may be the one positive silver lining. The broader ramifications are that there is a power vacuum. Russia has no interest in stopping a reinvigoration of ISIS, and Assad doesn’t really control all of his territory yet. If the Kurdish forces, which were fighting ISIS do not see any incentive to continue doing this, extremist forces like ISIS and al-Qaida will come back. I just worry, that we are so reactive at this point in time that we are just one terrorist attack away from something major.

I just worry, that we are so reactive at this point in time that we are just one terrorist attack away from something major.

What kind of overall strategy would you recommend to the transatlantic partners with regard not only to Syria but to the whole region in the Middle East?

One of the challenges we have for an overall strategy is that all of us are very distracted at home. You have to start at home. We as transatlantic partners have to focus on our core interests that we still share as a community of nations. NATO as the largest and most powerful and historic military alliance still has a role to play in protecting us and also in terms of working together. We are stronger together than individually. Turkey is a perfect example for us to cooperate with. Nobody has an interest for Turkey and its economy to go off the ledge. We need to find a way to reorientate our relationship with Turkey in a realistic manner. There are bright spots that we should be looking at, particularly in the economic sphere, when it comes to the Turkish youth and education system.

Here you can find Joshua Walker’s profile site at Eurasia Group.

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Two perspectives on impeachment and northern Syria

r.fehrenbach — Fri, 11 Oct 2019 08:18:36 +0000

A possible impeachment against U.S. President Donald Trump and the domestic implications of the situation at the border region between Syria and Turkey dominate the agenda on both sides of the Atlantic. We asked Peter Rough, Fellow at the conservative Hudson Institute and Young Leader 2018, and Michael Werz, Senior Fellow at the Democratic Center for American Progress and a member of the board of Atlantik-Brücke, for their views on these two issues which influence the election campaign toward the Presidential Election in 2020.

A potential impeachment against U.S. President Donald Trump keeps Washington in suspense. Has it become more likely due to this week’s developments?

Michael Werz: Yes, public support for an impeachment inquiry has grown by leaps and bounds over the past few weeks and is now at 58%. More interestingly, 49% of all Americans now want President Trump to be convicted in the Senate and removed from office. The Democratic majority in the House of Representatives will insure the initiation of the process. However, two thirds of the Senate have to support the motion to impeach a President. That means, in addition to the Democratic votes, 20 Republican Senators would have to vote against President Trump.

[related]So, it’s unclear, as always. What is clear is that vulnerable Republican Senators who face reelection next November will have a near impossible choice: vote for Trump and alienate independent voters and some moderate Republicans or vote against him and potentially lose his hardcore supporters. This is important, since the Democrats need only four seats to win the majority in the U.S. Senate and vulnerable Republicans include Cory Gardner in Colorado, Martha McSally in Arizona, Thom Tillis in North Carolina, Joni Ernst in Iowa, and Susan Collins in Maine.

Peter Rough: The political fundamentals surrounding impeachment have not shifted over the past week. The Democratic party leadership, led by Speaker Pelosi in the House of Representatives, is overwhelmingly in support of impeachment. The Republican party, led by Senator McConnell in the Senate, vociferously disagrees. As things stand, this sets up a collision that will play out over the next year.

Prominent voices from the Republican Party have fiercely criticized the President‘s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria. What does this tell us about the overall situation of the GOP?

MW: Several things: that there may still be some life left in the Republican Party; and that military retrenchment in the Middle East stirs more unease than putting Latino children into cages at the U.S.-Mexico Border, the reversal of important environmental protections, or the corrupt enrichment of the President and his family. It remains to be seen if this is a watershed moment for the Grand Old Party, if the past two and a half years and the massive support of registered Republican voters for Donald Trump are any indication, the latest crisis will pass and the party will only re-discover its traditional moral and political bearings when facing electoral defeat.

PR: So much for the criticism that Republicans in Congress are poodles of the president! In all seriousness, though, these objections show just how much esteem Turkey has lost over the past decade amongst both parties. The distrust of President Erdogan is visceral in Washington; by contrast, the Trump administration believes it has no choice but to lean on Turkey if it is to build a stable Middle Eastern order without large-scale American troops.

Many argue that from a strategic point of view it is highly risky for the Democrats to push forward with an impeachment. Does the Democratic Party fall victim to its internal dynamics with regard to the Presidential Election in 2020?

MW: It might or it might not—but that’s not the point. Congress has the obligation to defend the Constitution of the United States and sanction behavior by the President that defies the law of the land. Donald Trump openly asked for—and in the case of Ukraine, extorted—the help of foreign countries in investigating his domestic political rivals. He even asked China, perhaps the United States’ primary geopolitical rival, to meddle in American politics. By taking these steps, Trump crossed a line that made it impossible for Congress to stay silent.

Just as a reminder: Impeachable conduct is not limited to criminal behavior. There are several kinds of conduct that warrant impeachment, including 1) improperly exceeding or abusing the powers of the office; 2) behavior incompatible with the function and purpose of the office; and 3) misusing the office for an improper purpose or for personal gain. The Congressional Research Service notes that Alexander Hamilton described impeachable offenses as arising from “the misconduct of public men, or in other words from the abuse or violation of some public trust.” Such offenses were “political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.” Simply put: In a democracy, the sovereign may not act arbitrarily, nor abuse his office for his own personal gain.

PR: The Democrats are convinced that President Trump is a highly vulnerable incumbent on a glide path to defeat. If that assumption is correct, introducing a highly combustible external variable like impeachment is a risky proposition. In my view, the odds that the Democratic party overreaches is 100 percent. The extent to which that shapes the presidential election – and does so decisively – is anyone’s guess.

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“We are seeing history in the making in this country”

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 26 Sep 2019 09:36:30 +0000

Lord Stephen Green

The United Kingdom is in political turmoil these days. The terms of withdrawal from the European Union are a bone of contention between the political factions as well as between Parliament and the government. Lord Stephen Green, Member of the House of Lords, former Minister of State for Trade and Investment during the Cameron administration as well as former CEO of HSBC, talks about the current situation in Great Britain, the consequences of the conflicts on the political mood in the UK and about transatlantic relations.

Do you think the United Kingdom will leave the European Union on the 31^st of October?

[related]The chance of Britain leaving on the 31^st of October has declined in the light of recent developments. If no deal has been successfully negotiated by the 31^st of October, I think there is likely to be an extension. Britain will ask for it and I think the EU is likely to agree it. If there is a deal, then it depends on whether that gets through British Parliament. Any deal would have to include some provision for the situation on the island of Ireland. It would not be possible to get a deal with the EU that has no backstop, and it would not be possible to get a deal through the British Parliament that has the comprehensive backstop that was in Theresa May’s deal. If there is a deal with some modifications to address the Irish border question, then I think there is a reasonable chance of that getting through Parliament. And if that happens, Britain would leave on the 31^st of October.

What will be the consequences of Tuesday’s decision by the Supreme Court declaring the suspension of Parliament unlawful? Do you expect long term effects on the political climate in the UK?

The Supreme Court’s decision was hugely significant historically, and not just in the context of Brexit. This is a new step in the continuing evolution of the British constitution. Famously, the British constitution is not written down, it evolves by practice over the centuries. But this is a significant decision by the Supreme Court, because it was very precise, it looked at the historical precedents for the justiciability of advice from the Prime Minister to the Sovereign, and it took the view that this advice is subject to review by the courts under certain principles. Those principles were clearly defined, and it was a unanimous judgement. So it has strengthened the legislature against the executive. For the Supreme Court, itself a fairly new institution, to have made such a clear decision on this, is a remarkable constitutional development.

What the effects on the Brexit process will be is hard to see at the moment. The next few days will be quite significant. I don’t think it is going to lead to the fall of the government, I don’t think it will lead to a change in the present government’s strategy for negotiation, and I don’t think it will make much difference to the way in which this all plays out in late October. In all likelihood, it will not change the timing of a general election. Most people still believe that there will be a general election, but not before November. However, there is a lot of uncertainty about all of this. This is all completely unprecedented. We are seeing history in the making in this country, day by day.

Is there any chance for a second referendum?

Yes. The Labour Party’s official position is that they would seek to negotiate a new deal, which they would then put to a referendum, where the choice would be between the deal and remaining in the EU. The Liberal Democrats are clearly committed to remaining in the EU and they’ve taken the view that they would do that by revoking article 50 without a referendum. The Conservative Party is opposed to a referendum. But I think the probability of a referendum has increased in light of recent developments. It would not come before a general election, though.

President Trump and Prime Minister Johnson have demonstrated unity at a press conference at the UN General Assembly, and there has been talk about a comprehensive trade agreement between the US and the UK after Brexit, with President Trump promising to quadruple the trade volume between the partners. What is your take on the relationship between the UK and the US at this moment?

I don’t think that the special relationship that British governments have always talked about is as important to America as it is to Britain. I think the trade relationship could certainly benefit from a trade treaty. But it will be more difficult to negotiate it than many people believe. The areas of interest to the British are obviously the growth of particularly financial services, where there are all sorts of restrictions in the American market that will be hard to deal with in the context of trade negotiations. The Americans will want to see substantial opening of the British food market, and that would run into difficulties in Britain. So this will not be an easy trade deal to negotiate. There is a fair share of naïve optimism on the part of those who believe that Britain will be so much more strongly placed once it’s out of the EU to negotiate favourable trade deals. We should expect it to be a long, drawn-out process with plenty of obstacles on both sides. In the short or medium term, it will be difficult to achieve any significant change in the amount of trade done between the two countries.

What does this mean for the European-American Partnership?

The American interest is shifting away from Europe towards Asia. Their relationship with China is now their most important strategic issue, and their relationships more generally in the Far East and South Asia are now significantly more important strategically for the coming decades than Europe. Trump clearly wants to weaken the European Union. I don’t think that’s widely shared among the American establishment; but what is shared among the American political spectrum is a sense that Europe is losing significance, and that Asia is gaining significance. As far as their relationship with the British is concerned, I believe that it is less significant to America than the British think it is. In the area of NATO and of security, there are of course important common interests. But if you’re looking at wider geopolitics and at commerce, the Americans will be very hard-nosed in their approach to any negotiations with the British. As far as the EU is concerned, they don’t mind if it weakens, because that is not their primary area of interest anymore.

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“The government hasn’t constructed new stretches of fencing”

r.fehrenbach — Thu, 26 Sep 2019 08:55:18 +0000

Blas Nuñez-Neto regards the humanitarian crisis on the U.S.-Mexican border as the most pressing challenge of the current American immigration policy. The Senior Policy Researcher at RAND Corporation discusses in an Atlantik-Brücke Transatlantic Call President Trump’s plans of building a wall, his debate with Congress, and the value of migration.

Listen to the conversation:

https://www.atlantik-bruecke.org/app/uploads/Audiofile_TaCall_Blas-Nunez-Neto.mp3

Interview: Robin Fehrenbach

Mr. Nuñez-Neto, the U.S.-Mexican border is roughly 2000 miles long. Can you give us an update: What distance has been newly covered with steel fences, walls or border installations since President Donald Trump took office?

The government has not constructed any kind of significant new stretches of fencing. There are some demonstration projects that it has constructed on the border to test different kinds of technology. Some of this relates to some disputes and some funding issues between the Congress and the administration and even within the administration.

Near San Diego is a site where a lot of prototypes are being shown. Is the president creating a showcase regarding the wall?

[related]Yes. In San Diego and in a couple of other parts of the border the government has constructed some demonstration projects to test different designs. That is important because the border is 2000 miles long, and it’s not all the same. There are parts where there are floods regularly and where it’s mountainous and rugged. One design isn’t going to work everywhere.

Can you estimate how much of the distance will be covered by the time the next presidential election takes place?

That’s a pressing question for the administration. The president would like to construct up to 500 miles of walls or fencing before the election. According to news media reports that just came out there has been a little bit of a dispute internally of what the cost of that might be. The U.S. Department of Defense apparently concluded that the cost was substantially higher than what it had thought. At least to date, the Pentagon has moved very slowly in transferring the funds that the president would like shifted for construction.

The president would like to construct up to 500 miles of walls or fencing before the election.

How did President Trump succeed in materializing at least a partial financing of his plans to build a wall, although the positions in Congress between Republicans and Democrats are totally divided?

The administration was unable to get Congress to approve funding for new barriers on the border. It’s probably worth pointing out that we already have roughly 700 miles of physical barriers which include both pedestrian fencing – that is fencing that is intended to keep people from crossing – and what they call vehicle barriers. These are intended to stop vehicles from crossing illegally. There was a dispute between the administration and Congress over how much additional barriers were needed and how much they were going to cost. Congress declined to appropriate funding for that purpose. In response, the president declared a national emergency on the border.

Under U.S. law, in times of national emergencies the president has fairly broad latitude to take emergency actions, including to move funds from accounts to pay for measures that address the emergency. There have been some law suits surrounding this issue. So far Congress has not succeeded in stopping the transfer of funding, despite that it appears that the process is moving pretty slowly, probably more slowly than the administration would like.

It appears that the process is moving pretty slowly, probably more slowly than the administration would like.

The president’s plans have also resulted in the longest shutdown in U.S. history with a duration of 35 days. Regarding the understanding of such measures by the public: How much is this kind of extreme policy accepted by American citizens?

The public has unfortunately grown a little bit used to government shutdowns. They used to be extremely rare and over the last seven to eight years they have become fairly regular. It’s a symptom of a broader issue with our politics in the United States today which is characterized by polarization – an unfortunate and shortsighted one when it ends up shutting the government down in order to achieve tactical results by wielding a very blunt object.

In this last shutdown substantial parts of the government stopped running. The public gets upset when it starts to feel the effects. For example, air traffic controllers started being unable to keep up the operational speed that they normally have. Some airports had substantial delays. That’s what broke the camel’s back with regard to the shutdown.

As you already mentioned, Donald Trump also imposed a national state of emergency while speaking of a national crisis on the Southern border. How severe is the problem of drug trafficking and crimes committed by illegal immigrants?

Drug trafficking has obviously been a large historical issue across the physical land border. I am most concerned about hard drugs like cocaine and heroin. More than 90 percent of those drugs generally come through our ports of entry because they are easy to conceal. You can smuggle them in small quantities and still make a lot of money. This issue has been fueled by the opioid epidemic in the United States which is a real problem and policy challenge. But the policy solutions should focus more on what we can do to better detect and interdict these drugs at our actual ports of entry.

As far as the violence committed by migrants is concerned, there is no evidence that illegal or legal immigrants in the United States commit crimes at a higher rate than the average U.S. citizen. That is not a huge concern. There has been a dramatic surge in migration over the last year and a half from Central America to the United States and it has predominantly been fueled by families and children. There is no doubt that there is a crisis on the border but it’s more of a humanitarian crisis than any other crisis.

There is no evidence that illegal or legal immigrants in the United States commit crimes at a higher rate than the average U.S. citizen.

Is president Trump trying to build a narrative working with fear?

The president has taken some incidents committed by bad actors and has often portrayed them as if that happens all the time. I am not convinced that’s exactly the case. Our border security agencies have been stretched to their breaking point. The issue is that we have frontline law enforcement officers and border patrol agents trying to handle a humanitarian crisis: They are being overwhelmed with young children and families.

The way the system works in the United States is that our frontline border agencies before the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are the border patrols between the ports of entry and the Office of Field Operations (OFO) at the ports of entry. Their facilities are only intended to hold people for a very short amount of time. We are talking of twelve to twenty-four hours. Other parts of the government are supposed to take those populations that need to be detained and put them in detention facilities that are geared to hold people for an extended period of time. Because the rest of the system has been completely overwhelmed by this surge in migration, we’re seeing people kind of stack up at our border facilities for many days at a time. This is unsanitary, and it’s unfair to our frontline law enforcement on the border.

Our border security agencies have been stretched to their breaking point. We have frontline law enforcement officers and border patrol agents trying to handle a humanitarian crisis: They are being overwhelmed with young children and families.

Will the deals with Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras that have been negotiated under high pressure by the U.S. government in 2019 really limit illegal immigration into the USA on a permanent basis?

They might. We are already seeing the numbers decrease a little bit over the last couple of months. Some of that could be seasonal. This is traditionally the time of a year when migration starts to slow down a little bit. It could also be happening due to the policies taking effect.

The bigger question is whether these policies will stand up in court. We have already seen competing rulings by different courts around this question. In the Immigration and Nationality Act, the law that governs the migration to the United States, there are provisions that would allow asylum seekers to remain in a safe third country. In some respect the administration has implemented something that looks a lot like a safe third country process without going through the actual loops you need to go through to designate a country like Mexico as safe third country. That will probably be litigated over the next year.

The administration has implemented something that looks a lot like a safe third country process without going through the actual loops you need to go through to designate a country like Mexico as safe third country.

Why are children still being separated from their parents on American soil?

There are legitimate reasons why children can sometimes be separated from their parents if their parents have committed a crime and if the government believes that the children will be endangered if they were to remain with their parents. Even in the Obama administration, when I was at CBP, we would have some incidents in which children were removed from their parents when it was deemed that their parents were criminals. The family separation policy that was put in place last year was substantially broader than that. It’s unclear to me why this is still happening.

It seems as if no long-term solution for this problem on the horizon.

I have been frustrated for years that the debate has been focused on what happens on the border, which is a symptom of the problem and not the actual challenge. The problem is that our system and our laws in the United States are antiquated and haven’t been updated in almost 40 years. We need to reform our system. We also need to recognize that these countries in Central America are essentially functioning as failed states where you have lawlessness and criminal elements including gangs like MS-13 taking over wide swaths of the country and making life basically unlivable for large parts of the population. As an American I think we need to take some responsibility for the fact that these gangs actually originated in the United States and were exported to Central America in the 1980s.

It’s sometimes very dangerous for immigrants to be sent back to the Mexican side of the border because they are exposed to robbery or violence. Could you elaborate on that?

One of the issues that doesn’t get talked about enough is that families and children are making the trip from Central America to the United States. This journey is incredibly dangerous for them and involves putting themselves in the hands of smugglers and criminals. There are horrible stories about the numbers of women who make this kind of journey that end up being violated in some way or other.

This is a deep concern, and this is probably one of the reasons why it’ll be difficult to designate Mexico as a safe third country. Mexico has taken enormous strides over the last twenty to thirty years and has become a middle-income country and has improved its security situation notwithstanding the wars with the cartels. But it’s still a pretty dangerous place, and migrants get routinely taken advantage of and have crimes committed against them.

You have extensively analyzed U.S. migration policy and worked on legislation in the Senate. What policy would you recommend to guarantee an effective immigration system with secure borders while simultaneously allowing for humane procedures in the process of seeking asylum?

Frankly speaking, it’s not rocket science. When I was working in Congress, there were multiple efforts both under the Republican president George Bush and the Democratic president Barack Obama to pass comprehensive immigration reform. It’s interesting that in both cases the broad contours of a possible reform were fairly similar. They generally involved accepting that we have between ten and thirteen million people living without legal status in the United States. We’ll never be able to find and remove them all. In many cases these people have been here for decades and have built lives in the United States and have U.S. citizen offspring. We need to provide these people with some avenue for having a kind of legal status whether it’s citizenship or something on a path towards citizenship.

It also involves making smart investments in our border that are targeting the problems we see on the border and not just building a wall or fences to make us feel better. It involves acknowledging that we need immigration and guest workers as Europe does as well. Our population is aging and has become accustomed to benefits like Social Security and Medicare. Without robust immigration numbers it’s going to be very difficult to continue that in the future.

We have between ten and thirteen million people living without legal status in the United States. We’ll never be able to find and remove them all.

How important will this issue be in the 2020 presidential election?

It’s clear that the administration wants to make it a primary issue during the election. What you hear from Democrats is more of a focus on economic topics and health care than immigration. That will probably be some sign of where the election is headed depending on what you hear more in the debates.

What is the Democrats’ strategy to counter the narrative and policy of the president?

Unfortunately, the Democrats are fairly divided on this issue. You have politicians on the far left who want to abolish immigration and customs enforcement. I personally think – and this is not a RAND position right now – that this is shortsighted. There are points that Democrats ought to be speaking about. One of them is that this administration has used a lot of a tough rhetoric on immigration but that it has overseen the most rapid increase in illegal immigration in quite some time. We are on track for a million apprehensions at the border this fiscal year. This would be the largest number since the early 2000s and almost three times more than what we saw in the last years of the Obama administration.

The USA has always been a country of immigration. Will it lose its status of an almost mythical land where you can fulfill your personal dreams if you just try hard enough?

I truly hope not. I myself am an immigrant from Argentina and a naturalized citizen. Yet, having not been born in the United States, I had the privilege to work as a senior advisor to multiple senators on an important committee in Congress. I have been a presidential appointee. Those are the kinds of opportunities that still exist in the United States for immigrants. Immigrants can make a difference. But immigration has also always been a polarizing debate in the United States going back hundreds of years. Both holds true.

Here you can find Blas Nuñez-Neto’s profile at the RAND Corporation.

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“Terrorists are adapting to cryptocurrencies”

atlantikbruecke — Mon, 23 Sep 2019 15:56:55 +0000

Yaya Fanusie scrutinizes the cyber security risks which originate from cryptocurrencies. The Adjunct Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies speaks with Atlantik-Brücke about the lack of expertise within governments and about states that circumvent international sanctions and undermine the global financial order.

Interview: Robin Fehrenbach

Mr. Fanusie, you analyze the implications of cryptocurriencies such as Bitcoin for the U.S. national security. To give us a better understanding of this issue: What challenges regarding cyber security do free Western societies face in this context?

The biggest concern right now is that cryptocurrencies are an evolving technology that have already taken hold among a certain niche population. Illicit actors are experimenting with them. Some of this experimentation are attempts at fundraising or new ways to launder money. It has not run the full course, but it is something that these actors are adapting to. That is why it is very important for national security actors, whether they are financial authorities, law enforcement or intelligence agencies, to be as smart with this technology as our adversaries are. Terrorist financing is still small but we see terrorists are gaining knowledge of this technology, and that is a concern.

It is very important for national security actors, whether they are financial authorities, law enforcement or intelligence agencies, to be as smart with this technology as our adversaries are.

To what degree does the funding of international terrorism and illicit finance occur today through new financial technologies such as blockchain?

[related]I can’t quantify the degree. No one really knows. I would generally say the scale is small. What terrorists are gaining from other methods of fundraising and moving money is much more than what they are probably gaining through cryptocurrencies. Because cryptocurrencies are still a very small sector, they are less available. It is a new additional niche to their mix. It is not providing them millions of dollars of funding. But they are becoming more familiar with them and they are innovating and developing new schemes that we cannot detect because we don’t follow every new payment method that closely. Their ability to adapt is the real problem.

How sophisticated and elaborated is the level of transatlantic cooperation when it comes to cyber security measures surrounding digital currencies and sanctions to maintain the geopolitical order?

We are still in the beginning stages because on both sides you only have a few people who understand this technology. So, it is hard to cooperate when you only have a small number of experts. There has to be an increase of sophistication on the government side. We have to do more.

We are still in the beginning stages because on both sides you only have a few people who understand this technology.

You have coined the term “crypto rogue” in your publications. What types of terrorists belong to this kind of criminal group?

I used that term actually for rogues who are state actors. You have states that are really trying to circumvent the global financial order and international sanctions from the European Union and the United States. That is the case for Iran, Russia and Venezuela and to some degree China.

Facebook plans to introduce its own cryptocurrency called Libra. China is also seriously carrying out its cryptocurrency plans. Do you think that this is a growing market and that new technologies will be common tools in the international economy and finance world to the disadvantage of regular currencies such as the U.S. dollar and the euro?

It is too soon to say because it really depends on how these stablecoins are implemented and get adopted. The projects that already exist won’t undermine major economies like the USA. I don’t envision a total undermining of our order.

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“An Inspiration for the World“

atlantikbruecke — Mon, 09 Sep 2019 14:04:14 +0000

At Atlantik-Brücke’s summer reception in Frankfurt, members and Young Leaders alumni came together for summer’s end, reconnected with old friends and made new contacts. Stéphane Dion, Canadian Ambassador to Germany and Special Envoy to the European Union and Europe, was the speaker of the evening and shared his views on German-Canadian relations.

The Relationship between Germany and Canada:
An Inspiration for the World

Lieber Herr Dr. Deißner, Geschäftsführer der Atlantik-Brücke, lieber Herr Michael Klaus, Partner am Bankhaus Metzler, lieber Herr Jürgen Conzelmann, CEO bei Haus & Grund Frankfurt am Main, sehr verehrte Atlantik-Brücke Mitglieder, Gäste und Freunde.

I am the other North American Atlantik-Brücke Ambassador. I am quite jealous that I do not receive as much coverage in Germany as my esteemed US colleague. But what can I do about it? The fact is that one would have to work hard to find provocative or controversial issues between Germany and Canada. Our relationship is like a blue sky, both bilaterally and in global affairs.

One can only dream of a world where all countries would be as friendly as we are. But Germans and Canadians should not take the excellence of their relationship for granted and always work to preserve and improve it. This is why I thank you so much for inviting me to join you at your annual summer party here in Frankfurt.

Over the next fifteen minutes or so, I will try to take a comprehensive – and I hope optimistic – view. My main point is that Germans and Canadians know that they appreciate each other, but increasingly, they realise that they need each other. I think that sentiment bears repeating:

Wir haben uns in der Vergangenheit sehr geschätzt, sind uns aber zunehmend bewusst, wie sehr wir uns brauchen. Nous savons que nous nous apprécions, mais maintenant nous réalisons que nous avons besoin les uns des autres.

Inspired by the German-Canadian blue sky, allow me to inject a bit of cautious optimism about the challenges that we are facing. I think that we need this positive view, as the stories that are so often repeated are excessively gloomy.

Let’s start with the state of the EU. Canada strongly believes in the EU and you may know that Prime Minister Trudeau appointed me his Special Envoy to the EU and Europe in addition to serving as Ambassador to Germany.

It is worthwhile to recall the extent of Europe’s divisions and difficulties only some few years ago. The EU was deeply preoccupied with its internal efforts to forge and maintain Member State consensus in response to a series of grave and unforeseen threats to EU unity: the Eurozone debt crisis, prolonged recessions in large parts of Europe, chronic high unemployment, mass arrivals of refugees, the trauma of the Brexit referendum result and the rise of identity-based, populist and anti-EU parties.

Some of these threats remain, but the state of the EU in my view has improved considerably. The turning point for the EU came… when the EU successfully negotiated a free trade agreement with Canada! Since then, the Greek crisis has been addressed, economic growth in Europe has returned to some extent, and the unemployment rate across the Union is at the lowest level since January of 2000. No other country has followed the UK to try to leave the EU, and solidarity amongst its members remains strong – if not stronger as a result of the never ending Brexit saga. According to polls, the image of the EU amongst its citizens is more positive now than in the past 35 years, and the EU has surpassed the popularity of national governments and parliaments, including in Hungary and Poland.

Yes, the populist and Eurosceptic parties have made their presence felt, but support for them appears to have plateaued since the major impacts of 2015 migration crisis are behind us.

So, I think there are reasons for cautious optimism as to the state of the EU.

But what about trade. Can we be cautiously optimistic about international trade? Are we not facing a strong global protectionist mood?

Well, I would say that Canada, Germany and the EU can be proud to have made such progress on trade, despite growing protectionism. If you invest in Canada, you now invest in a country which has free trade with the EU, continued free trade with the United States and Mexico, and a newly concluded free trade agreement with 10 other countries of the Pacific, including Japan and Korea. Doing business in Canada means having access to 2/3 of the world economy, almost entirely duty-free. The EU has been equally active in opening its markets, as in addition to CETA it concluded agreements with Japan, Ukraine, Singapore and the Mercosur just in the past two years.

Since provisional implementation of CETA in September 2017, the two-way trade in goods between Canada and the EU has increased by 9.4% over pre-CETA volumes, and trade in services went up 5.9%. But this is only the beginning, there is a lot of room to increase the volume of trade between us.

The European Court of Justice released its decision on CETA in April, and it was positive, as anticipated; we look forward to a decision by the German Constitutional Court to follow. This opens a window of opportunity for ratification by EU member states. Thirteen EU countries have ratified already, and most recently France is moving forward. Clear leadership from Germany along with France is important in this critical phase.

Some Länder in the Bundesrat may have concerns about CETA as their coalition governments include the Green Party. But in my country I am known for being quite green myself, and I am making the point in Germany and elsewhere in Europe that CETA will facilitate the spread and implementation of the types of green innovation that Europe and Canada need. CETA includes ambitious environment provisions that commit Canada and the EU to uphold high levels of environmental protection as we liberalize trade, and to cooperate on issues of mutual interest such as climate change.

In fact, CETA is a major landmark in the development and global articulation of an inclusive Trade Agenda – an agreement that will improve free and fair trade between the EU and Canada and includes high standards for consumers, workers and the environment. CETA is an opportunity to convince our populations, and the world, that it would be a mistake to think we have to choose between trade and social progress. We can, and we must, pursue both.

More united than ever, Germany and Canada must work together to facilitate progressive trade around the world and to avoid protectionism and harmful tariffs. For example, we must prevent new tariffs especially on the auto industry and rebuff the surreal notion that our countries could be national security threats to the United States.

These tariffs are damaging each of our economies, including that of the United States. We should not sanction each other as friends and partners through damaging tariffs or extra-territorial sanctions. That much is clear.

As Germany and Canada watch the trade negotiations between the US and China, we hope that these negotiations will result in the protection of intellectual property, and ward off non-tariff barriers, the misuse of technology and massive public subsidies. These negotiations would be more likely to succeed if everything was done to strengthen, and not weaken, the WTO.

For our two countries, in fact for the world, China is an opportunity and a challenge. According to the IMF, China now accounts for 15% of global GNP and 14% of global military spending, versus just 1.7% and 1.6% respectively in 1990, a phenomenal increase.

For the first time since 1945, the second-ranked country on the list of the largest military and economic powers is not a liberal democracy.

That is an additional reason for liberal democracies to work together to strengthen rules-based trade.

China is not only a big economy, it is also an authoritarian regime, which raises many issues around human rights and the rule of law. If China is putting the freedom and security of our business people, diplomats, and other citizens at risk, then this is bad for all of us, including China.

The rule of law is essential for human rights, but it is also essential for a sound business environment. We as liberal democracies must work together, and not in a disjointed way, for inclusive rules-based trade. Strong cooperation between Germany and Canada will be key to successfully meeting this challenge.

I would apply the same cautious optimism about the future of multilateralism. Allow me to say a word about that issue.

For one thing, there has never been a golden age in which practising multilateralism, as a way of addressing bilateral and global challenges, has not faced headwinds. The end of the Cold War sparked hope that the difficulties were behind us and that multilateralism would henceforth be unimpeded, used by all. But states have always been inclined to follow those international rules that benefit them while ignoring or bending those they do not like. In a world fundamentally governed by state sovereignty, multilateralism will continue to be a system that cannot be taken for granted, one that requires constant attention, especially from committed countries like Germany and Canada.

It is a safe bet that multilateralism and its institutions such as the UN, the WTO, NATO and the European Union will survive today’s pressures just as they have overcome past challenges. Canada will do everything toward this aim, starting by engaging our US friends, whose leadership is so needed. In the United States itself, nearly 9 out of 10 Americans (88 percent) want their country to continue playing an active role in the United Nations. Eighty-three percent want their country to continue working with its allies. Two thirds of Americans prefer a foreign policy that draws them closer to Europe rather than a more independent policy.

Canada and the United States enjoy a unique and interdependent relationship, forged by shared geography, similar values, common interests, deep connections and powerful, multi-layered economic ties. Close to 400,000 people cross the shared border each day for business or pleasure or to maintain family ties.

On the trade side, the new Free Trade Agreement between Canada, the United States and Mexico: CUSMA, will maintain the tariff-free market access from NAFTA, and includes updates and new chapters to address modern-day trade challenges and opportunities.

The strength of our transatlantic relationship and the common commitments of our three countries to international peace and security are evident in our important contributions to NATO’s enhanced forward presence in Europe. Germany leads NATO’s military deployment in Lithuania. Canadian soldiers are leading a NATO battle group stationed just to the north in Latvia, and the US is leading the NATO deployment in Poland. As our Foreign Minister recently said, “we may not all be neighbours geographically, but we are actually neighbours in those NATO deployments.”

Canada is on the front line in supporting multilateralism along with Germany, but not just to defend it, to improve it as well. Canada is campaigning for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council for 2021-2022 and also plans to make promoting multilateralism one of the major objectives of its potential mandate. No country would be a better successor to Germany, on the Security Council.

The relationship between Germany and Canada may have never been more positive, true, but we need to make it even more effective, about trade, of course, but also among a range of other issues like climate change, international security and the Artificial Intelligence. Recently, Foreign minister Maas came to Toronto and Nunavut to strengthen our cooperation in key issues like digitalisation, climate change and the Arctic. This past spring, in late April and early May, the Deutsch-Kanadischen Parliamentariergruppe criss-crossed Canada, traveling from British Columbia to Yukon to Ontario to deepen the dialogue between our respective national parliaments. But is not only our politicians who bring us together, but our family, business, cultural and even sporting ties. For example, Germany and Canada have one of the oldest and most successful bilateral youth mobility programs, which brings our countries even closer together.

In all of this, Atlantik Brücke and you all here tonight have an increasingly important role to play and let me conclude on that. Just as we are doing tonight, the importance of our meetings of high-level groups of business leaders, political figures and academics, committed to strengthening the Germany-US-Canada relationship cannot be overstated.

Our Executive Director, Dr. David Deißner is responsible for the 35^th annual Germany-Canada conference, to be held in Germany next year – and dear David, no pressure, but you have our full support in meeting the challenge, from the Canadian Embassy and myself, and as well, I know, from your excellent Ambassador in Ottawa, Sabine Sparwasser.

Abschließend wünsche ich Ihnen allen einen schönen Abend, einen tollen Sommerausklang und die besten Wünsche für den Herbst und das bevorstehende Jahr.

Danke sehr, thank you very much, merci du fond du coeur.

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Hodges: “Germany’s reluctance surprises me”

r.fehrenbach — Fri, 09 Aug 2019 09:27:41 +0000

Ben Hodges, the former Commanding General of the United States Army Europe, criticizes the position of Germany’s Federal Government regarding the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. Atlantik-Brücke’s long-standing confidant und today’s owner of the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington, D.C. underlines Germany’s dependence as exporting nation on free and safe shipping routes. But besides that, he would have preferred that the USA remains within the Iran Nuclear Agreement.

Mr. Hodges, free and safe international shipping routes are essential for peace and stability in the globalized world. Now the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz poses a severe threat for international oil tankers. Are you disappointed about the German government’s decision not to join a combined British-U.S. naval mission?

Yes, I am. Germany is a long-time, reliable ally, so I’m a bit surprised at their reluctance, thus far, to join this mission. German leadership is essential for stability in many of the critical regions of the world, including the Middle East. The brand name, “Made in Germany”, is respected around the world and other nations take note when Germany decides to act or not. Whether in the construct of a multilateral coalition, NATO, or a European construct, Germany would add real value to this mission in terms of diplomatic, information space, and economic value as well as military support.

Surprisingly, Germany is also a “Non-participant” in the four EU PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) projects that are directly related to maritime security. This seems unusual for a leading nation in the EU and NATO and a global economic trading power that depends on freedom of navigation for its economic security and prosperity.

Is U.S. President Trump’s “policy of maximum pressure” vis-à-vis Iran and the future of the Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA) an effective way to guarantee peace in this region?

[related]I would have preferred that the USA remain in the JCPOA. Not because it was a good or the best agreement, but because I believe in the value of having and working with strong allies towards a common objective. The JCPOA was inadequate to address all of the key security issues. And the current Iranian regime has clearly been creating instability in the region in support of various extremist organizations for years. Many American soldiers died in Iraq as a result of EFP (explosively formed penetrator) IED’s (improvised explosive devices) which were manufactured in Iran and supplied to insurgent forces. But by working closely with the leading nations of the international community, especially Germany, I believe we could have continued to press Iran using all the elements of national strength and of the coalition’s power. This is what we call the DIME construct (diplomacy, information, military, and economy).

Stability in the region is a necessary precursor for prosperity in the region and, because of the importance of energy resources, much of the rest of the world. The best way to guarantee stability in the region is to involve all the parties interested in the process, to enforce international law, and to maintain a united front.

What are your hopes for transatlantic cooperation in the Middle East in the upcoming weeks and months?

Transatlantic cooperation is essential, there is no other way to achieve meaningful, lasting results. NATO is the most successful alliance in the history of the world. There is a reason it has continued to grow since its founding in 1949. As Secretary General Stoltenberg recently said, NATO means that every member has 28 other friends with common values and shared interests.

None of us has adequate capabilities in any of the DIME domains to go it alone. And we are indeed much stronger together, when we can prevent potential adversaries or the relevant regional parties from driving wedges between us.

Germany has a key role to play in the region not only because of its economic requirements and the need for energy for customers of the German auto industry, but because of its moral authority. Germany is respected around the world and currently has a key seat on the UN Security Council. This, combined with its leadership in the EU, make it the nation that I believe is America’s most important ally. I hope that my country will pursue Germany as our most important ally. I also hope that Germany will step up to accept a leading role in the region.

Learn more about Ben Hodges on his CEPA-profile site.

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“The number one national security priority is great power competition”

r.fehrenbach — Thu, 18 Apr 2019 08:47:31 +0000

Elbridge Colby, Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, regards China and Russia as biggest security policy threats for the USA. Germany should be more engaged within NATO, he argues. You can read an edited version of our podcast “Atlantik-Brücke On The Record” with Elbridge Colby below. The podcast was produced on the occasion of a discussion with him on the new U.S. Defense Strategy, hosted by Atlantik-Brücke.

Interview: David Deißner and Robin Fehrenbach

Elbridge, in 2018, the U.S. government has fundamentally changed its National Defense Strategy. One could argue that it focuses more than before on the great power competition. What are the implications of this strategy for Europe and for NATO?

[related]As former Secretary of Defense James Mattis put it, the number one national security priority and particularly defense priority for the United States is no longer terrorism, it’s the great power competition. This means above all China because of the scale and sophistication of its military, but also Russia. From a military perspective in Europe it’s going to mean a greater focus on Russia. Over the last 15 years, the Russians have quite assiduously worked on developing a range of capabilities, particularly conventional forces to pursue a theory of victory against eastern NATO by using the fait accompli and coupling that with their nuclear forces to create new facts on the ground. NATO would be very loathe to try to reverse them.

You have recently co-authored an article with Walter Slocombe in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung regarding the collapse of the INF treaty. You wrote that “this is not a problem that will be solved by threatening targets deep into Russia.” Your advice is instead to blunt a Russian assault against NATO. Could you elaborate on this approach?

The real danger that Russia poses from a military perspective is that it might very rapidly seize territory in the Baltics or in eastern Poland and then create a hardened defensive position. After the long period of time it might take the alliance to build up the forces to eject Russia, people will be so accustomed and so loathe to risk what would be required to eject them that they will accept the new reality. That would fundamentally undermine NATO.

The real danger that Russia poses from a military perspective is that it might very rapidly seize territory in the Baltics or in eastern Poland and then create a hardened defensive position.

Instead of waiting, our forces have to be better able to blunt a Russian assault from the beginning. European forces, along with American forces, can get forward very quickly and engage Russian forces that might be invading. That sounds aggressive, but actually it’s considerably less destabilizing than some of the alternatives. If Germany wants to avoid an arms race, it could put a bit more effort and resources into redeveloping at least a fraction of the Bundeswehr that existed in 1988. That would go a long way to solve this problem.

The US has repeatedly called upon NATO member states to commit themselves to the 2-percent-target. What is the US asking of Germany and other European NATO allies beyond spending 2 percent of their respective GDP on security and defense?

Two percent is a good marker. But what we really want is output. As an alliance we want forces that can defend our common territory. Europe must be able to contest Russian aggression from the get-go. Germany could put three divisions in the field. In 1988 Germany had 15 divisions available. So, this would be one fifth of what Germany could do in 1988. Today Germany is much richer and much more secure. Germany is really the crucial state: It’s the country that has the largest economy in Europe and it has a significantly latent military capability. Meeting some of these objectives would be well within Germany’s ability without imposing a strain on its society.

Germany could put three divisions in the field. In 1988 Germany had 15 divisions available.

How is the German reluctance to the 2-percent-target perceived in defense policy circles in Washington?

It’s mystifying at best. For 35 years of the Cold War, the members of the NATO alliance provided Germany a forwarddefense on which Germany insisted. It’s strange that Germany doesn’t help to provide this forward defense to the new entrants that have not had the fortune of being under the Western umbrella during the Cold War. This would be the same level of defense at a much lower level of commitment than during the Cold War. We are living in an era and world in which the US needs more help. For those of us, like myself, who want to preserve the transatlantic alliance we have to change to stay the same.

We are living in an era and world in which the US needs more help.

What steps can we expect the United States to take in the future when it comes to the asymmetric threats of cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare?

This is a form of competition that the American government is increasingly attuned to. In terms of our societal vulnerability we need to recognize that the world we expected in the 1990s is not the world that will materialize. The internet was designed as if the state was going to wither away, as if strategic competition belonged to the past. If you now look at what the Chinese are able to do with technology and Artificial Intelligence and how they intrude into people’s lives, that’s the future if we don’t have a better response. We have to accept that we are going to need more intelligence steps to protect our networks.

If you now look at what the Chinese are able to do with technology and Artificial Intelligence and how they intrude into people’s lives, that’s the future if we don’t have a better response.

Do we have to rethink NATO and our security architecture in order to guarantee safety?

If NATO didn’t exist, we would have to create it. NATO at its core is still a security alliance. Its fundamental purpose is a collective defense organization to protect its member states. It might do other things, but those are secondary functions. NATO is a very broad organization that has 29 members and lacks a clear threat in the way that the Soviet Union presented it. Will it be able to provide the degree of coherence? I don’t know. The international architecture is going to probably change most in Asia, because that’s where it’s less formed. The rise of China is a tectonic shift.

The rise of China is a tectonic shift.

An argument that you hear very often in Germany is that the transatlantic partnership should give a strong answer to the rise of China. Does this resonate in the current U.S. administration?

Absolutely, that is completely correct on the security front. If Europe can take a greater degree of responsibility vis-à-vis Russia, that would allow the United States to focus more on China and issues like 5G, especially not allowing Huawei to penetrate into a continent that’s in many ways very rightly focused on data privacy. Huawei is the route towards perdition. Europe and America have to integrate through trade and security in a way that still preserves our own autonomy and decision-making.

Europe and America have to integrate through trade and security in a way that still preserves our own autonomy and decision-making.

In your last conversation with Atlantik-Brücke in 2016, we were talking about President Obama’s track record in fighting international terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. How do you assess President Trump’s successes and failures in this policy field after more than two years in office?

He has done very well in the international security field. In 50 years, people will look back and say: “What really changed was the American position on China”. For the first time, the Trump administration has made clear: “China is a competitor. The best way to have a secure and stable relationship with them is to be clear and firm and strong and to negotiate from a position of strength to avoid them miscalculating our ability and our resolve.” That’s a major development. The President is also trying to do less in the Middle East. How you do that, is a very tricky problem.

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The fight over the Mueller investigation in Washington has just begun

r.fehrenbach — Wed, 03 Apr 2019 09:14:23 +0000

Max Bergmann, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, underscores how urgent the transparency of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s full report is. He criticizes Attorney General William Barr’s refusal to release the document.

By Max Bergmann

The first round went to Trump. Instead of just releasing the Mueller report, Attorney General William Barr released a four-page summary, highlighting the Special Counsel’s “top findings.” In the letter, Barr quoted a part of a sentence which showed that Mueller did not find grounds to bring a conspiracy charge against Trump or his campaign for coordinating activities with the Russian interference campaign. And so American newspaper headlines led with “no collusion” while Trump and his associates vigorously attacked their opponents.

However, in round 2, the momentum of the fight is against the President. Barr’s continued refusal to release Mueller’s report, which was recently revealed to be around 400 pages long, underscores the urgency of transparency. If the report was as exonerating as Barr implied, why hasn’t he released it? And that’s likely because the report is quite damaging to the president.

After Watergate, the Special Counsel produced a full report to Congress.

[related]The Attorney General says he needs to vet the report for classified material, redact information from the grand jury, and even cut information that might be embarrassing. This sort of aggressive redaction stands in stark contrast to previous investigations of this type. In 1998, Ken Starr published his 500+ page report with lurid details of an affair, and after Watergate, the Special Counsel produced a full report to Congress.

As a result, Democrats are describing Barr’s actions as a cover-up. This isn’t the first time Barr’s motivations have come into question. At his confirmation hearing in January, Democrats in the Senate raised concerns about his impartiality, as he had written an unsolicited 19-page memo to the Justice Department the year prior attacking the Mueller investigation.

Overall, the fight over the release of the Mueller report will be long and drawn out. But given Barr’s summation, what can we expect in the report? There’s a lot that we already know.

Mueller has proven that there were two campaigns to elect Donald Trump.

From a transatlantic perspective the most important (and also most overlooked) are the revelations related to Russia’s interference campaign. Mueller has in effect proven that there were two campaigns to elect Donald Trump – one run out of Trump Tower and one run out of the Kremlin. The charges Mueller brought against the GRU intelligence officers and employees of the Internet Research Agency for running what amounted to a digital influence campaign exposed the breadth and depth of the Russian campaign to elect Donald Trump. The IRA had roughly same number of employees as the Clinton campaign. The hack and release of emails dominated news cycles with negative stories about Clinton, resulted in the resignation of the leader of the Democratic Party before the convention, and provided the “October surprise” that significantly impacted the election. In other words, Mueller has proven that Russian interference was real, significant, and designed to help Trump.

The next question for Mueller was whether these two campaigns conspired. Although Mueller ultimately decided not to bring a criminal charge of conspiracy, the report itself is still likely to be highly damaging.

Barr’s summary left a lot of unanswered questions about the investigation.

Charging a criminal conspiracy against the President and his campaign would have required Mueller to have evidence of an “agreement – tacit or express,” which is an extremely high legal standard. But that doesn’t mean there wasn’t “collusion” between Trump and the Russians. There were more than 100 contacts and at least 28 meetings between Trump associates and Russia-linked figures. The Trump campaign provided internal polling data to a suspected Russian agent. There was a suspected Russian asset on the campaign as a foreign policy advisor. And the Trump campaign was informed of the hacking and theft of emails months before the information was released. That is collusion.

Despite all we already know, Barr’s summary left a lot of unanswered questions about the investigation. These include whether Trump obstructed justice by firing James Comey, the results of an unprecedented counterintelligence investigation into the President of the United States, what witnesses like National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and UAE lobbyist George Nader were cooperating about, and so much more.

With all these outstanding questions, Barr’s summary increasingly looks like a whitewash of the report. At first, this seemed like a public relations master stroke designed to harden Congressional Republicans’ support of Trump and win the opening battle over public opinion. However, a week later, opinion polls showed the public unmoved in their views of Trump’s criminality and almost unanimous support for fully releasing the report.

The fight over Trump’s involvement with Russia is just beginning. The Mueller report will likely contain explosive and damaging information. But the question now is: Will we ever see it? That will likely be decided in court.

Max Bergman is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and Co-Founder and Director of The Moscow Project.

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A Crisis of Liberalism in the West

r.fehrenbach — Thu, 21 Mar 2019 13:03:49 +0000

Torrey Taussig, a Robert Bosch Foundation Fellow and Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings Institution, speaks in this conversation about the crisis of liberalism in the West. She demands that it has to be proven that democracy works.

Ms. Taussig, is there a war between liberal and autocratic systems and ideas?

Great power competition today is not only a competition over security, economic and technological interests; it is also a struggle over the role and influence of democracy in the international order. Both Russia and China, using different means and with different strength, seek to weaken democratic institutions and norms that challenge their own internal power and legitimacy. This contest of ideas runs across states and also through them, as illiberal and authoritarian-leaning leaders and parties are consolidating control within democratic states. Current governments in Hungary, Poland and Turkey represent the forefront of the illiberal challenge in the EU and NATO. Their advancements are emblematic of the separation of liberal principles – individual liberties, and legislative and judicial checks on the executive – from democratic processes and elections. Even more than democratic setbacks, these developments highlight a crisis of liberalism in the West.

Current governments in Hungary, Poland and Turkey represent the forefront of the illiberal challenge in the EU and NATO.

Has the West lost its credibility due to its own internal political turmoil?

Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic must engage in a meaningful debate of democratic renewal in order to compete with increasingly confident and powerful authoritarian states such as China. First and foremost, to strengthen democracy internationally, it first must be shown to work. This means reinforcing basic democratic fundamentals on the rule of law, minority protections, free and fair elections and free media across western and non-western democracies. This also means developing policies of inclusive growth to tackle rising economic inequality and pro-growth policies to address societal and rural-urban imbalances across advanced democracies.

Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic must engage in a meaningful debate of democratic renewal in order to compete with increasingly confident and powerful authoritarian states such as China.

How can the transatlantic partners counter expanding military and economic influence by autocratic states?

[related]Militarily, burden sharing will remain a critical component of NATO’s ability to counter Russian aggression in Europe. In addition to higher European defense spending, strong and principled American leadership is needed, as well as stronger responses to democratic backsliding within NATO’s ranks, which hurts cohesion and trust in the alliance. In the Indo-Pacific, European partners should invest greater resources in upholding the rules-based order. Positive examples include Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) carried out by the British and French Navies in the South China Sea, while more is needed from Germany. Economically, corruption is a primary vehicle for authoritarian influence in democratic states. This is why strengthening the rule of law and shining a light on corrupt practices and networks can counter outside influence, as well as internal practices that weaken trust in democratic institutions and free market economies.

Are Western democracies well equipped to react to external interferences with their institutions?

Recent examples of Russian political influence have garnered significant attention. Examples include Moscow’s interference and disinformation efforts in the 2016 U.S presidential election, attempts to influence the Brexit referendum, and ongoing financing and tactical support for far-right political parties throughout Europe. Russia’s efforts are primarily opportunistic, as they exploit existing vulnerabilities within societies and political systems. Chinese influence is more strategic and subtle. How Chinese economic engagement across Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America may result in political influence that hinders good governance and transparency is still a little understood phenomenon that will require more focus in the years ahead – particularly as it becomes more technologically advanced.

Russia’s efforts are primarily opportunistic, as they exploit existing vulnerabilities within societies and political systems. Chinese influence is more strategic and subtle.

Is the liberal multilateral international order beyond saving?

The liberal international order developed in the wake of WWII has very much been a U.S.-led order. American withdrawal of its support for longstanding military alliances, political partnerships, democratic norms, and the rules-based trading system would weaken the order, regardless of whether other nations were willing to “pick up the slack.” That being said, critical progress must be made on burden sharing and institutional reform if this order is to withstand new and evolving transnational challenges and the rise of powerful authoritarian states that seek to make the order less liberal.

You can find Torrey Taussig’s detailed curriculum vitae here.

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Time to Realign with the United States

r.fehrenbach — Wed, 20 Mar 2019 16:42:10 +0000

True multilateralism can only gain momentum with the combined strength of Europe and the United States, writes our columnist Peter Rough who is a Fellow at the Hudson Institute. He argues that the transatlantic project needs new dedication.

By Peter Rough

Since the end of the Cold War, the strategy of German foreign policy has been a twin reliance on multilateralism and the United States. Of course, there have been notable exceptions to this approach. Today, Germany insists on proceeding with Nord Stream 2 over the objections of its allies. And who can forget Berlin’s campaign against the American-led war in Iraq last decade. Such exceptions aside, however, Germany has mostly embraced both pillars, convinced that together they would facilitate the grand denouement of liberalism’s triumph.

Today, however, a key pillar in German grand strategy is showing cracks. A bevy of issues is chipping away at the relationship with the United States—and with no apparent end in sight. This is all the more worrying because current disagreements between the U.S. and Germany appear to be structural and enduring rather than discrete and temporary. Unlike in the past, the reason for today’s disagreements is a basic misalignment between the two countries: in contrast to Germany, which still issues peace dividends in the form of military cuts, the United States has left the post-Cold War era behind. In the process, it has shifted from accommodation to competition, intent on confronting revisionist actors like China in various venues. By now, it seems improbable that the U.S. will snap back to the status quo ante in the coming years.

The talk has been of replacing the American pillar with one designed in Paris

[related]For Germany, which wishes to sustain the post-Cold War setting for as long as possible, this is a sobering prospect. Today, German leaders are casting about for ways to defend an order within which they had grown peaceful and prosperous. Of late, the talk has been of replacing the American pillar with one designed in Paris: European strategic autonomy.

There are few, if any, American defense officials who take such a prospect seriously, however. And for good reason: Europeans have talked of strategic autonomy for years without taking the necessary steps to make it a reality. Just this week, news broke that Germany’s defense budget may decline to 1.25 percent of gross domestic product by 2023. And last week, Germany’s presumptive next chancellor floated the idea of building a European aircraft carrier as a symbolic gesture, apparently without considering the fact that no European navy exists. Aside from concerns about economic protectionism in the defense sector, European defense initiatives are greeted in Washington with an eye roll and a shoulder shrug.

Similarly, eastern Europeans have watched the debate in Berlin and Paris with skepticism. Unless Germany manages a near miraculous strategic transformation, Europeans living within the shadow of Russia will prioritize their relationship with the United States over all others. The implication is that a hasty campaign for strategic autonomy risks isolating Germany (and France) more than the United States. But if strategic autonomy is merely an ornate pillar with a hollow core, how can Germany support the multilateral order on which its values and exports depend?

A fool’s errand to construct multilateral structures on the quicksand of revisionism

As it has for decades, the answer lies in the transatlantic alliance. The first step is to recognize that the United States and the multilateral system are interwoven like hair in a braid. It is no coincidence that multilateralism thrived most during America’s unipolar moment. Relatedly, the challenges to it today are the direct outgrowth of a shift in the global distribution of power. Sensing that their moment has come, Russia and Iran have issued major regional challenges to the United States. And globally, China is increasingly testing the system as it charts its own path to superpower status. From theft of intellectual property to annexations of territory and sectarian campaigns of aggression, these actors have demonstrated a basic hostility to the values that underpin the American-built framework. It is a fool’s errand to construct multilateral structures on the quicksand of such revisionism. To do so creates awkward, even dubious arrangements. Instead of the Iran deal, Nordstream II, and Huawei, Germany is better off aligning with the United States in its attempt to hold bad actors to account and inject accountability into the system. Only with the combined strength of Europe and the United States can a true multilateralism gain momentum again.

In the Financial Times last summer, Henry Kissinger argued that a divided Atlantic would simply turn Europe into “an appendage of Eurasia,” which would be at the mercy of China seeking to recapture its ancient role as “the principal adviser to all humanity.” Undoubtedly, the Trump administration is a difficult partner for Berlin. As the Atlantik-Brücke/Civey survey this winter showed, almost 85 percent of Germans view relations with the United States as bad. But Germany faces a choice: it can either support a pugnacious yet fundamentally liberal and democratic partner in the United States or back a diplomatically adept but fundamentally illiberal and authoritarian challenger in China. That is not much of a choice at all. It’s time to rededicate ourselves to the transatlantic project.

You can find Peter Rough’s detailed curriculum vitae here.

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Why the Timing is Right for a EU-US Summit this Spring

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:43:41 +0000

By Rick Minor

The Juncker Commission in Perspective at the End of its Term

As his term as Commission President of the European Union comes to an end later this year, Jean Claude Juncker still has time to add to his European achievements. Juncker should propose to the Trump Administration a mini-summit that could take place in the Spring, April preferred, but he must move quickly to get it in the calendar. The summit could, at the least, set the stage for more meaningful interaction with the US administration before and after European Parliamentary elections in late May. Following those elections, the campaign to choose Juncker’s successor will begin in earnest. The summit agenda could be modest but should include trade, tax, and national security issues, with or without Brexit in mind. In any case, the US administration and the EU Commission will both need to adjust to the UK no longer being part of the EU.

[related]When Juncker was chosen by European party vote President of the Commission, the head of the executive arm of the European Union, he was arguably the most qualified candidate who had ever taken the office. During his presidency, he has kept a low public profile but through the mandates of his Commissioners has made measurable progress on the priorities in his 2014 campaign platform. Unlike his predecessor, Juncker has generously yielded the Commission press spotlight to European Council President Donald Tusk, even though the Council President is a recently created, largely ceremonial position. This is both a gesture to Tusk, the one-time President of Poland, one of the key Member States in the east, and to enhancing the relevance of the Council President position itself, a position Juncker once sought. During his Commission term, President Juncker has found less opportunity to leverage his Atlanticist credentials, however, with the exception of his July 25, 2018 meeting in the White House with President Trump, their first and only meeting to date. At the July meeting, Juncker seemed to capture the attention and respect of President Trump in alleviating the US threat to impose tariffs on EU goods, especially higher tariffs on European automotive imports.

Juncker announced early on that he would not seek a second term as Commission President. That means that we already know today there will be a longer transition period between Commissions than would be the case had Juncker sought and achieved a second five-year term. Thus, the strategic opportunity for a summit this spring would be to advance discussions on these key topics and stabilize the US-EU working relationship before the lag created by an entirely newly appointed Commission taking office in the fall. Moreover, by the time the next Commission gets settled next year, the US administration will likely be even more focused on the 2020 US presidential election.

Jean Claude Juncker: European and Atlanticist

In Europe, Juncker is seen as the last of the generation of European statesmen (that must include German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, French President Francois Mitterand, and EU Commission President Jacques Delors) who were responsible for an unprecedented period of harmony within the European Union. During that period, the Maastricht Treaty was agreed which, among other things, launched the Euro, led to the Schengen Agreement which eliminated border controls for most of the Member States, and accelerated a significant increase in the size of the EU with the addition of former Soviet states, thereby expanding sustainable peace and prosperity eastward.

Before he became European Commission President in 2014, Juncker served 18 years as Prime Minister of Luxembourg (interestingly, he replaced the then Prime Minister Jacques Santer when Santer became President of the European Commission). As Prime Minister, Juncker was a key European ally of every US administration from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama, and his administration supported the US behind the scenes during the second Gulf War. As Finance Minister and later Prime Minister of Luxembourg, he was known in Brussels as a successful, behind the scenes political negotiator on European issues. Juncker’s credibility with European leaders derived from a deep knowledge of subject matter, cultural political intelligence, and fluency in the German, French and English languages in addition to his native Luxemburgisch. His personal relationships to German and French leaders as a result of his lengthy service as Prime Minister was also an advantage in knowing how to get things done with those leaders. Finally, as the head of Luxembourg, a small but fiscally significant member state, he could spend much of his time in office on European issues. Juncker cleverly served as both Finance Minister and Prime Minister for most of his premiership. This dual state role allowed him to represent Luxembourg on both the Council of State and the Council of Finance Ministers, the two most powerful member state executive decision-making bodies in the EU.

What a Summit Agenda Should Look Like

On trade, the EU needs to at least offer a timetable to resolving the dispute over the level of agricultural imports from the US to Europe and, as needed, set expectations that there is not likely to be any substantive agreement before a new Commission is in place. US business groups and the US Congress have complained publicly that the EU Commission deliberately targeted large US digital companies in connection with state aid investigations and digital tax legislative initiatives under Juncker. Recent correspondence from the Senate Finance Committee to the US Secretary of Treasury has reignited the threat of a US-EU tax war. President Juncker is as knowledgeable about the evolution of the US digital revolution in Europe as any European politician given Luxembourg’s strategy, through active marketing and fiscal incentives, to attract and retain significant direct US investment in Luxembourg while he was Luxembourg Prime Minister. For an encore, Juncker set as a priority of his Commission the development of multiple legislative proposals to reform the kinds of tax planning opportunities that were used to his home country’s economic advantage under his premiership.

He should be able to articulate why the EU and the US have differences in how to modify the taxation rules for digital business models and why the EU’s actions are legitimate and necessary from an EU perspective for the purpose of principled policy discussions going forward. This is not a difference with the US to leave to the next Commission to solve. On national security, the EU will want to share lessons learned from the success of the much anticipated 2018 launch of the upgraded European privacy law legislation, the GDPR. The GDPR was greeted with skepticism by the US from the time the first draft of the legislation was published in 2012. Now, less than a year after the GDPR took effect, there is serious discussion in the US Congress and the US business community regarding a reform of the fragmented US approach to privacy law along the lines of what the EU has done. As predicted, GDPR is becoming a template for a privacy law reform movement globally. Greater attention is being given to potential security threats from Chinese industry on the cybersecurity front and whether there is a growing urgency for the EU,the US, and the other usual allies to craft a concerted approach to deal with such a threat.

The Dynamics of the EU-US-GE Relationship post-Brexit

A Juncker summit may also remind the US what its relations with the EU Commission will be like without the UK in the EU. President Juncker can demonstrate to the US the value of directly engaging the EU, and not always through public rhetoric, on issues of common interest, as he understands the US as well as any European leader today. At the same time, as the UK exits the EU, the US will want to find an ally, like it had in the UK that can help it navigate an increasingly important EU relationship. Among the potential candidate countries, Germany is the most likely successor to the UK for the key EU partner of the US. There are many Atlanticists in the US and in Germany who would support the restoration of this key alliance that has a long record of success forged during the threat and intensity of the Cold War. Jean Claude Juncker, the Luxembourg Atlanticist, could help make this happen before he leaves the European political stage.

Rick Minor, a US lawyer with Womble Bond Dickinson, advised the Luxembourg Government on fiscal policy and GDPR issues when President Juncker was Prime Minister.

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“At the tip of the iceberg with regard to disinformation”

r.fehrenbach — Wed, 13 Feb 2019 10:17:22 +0000

Alina Polyakova regards the USA and Europe as inappropriately prepared for the threat posed by so-called Deep Fakes. Polyakova, who is the David M. Rubenstein Fellow at the Brookings Institution, analyzes disinformation campaigns that have been produced with the help of Artificial Intelligence. Both social media companies and policy makers have a responsibility to act, she says.

Interview: Tyson Barker

https://www.atlantik-bruecke.org/app/uploads/Audiofile_TaCall_Polyakova.mp3

Dr. Polyakova, when we talk about disinformation campaigns and political warfare the year 2016 stands out. The presidential election in the United States and the Brexit referendum were the wake-up call for the West. What has happened since and what is the next iteration of this threat?

[related]What happened in 2016 was not new in terms of Russia’s global desire to undermine influence politics in other countries like Ukraine, Georgia and countries closer to Russia that it considers to be the legitimate testing grounds for these kinds of operations. This tool kit has become so diffuse. We are seeing other state actors using these kinds of techniques. Iran, North Korea and China will eventually enter this space in a significant way as well. If you look at what the Russian intentions and activities have been in places like Ukraine, we can make some assertions about what we might expect.

First of all disinformation campaigns especially in social media have not stopped. Secondly they have certainly evolved in the sense that we now see a lot of content that we can identify as disinformation from the Russian side jumping across platforms and being amplified by Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. Google results are being manipulated when it comes to certain search terms. The social media companies have responded to a certain extent. In my view, their response is relatively superficial and minimal. They have started taking down disinformation networks and reducing automated accounts in rank. However, we are quite far behind in truly addressing this threat.

The social media companies have responded to a certain extent. In my view, their response is relatively superficial and minimal.

Ukraine has been the laboratory for these kinds of tools and techniques. Do we see new mutations of these tools being used in Ukraine?

The positive outcome of the exposure to these influence operations in the information space has been hyperawareness. There has been a general acknowledgement that Ukraine has been the primary victim and target of Russian efforts. There have been attacks on critical infrastructure systems, especially on electrical grids. We are going to see much more of these kinds of aggressive attacks. The presidential elections in Ukraine in March are just around the corner. This is going to be an event to watch.

You wrote an excellent report at Brookings entitled “Weapons of the Weak” in which you highlighted the return on investment of so-called Deep Fakes. What exactly are we talking about here?

‘Deep Fakes’ has become the term of a catch-all-concept for manipulation of audio and video content online. Deep Fakes are A.I. driven and produced, incredibly advanced and original content. Doctored videos and images are nothing new. But this concept is profoundly different because our ability to detect manipulated video and audio has not caught up with the ability of these algorithms to produce this false audio and video material.

Deep Fakes are A.I. driven and produced, incredibly advanced and original content.

Can you give us an example?

Here is a quick and famous one: If you google Obama and Deep Fake, you will see four videos of President Obama speaking. I regularly show these and give talks about them. I always ask the audience: which one is the real Obama? People pick one, but of all them are fake of course! This signals to us that AI is closely linked to Big Data. If you can feed a huge amount of data into this algorithm, it can produce a new video. It looks so real and so convincing that we can’t detect it is false content.

If you can feed a huge amount of data into this algorithm, it can produce a new video. It looks so real and so convincing that we can’t detect it is false content.

Frankly, some implications of this phenomenon are frightening. An audio voicemail being left for troops serving in the Baltic states or an e-mail coming in with a video of the commanding officer sharing what is actually false and misleading information take some time to verify. Meanwhile, that will subserve the role of disorientating potential military operations. Fake videos are often much more fun to look at because they are more sensationalist than accurate content. They are spread much faster than accurate content, and it takes longer to debunk their false narratives. It is open source based, so it is out there. We have to prepare ourselves for this.

Russia will probably not be the developer of this technology but more of an early adopter and weaponizer of it. Who is developing this technology?

Russia has great military capacities and of course a nuclear arsenal. But if you look at its financial capabilities, its struggling economy and its declining demographics, Russia doesn’t look like a great power. From the Russian perspective, investing in these kinds of technologies and asymmetric threats is a great way to balance out the other inequities that the country experiences vis-à-vis Western Europe and the United States.

From the Russian perspective, investing in these kinds of technologies and asymmetric threats is a great way to balance out the other inequities that the country experiences vis-à-vis Western Europe and the United States.

Well, who are the innovators? Certainly, it is a global market. If we look at a few different indicators, it becomes very clear who is going to be an innovator. Obviously, you need well trained, sophisticated, highly skilled individuals in machine learning. You also need access to massive amounts of data. A.I. has been around for decades, some of the first A.I. algorithms were written in the 1950s. In fact, the new algorithms are not that different. However, the critical change has been that we now have the ability to process data and that we have a mass availability of data. China will consequently lead in this sphere. Whoever controls the data, will control the world.

Another leader in this space is the United States. How should governments regulate A.I. to protect our democracy from these kinds of technologies being weaponized in the civil society?

I haven’t seen any serious regulatory and legislative efforts in the United States so far to grapple with this problem. Mainly because we don’t see a clear technological solution. On the regulatory side it is very difficult to see where this will go. There is a general reluctance among policy makers in the Republican and Democratic parties around regulatory efforts for the big tech firms who are driving so much of the economic growth in the United States and are also funding many congressional campaigns.

There is a general reluctance among policy makers in the Republican and Democratic parties around regulatory efforts for the big tech firms who are driving so much of the economic growth in the United States and are also funding many congressional campaigns.

We have to start from the very beginning. This means policy makers need to know what they are talking about before they start legislating. Right now, there is a serious gap between tech and policy regarding the understanding of technology. There is some precedence showing how to deal with big new industries and big revolutionary changes, like forcing these companies to have common terms of use. This is something that the U.S. Congress has forced on credit card companies, it has also forced regulatory efforts on big tobacco back in the 1960s.

Is there an increasing pressure on the companies to take more responsibility?

The pressure is certainly there. Facebook and Twitter have made some efforts to deal with this. If I had to rank them in terms of how cooperative they have been with researchers and government, Twitter is most transparent in sharing data on some of the networks that are identified as being malicious. The companies now call this kind of manipulative behavior an offensive coordinated activity. We have heard a lot of very highly publicized takedowns of networks on Facebook and pages associated with Sputnik for example. But we don’t have a good sense whether this really makes a difference. We are very much at the tip of the iceberg. The platforms are perfectly designed to be the vectors of the diffusion of disinformation.

The platforms are perfectly designed to be the vectors of the diffusion of disinformation.

How do you deter an authoritarian state where a civil society doesn’t really exist?

That is where governments can be most effective. They should send very clear messages via intelligence as to the consequences to specific actions on our critical infrastructure. You have to convey that there is a price to pay if you attack our societies. There has to be an economically punitive component. Others have suggested not so much a defensive strategy but an offensive strategy. But this is very dangerous.

You have to convey that there is a price to pay if you attack our societies. There has to be an economically punitive component.

Tyson Barker is Deputy Director and Fellow at the Aspen Institute Germany. He is a foreign and economic professional with in-depth experience working at senior levels in government and the think tank community. He is a 2014 Young Leader Alumnus of Atlantik-Brücke.

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“The shutdown was a tactical misstep by the President”

r.fehrenbach — Mon, 04 Feb 2019 12:56:00 +0000

Jamie Fly talked to members and Young Leaders of Atlantik-Brücke about the new political power relations in Washington. At a dinner discussion in Berlin, Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) highlighted the domestic and foreign policy implications of the midterm elections and the partial government shutdown.

By Robin Fehrenbach

Jamie Fly was used to harsh criticism whenever he landed in Berlin. That’s what happened to him in 2003, when he worked for the George W. Bush administration and was asked tough questions about the war in Iraq. Ten years later – working for President Barack Obama – he experienced the outrage of the German partners over the NSA affair. Today, Fly’s situation is completely different, as the Senior Fellow of the GMF and Atlantik-Brücke Young Leader Alumnus conveyed at a dinner discussion in Berlin. For two years, Germans have been asking him to explain President Trump’s policies. What used to be irritation has turned into helplessness.

[related]Fly, who also acted as a foreign and security policy advisor for Republican Senator Marco Rubio, began his domestic policy analysis with the recent congressional elections. “After the Midterms, it looked as if Trump would emerge relatively unscathed. Although the majority in the House of Representatives was lost, the Republicans were pleased with winning seats in the Senate.” But the government shutdown, which became the longest in US history, shattered trust. The economic impact, Fly predicted, would be enormous. “The shutdown was a tactical misstep by the President. What has he achieved? He didn’t get the money to build a wall at the Mexican border,” Fly noted. He said he expected the new Congress to use more of its oversight authority to keep the executive branch in check, but this would likely aggravate the deadlock in US politics.

Fly was worried about the American people. The continuing domestic political squabbles and the negative experiences with military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were increasingly tiring the population of US foreign policy. Before the Midterms, polls showed that only 6% of US citizens considered foreign policy to be an important issue. Fly regretted that the current administration continued to act erratically in this field. The high turnover of key foreign policy officials was also related to this. There is a long list of common challenges facing the United States and Europe, such as the search for solutions to social problems or the handling of Artificial Intelligence. However, there is no impetus on the part of the United States to push this transatlantic agenda forward. “The will to play a leading role in world politics is disappearing. This break with decades of continuity will bring fundamental changes for Europe, but also for the Middle East,” said Fly. As a consequence, Europe must work out what it wants to achieve internationally and, above all, how it wants to succeed. Germany in particular should become much more involved in Asia, especially Japan.

In the subsequent discussion, Fly addressed “a general crisis of confidence in our societies,” noting that the fear of globalization, immigration and digitization is real. “This is where real transatlantic cooperation should become the driving force for countering populism and nationalism,” Fly noted. At the end of the event, Fly and the members and Young Leaders of Atlantik-Brücke discussed the state crisis in Venezuela and the trade conflict with China.

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The EU’s response to Russia must be bold and unanimous

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 13 Dec 2018 09:41:58 +0000

by Norbert Röttgen

It was always just a matter of time before the smouldering conflict between Russia and Ukraine in the Sea of Azov, a body of water to the north-east of Crimea, escalated militarily. After it opened a bridge across the Kerch strait in May 2018, Russia has gradually brought the entire area under its control, causing severe economic damage to the Ukrainian trading ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk. A volatile situation morphed into an unprecedented, open act of aggression when on 25 November the Russian navy rammed a Ukrainian tugboat, seized three vessels and their crews and temporarily blocked passage through the strait.

[related]Two months earlier I’d made the point that, with rising tensions in the Sea of Azov, we might soon witness a “second Crimea” – another territorial grab. That has now come true. Russia has in effect seized the Sea of Azov through military means. This must be seen as just the latest in a long chain of Russian military interventions outside its own territory.

The March 2014 annexation of Crimea was a tipping point. That day, Russia turned its back entirely on the principles enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and later reaffirmed in the 1990 Paris Charter: it violated the borders and the territorial integrity of a European state. With that, Europe’s postwar order – and the continent’s longest period of peace – came to an end. As a result, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is hardly just a bilateral one. Rather, it raises the question of Europe’s political set-up and whether “might makes right” will dominate, instead of the rule of law.

It’s hard to exaggerate the significance of what is unfolding. When I became chairman of Germany’s foreign affairs committee, in January 2014, the world was a different place. The conflict in Ukraine, the refugee crisis, Brexit and the strains in the transatlantic relationship brought by the election of Donald Trump, had not yet happened. Dealing with Russia’s violation of international norms has become a constant part of my work now. President Putin wants Russia to become a counter-model to the western-led liberal order. The destabilisation of other countries and societies has become the guiding principle of his foreign policy.

But it’s important to keep in mind that Putin isn’t acting from a position of strength – rather, from a position of weakness. Russia’s economic forecasts are poor and Putin’s approval ratings have gone down. Russia’s deep, post-cold war anxiety comes from losing influence on the global stage and especially in eastern Europe. This was the inevitable consequence of the emancipation of the former Soviet republics. Russia feels cornered and is trying to halt its own decline by using the last means at its disposal: military power and control over access to energy resources.

The EU needs to maintain dialogue with its large eastern neighbour, for otherwise there will be no peace in Ukraine

As western Europeans, we have to acknowledge our part in this: we did not take Russia’s concerns seriously enough. I remember wondering in early 2014 how we might best address Russia’s nervousness concerning the planned association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine. What happened later showed that the west had completely underestimated what Ukraine’s rapprochement with the west would mean to Russia.

Since the EU’s 2004 enlargement to the east, Russia has watched one country after another in its neighbourhood affiliate itself with western Europe, and benefit politically and economically from that. Meanwhile Russia was failing to modernise and rebuild its sway. By 2011, along with the presidents of Belarus and Kazakhstan, Putin had signed an agreement to set up a Eurasian Economic Union – designed as a counter‑model to the EU. “Losing” Ukraine – a natural candidate for the EEU – was obviously too much for Russia to bear.

I’m certainly not trying to defend Russia’s military aggression in any way – Ukraine is a sovereign state and has the right to decide which alliances it wants to join. The EU was right to support that process from the beginning. But it was certainly naive for the west to assume that Russia would simply accept such developments.

Military means are out of the question, but all measures short of war should be taken into account.

What has to be done now? We can no longer rule out further Russian aggression, for example on the coastline of the Sea of Azov, designed to open a land route to the Crimean peninsula. Above all, the EU’s response must be coherent and unanimous: our greatest strength lies in our unity. Military means are out of the question, but all measures short of war should be taken into account.

First of all, Russia must immediately release the Ukrainian ships seized near the Kerch Strait and their crews. One good sign is that Russia has now reopened the Kerch Strait for Ukrainian ships. But freedom of navigation in the Sea of Azov must be guaranteed at all times. Next, the 2015 Minsk agreement aimed at resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine must be implemented promptly by both sides. Without that, it won’t be possible for us to cut back on existing sanctions.

Germany in particular must urgently reconsider the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project

But we must go further: Germany in particular must urgently reconsider the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project. I’ve long been a critic of this plan, aimed at building an alternative to existing transit routes for energy through eastern Europe. Nord Stream 2 is hardly a purely commercial project; it has strong geopolitical implications. Building permits have already been granted by all the European states involved – with the exception of Denmark – so stopping the project has become even more difficult. At the very least, Russia must guarantee that gas transits through Ukraine will continue. Meanwhile the EU must ensure Russian gas pipelines on its territory comply with the bloc’s competition rules. Here again, Germany must act: my country should abandon its veto on a planned reform of the EU’s gas directive.

One thing is clear – there are no quick solutions to tensions between Europe and Russia. The EU needs to maintain dialogue with Russia, for otherwise there will be no peace in Ukraine. In dealing with Putin, we need strategic patience and, where possible, must identify common interests. Europeans have perhaps been too naive in the past, but if we stick together we can tailor policies that will work for the future.

Norbert Röttgen is Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag. He is a member of Atlantik-Brücke’s Board.

This article was first published in the Guardian on Wednesday, December 12, 2018.

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On The Record

r.fehrenbach — Tue, 30 Oct 2018 12:39:39 +0000

“The bonds are too strong to see them unravel”

For more than 21 years Steve Russell served in the U.S. Army. He has fought in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Since 2015 he represents the 5th district of Oklahoma in the Congress of the United States. Russell regards the transatlantic alliance as stable and culturally ingrained. The Congressman explains in conversation with Atlantik-Brücke where Americans and Europeans should encounter each other, why Eastern Europe must concern us and why he doesn’t trust Iran. An on-site visit in Oklahoma City.

Interview: David Deißner

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“The trade war with China will be resolved within six months”

r.fehrenbach — Mon, 29 Oct 2018 11:32:09 +0000

Von Robin Fehrenbach

Frank Lavin regards U.S. president Trump as the driving factor for a solution in the escalating conflict between the United States and China. Moreover, the CEO of the Export Now Incorporation based in Shanghai and former Under Secretary for International Trade in the U.S. Department of Commerce criticizes the reaction from the USA and the EU to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In the short interview Lavin argues in favor of a transatlantic free trade agreement – also for energy policy reasons.

Mr. Lavin, with its Belt and Road Initiative China follows a very clear economic and geopolitical strategy. Is the reaction from the USA and the European Union (EU) to this large-scale project sufficient so far?

The United States and the EU have both been taken by surprise by the project’s scale. There has been some response, but it has not been adequate. For example, the largest and very promising opportunity for the United States to improve its economic connectivity in East Asia was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade agreement with twelve countries anchored by the United States but also by Japan. It would have allowed all the smaller countries of the region to at least have an alternative to China. The American withdrawal from TPP was a step backwards.

The United States and the EU have both been taken by surprise by the project’s scale.

[related]The EU has not been active in this space and has not risen to the challenge of the Belt and Road Initiative. However, the EU has several strengths: One is the enormous size of its home market. The second is its soft power. This means that in their home markets, countries in Africa and Central Asia have an enormous need of a better connectivity to Europe. They want to establish a settlement market and an investment market. The EU should look for ways to reduce trade barriers and the costs for a lot of the countries participating in the Initiative.

Along with the Belt and Road Initiative, China is becoming a rising energy superpower. What could a consistent transatlantic response to this endeavor look like?

The core of a transatlantic response to China in general should be a EU-US free trade agreement. We should be able to create a market that includes the EU and the United Kingdom with a global GDP of about 35 percent. This market would also include the USA embedded in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contributing approximately 25 percent of the global GDP. This would be an enormous step towards prosperity. But even more important vis-à-vis China is that a free trade agreement would set a global template. Think of countries like South Korea, Australia, Egypt or Turkey which are very decent economies. They would adapt their standards in order to participate in this EU-US-NAFTA common market. Consequently, there would also be global norms for specific energy sector areas such as automobile fuel efficiency, electrical usage of home appliances, labeling and testing standards.

The core of a transatlantic response to China in general should be a EU-US free trade agreement.

The trade war between the United States and China has escalated this year. The IMF has just revised its global growth forecast downwards. Do you see any chance to find pathways to a constructive dialog?

Yes. This trade war is driven by Donald Trump’s view. In some respects, he has done a reasonably good job in identifying problems with China’s feasance of trade issues. But he has done a reasonably bad job in developing a policy response to this. He has increased friction in trade and costs of trade. There are contradictions in his approach: If China is the main problem, why do you spend 18 months in arguing with your NAFTA partners? 99 percent of the trade within NAFTA is not a problem. You are spending your political capital, all of your energy and time on NAFTA. And why do you have the conflict with the EU on steel tariffs?

I suspect the trade war with China will be resolved within six months. Not for trade reasons, but almost for stylistic and psychological reasons. I can tell you two things about president Trump. One point is that he gets fatigued, he gets bored. His two most important issues when he was running for president were immigration, including building a wall to Mexico, and president Obama’s health policy. He makes some efforts on both issues, and he has limited success on both. But after a year he didn’t even talk about the wall, or only occasionally. The same applies to Obama’s health care. For Trump, China is now the greatest threat to America. But in a couple of months it will be something else. Trump is very interested at the moment.

One point is that president Trump gets fatigued, he gets bored.

The second point is that he has to be the hero of his own story. He alone determines what is successful. On trade issues, Trump is both the power maniac and the fire marshal. He lights the fires and he puts them out. Then he declares victory. This has been the case with NAFTA. This will happen again in the trade war with China.

The U.S. administration accuses the Chinese government of trying to influence the upcoming midterm elections by fake news and cyber attacks. China is denying the accusations. What consequences could this development have both in America and in China?

China is playing more of a role in American civic life than it has ever played. I am not concerned when this is transparent. If the Chinese foreign ministry puts Xi Jinping’s speeches in English on a web page, this is not a camouflage of a secret project. This type of activity is a constructive use of diplomacy. But if China is suppressing thoughts and words of Chinese students in American universities, this is very harmful and an inappropriate intervention in the United States. The USA should provide human rights guarantees to anybody who is studying in an American university. I would encourage US civic organizations and universities to watch out. We have a responsibility to protect open discussion in the United States. We should not allow any foreign power to intervene in our society. No one should try to alter outcomes of an election.

We should not allow any foreign power to intervene in our society.

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On The Record

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 11 Oct 2018 12:33:14 +0000

“We assumed the public was coming along with us on American engagement”

In our first episode of “On The Record”, we talk to Julianne (“Julie”) Smith, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, who is currently serving as a Weizsäcker Fellow at the Bosch Academy in Berlin. She served as the Deputy National Security Advisor to the Vice President of the United States, Joe Biden, from 2012-2013. Shortly before the Midterm elections, she speaks about the discontent of many Americans with the elites in Washington, about President Trump’s foreign policy and the future of NATO.

Interview: David Deißner

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“It is important for Germany to lead in NATO on the European landmass”

r.fehrenbach — Thu, 11 Oct 2018 10:34:58 +0000

Interview: Robin Fehrenbach

General Philip Breedlove would welcome “Germany’s recapitalization and retraining of its military forces.” In our interview, the former Commander of the United States European Command and NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) calls for a higher readiness of the whole Western alliance to cope with massive and complex threats. You can read an edited version of our podcast “Atlantik-Brücke On The Record” with General Breedlove below. The podcast was produced on the occasion of a discussion on the future of NATO, hosted by Atlantik-Brücke.

General Breedlove, how would you describe NATO’s current situation?

Our alliance is strong and it continues to be an important and successful alliance. However, I would also note that we are facing challenges now that are tough and we haven’t really faced some of these challenges in a long time. They force us to take a look at ourselves and to say: Are we ready for the threats that we see out there today? That is the biggest challenge to NATO.

What are the most pressing internal challenges which the Alliance is facing at the moment?

[related]Our current challenges began when the Russians invaded Crimea and the Donbass. A lot of attention again began to be paid to this neighbor to the North and East that was threatening Ukraine. Many of the former Soviet Warsaw Pact nations felt threatened again. There was a very strong focus on the fact that Russia was not going to be a partner but might actually once again be an opponent. At the same time, we were seeing massive migration problems in the South emanating from Northern Africa and from the civil war in Syria where Bashar al-Assad was murdering his people. Large numbers of people began to flee Syria.

One of those really tough internal problems in NATO is that we had a division in worry, a division in concern in that we saw this belligerent Russia to the East and the North, and we saw this very tough societal problem of immigration being caused by problems in Syria and Northern Africa. NATO had to come to grips with it. At one point, we created the ‘Strategic Direction East’ and ‘Strategic Direction South’ to label these internal problems. One of the biggest internal concerns is that NATO has to be able to address all of the challenges to its nations.

One of those really tough internal problems in NATO is that we had a division in worry, a division in concern in that we saw this belligerent Russia to the East and the North, and we saw this very tough societal problem of immigration being caused by problems in Syria and Northern Africa.

What are other severe external threats which NATO has to cope with?

There are other threats that may emanate from the same places, but they are different kind of threats. Clearly, the cyber threat that we face today is different than two decades ago. Cyber is a tool that is being used in everyday conflicts. We are having issues in cyber with our opponent to the East every day. These sets of old tools that many label hybrid war – Mr. Gerasimov (the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia; remark of Atlantik-Brücke) calling it ‘indirect means and asymmetric methods’ – are being used in a new way.

What worries you most?

Our nations are under a lot of pressure to address societal challenges and the policy solutions battle for the same budget that must be used to ensure that the militaries of NATO are ready to carry out the missions that they must accomplish. As the SACEUR it was clear to me that the readiness of our militaries in NATO was not adequate. It was not appropriate to the task that we saw from a resurgent and recalcitrant Russia. We need to address the readiness and recapitalization of our militaries.

As the SACEUR it was clear to me that the readiness of our militaries in NATO was not adequate. It was not appropriate to the task that we saw from a resurgent and recalcitrant Russia.

Being the former SACEUR and being equipped with the knowledge of your 39 years lasting military career, how do you assess the military exercise “Vostok 18” that was carried out by roughly 300.000 Russian soldiers as to the security of the NATO area?

First and foremost we should not be alarmed that Russia is exercising. We exercise. It is every nation’s right to exercise. The issue is that we must exercise responsibly. It is important that we are transparent in what we are doing, how long we are doing it, where we are doing it, who we are doing it with. Things that NATO advertises every day about its exercises. Vostok is an exercise towards the East. What worried me more as the SACEUR were the Zapad exercises. Those were the exercises done in the West. They were rarely open and transparent.

First and foremost we should not be alarmed that Russia is exercising. We exercise. It is every nation’s right to exercise. The issue is that we must exercise responsibly.

Do we witness the entering into a Russian-Sino phase at least on a military level when analyzing the participation of 3.000 Chinese soldiers in “Vostok 18”?

We should not be surprised. We as the West have issues working with Russia. We also have issues working with China. Geostrategically, why would we not expect them to possibly message us by collaborating? We also need to sit back and understand that the Russians have issues with the Chinese and the Chinese have issues with the Russians. It is not appropriate to overdramatize and to draw any major geostrategic conclusions from them exercising together.

Would you recommend any adaptations to NATO regarding its general strategy for the European security architecture?

We have been through two decades of fighting counter-insurgency and we have lost our focus on large scale war fighting operations. We do not have a focus yet on the size of operations that article 5 would require. We need to regain our ability through training and exercises. We need to regain our ability to understand how to command and control large formations against a dedicated opponent.

We need to regain our ability through training and exercises. We need to regain our ability to understand how to command and control large formations against a dedicated opponent.

Do you show understanding for Germany’s foreign and security policy that has not reached NATO’s 2-percent-goal yet?

I am not going to pretend to criticize or advise Germany. But the young Captain Breedlove who served during the Cold War here in Europe eight times and in Germany five times experienced that the Bundeswehr and the Luftwaffe of the Cold War was an incredibly capable military force. It was a leader on the European landmass. It is important for Germany to lead in NATO on the European landmass. I am not saying this at the exclusion of other large countries. But I would like to see that Germany’s recapitalization and retraining of its military forces show that leadership in NATO.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

The same role it played for the last seventy years. NATO is not perfect and it hasn’t kept perfect peace here in Europe. We have had some issues that we had to work through. But what NATO has done, is to prevent the kind of wars that ravaged Europe multiple times. NATO will continue to do that. NATO is a very capable and very important alliance. The mission that it has had for the last seventy years will be important for the next seventy years.

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Nord Stream 2 – a project with geopolitical dimensions?

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 20 Sep 2018 09:24:15 +0000

In recent months, the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline has repeatedly led to irritations in transatlantic relations. U.S. President Donald Trump’s accusation that Germany is becoming dependent on Russian gas is merely a rhetorical shift, according to Alina Polyakova, an expert on European and Russian foreign policy and David M. Rubenstein Fellow at the Brookings Institution. In her remarks at an Atlantik-Brücke dinner discussion in Berlin on September 6, Polyakova argued that the President was reiterating criticism of the project that both the Obama and Bush administrations had already expressed. She added that from the U.S.’ perspective, Nord Stream 2 undermines and destabilizes Europe’s energy infrastructure.

[related]The discussion between Polyakova and members of Atlantik-Brücke was mainly concerned with the question of whether and why the new gas pipeline was needed at all. Polyakova believed the pipeline had no advantages for Europe or Germany, but rather presented disadvantages in terms of both the energy supply and geopolitical considerations. According to Polyakova, it is clear that Nord Stream 2 will not supply Europe with more gas. Rather, the construction project helps Russia’s strategic interest. “With Nord Stream 2 Russia intends to completely destabilize Ukraine so that it never becomes a member of the EU or NATO. At the same time, Europe becomes increasingly dependent on Russia.”

Polyakova also emphasized that she considers the purchase of Russian gas to be economically unproblematic. Her criticism was instead based on the fact that Nord Stream 2 was primarily a political and military project. She argued that due to the geopolitical implications and the enormous resistance in some European member states, the construction project not only endangered the long-term security situation on the European continent, but also Europe’s internal political coherence. Other participants argued that, thanks to diversification efforts at European level, there was no danger of dependence on Russian gas either now or in the future. Furthermore, the question was raised as to whether the U.S. government’s criticism of Nord Stream 2 could mainly be driven by economic interests regarding the sale of American Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to Europe. Polyakova’s view that the construction project is not only based on economic and energy policy concerns but also on geopolitical considerations was also controversially discussed.

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Atlantik-Brücke mourns the loss of Senator John McCain

atlantikbruecke — Sun, 26 Aug 2018 14:06:09 +0000

Atlantik-Brücke mourns Senator John McCain. His passing is a loss not only the United States of America, but also for the European partners. Senator McCain was a courageous and principled champion for freedom and democracy. Last year, in a moving speech at the Munich Security Conference, he reminded us that we must fight tirelessly for the universal values of the West, for democracy, open markets and the rule of law. John McCain was not afraid of conflict – even with his own party – when it came to standing up for his convictions. As someone who personally lived through and bravely endured violence and injustice, he knew freedom and human dignity were invaluable.

Friedrich Merz, Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, said: “John McCain’s integrity, selfless dedication and political passion deserve our highest recognition and will be remembered forever. The board and the members of the Atlantik-Brücke commemorate an outstanding man and a great transatlanticist. His voice will be missed.”

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U.S.-Turkey Relations Hit a New Low

atlantikbruecke — Fri, 24 Aug 2018 09:21:48 +0000

By Joshua W. Walker

The U.S. and Turkey hit a new low this summer that caught many by surprise. Unfortunately, however, the current crisis has been a long-time coming. The relationship between the two countries has been in need of serious attention even as the broader transatlantic relations seem to be undergoing a reset under the Trump administration.

The initial honeymoon period that brought hopes of greater understanding between Presidents Trump and Erdogan has come crashing down as neither of the two leaders wants to look weak, as they depend on their strongman personas and images to govern. In both countries, foreign policy is driven by domestic politics and creating an “us versus them” rhetoric to consolidate power at home. With the Mueller investigation and upcoming mid-term elections in the U.S., Trump through Vice President Pence sees Pastor Brunson, a US national who was detained in Turkey on espionage charges, as an easy rallying cry for his evangelical base. The new nationalist parliament in Turkey is already using a more pronounced anti-American, nationalist rhetoric kowtowing to the far-right Nationalist Movement Party MHP. In other words, both leaders, President Erdogan and President Trump, have been willing to exploit these foreign policy crises to consolidate their power at home and strengthen their leadership positions.

[related] After a chummy NATO summit together, Trump publicly warned Erdogan over Twitter that an escalation was coming as a result of a breakdown in diplomacy involving a Turkish national released from Israel at Trump’s request, but the speed at which careful behind-the-scenes negotiations on the release of Andrew Brunson broke down is still breathtaking. The U.S.-Turkey collapse of trust has shown itself again and again in recent years. There can be no doubt that Brunson’s arrest in and of itself is not the worst in the long history of Turkish-American relations that has whether the 1974 Cyprus fallout and 2003 Iraq War. Still, its consequences have had immediate repercussions for bilateral relations and may be far worse on broader transatlantic relations in the longer-term.

There are many nuances that make reporting on this relationship particularly difficult. From a Turkish perspective, major sticking points are the fallout from the July 15^th failed coup attempt and its accused mastermind Fethullah Gulen living in Pennsylvania, as well as Turkish bankers and gold traders that have busted U.S. sanctions on Iran. From an American perspective, problems include the purchase of the latest cutting-edge fighter jet F-35s as well as S-400 Russian missiles which complicates relations with NATO that relies on interoperability and being on an American based weapons system, conflicting policies towards Syria, and finally, American Foreign Service Nationals being detained and denied diplomatic immunity. Pastor Brunson has become the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back for the Trump administration, especially given the strength of the evangelical right and the absurdity of the charges he faces in Erdogan’s Turkey.

US-Turkey relations now have to be reset; there is no going back to normal.

On the political level, much like the “visa-crisis” of last year that dragged on for almost a month over a seemingly minor diplomatic breakdown, US-Turkey relations now have to be reset; there is no going back to normal. A fully-functioning State Department is necessary to deal with Turkey, given the Pentagon is far more anti-Turkey and pro-Kurdish these days vis-à-vis Syria. The imbalance in Washington between State and Defense must be righted. Assistant Secretary Wess Mitchell is uniquely placed to play a role as a sensible Europe expert that must take a tough but fair line on Turkey. In addition to a Senate confirmed Assistant Secretary, a permanent Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for day-to-day relations with Turkey and an Ambassador in Ankara should also be a priority as tough love is applied more effectively in person than over Twitter or through press conferences.

Anti-American anger in Turkey is at a high

Turkey’s economy is at an inflection point and American leverage has never been stronger. At the same time, anti-American anger in Turkey is at a high, and balancing these two trends will be critical. The Anti-Americanism in Turkey has increased mainly because of continued American support for the YPG, the mostly Kurdish militia in Syria.

EU-Turkey relations are looking much better as a result of the breakdown in U.S.-Turkey relations, and Turkey’s economy depends far more on the EU than on the U.S. Turkey is increasing its focus on the EU to secure its own future, regardless of where U.S. policy ends up going under Trump. Germany is still Turkey’s largest partner for trade, and Turkey has been basing this relationship on a win-win approach. In this context, Europe continues to be a reliable partner for Turkey particularly in comparison to America these days.

Indeed, since the Justice and Development Party came to the power, Turkey has been willing to seek more partners and good neighbors around it. With Erdogan at the helm, Turkey has flirted with Russia, Iran and China, while trying to get away from Western values on different sets of issues. Because of clashing interests over the years and power struggles between the U.S. and other countries in the region, Turkey has been trying to seek alternative options for its foreign policy choices. This was abundantly clear on the most recent visit by the Emir of Qatar, which resulted in Qatar’s $15 billion promised infusion into the Turkish economy even as the lira plunged to its lowest levels yet this year.

Turkey wants to reduce dependency on Western actors, creating more partnership options to increase pragmatism and flexibility in foreign policy decisions. Another current example is the first high-level meeting between Turkey and the BRICS countries, with whom President Erdogan expressed desire to further collaborate. At the first Turkey-ASEAN trilateral meetings in Singapore, Turkey indicated its approach for seeking areas of cooperation with the member countries in the region. In addition, through the Astana Process, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and many other multilateral forums, Turkey is seeking to engage with emerging powers and organizations on the global stage, leading the way for a transforming balance of power internationally.

Perhaps the most immediate concern for the transatlantic alliance has been Turkey’s turn towards Russia

Perhaps the most immediate concern for the transatlantic alliance has been Turkey’s turn towards Russia to buy major weapons system, specifically the S-400 missile defenses. This has created problems both with the U.S. and among the NATO alliance over military interoperability. Turkey also wants to build more ties with different actors or organizations in the world. Saving Turkey as a transatlantic ally is imperative in the long-term given the historic investment that has already been made by successive generations. Taking into account the shifting dynamics in both American and Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy environments, there has never been a more opportune moment to double-down on an equitable partnership of shared interests that Europe can help facilitate.

Ultimately the U.S.-Turkey relationship will be determined not just by the presidents, their war of words or even their governmental colleagues in Washington and Ankara, but by the businesses, civil society, educators, entrepreneurs and leaders from Istanbul, New York, Izmir, San Francisco, Bursa, Boston, Kayseri, Chicago, and beyond; that is why both governments and nations must make a concerted effort to expand relations and save the alliance.

Joshua W. Walker, PhD (@drjwalk) is a longtime Turkey watcher who is a proud Atlantik-Brucke Young Leader based out of Washington, DC currently Global Head of Strategic Initiatives at Eurasia Group, Executive Vice President of the American Turkish Council and a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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“Conversations on the future of NATO“

r.fehrenbach — Tue, 10 Jul 2018 12:10:13 +0000

„Conversations on the future of NATO – The challenges with which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has to cope“
Atlantik-Brücke Arguments
Edition 04
Berlin, 2018.
159 pages
ISSN 25092456

„Verlässlichkeit in der NATO ist ein hoher Wert“
Interview mit Dr. Géza von Geyr
„Diplomatie bleibt heiße Luft ohne militärische Fähigkeit“
Interview mit Botschafter Wolfgang Ischinger
„Wir müssen mehr Mittel bereitstellen“
Ein Pro zum 2-Prozent-Ziel von Henning Otte …
„Mehr Geld ist nicht gleich mehr Effizienz“
und ein Contra zum 2-Prozent-Ziel von Rainer Arnold
Uneinigkeit bei fairer transatlantischer Lastenteilung
Hintergrundartikel von Robin Fehrenbach

2 Die Rolle der USA innerhalb der NATO

“A demonstration that we stand together”
Interview with Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller *
“NATO is the most successful Alliance in world history”
Interview with Lieutenant General Frederick B. Hodges *
“The goal is to normalize the relations with Russia”
Interview with Dr. Michael E. O’Hanlon *
„Wer bei Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung kürzt,
muss hinterher mehr Geld ausgeben“
Interview mit Dr. Marco Overhaus
“‘America first’ does not mean ‘America alone’”
Interview with Dr. Richard D. Hooker Jr. *
“Doubts about America’s commitment to Article 5 are removed”
Interview with Dr. Magnus Nordenman *
“Sometimes nastiness is more effective than soft power”
Interview with Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *

3 Der europäische Pfeiler der NATO

„Absurdes Ausmaß in der Vielfalt von Waffensystemen“
Interview mit Dr. Norbert Röttgen
“The EU is now motivated to take real action”
Interview with Dr. Julianne Smith *
„Europas Streitkräfte stehen an einer Weggabelung”
Interview mit Dr. Gundbert Scherf und Dr. David Bachmann
“Russian challenges tire out our population”
Essay by Ambassador Darius Semaška *
* In English

Burkhard Schwenker’s standpoint as PDF

The publication as PDF

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“Does our model of a free society still have a future?”

atlantikbruecke — Tue, 26 Jun 2018 09:11:30 +0000

On June 22, Friedrich Merz, Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, was interviewed on “phoenix persönlich” about Europe’s current relationship with the United States. Merz stressed that transatlantic cooperation is not an end in itself, but is proving indispensable, especially in a world in which authoritarian regimes are gaining more and more influence. Curbing their influence must be a common undertaking. Friedrich Merz gave an insight into the contribution of Atlantik-Brücke to maintaining the dialogue with the United States. He also underlined the importance of multilateralism for Germany and urged that the European project should not be given up.

The complete interview (in German) can be seen here.

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“Germany has to be tougher”

atlantikbruecke — Fri, 18 May 2018 14:25:32 +0000

A survey conducted by Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany has shown that trust in democratic institutions is waning on both sides of the Atlantic, and you also talked about the phenomenon in your speech here at the German-American Conference. How do you think trust in democracy and institutions can be reestablished?

That´s a good question. There is a sort of chicken and an egg element to this because the decline of trust accompanies the declining economic security of the middle of the economy, the middle skills portion of the labor force. So one obvious thing would be to have public policy that addresses those insecurities, that updates welfare systems for the gig economy, that makes them more portable, more adaptable to the 21^st century. That, I´m sure, would make people feel more invested in society and in their own as well as their children´s future and help restore some lost trust.

[related]The problem is the decline of trust has disabled the political system to take actions like this. So, it´s quite hard to say practical things that are likely to happen other than to hope and pray that we get some especially talented politicians who are able to thread this needle. Praying for great leaders is not really political science. It is just wishful thinking. But when there is a demand for statesmanship, there must be talented Macron-type figures out there, who understand this is a historical opportunity, who can get these systems to deliver those policies. That would restore a lot of the trust that has gone missing.

In the era of Trump with all his very anti-international rhetoric, do you think that there can be a constructive cooperation between the EU and the US? And if so, what would that look like from the EU-side especially?

If there is a positive impact of Trump on transatlantic relations, it is to force us on the European side to take more responsibility for our fate into our own hands and not to rely on America to do it all for us. That’s not really transatlantic cooperation, that is Europe becoming more coherent as a unit in terms of foreign and defense policy, in terms of its external interaction with the world, particularly in the face of threats from the East from Vladimir Putin and indeed within the European Union itself in the Visegrád countries. That, of course, is a challenge that makes it all the more urgent that we stand up to. I can’t overstate how important it is that Germany showed more leadership on this question.

What would that leadership look like?

Not just higher defense spending as a matter of numbers but as a matter of strategic thinking on one hand. Second, much tougher on the illiberal democrats within the European club, whether it’s Hungarians, the Polish. But in matters of upholding the values that bind the European Union together, Germany has to be tougher. I understand why it is a difficult thing to do and there are always consequences and prices to pay. But that’s what leadership is. It is paying prices. It costs to be a leader.

So, would you say that vis-à-vis the US, Europe would be well advised to shore up Western values on its own for now?

Yes! Trump doesn’t believe in these values. There has been a lot of focus recently on how far you get if you flatter Trump. Merkel, to her great credit, doesn’t flatter Trump. She just can´t do it and I don’t blame her. Macron has been trying to flatter Trump. They have the same results, whether you flatter Trump or you don´t. On the other hand, strongmen, authoritarian leaders, don’t really flatter Trump. Trump flatters them. He wants to be like the authoritarians. That’s who he really envies. So, he doesn’t believe in these values. But of course, America does – Trump isn’t all of America and Trump isn´t forever. But while he’s president, the initiative has to be taken elsewhere. Canada is doing ok. Actually, they have a good government. The Australians in a different way, the Japanese in a different way. But really the core of the Western alliance is between the United States and Europe. And if the United States is AWOL, it has to come from Europe. And without Germany we do not get European leadership. It must be boring for Germans to hear that but it is just true.

One last question: You mentioned that you might or might not write another book in a few years on the return of Western liberalism. If you think of the future, are you optimistic or pessimistic?

I’m actually agnostic. If you had asked two or three years ago, I would have said pessimistic. I wrote another book about six years ago about the relative decline of America and I think on that I was a little bit ahead of the curve. Retreat of Western liberalism is right on time as everyone else begins to write about it. In both cases I felt sure of the direction we were going. But if you asked which is more likely: the return of resilience of democracy in the West or a gradual democratic depression I honestly don’t know. It is up to us. It’s up to our actions in the face of these challenges.

Thank you so much.

Interview: Katharina Draheim

Edward Luce is the chief US commentator and columnist for the Financial Times. He writes a weekly column on US politics, economy, and foreign policy. Previously, he served as the FT’s Washington bureau chief. He has also worked as the FT’s South Asia bureau chief in New Delhi, capital markets editor in London, and as the Philippines correspondent. Luce was previously the speechwriter for Lawrence H. Summers. His most recent book is The Retreat of Western Liberalism, and he is also the author of In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India, and Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent.

A Graduate of Oxford University in Politics, Philosophy and Economics, he received his post-graduate in journalism from City University, London. He is a frequent guest on Fareed Zakaria GPS, PBS NewsHour, NPR, and C-SPAN.

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Russian challenges tire out our population

r.fehrenbach — Wed, 09 May 2018 08:27:59 +0000

Lithuania’s Ambassador to Germany, Darius Semaška, represents a country on the eastern border of the NATO territory. In this personal essay he describes how Lithuania experiences the threat created by Russia on a daily basis. Russian cyber attacks on critical infrastructure serve as one major example of this constant insecurity. However, Semaška assures that his country remains resilient not least because of the German and American engagement within the NATO framework in the Baltics.

When I wonder how the Russian claim to power affects the everyday life in Lithuania in concrete terms, I immediately have two incidents in mind. One can recall the story of Russian supplies of oil via the pipeline “Druzhba”. Back in 2006 Lithuanian Government went for privatization of a major oil refinery that was and still is a major supplier of oil products to the region. Russia was pressing to sell the refinery to a Russian company for a low price. Lithuanian Government went for an open and transparent international privatization tender. The Polish company “Orlen” won. A few months later oil supplies via the “Druzhba” pipeline stopped, and the pipeline branch coming to Lithuania has been dry until this day. Official Russian explanation was that the pipeline needed repair. It still needs …

In Lithuanian efforts to develop alternative energy sources or to establish alternative routes of supply, there were various obstacles generated by Russia related actors. They ranged from financing, or, in fact, bribing local people to wage a campaign against extraction of shale gas up to engaging Lithuanian LNG terminal developers into lengthy litigation in courts. We also witnessed Russian efforts to question Lithuanian Government’s ability to meet its international commitments. For example, Russian representatives in UNESCO waged a campaign of allegations on, as if, environmental harm done by the construction of Lithuanian LNG terminal.

The same pattern in any maritime area considered by Russia as its zone of influence

[related]There is another case deserving serious attention. In 2014 and 2015, the power cable connecting the Lithuanian and Swedish electricity grids, called NordBalt, was being laid on the Baltic seabed. Russia launched a series of naval exercises in the vicinity of NordBalt power cable itinerary. Under an excuse of caring for safety, Russian navy chased away all the ships from the area. The area, de facto closed by Russian navy, encompassed a big sector of the Lithuanian exclusive economic zone. And, surprise, surprise, that was the area in which NordBalt cable had to be laid down. Russian navy exercises lasted more than half a year. In extreme case, in April 2015, the area was closed for 26 days. Completion of NordBalt was delayed and costs of the project increased significantly. This pattern could be applied in any maritime area considered by Russia as its zone of influence or interest. It has also to be noted that the Baltic Sea is quite shallow, and it is not so simple to change the established sea routes. Therefore, the approaches to the seaports on the Eastern Baltic coast could be severely hindered.

The examples that I have mentioned refer to several challenges posed by Russia. It is about Russian effort to take over the assets of our major companies. It is about using those companies as a major lobbying or corrupting instrument in politics. It is about steps to preserve and abuse a dominant role in the energy supply and about using it to achieve a major policy change of the country. It is about testing ways and means to disrupt major supplies and thus to tire out our population. It is about testing ways to hinder deployments of NATO reinforcements in the Baltics when the time comes.

Hostile activities against the IT systems are on the rise

Russian cyber attacks on our country pose another very dangerous threat. Russian hostile activities against the IT systems of the Lithuanian state sector and critical infrastructure are on the rise. Last year almost 55,000 cyber incidents were dealt with by Lithuanian National Cyber Security Centre. One fourth of them occured in our energy sector. Government institutions are also frequent targets. For example, features of a cyber and information operation were identified after the news portal of Lithuanian TV channel had been hacked and fake information about the Defense Minister had been placed on it. Subsequently an email containing a malicious document was distributed to the media and government institutions. The email contained a link to the fake article, in order to attract the recipients’ attention and increase the spread of the malware. The main goal of the hacker group associated with the Russian intelligence services was not an information operation but spreading the malware in the networks of state institutions.

The National Cyber Security Center now operates as the main national computer emergency response unit for management of cyber incidents. It also operates as the main Accreditation Authority of all types of IT systems and networks in Lithuania. The Centre has an R&D division for creating tools, necessary for managing cyber incidents and executes cyber exercises. A secure network of main state institutions, which could be capable of exploiting the benefits of peacetime systems and ensuring their viability in case of possible military action, is being developed. It is expected that approximately 550 most important state and municipal authorities will be interlinked by this network. It will be capable of operating separately from the public internet and remain resilient to the cyber threats. Lithuania initiated and leads the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defense policy (PESCO) project called “Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security”. The first outcome of the project is expected at the beginning of 2019 and should assist the participating nations to counter a cyber attack or an incident. This project will help participating EU member states to mobilize collective expertise in order to jointly strengthen their cyber security resilience and facilitate cooperation in combating cyber threats through mutual assistance. This year, NATO exercise Steadfast Cobalt will again take place in Lithuania. Thus, we try to contribute to the development of practical cyber security capabilities of the Alliance.

Contributions by our European allies, and, first of all, those by Germany, to increase our security are very much appreciated. However, the transatlantic factor is crucial. Russia must know that even in case of a limited incursion, it would immediately enter a military conflict with the whole Alliance including the nuclear powers and particularly the United States. Russians try to avoid namely that, and this is a major deterrence factor.

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Nordenman: “Doubts about America’s commitment to Article 5 are removed”

r.fehrenbach — Wed, 25 Apr 2018 08:20:52 +0000

Interview: Robin Fehrenbach

Part XIV of our series: Magnus Nordenman calms the inhabitants of Guam and Hawaii: After initial irritations, the U.S. government under President Trump adheres firmly to Article 5. The Director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council points out however that the United States’ counter-terrorism strategy for NATO is hardly developed. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke in Washington, D.C. Nordenman also explains that the special quality of the Alliance’s new command structure rests on the better reinforcement build-up.

Mr. Nordenman, how steadfast is the U.S. government’s commitment to Article 5 under President Trump?

We’re in a better place than we were at the beginning of this administration. As a presidential candidate, Trump called NATO and America’s commitment into question. And the first summit in Brussels with President Trump was not a good day for NATO. But since then a lot has happened. The vice president has relayed America’s commitments, as have Secretary Mattis, Secretary Tillerson and the president himself. In that sense, the worst is over. We’ve removed most of the doubts about America’s commitment to Article 5 and European security. That’s not to say there won’t be turbulent times ahead. But at least, on that basic level, we are in a better place than we were in early January of 2017.

The first summit in Brussels with President Trump was not a good day for NATO.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

Russia is trying to extend its spheres of influence. The Baltics and Poland, in particular, feel threatened by Russia’s aggressive behavior. How reliable is NATO’s security guarantee in this European region?

[related]It’s getting better. The implementation of the Warsaw Summit decisions with an enhanced forward presence in the Baltic States and Poland is a first step. But now we need to do more in the maritime domain, in the air domain, and in reinforcement. NATO is on the right track, and it actually got there surprisingly quickly. One important point that isn’t discussed much in Europe is the fact that European nations are stepping up their efforts – with Germany having the lead in Lithuania, the UK in Estonia and Canada in Latvia. It’s crucial to understand that America is not alone in its commitment to security in the Baltic region.

That’s a contribution to transatlantic burden sharing.

Correct. It’s not enough, and more needs to be done. But the political point is important: this is not a scenario in which America has to shoulder the entire burden.

North Korea has threatened to attack the island of Guam, which is a territory of the United States. Would such an event invoke NATO’s Article 5 on collective defense?

It might. That’s an unknown factor that wasn’t considered when NATO was first established because the focus back then was obviously on Europe. But Guam is an alliance territory and the only time Article 5 has been invoked was actually in response to the attack on the U.S. Guam is obviously open to legal discussion. A more interesting case is probably Hawaii, which is actually a state in the Union. Hawaii is also within missile range, and North Korea has commenced nuclear missile drills again for the first time since the Cold War. In this new, globally interconnected security environment, both Canada and the U.S. – as Pacific countries and allies – have to be prepared for Pacific events that might also impact NATO.

In this new, globally interconnected security environment, both Canada and the U.S. – as Pacific countries and allies – have to be prepared for Pacific events that might also impact NATO.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

Would you recommend NATO to think through these legal issues surrounding Guam?

It makes a lot of sense for NATO to focus primarily on the East and South. That’s where we have intense security challenges. But it’s always good to give your mental muscles a work out and at least think things through to conclusion. It ensures that the decision makers are better equipped to cope with unexpected events. It’s also worthwhile thinking about worst case scenarios. This has been a longstanding challenge for the alliance. If you told someone that NATO would be engaged in central Asia in early 2000, people would have thought you were joking. But then 9/11 happened, and all of a sudden NATO was undertaking its largest expeditionary operation for almost 15 years. So it’s healthy for any alliance to regularly consider the impossible.

Which strategy for NATO does the United States under the Trump administration seek to develop?

This administration, at least at the senior level in the White House, really has two priorities: a better balance of burden sharing and a NATO role in counter-terrorism. A couple of rungs down things get a bit more detailed and granular. One example is the Department of Defense under Secretary Mattis, who has a very good understanding of the Russian challenge and the importance of defense and deterrence. There’s a lot of good, practical work going on there.

This administration, at least at the senior level in the White House, really has two priorities: a better balance of burden sharing and a NATO role in counter-terrorism.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

How far developed is this strategy already?

There’s a growing sense in Washington that the burden sharing discussion is going in the right direction. Then we can move on to the reasons. Is this being driven by Putin or Trump? Europeans tend to argue that it is actually being driven by Putin rather than Trump. Trump supporters tend to argue that it is all being driven by Trump. I like to think the truth is somewhere in between. But whoever is driving it, and however long it takes to get there, this discussion is moving in the right direction.

The counter-terrorism strategy is much less developed. Both Washington and the alliance agree that NATO is not a counter-terrorism organization. There are also different opinions within the alliance on how counter-terrorism should be implemented and what institutions have to be worked through. This opens the door to European NATO members to come to Washington with their ideas and proposals on what NATO’s role in counter-terrorism could be.

President Trump’s ‘America First’ strategy seems to put American protectionism in a broad range of policy fields. To what extent does this impact NATO’s strength and the United States’ longstanding aspiration to shape the liberal world order?

You are seeing two separate directions in American foreign policy. I’m less worried about the defense and national security situation. As I said, we’re already past the worst in terms of America’s commitment to NATO. The burden sharing issue is also going in the right direction, and the U.S. is maintaining strong defense relationships with partners such as Australia, Japan and South Korea.

More damage is probably being done on the trade agenda, with President Trump’s proposal to withdraw from the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement and his pulling out of the TPP negotiations. TTIP also seems to have been abandoned for the moment. In that sense, multilateral trade agreements are more at risk than America’s military and security alliances. On a day to day basis these are unrelated. But they do say something about America’s commitment to multilateral solutions and rules-based institutions. At a philosophical level they certainly reinforce each other. So there is a danger of a divide opening up, and of American engagement in the world resting on the single pillar of defense, whereas before it rested on two – the other being multilateral trade.

Multilateral trade agreements are more at risk than America’s military and security alliances. On a day to day basis these are unrelated. But they do say something about America’s commitment to multilateral solutions and rules-based institutions. At a philosophical level they certainly reinforce each other.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

The Ukraine crisis remains unresolved. Would the revitalization of the NATO Russia Council help to improve both the situation in Ukraine and the American-Russian relationship?

Broadly speaking, the U.S.-Russia relationship is at its worst since the Cold War in spite of the hopes of the White House to try and restore it. We’ve arrived at this point for a number of different reasons – first and foremost as a result of Russian interference in the U.S. election and its continued aggression in Ukraine. The relationship has taken a turn for the worse since President Trump took up office. There is some consistency here, because the administration is saying the relationship cannot improve until we have a political solution for Ukraine, which puts this administration in line with the Obama administration’s position. The Ukraine remains a huge issue and the topic of supplying arms to Ukraine is back on the table. It was ultimately rejected by the Obama administration but is now being seriously discussed again in Washington.

What is your key takeaway from the NATO Russia Council?

We aren’t going to see any major breakthroughs. Talks are taking place for the eminently good reason that talking to each other is better than not talking to each other. On the one hand we are moving to deter Russia, and on the other we are attempting to engage in constructive cooperation. This isn’t just the European view. Secretary Mattis is also on the record talking about the importance of strong deterrence and dialogue.

NATO’s new command structure and additional headquarters will enhance its troop deployment capabilities. Do you think these changes go far enough to be an effective deterrent against Russia?

This is another very important building block of our deterrence construct, which relies on reinforcements. We’re never going to have enough troops from day one in Poland, or in the Baltic States, or in Romania. It will always be a reinforcement build-up. By the way, it was also a reinforcement build-up during the Cold War. The U.S. certainly has fewer troops in Europe than it had during the Cold War, but even back then a key objective was to channel reinforcements into Europe. It is easy to forget. People like to talk about fighter jets, artillery, and tanks. But these structures, logistics, supplies and reinforcements all keep NATO going. I’m glad we’re finally getting to it because this has been underappreciated for a long time.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

That’s a great question! NATO will continue to play a central role supporting America’s national security. The EU has an incredibly important set of European institutions. In that respect we will always be an outsider, but this doesn’t mean there won’t be close cooperation or a close U.S.-EU partnership. We were a founding member of NATO and we’re also one of the leading members of the alliance. NATO will always be important. I remain optimistic about NATO and the transatlantic relationship. We’ve been through bad times and crises in our relationship before. It’s particularly striking how many aspects of the situation today remind me of 2002, 2003 and 2004, another period in which many Europeans believed that America was a rogue country that wasn’t respecting its allies and international institutions.

NATO will always be important. I remain optimistic about NATO and the transatlantic relationship.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

You’re talking about the war in Iraq.

Correct. There was talk in Berlin and Paris back then about it being time for Europe to go its own way and reduce its dependence on the United States. But we overcame that relationship crisis. I’m not saying that the situation then is comparable to the situation today. Very different factors are involved. But I’ve heard talk like this before. Domestically, in the U.S., I’m beginning to see a pretty healthy counter-reaction – especially if you look at congressional interest in NATO, congressional delegations traveling to Europe, members of the Senate and the House talking about the importance of NATO and American commitments to Europe, and more funding for the European Deterrence Initiative. The U.S. is definitely going through a turbulent and challenging time, and there is a lot of uncertainty. But I am beginning to see the outlines of a counter-reaction. People here in Washington are waking up and realizing that we can’t take the transatlantic relationship for granted. It is something that we have to nurture as well.

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Understanding the Russia Investigation

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 19 Apr 2018 09:54:54 +0000

by Max Bergmann

Looking back across the Atlantic, Europeans may understandably assume that America has lost its mind. Not only did America elect a President that is unfit for office, but now the country is obsessed with an utterly bewildering Russia scandal, seemingly pulled from a conspiratorial spy thriller.

[related]This scandal, however, is actually quite real and quite straightforward. On January 6, 2017, the US Intelligence Community issued a report that said that Russia in effect ran a campaign to help elect Donald Trump in the 2016 election. There were therefore two campaigns to elect Donald Trump in 2016 – the Trump campaign and a Russian campaign. The current investigation is focused on whether these two campaigns worked together. It looks increasingly certain that they did.

To date, 22 people have been indicted, including Trump’s campaign chairman (Paul Manafort), his deputy (Rick Gates), his first National Security Advisor (Michael Flynn), and a campaign foreign policy advisor (George Papadopolus). Flynn, Gates, and Papadopolus have all pled guilty and are cooperating with Mueller.

But there’s more, Trump’s own personal lawyer just had his office, his apartment, and the hotel where he was staying raided by FBI agents. We also now know that the FBI suspected another one of Trump’s main campaign foreign policy advisors, Carter Page, of being a Russian agent and even got a warrant to monitor him. And the warrant produced results good enough to renew that warrant three times.

While Trump rails against this being a partisan “WITCH HUNT,” this is an investigation started by a Repulican, overseen by a Republican, and run by a Republican.

President Trump has insisted that this investigation is some Democratic plot. Others have suggested that this is really about the Democratic Party trying to get rid of Trump or make excuses for their electoral defeat. But Democrats have no power in Washington. After Trump fired FBI Director James Comey last May, the Deputy Attorney General – a Republican who Trump himself appointed – decided to establish a Special Prosecutor to investigate whether there was collusion with Russia and appointed not a low level figure, but another former FBI Director – Robert Mueller, a Republican who was appointed by George W. Bush. While Trump rails against this being a partisan “WITCH HUNT,” this is in fact an investigation started by a Repulican, overseen by a Republican, and run by a Republican.

What has made this scandal so confusing is that we are watching an investigation unfold in real time. There is therefore a lot we do not know. The Mueller investigation has shocked Washington for the lack of leaks to the press. The press are uncovering information piece by piece by talking to defense lawyers and witnesses, and through great investigative reporting. So there is a lot of information coming out about different investigative threads that Mueller is looking into: Trump’s data digital firm, Cambridge Analytica; the Trump campaign’s coordination with WikiLeaks; Russians providing funding through to the National Rifle Agency; deals with sketchy UAE figures; and meetings with Russian officials in Trump Tower and places like the Seychelles. Therefore, figuring out where this scandal is headed requires reading some of the tea leaves and speculating. What has become clear, though, is that there is a tremendous amount to investigate. Trump was a shady businessman, operated a shady campaign, and looks like he’s operating an incredibly corrupt administration. The hard part for this investigation seems to be deciding what sketchy behavior not to investigate.

The Russia scandal has all the bearings of the greatest political scandal in American history.

The Russia scandal has all the bearings of the greatest political scandal in American history. It is unfolding in similar ways to the Nixon Watergate scandal, which enveloped the country for two years from 1972-74. There, a White House-directed effort to break into and bug the Democratic Party headquarters was exposed in 1972. But the question of what the White House knew and when it knew took two years to unfold.

Following Russia’s interference in the 2016 elections, America turned to Europe for guidance. Many in Europe wisely explained to Americans the nature of Russian interference – something that Europe has lived with for decades. Yet over the past year, America has done something that European countries haven’t done – it established a robust criminal investigation into the depth and breadth of Russian influence efforts and whether their efforts were abetted by Americans. The Russia investigation is exposing the depths of Russia’s efforts and the depravity of Donald Trump. Far from America losing its mind, this investigation attests the strength of America’s democratic institutions – where no one is above the law, even the President of the United States.

Max Bergman is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and Co-Founder and Director of The Moscow Project.

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Gottemoeller: “A demonstration that we stand together”

r.fehrenbach — Wed, 11 Apr 2018 14:15:10 +0000

Interview: Robin Fehrenbach

Part XIII of our series: Rose Gottemoeller regards the Alliance’s security guarantee for the Baltics and Poland as reliable. NATO Deputy Secretary General demands that Russia complies with its commitments to transparency of its military exercises in this region. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke Gottemoeller also stresses that the Alliance’s new command structure will be “robust, agile and fully fit for purpose”.

Mrs. Gottemoeller, Russia is trying to expand its spheres of influence. Especially the Baltics and Poland feel threatened by Russia’s aggressive behaviour. How reliable is NATO’s security guarantee in this European region?

In recent years, Russia has threatened and used military force against its neighbours. NATO has responded in a defensive and proportionate way. The response includes the four multinational battlegroups that are operational in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Our measures are strictly defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments. They aim at preventing conflict and preserving the peace.

Our measures are strictly defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

This is a clear demonstration that we stand together, and is the essence of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. But our deterrence and defence does not rely on four battlegroups alone. They are part of a broader posture that involves national home defence and other NATO forces. We have, for example, tripled the size of our multinational NATO Response Force to 40,000 troops – with a 5,000-strong spearhead force ready to deploy within 72 hours. We have also enhanced air patrols over the Baltic and Black Seas. Our defences are now stronger than at any point since the Cold War. That sends a clear signal.

Our policy towards Russia is consistent: strong defence and openness to dialogue. We are delivering on both tracks. While our practical cooperation with Russia has been suspended, we remain open to a periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue. We held six meetings of the NATO-Russia Council over the past two years, and are continuing to look for further opportunities.

There are regular reports about a gap of exercises between NATO and Russia. How severe is this problem in the perception within the alliance’s Headquarters?

[related]All nations have the right to exercise their armed forces; it is essential that in doing so they respect their commitments to transparency and predictability. Transparency has also been a priority for NATO in its discussions with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council, and it will remain a priority as we continue our dialogue with Russia. Exercises such as ZAPAD last year – together with the overall increase in Russian military activities – underline the need for close dialogue between NATO and Russia to avoid incidents and miscalculations.

Russia has regularly under-reported the size of its exercises to avoid mandatory observations by the OSCE. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has never opened an exercise for the mandatory observation outlined in the Vienna Document. We continue to urge Russia to be fully transparent about the scope of its exercises and to comply with the requirements of the Vienna Document. Allies are also making efforts within the OSCE to modernise the Vienna Document in order to close loopholes and ensure transparency of military exercises.

Russia has regularly under-reported the size of its exercises to avoid mandatory observations by the OSCE.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

As for what NATO does in this area, we ensure that all we do is defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments – including those outlined in the Vienna Document. Exercising is important to test our capabilities and make certain that we are fit for purpose and ready for the challenges we might face.

In May and June, NATO Allies will conduct a range of exercises in the Baltic Sea region – testing the ability of Allied forces to operate together. In the bigger picture, our measures strike the right balance between a greater military deterrence in the east and the ability to quickly send reinforcements. So, our approach remains firm, defensive and proportionate.

We will do what we believe is necessary to ensure that we are capable of defending our territories and populations. But I want to make clear that we do not want a Cold War, and we will not let ourselves be dragged into a new arms race. NATO remains determined to defend all Allies against any threat. We will maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent, as well as strong conventional forces. And we will continue to engage in a meaningful dialogue with Russia, to increase predictability and reduce risk.

We do not want a Cold War, and we will not let ourselves be dragged into a new arms race.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

NATO’s new command structure with additional headquarters aims to accomplish a better capability of deploying troops. Do you think the potential deterrence towards Russia deriving from this step goes far enough?

Our ability to deploy troops wherever they are needed is key to deterrence in peacetime and to our collective defence in times of crisis. This must go hand in hand with a NATO command structure that is robust, agile and fully fit for purpose. Last November, NATO Ministers agreed in principle on the outline for such an adapted NATO Command Structure, and in February of this year, Allies agreed the proposed design for the adapted command structure. We will discuss resources, timelines and locations at the next Meeting of Defence Ministers in June.

The new command structure will include a number of new elements. A Command for the Atlantic will help protect the sea lines of communication between Europe and North America. There will be a new Command to ensure the mobility of our forces within Europe. We also agreed on the need for a renewed focus throughout the command structure on logistics and movement, situational awareness, resilience and on cyber defence. I expect we will finalise all aspects of the adapted structure ahead of the Brussels Summit in July.

Since 2014 there has also been good progress in improving national legislation, removing many bureaucratic hurdles to allow us to move forces across Allied territory. This is important, but we still have work to do. We need to have enough transport capacity at our disposal, and we need to improve infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, railways, runways and ports.

This is not a job for NATO alone – it requires close coordination across national governments and with the private sector. The EU has an important role to play as well, so NATO and the EU will continue to work very closely on this vital issue.

Russia has supposedly violated the INF Treaty by having developed the ballistic missile SSC-8 that is expected to have a range of more than 500 kilometres. What role does this threat play in NATO’s strategic considerations?

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons that threatened Europe, and which were associated with the ability to launch attacks with little warning. We remain fully committed to the preservation of this historic arms control treaty. The INF Treaty is a crucial element of Euro-Atlantic security. Full compliance with the INF Treaty is essential.

The United States has determined that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty. US Defence Secretary Mattis updated Allies on this issue in November of last year. In December, Allies issued a statement calling on Russia to address these serious concerns in a substantial, transparent and verifiable way.

The United States has determined that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

Allies welcome the continued efforts by the United States to engage Russia to resolve concerns about Russia’s compliance with the Treaty.

The relationship between NATO and Russia is very strained since the annexation of Crimea. Which approach should NATO take in order to accomplish a convergence with the Kremlin?

We have seen a broad pattern of reckless behaviour by Russia over many years. This includes the illegal annexation of Crimea, the military support to separatists in Eastern Ukraine, and its military build-up from the North of Europe to the Middle East. Russia’s military presence in Moldova and Georgia is against the will of either of these countries’ governments. There have also been attempts to subvert democratic processes and institutions, and we have seen an increase in cyber attacks. In March, Allies expressed their deep concern about the nerve agent incident in Salisbury in the United Kingdom, the first use of a nerve agent on Alliance territory. Subsequently over two dozen countries expelled people who had been accredited as Russian diplomats from their countries. NATO’s Secretary General withdrew agreement for the appointment of seven individuals accredited to the Russian Mission to NATO and denied the pending accreditation of three others.

This is certainly a challenging time, but NATO’s policy remains unchanged. We have strengthened our deterrence and defence in response to Russia’s actions, while we remain open for a meaningful dialogue with Russia. We held six meetings of the NATO-Russia Council since 2016, and we are working to hold another. This dialogue is difficult – but it is vital to increase transparency and reduce risk. So, NATO’s approach to Russia combines strength and dialogue. And we are delivering on both fronts.

Michael O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, supports the hypothesis that the end of NATO’s eastward expansion and the implementation of a zone of neutral nations would reduce tensions with Russia. How do you assess this proposal?

Russia’s western borders have never been safer. NATO enlargement poses no threat to Russia. NATO’s Open Door policy is enshrined in the Washington Treaty and has helped spread stability and prosperity, just like the European Union’s enlargement. And Russia has benefitted from this stability and prosperity as well. Our door remains open to European nations able to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Russia’s western borders have never been safer. NATO enlargement poses no threat to Russia.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

Every country has the right ”to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance.” These principles are enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. All OSCE member states have signed up to these principles, including Russia.

NATO membership is not imposed on countries. All countries that have joined NATO have done so freely, and in accordance with their domestic democratic processes. To join NATO, countries are expected to adhere to the values of NATO, and to meet strict political, economic and military criteria. NATO Allies are keeping the progress of aspirant countries under close review. In any event, accession to NATO is for individual candidate countries and the Alliance to decide. No third country has the right to interfere in this process.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

NATO has kept the peace in Europe for almost seventy years. It is the most successful military Alliance in the world because we have been able to adapt. In an unpredictable world, we will continue to adapt to new challenges and continue to keep our nations and populations safe and secure.

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Steel Tariffs are a Distraction from Transatlantic Cooperation on China

r.fehrenbach — Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:04:56 +0000

By Peter S. Rashish

The White House’s decision on March 8^th to impose tariffs on imported steel and aluminum is not without precedent: President George W. Bush did something similar in 2002 when there was a surge in U.S. steel imports. What is different this time, however, is the trade law President Trump called on to justify his decision – the little-used section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act that authorizes the President to bar imports if they threaten U.S. national security.[related]

While in principle this move is compatible with international trade rules – the World Trade Organization allows its 164 members to invoke “essential security interests” to block trade – it is difficult to see how metals imports from a NATO ally like Germany could cause political or military harm to the United States. For that reason, it is far from clear that the U.S. decision would survive a challenge at the WTO dispute settlement body.

But would it be wise for the European Union (which negotiates trade on behalf of its 28 member states) to take that step and bring a case against the U.S.? The U.S. Administration has already exempted NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico from the tariffs, and there are signs that the U.S. is willing to consider exemptions for other countries if doing so would support U.S. national security. While it may be awkward for the EU to plead with the U.S. Administration, its case is an overwhelmingly convincing one and one worth making.

“The EU should bring to Washington’s attention the considerable overlapping agenda that the two transatlantic trading partners have when it comes to China.”

It is understandable that the EU is considering all options open to it – including not just a WTO case but also retaliatory sanctions targeted for maximum political effect. At least in the near term, however, when the exact contours of the U.S. 232 action remain in flux, the EU might be better advised to focus its political muscle elsewhere: bringing to Washington’s attention the considerable overlapping agenda that the two transatlantic trading partners have when it comes to China. Before the tariff decision intervened, finding common ground on Chinese trade policies was the intended focus of a March 10^th meeting in Brussels involving EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, and Japanese Trade Minister Hiroshige Seko.

What brings the U.S., Germany, and the EU together over unfair Chinese trade practices – not only its subsidies of steel and aluminum production but also issues like intellectual property, technology transfer, and foreign investment – is much greater than anything that divides them. The challenge from China is too big to handle alone, so it is in the German and European interest to strengthen transatlantic cooperation in this field. That means it is also in the U.S. interest to do so, even if the U.S. Administration may need a friendly reminder of that fact from its European partners.

Peter S. Rashish is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Geoeconomics Program at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS). He also serves as a Senior Advisor on transatlantic economic relations to Transnational Strategy Group and the European Policy Centre. Earlier he served as Vice President for Europe and Eurasia at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, where he spearheaded the Chamber’s advocacy for a comprehensive trade agreement between the U.S. and the EU.
»Link to Peter Rashish’s full biography

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“The EU is now motivated to take real action”

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 01 Mar 2018 16:59:53 +0000

Part XI of our series: Julie Smith supports the plans of a strong European Defense Union. The Senior Fellow and Head of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security underlines that NATO would benefit if these efforts among European militaries succeeded. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke in Washington, D.C. Smith also states the British contribution to European security policy after the Brexit can’t be evaluated yet.

Ms. Smith, there is an ongoing discussion whether the planned European Defense Union will compete with or complement the NATO alliance. How do you assess the developments in increased sovereignty in European security policy?

Personally, it is something that I support. America has had a very schizophrenic attitude towards European defense as it has been developing inside the European Union. When the idea first came forward in the late 1990s during the Clinton administration, the response from Washington was fairly negative because Americans were generally worried about two things: That it would succeed and serve as a counter to the NATO alliance and to US interests; or it would fail and ultimately weaken Europe’s position in the area of defense and military affairs, causing us to have a weaker partner consumed with process and institutions without building capacity.

[related]Since that time and since the chocolate summit, over the last 20 years Americans through the Bush administration, Obama administration and now Trump administration are coming to terms with the fact that this may at long last build real capacity on the other side of the Atlantic. If efforts inside the European Union succeed, among European militaries in particular, then that benefits the NATO alliance.

Can you find people in this town who don’t want to see the EU do this?

Yes, you can. But they are fewer in number. And you can even find people in uniform who understand that for some countries it is politically easier to pursue defense initiatives inside an EU framework versus a NATO framework. The EU is now motivated to take real action and that could lead to a European Union that is doing more in the world in the area of foreign and defense policy. The path on this side of the Atlantic has been positive in terms of us appreciating what the EU is trying to do and understanding that these initiatives may ultimately benefit the transatlantic alliance.

Are the EU member states acting in a smart way as they build up the Defense Union and decrease independence on the US, for example through PESCO, rather than fully concentrating on NATO’s European pillar?

We are talking about one set of forces. Take any country in Europe and think about its military and the work that needs to be done to ensure that those militaries are capable, equipped, well trained, and exercising with US allies. Anything that can help strengthen the capacity of these military forces is a good thing. You will find some people who are skeptical that this is going to lead to anything significant based on the history of the last 20 years. But the majority of folks here in Washington is willing to sit back and see what actually transpires. What we see right now is that real resources are being poured into these initiatives and European capabilities.

Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, stated that the European Defense Union should be fully established by 2025. Is this realistic?

No. Based on what we have witnessed in the past regarding European attempts to strengthen their defense capabilities and strategy, I find that to be a very ambitious target. I hope I am wrong. I would love to see changes take place in less than ten years but in my experience in observing developments inside Brussels, it is going to take longer than that. But again, ultimately this is a good thing, and something that Europe should pursue. I hope it will make our partnership stronger, not weaker.

For the officials in the Trump administration, they may have some wrinkled brows trying to understand what is happening here and what the motivation is. But if Europe can make the case that this will make us stronger as partners and help Europe take on more of the burden of managing the global security environment, certainly that is something that the Trump administration would applaud.

There is remarkable cooperation between NATO and the EU in progress: for example, the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. Are the two organizations on a successful path in rising to this complex challenge?

The EU-NATO relationship is something that many of us have been watching for a long time. All of us have been collectively frustrated by the lack of progress in enhancing it. But what has transpired now is really interesting and shows progress for the first time in a long time, though we should not overstate that. Right now, there is a lot of sharing in an unclassified environment. I would like to see more of it in a classified setting. That appears to be a bridge too far at the moment. But it is an important first step.

Regarding military spending efficiency, EU states are performing poorly in both NATO and the EU. How would you improve the situation?

Americans tend to get fixated on the goal that European militaries should spend two per cent of their GDP on defense. That is the line that you have heard coming from Washington for the better part of three or four decades through past administrations. What we talk less about is the way in which countries allocate that spending across several different priority areas. It is not enough for a country to spend two or three per cent. We have allies who are doing that. For example, the Greeks and the Turks spend a lot of money on defense.

It is not enough for a country to spend two to three percent of its GDP on defense. [quoter]Julianne Smith[/quoter]

But you have to look at how they are actually allocating and spending those resources. If you look at the numbers closely you don’t see the allocation required to make those countries be the most effective contributors to NATO security. We have countries that spend an enormous amount of money on defense, maybe a little under two per cent. But they spend about 70 per cent of those resources on personnel costs. That is not what you want to see. I understand this is due to pensions. But over time you want to see countries spending a much larger percentage on research and development and acquisition. NATO has set some modest targets in that regard. But it needs to do more particularly now that countries are going to start spending more. The needle is moving. What the Trump administration has been able to get passed is the message that you need to spend more. The next question is how should we spend these resources collectively and individually. We need an overarching strategy on where we want to prioritize, particularly R&D and acquisition.

Can you give an example?

Denmark has been told over the last 20 years that the focus is on expeditionary forces. You need to get your air and ground forces to far away places. That was true when we were deep in the Afghanistan mission and looking at expeditionary operations as the future of the alliance. But now that we are also tracking Russian activities in places like the Baltic sea or the North Atlantic or even the Black Sea, a country like Denmark is asking itself: ‘Should we now allocate more resources towards ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare), should we be doing mine clearance in the waters off of Denmark, should we develop another expeditionary brigade?’ Where are they expected to get guidance like that? Should they turn to NATO defense planners? Should they ask the European Union? I am sure the Danes would say no to that. Should they look for a signal from Washington where the priorities are? These are the questions we face now.

We don’t have a broader strategy about the priorities for this alliance. [quoter]Julianne Smith[/quoter]

What do you suggest?

It is not just enough to spend more. It is about spending wisely, contributing to a broader strategy. We don’t have a broader strategy about the priorities for this alliance. We seem to be signaling that every NATO member should do everything. So, we say
‘28 for 28’ or ‘360 NATO’. Those are nice slogans, but the reality is we might need more of a regional strategy. For a country like Denmark maybe its priority really is just the North Alliance at this point and less expeditionary forces.

The Framework Nation Concept implements European clusters of capabilities into NATO’s processes of planning, procurement and operations. Should NATO focus more on this concept in the future?

Yes, this is exactly what the alliance needs at this point. The Framework Nation Concept is a good model. It is not applicable in all cases but it allows groups of countries to advance a regional set of priorities together, to lift each other up in their neighborhood and to work more closely together. It forces them to talk about their strategic goals and threat receptions. Then they pool resources, train and exercise together. It is a very pragmatic approach to today’s security environment. Clearly, a country like Portugal can’t do it all. Putting Portugal inside the Framework Nation Concept works nicely for a small country that has a set pool of assets and needs to talk to its neighbors about how to best apply those assets. It is wise and has already proven to be effective and could help us more in the future.

What will be Great Britain’s contribution to European security policy after Brexit?

This is the 64,000 dollar question. We are all asking ourselves this. Many people on this side of the Atlantic are curious about where our bilateral relationship with the United Kingdom will go. We are also very curious about the role the UK will play inside the EU on security and defense. Our friends from London come over regularly and talk to us about enhancing the UK-US relationship, playing a stronger role inside the NATO alliance and continuing to be a contributor to European security.

One could imagine a situation where a Brexit leads to a real financial strain on London. The first place to look for savings is often in the area of defense.[quoter]Julianne Smith[/quoter]

What are your concerns?

Those announcements and speeches are met with some skepticism on this side of the Atlantic. One could imagine a situation where a Brexit leads to a real financial strain on London. The first place to look for savings is often in the area of defense. And while all of the decisions being taken right now, the policies that are being pursued, the new initiatives that are being launched seem very wise and are welcome here in Washington, we are just wondering if this will be the same picture that we will be seeing in three to five years. We really won’t have the answer to some of the questions until we push through Brexit and understand what the UK’s relationship with the EU is going to look like. There are still so many ongoing debates in London about a hard exit versus a soft exit. There are people inside Theresa May’s administration who have different views on the future of their country’s relationship with the European Union.

What role will NATO play in transatlantic security policy a decade from now?

I hope it will continue to play the same role it has played for seventy plus years. NATO has been first and foremost an important political forum where the top leaders from Europe, the United States and Canada come together to talk about today’s security environment. It is an important symbolic alliance in practice. It is a very effective military alliance. It has not had to invoke article 5 more than once in its history. It has shown the ability to reform itself. We have been through several iterations of NATO’s lifespan with the Cold War mission, the Balkans mission, the post 9/11 mission and now returning to the core mission of collective security in the face of Russian aggression. I don’t know what future chapters will hold for the alliance but if nothing else, NATO has shown the ability to innovate, reform, change, make new investments and carry on irrespective of any challenges it might face including public skepticism and a US administration that at best has mixed views about the alliance.

Julianne (“Julie”) Smith is Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.
»Link to Julianne Smith’s full biography at CNAS

Interview: Robin Fehrenbach

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“The Transatlantic Alliance Post Brexit”

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 01 Mar 2018 16:10:53 +0000

Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who served as the UK Defence Secretary between 1992-1995 and as Foreign Secretary between 1995–1997, joined Atlantik-Brücke in Berlin for a discussion on “The Transatlantic Alliance Post Brexit”. Sir Malcolm shared his insights on defense spending, the West’s stance towards Russia and China, and the future of the European Union.

Here are Sir Malcolm’s five key takeaways:

1. „There is no isolationist trend in the UK, and no one wants to lose the internationalism which has been part of our [UK] thinking for the last 200 years.“

2. „If the EU fails, the person who will be most delighted is Putin. The Chinese simply don’t pay as much attention. But don’t forget: for 18 of the last 20 centuries, China has had the largest economy in the world.“

3. „What causes me most concern is the possible fragmentation of the European Union.“

4. „The UK referendum result was an accident waiting to happen.“

5. „One of the EU’s biggest issues is how it will reconcile enlarged integration with the democratic deficit.“

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Nye: “Nastiness can be more effective than soft power”

r.fehrenbach — Thu, 15 Feb 2018 09:19:35 +0000

Part X of our series: Joseph Nye regards President Trump’s handling of NATO as forceful. Moreover, the Professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University detects that Trump has adapted to foreign policy traditions more than he expected. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke Nye points out nevertheless that the alliance is simultaneously affected by isolationist tendencies of the current U.S. government.

Professor Nye, in your book “Is the American Century Over?”, written in 2015, you express the expectation that the United States will still be playing a leading geopolitical role in 2041. Have you changed your position after one year of the Trump presidency?

Certainly, Donald Trump has put some doubts in the back of my mind. It is possible that he could derail these predictions. The Americans will generally still have the capacity to play a leading geopolitical role, but I am not sure if they are going to have the will. In the 1930s Americans drew inward, even though they were the strongest country in the world. This led to a terrible decade.

Is it perhaps too early to say after one year?

Trump has drawn upon a strand of populist nationalism which is common now in all countries in the developed world. It is, however, not dominant. If you look at public opinion polls, the majority of Americans still want overseas involvement including cooperation with other countries. But the strand that Trump has called upon is there. Even if Trump goes away, which I hope he will after four years, Trumpism or populist nationalism will persist. So, there is a certain danger that we face. We have to be careful to not just pin it on Trump’s difficult personality.

Trump has drawn upon a strand of populist nationalism which is common now in all countries in the developed world.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

You invented the term “soft power” describing the ability to attract and persuade. Did the United States become less or more attractive under Trump’s presidency?

[related]The evidence is very clear. I wrote a column for Project Syndicate saying that Trump has definitely reduced American soft power. There is a Gallup poll that shows that American attractiveness has gone down in more than 130 countries. There is a similar poll that was taken by Pew with results that were very much like those of the Gallup poll. Finally, there is an index of the soft power called the Soft Power 30 which is published in London by Portland, the British consultancy. The Americans dropped from first place in the last year of Obama to third place in the first year of Trump. That is not just a political statement or bias. There is evidence to substantiate that view.

What can be done to alter this course?

It is going to be difficult for President Trump because he tends to a bullying and unilateralist style which antagonizes others. If you use a phrase like ‘America first’ all the time, by definition this means that everybody else is second. That is not exactly the way to attract others. With that being said, however, let us note that Trump is able to make changes in his policy. Before he was elected he said NATO was obsolete. After a few months in office he discovered NATO was not obsolete. There are a lot of areas where he has initially challenged the traditions of American foreign policy but has come around to embrace those traditions. If you combine that with a resurgence in the economy, which he expects to get through his fiscal stimulus, and if that does not go off the rails into inflation, Trump can recover some of the American soft power. But he has to change his style to be able to fully recover.

If you use a phrase like ‘America first’ all the time, by definition this means that everybody else is second. That is not exactly the way to attract others.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

Which role will the United States be playing especially within NATO in 20 years’ time?

Probably since the 1950s, since the Suez Crisis, there have been articles and predictions about the death of NATO. That is now obsolete. NATO has proven a far more resilient concept and structure because of two reasons: One is the relatively open organization for democratic societies which enables them to interact with each other, more than just at the top level. The second point is that geopolitically, Russia still is a problem or a puzzle. If Russia remains that sort of a puzzle then NATO will not be obsolete. I am leery of these views that say NATO is finished.

And what will the role of the Unites States within NATO look like?

The United States will continue to seek its interests as it has since 1945 in being closely tied to an open and democratic Europe. That requires NATO and American participation in NATO.

Trump’s “America first” strategy seems to foster American protectionism. Does this affect NATO’s strength and the United States’ long-known aspiration to shape the liberal world order?

It does. The attitude which Trump and some of his close advisors have taken, that a trade surplus is a measure of moral failure, is simply not good economics. The basic view of most regular economists is that your trade surplus and deficit has more to do with your savings and investing rates. As Trump has pressed this issue that trade surpluses are rogue and demanded renegotiation, it does spill over into other aspects of alliances. Look at the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement or at the problems that Trump has had with his visits with Chancellor Merkel. This is a real problem.

Trump urges the Europeans to invest more in their military abilities. Is he right?

Asking the Europeans to do more to contribute to common defense has a long, long history. The 2-percent-target goes back many years. But because of his bluster and style Trump may be more credible than Obama on that.

Does he have more credibility by being more forceful in that matter?

Sometimes nastiness as a hard power is more effective than soft power.

Do you think the United States would ultimately appreciate a stronger European commitment within NATO?

The US has been interested in a stronger European military for some time, well before Donald Trump. There was a period when I was in the Defense Department in the 1990s when there were certain fears that France was trying to lead Europe out of NATO or reduce the American role in the alliance. That is ancient history. The view for a decade and more has been that a stronger Europe inside NATO is better for the United States. That is actually a pretty widely shared view among those people in the United States who pay attention to foreign policy.

What are the main and most urgent strategic challenges for NATO?

The issue of the return of great power politics and the issue of how Russia will behave will require a combination both of deterrence and also a way to think about retaining the democratic processes in Eastern and Central Europe. Both challenges are going to be central to NATO. I don’t expect countries like Poland or Hungary to defect to Russia. That is not plausible. But the quality of democracy in some of these former Visegrád countries has been under challenge from this same type of right-wing populist nationalism which has affected the United States. In addition to having a strong deterrent posture to prevent Russia from using its strength to bully its neighbors and expand, both NATO and the European Union have to think about the internal quality of democracy.

The issue of the return of great power politics and the issue of how Russia will behave will require a combination both of deterrence and also a way to think about retaining the democratic processes in Eastern and Central Europe.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

Are you less optimistic than 20 years ago that there will ever be a world in which Russia does not see NATO, the United States and Europe as competitors or even enemies?

20 years ago, we believed there was a profound change going on in terms of democratization and liberalization of Russia. That has been reversed. Part of it may have been mistakes made by the West. The Bush administration’s efforts to expand NATO membership right to the borders of Russia in Georgia and so forth were not appropriate in terms of reassurance for the Russians. But it is also true that some of the changes that occurred inside Russia have to do with problems in Russian society and economy which were not caused by NATO expansion.

But this serves as a good explanation for Russia blaming NATO for its domestic difficulties …

That is right. If one looks back at Putin’s policies and especially his Munich Security Conference speech in 2007, you can see this kind of blaming. The views that we had in the 1990s, when Yeltsin was in power and we used the NATO-Russia Council as a way to integrate Russia into NATO were overly optimistic. But if you take a long-run view we certainly should be hoping that changes inside Russia will allow a Europe that includes Russia again. But I don’t expect that in the near term, unfortunately.

When Obama was president one could get the impression that the relationship with Russia was not at the top of his agenda. Could that change with Donald Trump?

Ironically, one of the things that Trump got right in foreign policy was to think of ways to try to reduce the tensions with Russia and to improve the relationship. It is not that one has to accept Russian behavior. But it is true that Russia is a great power. We have to do business with them. To sharpen antagonism is not healthy for Russia, for Europe and the United States. In that sense, Trump’s insight might have been better even if his motives were somewhat unclear. Putin and the Russian intelligence overachieved in their efforts to interfere in the 2016 election and they have made rapprochement with Russia so radioactive inside American politics that not even Trump can do anything about it.

Putin and the Russian intelligence overachieved in their efforts to interfere in the 2016 election and they have made rapprochement with Russia so radioactive inside American politics that not even Trump can do anything about it.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

The Munich Security Conference 2018 will focus in particular on the future role of the European Union as a global actor and its relations with Russia as well as the United States. What is your opinion on the EU’s future role?

The EU plays a very important role. I have always thought of the EU as a magnet which should draw others towards an open, rules-based society both domestically and internationally. On the other hand, there is a historical danger of Central Europeans like Germany being drawn too much into the Russian orbit. The effort is to build bridges – but sometimes in the effort to build bridges they may go too far. The key question for Europe is whether it is careful enough not to be played by Putin in order to divide the United States from Europe. It is interesting to me that the sanctions were applied to show that a country cannot steal its neighbor’s territory without paying a price. Those sanctions applied after the annexation of Crimea have maintained an important role and the West is not divided on that so far.

Do you think the sanctions should stay for the near future?

Yes. Until you see changes in Russian behavior. One could imagine steps that might be taken to reduce Russian interference in Luhansk and Donbass for example which could lead to some degree of relaxation of sanctions in a step-by-step process. A total removal of sanctions right now would be a mistake.

There is much more movement within the European Union than in the United States. Some countries are in favor of lifting the sanctions …

Correct. Italy and other countries like the former Visegrád countries would like to see more rapid progress than is healthy. What is interesting to see is that the transatlantic relationship has survived these temptations.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

NATO provides a security blanket in the sense of reassurance. Despite of different national interests and different political pressures which tend to pull states in different directions there is an overarching security framework which helps states to avoid rash or desperate types of actions. NATO in that sense is a complement to the EU. But the heart of the future of Europe is obviously to find ways to continue the process that has begun under the rubric of the European Union. That does not mean a federation. The political and public opinion do not back this kind of system right now.

NATO and the EU are complementary, like hard and soft power.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

NATO and the EU are complementary, like hard and soft power. The danger is that the Trump administration disrupts this larger picture. So far – and it is only a little over a year into his presidency – he has adapted more than I expected and has not broken that basic consensus in the Atlantic area. I don’t want to sound like somebody who is a Trump supporter because it is very clear that I am not. But it is important that we keep what he is doing in some degree of perspective. So far he has not broken the basic hard power framework which underlies a smart power policy.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. was interviewed by Juliane Schäuble, head of the politics department at the Berlin daily paper Der Tagesspiegel.

Listen to the Transatlantic Call:

https://www.atlantik-bruecke.org/app/uploads/Transatlantic-Call_Nye-Schäuble.mp3

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O’Hanlon: “The goal is to normalize relations with Russia”

r.fehrenbach — Wed, 31 Jan 2018 11:37:53 +0000

Interview: David Deißner

Part IX of our series: Michael O’Hanlon demands that NATO’s eastward expansion must come to an end. The Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and author of the book “Beyond NATO” suggests an alternative security architecture in Europe. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke he insists that neutral countries should have every option to join any other organization.

O’Hanlon’s main assumptions at a glance:

1. NATO’s eastward expansion has gone far enough
2. Negotiations of Western nations with potentially neutral countries in eastern Europe would reduce the risk of war with Russia
3. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova
4. The neutral countries could join the European Union in the future
5. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination

Dr. O’Hanlon, in your book “Beyond NATO” you outline the hypothesis that the end of NATO’s eastward expansion and the implementation of a “zone of neutral nations” would reduce tensions with Russia. Do you see any signs in the actual political landscape for this approach to be seriously considered?

I am not going to be so audacious as to say that this strategy is being followed now. But it has a chance. Let me add two points. First, I am not the original proponent of this kind of thinking. This architecture is mine. But the basic notion that we have to think differently about the East than we would think about other parts of Europe has a number of other adherents. Henry Kissinger is one, the late Zbigniew Brzezinski another, perhaps even chancellor Merkel. We know that going back to the 2008 NATO summit, president Bush and secretary Condoleezza Rice wanted to expand NATO and give both the Ukraine and Georgia membership action plans to join within a short time. Many Europeans held them back. We already saw foreshadowing of this thinking with European reluctance to go that far.

What is your second point?

I would not propose this architecture simply as a gift to Russia or as a unilateral concession on our part not to expand NATO further. Because for one thing we would be leaving Ukraine and Georgia in the lurch, since we did promise them eventual membership. Secondly, if we conceded this Eastern area as a non NATO zone without making any other efforts to define a new architecture this could almost seem like Jalta II where we are giving Russia its own sphere of influence suggesting, that it should have domineering powers over other countries. I don’t want to propose that.

If we conceded this Eastern area as a non NATO zone without making any other efforts to define a new architecture this could almost seem like Jalta II where we are giving Russia its own sphere of influence suggesting, that it should have domineering powers over other countries.[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

What is at the core of your proposed new security architecture?

[related]The concept combines neutrality with an insistence that these countries have every option to join any other organization that might be open to them. Obviously they are not yet candidates for EU membership. If the European Union ever wanted to include Ukraine and Georgia, Russia would have to say: ‘That is okay.’ Russia also needs to solve Donbass, South Ossetia, and Abchasia, in other words the territorial disputes with Ukraine and Georgia. All these things need to be wrapped together. Or you can’t call it an architecture. If we agree on all of this, here is the additional sweetener for Russia: EU sanctions can be lifted as well, because the idea is that we will actually have created a new path forward. The goal is to normalize the relations with Russia.

In order to call it a strategy something has to happen in return, correct?

Exactly right. It has to be seen as an agreement that requires Moscow to do some things, too. That is fair and even favorable to the neutral countries themselves. I will acknowledge that most of the emails that I have received from the neutral countries since I have published this work have not been that favorable. They see this as an abandonment. I try to argue that this is not an abandonment. Because in fact right now they are being promised something that they will probably never get. I don’t see any realistic movement towards NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia or other former Soviet republics. We have left them out on a limb, exposed and with no protection. My plan is better for those neutral countries. But it will only be better for them if every other prerogative of normal sovereignty is protected.

I don’t see any realistic movement towards NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia or other former Soviet republics. We have left them out on a limb, exposed and with no protection.[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

You believe that NATO’s expansion has gone far enough. Do you thereby call into question that several countries in eastern Europe have decided independently and in a self-determined way to join NATO after the end of the cold war?

This is a very difficult and delicate question. I admit I walk a very fine line. I do not believe the West can go into a negotiation for a new security architecture without any kind of apology to Moscow. I do not try to relitigate previous rounds of NATO expansion except to try to understand how Putin and Russia have gotten to where they are mentally and strategically.

NATO expansion was offered to independent countries that had often been under the Soviet yoke for a long time. Countries that the West helped consolidate their democracies, for example with civilian control of the military, and stability of borders. That was good. That all expanded the zone of peace in Europe and helped a number of these countries make remarkable progress. If you compare Poland to Ukraine today for example, they started out in the post cold war era more or less identical in size, population and GDP. Today, Poland despite its recent problems with governance is three times as wealthy as Ukraine.

Also, NATO worked very hard to reach out to Russia throughout this period creating the NATO-Russia Council and the partnership for peace. Moreover, NATO promised not to station major combat forces east of where they had been located previously. We generally kept to that promise. Now we are slightly modifying that approach but Russia gave us no choice because of the threat they have been posing to the East.

What does your analysis mean for potential future NATO member states?

People sometimes quote the Helsinki final act of 1975 which says that any state should be able to join any organization it wishes. They will say: ‘Doesn’t that mean that Moldova should be able to join NATO if it wants?’ I have three replies to that. First, the 1975 Helsinki final act was a long time ago. It did not really envision the cold war ending with one of the alliances resolving and the other going strong and expanding.

Second, the 1949 Washington Treaty that created NATO explicitly said in Article 10 that membership could be offered to other countries provided that it was seen to be in the interest of the security and strategic stability of the existing members and of Europe in general. It was not an open-ended blank check that anybody who wants in can be immediately assumed to be eligible.

My third argument is a little bit more crass. This almost sounds like Donald Trump. From our perspective one could ask: ‘Why are you assuming that I want to send my daughters to fight and die in the defense of your country?’ If I were an American diplomat I would not say that. But frankly, it reminds people of the stakes. NATO is a mutual defense organization in which the member states are sworn to each other’s protection. The United States has always taken that very seriously. We are the country that would probably bear the largest burden in terms of deployable combat forces apart from any country that has been attacked. We are entitled to ask: ‘Would it be good for us?’

Your core concept centres around a security architecture of permanent neutrality. In the best case, it would include from north to south Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus and Serbia. Are these states willing to stay neutral forever?

First of all, we can’t prevent them nor should we try to prevent them from joining other security organizations or creating new ones. If the Caucasus countries wanted to create a Caucasus security organization that would help them feel like they were part of a common body, prepare for peace keeping missions overseas, handle counter-terrorism locally through coordination, and resolve their own territorial disputes, that might be good. I do not try to rule that out. But NATO should not offer membership to these countries.

If the Caucasus countries wanted to create a Caucasus security organization that would help them feel like they were part of a common body, prepare for peace keeping missions overseas, handle counter-terrorism locally through coordination, and resolve their own territorial disputes, that might be good.[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

How could the neutral countries be integrated into the EU security architecture?

If these countries do join the EU there needs to be some care about the mutual defense provisions of the European Union Treaty which sound almost like the Article 5 provisions of the NATO Treaty. Maybe, those EU security provisions need to be either deleted or clarified for a new member. This would not mean that the entire EU would deploy forces as an entity to the defense of Moldova for example. Because that would violate the spirit of what I am proposing. The main idea is that NATO countries are no longer going to extend their Article 5 protections further east.

It would take huge diplomatic efforts to establish such a neutral zone in eastern Europe. You suggest the following steps: first, setting a new framework within NATO. Second, deliberation with the potentially neutral countries and, third, formal negotiations with Russia. How big is the risk that the Kremlin would perceive this kind of procedure as Western dominance once again?

Since we have the honor of sitting at Atlantik-Brücke’s office right next to the chancellor’s apartment: If someone like her with a greater diplomatic skill and experience than myself liked the main idea, but wanted to pursue it in a somewhat different way, I would be okay with that. I am not insisting that the exact sequence of what I am proposing is imperative. But the NATO members are sworn to each other’s defense. We have agreed that in security terms there is no daylight between us. Therefore, it makes sense to begin any discussion about NATO’s future within the alliance.

Then you have the question: Do we go over the heads of the neutral countries and talk to Moscow or do we involve these countries first? I am not in favor of NATO membership for Ukraine. Period. However, I am sensitive to the fact that Ukrainians are a proud and sovereign people. They deserve protection and safety. They gave up nuclear weapons after the cold war as we asked them to do. We had a promise that we would watch over their security. Arguably, we have failed in that. Rather than just go over Ukraine’s head and start talking to Vladimir Putin about how to divide up the world which is how this would be portrayed if we didn’t allow the neutral states to discuss this with us first, we have to go to them. This cannot be seen as Jalta II. It does not mean we have to keep Putin in the dark. I will send him a copy of my book, and maybe Donald Trump and chancellor Merkel could inscribe it and say: ‘Vladimir, we are trying to do something like this. We look forward to your reactions once we are a little more organized internally.’

It does not mean we have to keep Putin in the dark. I will send him a copy of my book, and maybe Donald Trump and chancellor Merkel could inscribe it and say: ‘Vladimir, we are trying to do something like this. We look forward to your reactions once we are a little more organized internally.’[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

You argue that it is required that Russia commits to help uphold the security of especially Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. This means, Russia would have to withdraw its troops. For years now there is no indication at all that Russia would agree to such a step. How realistic is this option?

Let me start with the hardest problem: Crimea. Russia will not give Crimea back. And we should not make the entire idea for a new security architecture contingent on Russia giving Crimea back. The way I would finesse that is that we should tell Russia we are not going to recognize the annexation of Crimea but otherwise put the issue aside.

Secondly, in regard to Moldova and the Transnistria region I don’t have a strong view on that question. The Moldovans there may welcome or be willing to tolerate the presence of Russian troops. This issue should be solved through a legitimate mutual agreement between Moldova and Russia that is ratified by the Moldovan parliament.

What does your assessment for eastern Ukraine and Georgia look like?

I know for a fact that Ukraine and Georgia don’t accept Russian troops. Russia is going to have to withdraw its troops. Maybe there could be international peacekeepers or a creation of a temporary buffer zone. We need to establish a credible monitoring body like the OSCE which is already in the Ukraine. Then at some point, maybe give a six month grace period, Russia will have had the opportunity to make enough adjustments to its presence in eastern Ukraine that the OSCE can certify that there is no longer a Russian military presence.

Certainly, in northern Georgia you could argue that there is a Russian speaking population so that autonomy in some kind of concept could be explored. We know that the Minsk II process for Ukraine would envision political autonomy for eastern Ukraine. There are ways for Russia to get an agreement where it can say that it is partially protecting the Russian speakers in those two countries. What is hardest to describe is the resolution of the territorial problems with eastern Ukraine and northern Georgia. Those would take some negotiation. However, we already know the geographic contours of the disputed areas and we know the kinds of autonomy that could realistically be provided.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years‘ time?

NATO is a fantastic organization. I want NATO to stay strong and the European Reassurance Initiative and Operation Atlantic Resolve to continue. We need to clarify to Vladimir Putin that the alliance is fully committed to all 29 member states and that there are no degrees of seriousness, no different categories of which member is truly worthy of Article 5 protection. Everybody is! Any other position would be an invitation to Russian mischief, even more than we are seeing already. I very much want NATO to continue as an Article 5 based, territorial and mutual defense organization for Europe and North America. It has accomplished that goal remarkably. That is by far and away its most important purpose. Even though I am a supporter of the mission in Afghanistan, NATO’s ability to do something like that is far less important than NATO’s ability to vouch for the security of its member states.

We need to clarify to Vladimir Putin that the alliance is fully committed to all 29 member states and that there are no degrees of seriousness, no different categories of which member is truly worthy of Article 5 protection. Everybody is![quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

Let me also add that I admire the European Union. Right now, the deterrence of Russia that we are accomplishing by making sure the Russians don’t come even further into Ukraine for example is largely because of EU sanctions and their ability to deprive Russia of the richest market on earth. This economic power is just as influential in shaping Vladimir Putin’s decision making as anything we are doing within the alliance. Hence, NATO needs to stay closely coupled with the EU. We need the EU to be strong to complement NATO and work together to create this overall western foreign policy of military and economic deterrence which is keeping Putin from doing any more damage than he has already done.

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President Trump: One Year Later

atlantikbruecke — Thu, 18 Jan 2018 15:54:55 +0000

By Eric Ham

U.S. President Donald Trump’s improbable rise to the White House caught many by surprise. Outspent and out-staffed, his unexpected victory over former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, had Washington reeling. Still, since taking the oath of office, his Administration has been anything but smooth. Stunning setbacks, crippling defeats, and perennial controversies have marked his one-year in office. Yet through it all, the former real-estate tycoon and reality television star continues to reshape Washington and the geo-political landscape issue-by-issue; challenge-by-challenge; crisis-by-crisis.

[related]Despite a less-than-stellar record of legislative accomplishments, undoubtedly the Trump Administration will point to a plethora of achievements since winning the highest office in the land. A record-setting and record-breaking stock market; more judicial appointments, including the appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the U.S. Supreme Court, than any American president in recent history; the roll-back of several Barack Obama-era regulations ranging from environmental protections to criminal justice reform. President Trump’s “Make America Great Again” is becoming the new reality and Americans are not the only ones being impacted by these seismic shifts.

On his first visit to Brussels for the NATO Summit, the mercurial White House occupant unnerved some with his heated calls for more members to meet their financial obligations to the historic multilateral organization. Moreover, stalwart U.S. alliances are now frayed and hanging in the balance amid the president’s continued support of incendiary and racist propaganda. Already U.K. and German leadership have voiced strong denunciations of actions taken by President Trump. A stark contrast to the reception granted to Obama during his tenure. Yet, while some relationships have become strained, others have been strengthened. Once icy relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia under the Obama Administration have thawed and these Middle Eastern nations are enjoying a robust revival in the Trump era.

While some relationships have become strained, others have been strengthened.

The toughest and most demanding job in the land is challenging for even the most seasoned of politicians. Former President Lyndon B. Johnson, who was a master of the Senate, grew weary and broken from a failed Vietnam policy and decided not to run for re-election. His successor, Richard Nixon resigned in disgrace to avoid impeachment after the Watergate break-in. Debilitating foreign and domestic setbacks led to a surprise challenge from within his own party for Democratic President Jimmy Carter.

Now, Trump, the political neophyte has been beset by a cavalcade of crises as he grapples with the limits to his presidential powers. As the Chairman and CEO of the Trump Organization, a private company, his decision is final. But, the U.S. government does not work that way. Even the president has to answer to the U.S. Constitution and the norms and customs governing bureaucratic institutions. No doubt the enormous breadth and depth of the presidency is humbling and overwhelming, especially when compared with the operation he’s led for decades.

The verdict is still out on the Trump presidency.

The verdict is still out on the Trump presidency. Even by the most diplomatic standards, his first year in office has been an unmitigated disaster—much of his own making. Indictments; guilty pleas; unheard of turn-over in the Executive Branch; and mounting losses have left the Trump Administration demoralized and deflated. Many political observers and historians are doubtful of his ability to orchestrate a vast turnaround, lift his presidency, and personally rise to the ideals of the Oval Office as immortalized by the framers of the constitution. Russian collusion, claims of racism, and nuclear war are just a few of the very real threats plaguing this Administration. As President Trump moves into his second year, the world is watching and waiting for American leadership’s re-emergence.

The world cheered when America (under Obama) restored its stature on the world stage: from ending the Iraq War to saving the U.S. economy from the greatest collapse since the Great Depression, to re-establishing relations with foreign states such as Iran and Cuba. But now, it appears America is absent.

Under Trump, the U.S. positions on climate change; global trade; Jerusalem, Iran and more have the U.S. standing alone. In the past where America moved, the world followed. Now, not so much.

“Making America Great Again” was a great campaign slogan, but as president that greatness can only be achieved when reaching upward not stooping low.

Eric Ham (Atlantik-Brücke Young Leader 2011), is co-author of the bestseller THE GOP CIVIL WAR: Inside the Battle for the Soul of the Republican Party.

Der Beitrag President Trump: One Year Later erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Hooker: “‘America first’ does not mean ‘America alone’”

r.fehrenbach — Mon, 08 Jan 2018 15:35:57 +0000

Interview: Robin Fehrenbach

Part VI of our series: Richard D. Hooker Jr. says the American commitment to NATO is ironclad, based on fair burden sharing. The Special Assistant to President Trump and Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs in the National Security Council outlines the U.S. strategy for the alliance. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke Hooker emphasizes the importance of “maintaining peace throughout the North Atlantic Treaty Area.”

Mr. Hooker, which strategy for NATO does the United States under the administration of President Trump seek to develop?

The US seeks to advance and strengthen a cohesive alliance in the interest of maintaining peace throughout the North Atlantic Treaty Area.

How steadfast is the U.S. government’s commitment to article 5?

In president Trump’s words, our commitment is ironclad, based on the principle of reciprocity and fair burden sharing.

North Korea has threatened to attack the island of Guam which belongs to the territory of the United States. Would such an event invoke NATO’s mutual defense clause?

This would be a question for the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to decide. We are confident that any attack on the United States and its territories would be met with an appropriate response.

President Trump’s “America first” strategy seems to create American protectionism in a broad range of policy fields. To what degree does this affect NATO’s strength and the United States’ long-known requirement to shape the liberal world order?

‘America first’ does not mean ‘America alone,’, nor does it equate to protectionism, but to fair trade practices that do not disadvantage American workers and to a foreign and security policy centered on American interests. This administration believes in NATO, and is committed to retaining, defending, and strengthening NATO as the bedrock of our own national security, and of Europe’s.

This administration believes in NATO, and is committed to retaining, defending, and strengthening NATO as the bedrock of our own national security, and of Europe’s.[quoter]Richard Hooker[/quoter]

Russia is trying to expend its spheres of influence. Especially the Baltics and Poland feel threatened by Russia’s aggressive behavior. How reliable is NATO’s security guarantee in this European region?

Our commitment to article 5 is ironclad. The large sums being spent on the European Deterrence Initiative are indicative of this commitment, as are U.S. participation in EFP (Enhanced Forward Presence), increasing amounts of prepositioned equipment and the U.S. rotational armored brigade combat team in Poland.

The crisis in Ukraine is still not solved. Would the revitalization of the NATO-Russia-Council help to improve both this situation and the American-Russian relationship?

Our policy is ‘no business as usual’ until Russia changes its behavior in Ukraine. While we support open channels of dialogue with Russia, and are always open to substantive discussions, we do not support a resumption of regular, recurring meetings of the NRC that are not productive or meaningful. We remain opposed to ‘normalizing’ relations with Russia until Russia demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.

We remain opposed to ‘normalizing’ relations with Russia until Russia demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.[quoter]Richard Hooker[/quoter]

Michael E. O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, supports the hypothesis that the end of NATO’s eastward expansion and the implementation of a zone of neutral nations would reduce tensions with Russia. How do you assess this proposal?

This again is a question for the alliance as a whole. The United States is unwavering in our support for NATO’s open door policy. It is a core NATO value that sovereign countries choose their own security arrangement. No third country has a veto on NATO membership.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years‘ time?

[related]Enduring alliance, the most successful in history, and one that has weathered many storms and challenges in its existence. We are confident that a decade from now, NATO will still be performing its key role as the principal provider for transatlantic security.

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Hodges: “NATO is the most successful Alliance in world history”

r.fehrenbach — Mon, 18 Dec 2017 16:46:52 +0000

Interview: Robin Fehrenbach

Part V of our series: Lieutenant General Frederick B. Hodges highlights the value of logistics and interoperability for NATO in Europe. Hodges who has served as Commanding General of the U.S. Army Europe until December 15, 2017 also expresses his hope that the strained American-Russian relationship will improve. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke he wishes for Russia one day being “welcomed back into the community of responsible nations.”

Lieutenant General Hodges, your service as Commanding General of the U.S. Army Europe is about to end. When you look back to your duty in Germany, which cooperation projects between American and European armed forces have been the most successful?

The most important cooperation project has been the improving interoperability for our communications systems between all the Allies. Right up there with it are our efforts to improve cross boarder military mobility, so that military formations can move quickly across Europe. Crossing international boundaries, trying to improve infrastructure. All of these things are of course intended to speed up our ability to assemble, which would give political leaders more options.

With its concept Strong Europe the U.S. Army seeks to strengthen the defense capabilities of its NATO allies in Europe. What does your first resumé on this look like?

U.S. Army Europe has contributed in several ways: First, we go to everybody’s exercises and we invite people to all of our exercises. We have created and are continuously improving more sophisticated multinational, joint, and multi-echelon exercises that test logistics and interoperability.

Secondly, the 7th Army Training Command with their training centers in Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels and their ability to export training capabilities to other places like Georgia, Romania, Poland and Lithuania have significantly improved training opportunities for our Allies and Partners. The quality of what they do for ranges, for example, or with the observer controller trainers has helped raise the bar for quality training for many countries in the alliance and in Europe.

NATO is the most successful Alliance in the history of the world and it is successful because of its shared values and the commitment to collective security. That is an unshakable guarantee and I am very confident that the members of the Alliance are safe. When 29 nations stick together and we all continue to do our share in contributing to that collective defense that is a powerful message and powerful commitment.

I am very confident that the members of the Alliance are safe.[quoter]Lieutenant General Frederick B. Hodges[/quoter]

The crisis in Ukraine is still not solved. Would the revitalization of the NATO-Russia-Council help to improve both this situation and the strained American-Russian relationship? For example, the collaboration in fighting international terrorists like ISIS in Syria could be enhanced.

[related]As a Soldier, of course I hope that Russia one day is welcomed back into the community of responsible nations. It is a great country with a great history and great people. There are so many places where we could cooperate and we thought that this was going to be the case, up until a few years ago. But, Russia has to respect international institutions and order. And when they do that and respect the sovereignty of European nations, then we can get back to training together, and have cultural exchanges and all those kinds of things. As well as cooperating on important issues. But this is not the 18th Century, where they get to pick and choose countries to divide up.

It reflects the forward leaning adaptive nature of our great Alliance. I am impressed with both of the major command changes that have been proposed. And, I hope that Germany is the country that takes the lead on this. Particularly the rear area operations command. That is a logical choice from geography as well as capability and their organizational skills. It would do an awful lot to improve our ability to receive reinforcements as well as move allied formations across Europe.

I believe nations get to make their own choices. If those nations want to join the EU and they meet the criteria then they should be able to join the EU. If they want to join the Alliance and they meet the criteria and the Alliance accepts it, then they should be able to do it. So, that is what we are all about, the self-determination of sovereign nations.

Everything that was promised under the Obama administration has been delivered under the Trump administration. Rotational forces, preposition equipment, enhance Forward Presence battle group and an increase by over a billion dollars of the European deterrence initiative. When the United States is serious about something, we put Soldiers on it, we put money on it and that is what is happening in Europe today. The president, the vice president, secretary of defense, secretary of state, everybody has confirmed our commitment to Europe and guaranteed our commitment to the Article 5 of the Washington treaty.

Everything that was promised under the Obama administration has been delivered under the Trump administration.[quoter]Lieutenant General Frederick B. Hodges[/quoter]

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

It will continue to adapt, it will continue to be the most successful Alliance in the history of the world. The fact that the Alliance continuously looks at its’ structures, procedures and policies and the fact that NATO works very hard to be effective, and its’ historical success is what will guarantee that it is still here ten years from now. As the principal and most effective security framework in the world.

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Von Geyr: “Reliability is crucial in NATO”

r.fehrenbach — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:56:47 +0000

Interview: Robin Fehrenbach

In the debate on the two percent defense target, Géza Andreas von Geyr states that it is strategically imperative for Germany to increase its expenditure on security and defense. In an interview with Atlantik-Brücke the Director General for Security and Defense Policy with the Federal Ministry of Defense also expresses his support of an activity index within NATO as a means of reliably determining the extent to which NATO members are engaged in the Alliance – outside the military sphere, too.

Dr. von Geyr, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization pledged to increase their defense spending to 2 percent of their gross domestic product or maintain it at that level at the 2014 summit in Wales. Germany’s defense spending is currently 1.26 percent of GDP. Can you estimate when Germany will be spending the agreed amount?

The target existed long before 2014. The NATO member countries initially agreed on it in 2002 and then again in 2006. But in 2014 there was much stronger focus on it. The summit decision was prepared by the Federal Ministry of Defense and the Federal Foreign Office before it went up to head of state and government level. The wording is: ‘We aim to’. It’s a political pledge by all NATO members and it is up to each country individually to honour that pledge. In Germany we have an annual budget process. Other countries are structured differently. But this ‘We aim to’ is an expression of the collective will of 28 heads of state and government who looked each other in the eye and made a strong political self-commitment on a consensus basis. I’m emphasizing ‘all 28’ because the two percent pledge is made on the basis of reciprocal trust and reliance.

It was reiterated again at the Warsaw summit in 2016. And at the 2017 summit, which was a special summit only attended by foreign secretaries and defense ministers so there was no published decision. But if you take a look at a transcript of the NATO Secretary-General’s press conference, you’ll find a passage confirming that the spirit of the 2 percent pledge was reiterated.

In 2014 President Obama and his administration pushed the 2 percent issue, but he wasn’t the only one! Now, in 2017, President Trump’s doing the same. So we have two U.S. governments with very different policies that both agree on this point.

When will Germany be able to meet the target?

[related] The issue of national implementation is one that all the countries – 29 now that Montenegro has joined NATO – face and each of them have to plead the case of why it makes sense to spend two percent of GDP on defense to their parliaments and tax payers. They can’t simply argue that they have to do it because they made a joint commitment. More importantly, they have to focus on the security policy perspective, the common defense planning process at NATO and national armed forces planning. The arguments have to be financially forward looking and properly substantiated. In a white paper published in 2016 we set out the reasons why changes are necessary in the Federal Armed Forces for strategic reasons and what they mean for personnel, equipment and the budget. The Federal Armed Forces’ headcount is finally starting to increase again for the first time in many years. As far as equipment is concerned, the objectives are to increase transparency, fill gaps and accomplish modernisation in the broadest sense – for example by building cyber capability and using future technologies. We’ve also paved the way towards increasing federal budget spending in this area. We’ll have to see how the next parliament deals with these issues. But the framework is in place for increasing the budget in practical increments.

In a white paper published in 2016 we set out the reasons why changes are necessary in the Federal Armed Forces for strategic reasons.[quoter]Dr. Géza Andreas von Geyr[/quoter]

I assume that the new German government will also realize the importance of reliability in NATO and remain consistent. In 2014 there was talk of ‘within a decade’. Now we have to create the right roadmap. It has to be ambitious, feasible and justifiable.

What exactly do you spend the German defense budget on?

The budget is spent on personnel, equipment and operations, as well as missions. We have some very large complexes and many of the investments are long-term. We also spend budget funds on research and development activities. Basically, the budget proves that we, our partners and our allies accept responsibility for our security at a time when we all face some serious external security challenges.

Defense Minister Dr. Ursula von der Leyen regularly emphasizes that the defense budget isn’t just spent on military equipment. She also suggests an activity index that includes NATO missions. How is the debate on these contributions to NATO’s overall success progressing in the transatlantic security alliance?

It’s important that the debate on the activity index doesn’t challenge the two percent target. The two should be complementary. The basic issue is that NATO needs a legitimate means of checking the extent to which countries are meeting the planning objectives, and by that I mean the activities that are assigned to them on the basis of their size and economic strength. The two percent target alone doesn‘t solve that problem because no NATO member will spend its entire defense budget on NATO. Here in Germany, we place a substantial amount of our military capabilities at NATO’s disposal. But we’re also involved in EU operations in Mali and Somalia, and we support United Nations operations in South Sudan and along the Lebanese coastline. We also make targeted investments in providing support to partners in fragile regions such as Jordan so that they are equipped against risks such as terrorism and IS.

No NATO member will spend its entire defense budget on NATO.[quoter]Dr. Géza Andreas von Geyr[/quoter]

So we don’t spend our entire defense budget on NATO. The same applies to the other countries. The United States has a lot of activities on the Pacific side of its continent which have nothing to do with NATO. France has anti-terrorism units in Operation Barkhane, western Africa, which is unrelated to NATO. So none of the member countries spend their entire defense budgets on NATO. That being said, NATO has to know what each country is contributing to the alliance.

And that’s why we need suitable indicators. Firstly, we need clarity on the extent of the member countries’ involvement in NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, for instance. Secondly, to what extent are they involved in the initiatives that were launched by NATO in 2014 in response to the Kremlin’s show of aggression? Which countries are involved in the new high-readiness spearhead force? Or in the enhanced forward presence in the Baltic region and Poland. Which countries are offering divisions for the larger formations that we need to create the new high-readiness spearhead force. Thirdly – and this is already being measured – to what extent are the member countries fulfilling the capabilities packages that each country has to deliver according to the resources it has available so that the joint defense agreements can be upheld? Only all three indicators together provide a clear picture of exactly what each member country is contributing to NATO. They are the logical consequence of the two percent commitment and they reflect its sense and purpose. We will have to wait and see whether the NATO partners are all willing to create transparency in these areas.

Are you expecting parliamentary disputes to flare up about the German contribution in the Bundestag?

The outcome of the defense budget debates in the last two years is that an increase in defense spending is practical, necessary and justified. It’s evident that our allies expect us to make a contribution to collective defense and security that is comparable to their contribution, based on our economic strength. And reciprocal reliability within the alliance is at the core of our security policy interests.

That’s why security shouldn’t be weighed up against other policy areas. That would be wrong. We have an open society that offers us freedom and prosperity, but it’s vulnerable and needs protection. Security may not be everything, but without internal and external security everything else would be a lot more difficult.

What function should Germany be playing in NATO, both in the European construct and in the transatlantic partnership, according to the German government?

There are very good reasons why our strategy should be to remain transatlantic and become more European. Both are complementary. It’s certainly in our interest for NATO to continue to be the world’s strongest military alliance because it guarantees our continent’s security. At the same time, though, we have to take the issue of European security into our own hands to a greater extent. Demographic developments leading to the shrinkage of Europe and geopolitical shifts including Asia and Africa’s increasing relevance support that. Also, broadly speaking, the United States isn’t worried about Europe any more. It sees Europe as a potential partner to overcoming major security challenges on other continents. If we Europeans want to safeguard our security policy interests, we have to express the political will to increase our relevance. And we have to demonstrate the political strength to do it. The necessary momentum already exists, both in NATO and in the EU.

In reality, though, the United States is still the country with by far the largest NATO commitment. We need more Europe within NATO, and we’re working very hard to achieve that. For example, with the Framework Nations Concept which allows European countries to collaborate more closely in various initiatives. Germany plays a central role in this.

The goal is a European security and defense union that allows us to more efficiently organize our capabilities, plan in a more targeted way, make smarter investments and respond faster.[quoter]Dr. Géza Andreas von Geyr[/quoter]

We also want to – and have to – improve our defense capability in the European Union and we’re already working hard to achieve that in France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and other countries. The goal is a European security and defense union that allows us to more efficiently organize our capabilities, plan in a more targeted way, make smarter investments and respond faster. We made a lot of progress last year. Key projects include the European Defense Fund and the Permanently Structured Cooperation (PESCO). PESCO could be a crucial development because, for the first time ever, the EU countries involved would be committing to a high level of collaboration in the military sphere. So we really need both: more Europe in the alliance and an EU with a greater military capability. The transatlantic partnership would benefit from both.

Is the German government getting through to President Trump with this commitment?

U.S. security policy is made in the White House, but also in the government ministries, the intelligence services and Congress. I think they won’t just accept our approach. I think they will probably even support it because our efforts don’t fundamentally question NATO; they represent a perspective that would strengthen NATO. It is essential that Article 5 – the principle of collective defense within the alliance – remains at the heart of NATO. It is also necessary to maintain the integrity of NATO’s very delicate planning processes. On this basis, the Americans know where they stand and how to categorize the higher level of European collaboration.

The Europeans worked hard to convince the U.S. last year and they’ve earned its trust and understanding.

President Trump, like all the other U.S. Presidents since NATO was established, is demanding that the burden for this treaty, which is such a central aspect of the western world’s security architecture, is fairly shared between the U.S., Canada and Europe. Do you think fair burden sharing among all NATO members is realistically possible?

The issue of burden sharing within the entire Euro-Atlantic security architecture extends far beyond NATO. There are many factors to be considered in any fair distribution of the transatlantic burden, and they have to be considered in terms of a modern concept of security. That includes the fact that we Europeans will have to be capable of efficiently guaranteeing the security of our neighbouring regions in the future, and that’s also in the interests of U.S. security. Another focus is the security policy relevance of diplomacy and development policy and how these tie in with military activities. Finally, whatever happens, we have to prove by strategic consensus and foresight that the western world is prepared to deploy all its capabilities and strengths to persuade the non-western world that we are not the enemy. All these aspects are part of the wider picture on fair transatlantic burden sharing.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

I’m certain that NATO will continue to be the security cornerstone on the European continent and in the Atlantic region. It will also continue to guarantee collective defense and express the collective transatlantic will to uphold peace, freedom and security. It will be working very closely with a stronger and more relevant European security and defense union, have a more European character and probably be involved in a greater number of non-European partnerships and cooperations. I also very much hope that Moscow’s politics will have changed, making it possible for us to have a better relationship with Russia in ten years’ time.

Note: The content of this interview represents Dr. von Geyr’s personal opinions.

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The “New South”, New Skills, and Old Alliances

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:56:14 +0000

2017 Atlantik-Brücke Delegation Trip to Charlotte, NC & Washington, DC

October 8 to 13, 2017

Over the course of six days, the Atlantik-Brücke delegation traveled to the United States and met with a diverse group of politicians, CEOs, journalists, academics, and others, in Charlotte, North Carolina and Washington, DC, the nation’s capital.

Each year, a group of the organization’s members undertakes this journey to gain new insights and to strengthen the links between Germany and the United States. With a new administration in place that has new priorities, it is even more important to persist in creating dialogue. And each year, the delegates visit Washington as well as one other American city, to get beyond the beltway bubble. This year, the group traveled to Charlotte because of its strong trade ties to Germany, as well as to experience “the new South.” This term was originally coined by the journalist Henry W. Grady and characterized the new beginning for the economy of the South after the civil war and the end of slavery. In the meantime, the term has come to refer to successful economic growth in the American South, which is also promoted by innovative technologies.

Hope for the Transatlantic Relationship

“This president was elected to be disruptive,” is a sentiment echoed multiple times over the course of the week the group spent in the US. It became obvious that there is a major battle going on within the country. President Donald Trump’s attitude reflects some of the most negative ideas in American political thinking: isolationism, populism, nativism. Similar trends can be seen in Europe right now. What is unique in the US is that President Trump is acting as an independent president – independent from the party lines and positions which puts off many within his own party. The fact that many government positions have not yet been filled makes cooperation with transatlantic partners difficult.

“This president was elected to be disruptive,” is a sentiment echoed multiple times over the course of the week the group spent in the US.

And this is dangerous. Multiple government security officials noted that states with a different view of international order than the West are becoming more powerful (read Russia and China). For the American security apparatus, they see German leadership in multilateral organizations as greatly appreciated, and would like to see more of it in Central and Eastern Europe. On an “America First” note, it was pointed out that Americans “are spending as much as 3.5% of their annual salary on other countries’ security. Germany, as one of the most prosperous countries in the world must step up its own efforts.”

Despite these tensions, the relationship between the two countries remains a vital one at many levels: individual, corporate, political, administrative. Congressman Robert Pittenger (R), the US Representative for North Carolina’s 9^th Congressional District, assured that “We love Germany. Don’t believe the media, they are not our friends.” Several high-ranking members of government noted that “nothing has actually changed. Connections are as strong as ever.” As a consolation it was repeated that the “administration is still working itself out” and that partners should not be discouraged from interacting because the behind-the-scenes work remains the same as always. It seems that those who actually carry out the work do not share President Trump’s negative opinion of working with Germany. As Ambassador Daniel Fried of the Atlantic Council pointed out, “actual US foreign policy under President Trump is in fact picking up where the Obama administration was headed in its final months.”

Trade: Leave the Washington, DC Bubble

Frances Burwell, Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council and an expert on TTIP, foreign policy and transatlantic relations, warned that “not only is the government rhetoric on trade bad, but so are the policies themselves, under this president.”

The completion of TTIP, as the group heard often, is unlikely. “TTIP Light,” an edited version of the agreement which focuses on shared standards and other regulatory questions rather than import taxes, may be possible.

There is a “big push for protectionism combined with a lack of historical sense in the highest levels of the administration,” weighing heavy on long-standing partnerships. The completion of TTIP, as the group heard often, is unlikely. “TTIP Light,” an edited version of the agreement which focuses on shared standards and other regulatory questions rather than import taxes, may be possible. But as Congressman Pittenger noted, “the president prefers independent trade agreements” which would of course fundamentally alter the premise of TTIP.

NAFTA is another matter of great concern, particularly for the Canadians. The question on the table is whether there will be an exit from NAFTA, or just a renegotiation. There are no clear answers yet. In both cases – TTIP and NAFTA – the conditions for renegotiation certainly aren’t favorable. As the motto goes, “Buy American, Hire American.” Wilbur Ross, US Secretary of Commerce, however, has shown openness to join the conversation on how TTIP can be renegotiated. He is aware of the relevance of free trade for the US economy.

[related] In the end, a form of encouragement came from those who counsel against the fixation on Donald Trump. In reaching out to politicians, civil society representatives, universities, and innovators from across the country, one can find partners and allies outside of the Washington bubble. This is exactly what became obvious during the visit to Charlotte, where one notices firsthand the effect of German businesses in the region: Siemens Energy, Daimler Trucks North America, Groninger, Bosch Rexroth, Schaeffler Group USA Inc, and 200 others, including 59 US headquarters. This makes Germany the most largely represented foreign country in the region. With daily nonstop flights to Frankfurt and Munich and an active German community, the partnership between Charlotte and Germany is thriving.

The city’s outgoing Mayor, Jennifer Roberts, presented the city’s historic links with Germany – the city was named after Charlotte of Mecklenburg-Strelitz – but also its international nature. 18% of the city’s population is foreign-born, and the city boasts 1000 foreign companies, 200 of which have headquarters in Germany. 17% of the labor force of the city is foreign born, according to John Silvia, the chief economist of Wells Fargo, American international banking and financial services holding company. He also noted that nationally, foreign-born workers have accounted for half the growth in the labor supply over the past decade. Despite the unfavorable policies concerning foreign-born individuals living in the United States, Silvia hopes that “business is resilient, even with the fluctuation in politics.”

Preparing for Work in the Future Economy

In various meetings with the National Association of Manufacturers, the Central Piedmont Community College and its vocational training program, and the software startup Tresata, the need for change in educating a future workforce – both in the US and Germany – was very clear. Vocational training programs have been among the most successful exchanges between the two countries. The German vocational training model is well-known, but has lately been further improved by various programs in the US, some of whom have even surpassed their German counterparts.

Former and current US administrations have emphasized the need to fill the skills gap. President Trump in his meeting with Chancellor Merkel in March 2017 was joined by company representatives from the US and Germany and several young apprentices. This clearly shows that there is common ground and a common goal to advance alternative training options to fill the skills gap and offer a real opportunity for young people.

A highlight of the trip was a visit to Central Piedmont Community College (CPCC) in Charlotte, which currently serves 70,000 students. 20% of those students are in the College and Career Readiness Program, which offers a variety of programs to prepare students for their working careers. CPCC has offered manufacturing apprenticeships since 1995. A four-year program that guarantees a job at the end that emulates the German vocational education and training (VET) system and is primarily used by German companies located in Charlotte. To graduates, IHK Karlsruhe offers certificates of completion for equivalency in competence for automation and CNC machining, and there are student/apprentice exchanges to Stuttgart, Heidelberg, Crailsheim, and Gaggenau. Fourteen CPCC faculty are trained in Berlin at the Siemens Technik Akademie, and there are ongoing facilitator and administrator visits and courses in Germany.

Kevin Poet, director of operations at the Siemens Charlotte Energy Hub, noted that Siemens Energy has a workforce of 1,550 employees and more than one million square feet of space under one roof. It has become the largest manufacturer in Charlotte, and the third largest among the 250+ energy companies based in Charlotte. To develop a trained labor force to operate the new Siemens plant, the company began a partnership with CPCC to develop a mechatronics apprenticeship program, in 2011. By introducing the German apprenticeship model to the US, Siemens has been able to train its Charlotte workforce successfully.

Conclusion

The 2017 members trip to the United States has proven the need for regular exchange between the US and Germany. In a time of uncertainty, it is more important than ever to reach out to those outside of the government bubbles in both countries, and create long-lasting relationships. This has especially seemed to be the case when it comes to preparing future generations to succeed in a new economy. The presence of German companies, individuals, and organizations in the United States greatly benefits the regions they are in, and the same is true vice versa. There is a great need now for a strong commitment to the relationship between the two countries, with a hope that it will continue into the future.

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Howard Dean: “That is not what America looks like”

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:55:52 +0000

Howard Dean served as a six-term Governor of Vermont, 2004 presidential candidate, and Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. In this Interview with Atlantik-Brücke on October 5th, he spoke about America under Trump, about the reasons for the recent success of rightwing parties and movements, about the future of the Democrats, and about transatlantic relations.

How would you describe the current state of American politics after ten months of President Trump?

It is important to realize that the United States is a very strong country – not just militarily but economically. We are very decentralized. So when you have a weak president, which Trump is, life goes on. The economy is doing fine. The federal reserve runs the economic policy in the United States, not the president or congress. So, that doesn’t make such a difference unless the president does something really awful like get us into a war, which is not as likely as the European press is saying. It is very scary of course, because if there is a war there would be a nuclear war, but you know, it’s a strong country. Underneath Trump’s bombast, life is going on for most Americans. The really bad part about Trump’s presidency is he has given permission for people essentially to be racist, anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant. But, he is not a strong president, because he is unfocused and I think people are paying less attention to him.

Apart from the President justifying white supremacists, what do you think is at the bottom of this growing right wing extremism? Do you see any similarities between what is happening in the United States and in Europe?

[related]What you see happening in America has actually happened before. Brexit was exactly the same thing. The AfD in parliament now is the same phenomenon. These are people who have been left behind by globalization for the most part. In Germany that is maybe not as true. There are some educated people in the AfD, although many of them are taking advantage of frustrations of working class people. I also think Europeans have done somewhat of a better job with the social safety net, but that’s marginal. Because we are not talking about people that are starving, we are talking about people that feel like they are losing their place in society. And they are. If you are an older white worker in America, you were used to having a certain position and if you are not skilled, you have lost that position. The truth is that trade is good for the world, not bad for the world. Trade has created hundreds of millions of jobs. We have fewer people under the poverty line in the world percentage-wise than we have ever had before. But in the old days you could get a good union job making cars. Now, you can’t do that anymore. If you cannot use the internet and you are low skilled, you lose your job. Your children – if they are smart – have left your small town and gone to the cities. And they are fast with the internet. Working class families around the globe tend to have a more authoritarian set-up. That is disappearing. In the United States in the last 40 years, we have had a civil rights revolution where black people can vote, we have had a black president and two men can marry each other if they fall in love. You can imagine what this is like for somebody in a small village who is not terribly well educated. And that is what’s going on all over the West. And I think that is what’s really causing the upset. And then of course there are always unscrupulous politicians that are willing to take advantage of that by blaming some group. Farage did it by blaming immigrants. Trump did it by blaming immigrants and Muslims. The AfD has done it by blaming refugees. It is a convenient, short-sighted, and I think unpatriotic way to run a political party but it’s an instinct as old as human beings.

Your own party appears to be more introspective after the loss of the election. There was a piece by Senator Schumer in the New York Times a few months ago. It was entitled “A Better Deal For American Workers” and in it he said: “We failed to communicate our values to show that we were on the side of working people.” Would you agree with this assessment and what does that mean for the party moving forward?

I think we have failed at communicating well, but I think most of the reaction is not a reaction against the Democratic Party, it is against the establishment. People ask “So what’s the message of the Democratic Party?” Well, there is never really a message of the party out of power, because the president has the power to control the message and all the media attention. In 2018 our message is “We are not Trump” as the message in 2010 was “We are not Obama” for the Republicans. And then there’ll be a backlash against Trump. I expect to win the house and I think we have a shot at the senate. This is a debate in the party: do we try to bring white working class people back in the party? And my answer to that is: not if we have to give up on human rights. Our party is founded on the notion of human rights and diversity. There were more transgender delegates to the Democratic Convention than there were African-American delegates to the Republican Convention. They are old and they are white. That is not what America looks like. I want to be in the party of the future of America, not of the past. If we can bring white working class people back into our party by sticking to economic issues and fairness that is great. I am not sure we can because a lot of the message was about race and other very divisive issues simply aimed at separating us. And I don’t think we can be the party of division and I won’t be. And I don’t think most Democrats do, either.

There were more transgender delegates to the Democratic Convention than there were African-American delegates to the Republican Convention.[quoter]Howard Dean[/quoter]

I do think the Democratic party has gotten a bit cozy with big money. That’s what made Sanders strong and that’s what makes it harder for the Democrats to convince working class people we are really for them. To that extent I think we can improve the party. I am very much for lowering the corporate tax rate, but I want to pay for it by getting rid of the oil depletion allowance and the carried interest and all these things that are benefitting Wall Street, which really doesn’t create wealth for most of the country. We should give tax breaks to people who are building new houses, putting new jobs in places like West Virginia and Kentucky. That would be something that would be helpful for the working class. But remember that a lot of working class people are of color. So maybe we should stop talking about the “white working class” and start talking about everybody in the working class.

The president has been very critical of international alliances and it seems that a lot of Americans agree or at least don’t see the importance in maintaining international bonds. How do you think that perception in the American public could be changed?

I don’t think it is true. I think the majority of people in the United States are for trade. I think both parties have been very untruthful about what trade has done for the United States. It has created millions of jobs in the United States. I call young people the first global generation. And they are. Americans are not that different than European kids. They consider themselves citizens of the world as much as citizens of the United States. They all want to live in big cities, because this is where there are lots of different kinds of people. The under-35-generation in America believes diversity is good. They think immigrants are good. They believe gay rights are a civil rights issue of their time. Climate change is probably the most important political issue. So they are really nothing Trump stands for. I personally believe that the young people in our country are never going to vote Republican. They are not Democrats because they don’t like institutions, but I believe the future of our country is to integrate more fully with the rest of the world.

I saw Mrs. Merkel at the October 3rd celebration and I said to her: Thank you for being the leader of the free world and filling the leadership vacuum.[quoter]Howard Dean[/quoter]

Obama was the first president who embraced multilateralism. He really had to struggle especially with Europeans because Europeans were used to a different kind of bond. They tended to say: “Let’s call Washington and make sure we don’t do something they disapprove of.” That is gone now. So ironically, Trump’s behavior has enforced Obama’s larger vision for foreign policy. I saw Mrs. Merkel at the October 3rd celebration and I said to her: Thank you for being the leader of the free world and filling the leadership vacuum. Of course, she was too skillful to say “Oh yes, thanks!”. But she is. And I think this is going to give an opportunity to Europe to come into its own. Now, Europe has an enormous amount of work to do, like becoming more transparent and fixing some of the systems. I think the EU is the future of the West. It is the most important governance experience since my government was founded 250 years ago. The EU seeks to essentially extinguish nationalism and religion as a source of war. I see the success of the EU as absolutely essential to the future of mankind. It is an enormous step forward in terms of how we look at each other as human beings. I am sure that the people who read this interview are going to be as committed to the EU as I am but the question is now: can we get everybody else committed?

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Delegation Trip to San Francisco and Silicon Valley

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:45:48 +0000

San Francisco was at the heart of this spring’s Atlantik-Brücke delegation trip to the USA. Located in the Bay Area to the North of Silicon Valley, San Francisco has become a rival to traditional tech boom-centers like Palo Alto, Cupertino, and Menlo Park. Many of the young employees working in the Valley’s tech businesses prefer the vivid city life and accept long commutes to work. Prominent companies like Airbnb, Twitter, Uber, and Dropbox chose to open their headquarters in the heart of the city. The trip allowed our delegation to experience the city’s entrepreneurial spirit first hand, learn more about venture capitalists’ calculations, and meet representatives of numerous renowned companies.

On the first day, John O’Farrell, partner at Andreessen Horowitz, a company specializing in venture capital, revealed the seven secrets to success in the Bay Area. One of the central infrastructural prerequisites contemporary founders are able to draw on is the long tradition of successful tech-innovations in the area, which began with the founding of Hewlett-Packard seven decades ago. The universities located in the Bay Area are an essential success factor, as well, given the fact that they do not only produce excellent developers but also promote entrepreneurial spirit. The large number of start-ups located in the area play an important role, too: they foster mutual support and inspiration. Large companies such as Google and Facebook do not only serve as role models but are also “targets” of the smaller start-ups, which are much more flexible in their operations. Venture capital firms located in Silicon Valley are a financial source for the funding of brilliant ideas, and the Bay Area’s high standard of living attracts the best tech talents. Offering a comparison to the gold-rush of 1849, O’Farrell also emphasized the appetite for risk-taking shaping the Valley.

The delegations meetings with SV Angel‘s Robert Pollak and eVentures’ Mathias Schillingfurther emphasized that venture capital relies on different strategies when it comes to investments in promising start-ups. Personal contact to the founders plays an important role for all venture capitalists, but statistical analyses of successful business strategies also matter. In the end, however, good fortune plays a key role in success as well.

Tom Gillis, founder of the cloud computing company Bracket, does not only embody risk-taking propensity but also the willingness to overcome failure. Gillis talked to our delegation about the failure of his first venture and the tenacity it took to successfully build his current company. Former employees of Palantir founded the start-up BlendLabs and offered our delegation insights into how this young company is planning to simplify the application process for mortgages for both customers/clients and banks. A visit to BlendLabs’ office spaces revealed a lot about the everyday work of a young tech-company: a ping-pong table and a great variety of snacks were an integral part of the office equipment. The Airbnb headquarters offered a large variety of food and drink choices for their employees, as well, and creativity played a central role in the decoration and creation of the headquarter’s office spaces. During their visit, the delegation learned more about Airbnb’s business model, a platform for listing and booking accommodations with more than 2 million listings worldwide.

Maria Amundson of the communications and marketing company Edelman shed light on the downside of the tech boom in San Francisco: The high demand for housing has caused rents to skyrocket (the average monthly costs for a 1-bedroom-apartment are $3.500), and many of employees earning average wages are no longer able to afford living in the city. While the tech-founders donate large sums, these tend to benefit small groups with very particular/niche interests only.

The delegation trip’s itinerary also included a visit to the heart of Silicon Valley. The delegation visited the Facebook campus located in Menlo Park. Kevin Quirk talked about an initiative aiming at expanding internet access in areas without fiber optic cables, namely by using drones connected by laser beams. Kahina van Dyke further elaborated on another ambitious undertaking Facebook is pursuing: a peer-to-peer payment feature on the platform/Messenger. The delegation was able to observe the young founders at work at Plug & Play in Sunnyvale. A panel with German “Expatriates” offered insights into the factors pulling German founders into the Silicon Valley (apart from the quality of life, the proximity to American business partners is an important aspect) as well as an explanation of why Germany has not yet been able to create its own Silicon Valley (flexibility, openness for cooperation and a greater willingness to take risks). Arwed Niestroj, the head of the Mercedes Benz Research and Development in Sunnyvale, highlighted that well-established companies such as Mercedes benefit from the creativity in the Valley. Especially “automated driving” is an important topic for car manufacturers.

The delegation’s visit to a vineyard and Napa Valley and a ferry ride to Sausalito offered our participants a glimpse into why so many young tech talents move to the Bay Area: a beautiful landscape and Mediterranean climate.

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The EU Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: Visions, Ambitions, Realities

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:40:15 +0000

Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, was not afraid to speak his mind regarding the European Union’s foreign policy during his talk on February 25 in Berlin. During his speech in front of over 100 guests at a joint event hosted by Atlantik-Bruecke, the Daimler Corporation and the German Council on Foreign Relations, the Social Democrat drew an honest and sobering picture of the EU and its role as a global actor.

According to Schulz, there is no other political area where claims are further from the true reality than in the European foreign policy. The Arab Spring, the crises in Lybia and Syria, and even dealings with China and other regions of growth show that the European states are often simply overwhelmed by the strategic challenges they have to face.

Schulz went on to state that in the reality of the 21st Century, the interests of the European states are better secured by the transfer of sovereignity to the European level. This “abdication of power”, as the convinced European would say, “will be returned to us as a gain in strength in the globalised world.” The loss of governing ability of the nationstate has already become obvious in many areas; by 2050, Germany will not qualify as a G8-state according to today’s standards. “Germany is too small for a world without Europe,” Schulz says.

The fatal mistake that European decision-makers make again and again is to position themselves against the EU in favor of domestic politics of their own countries, thus undermining European institutions’ credibility and capacity to act: “European achievements are nationalizied and failures europeanized.”

“We could be so strong, but we are so weak”, stated the President of the EU Parliament. However, Schulz believes that the European project still has enormous appeal and great potential to serve as an example for other regions in the world. If Europe wants to have global impact and influence, it will have to create a real European government with a strong European parliament.

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“Mapping Out Security Policy Strategies for the Transatlantic Partnership” – Discussion with Distinguished Security Advisors

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:38:46 +0000

The panel of the discussion event “Mapping Out Security Policy Strategies for the Transatlantic Partnership” was occupied by distinguished guest speakers, one incumbent and three former Security Advisors. On the 14th of January, Christoph Heusgen, Security Advisor of Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, Tom Donilon, former Security Advisor of US President Barack Obama, Jean-David Levitte, former French ambassador in the USA and former Security Advisor of President Nicolas Sarkozy, as well as ambassador Simon McDonald, CMG, Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Germany and former Security Advisor of Prime Minister Gordon Brown, spoke in Berlin with a small group of guests about free trade, the American pivot to Asia, the challenges in the Middle East and South East Asia, and the future of the NATO. The debate was moderated by Stefan Kornelius, Head of Department Foreign Policy of the Süddeutsche Zeitung newspaper. Friedrich Merz, Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, greeted the guests.

The panel agreed that the relationship between Europe and the USA is good – Europe and the USA are still the most important partners to one another. Still, the partnership shouldn’t be seen as self-evident. It is always necessary to explore ways how both sides can master new challenges together. An important project in this context is the planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). It provides a wonderful opportunity for the transatlantic partners to prove their common leadership, by establishing global code of competition. At the same time, TTIP enables both sides to raise their gross domestic product.

The coping with the economic and financial crisis in Europe was mentioned as one of the challenges to the transatlantic partnership. Since Europe and the USA are also important economic partners, this is a topic that affects both sides.

Another big topic of the debate was the cooperation in the NATO, especially the distribution of financial and material responsibilities. The USA presently has 70% of the NATO budget, the European States 30%. The speakers were in agreement that the unequal distribution is not a good basis for a partnership on equal footing.

The division of responsibilities in the common security policy was also discussed. If the USA takes over tasks in which the European partners don’t involve themselves, then these must take matters in and around Europe in their own hands. But the war-weariness, which resides in the people of the nations which participated in the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, was also addressed. It was questioned, whether a military intervention would be sensible in every event of a crisis. Furthermore, the panelists discussed that also within Europe there are different priorities for military operations – which became clear through the disagreement about a military operation in the Central African Republic.

During the discussion with the invited guests, the surveillance methods of the National Security Agency and the ongoing conversations about a No-Spy Agreement, the role of parliaments in the legitimization of military operations, and the perspectives for pooling and sharing within the NATO were addressed.

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“Geostrategic Implications of Energy (In)Dependence” – Keynote Speech by Sigmar Gabriel

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:36:39 +0000

On October 9, 2014, Vice Chancellor and Federal Minster for Economic Affairs Sigmar Gabriel gave a keynote speech on the geostrategic aspects of energy policy. In light of the current crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, the issue of energy security was highly relevant, Gabriel stressed before 90 members and guests of Atlantik-Brücke. At the same time, he continued, the global energy landscape was changing profoundly. A growing world population and spreading industrialization caused an ever increasing demand for energy, while climate protection measures simultaneously transformed the structures of global and national energy supply.

Against this backdrop and in anticipation of rising energy prices, greater independence was an important objective of Germany’s energy transition (»Energiewende«), according to Gabriel. This major project of the German government not only included a complete phase-out of nuclear power, but also aimed to reduce the volume of oil and gas imports. In addition, it emphasized energy efficiency measures and their significant potential for cutting energy demand. Yet, the Minister underlined, complete energy independence was unrealistic in a globalized economy. Diversification was the better strategy to avoid supply shortages. His recommendation for the EU was to build an internal energy market. Supply security could not be achieved on a national level, he stressed; it rather necessitated a Europeanization – and partly and internationalization – of energy policy.

The following debate was moderated by Matthias Naß, international correspondent of the German weekly Die Zeit. It addressed the question how North America’s current energy boom will affect transatlantic relations. Gabriel emphasized that close cooperation between Europe and the United States was needed more than ever given multiple crises around the globe.

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“Are We Losing One Another?” Talk by Steven Erlanger

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:36:13 +0000

On February 12, 2015, around 40 members and guests of Atlantik-Brücke gathered in the Berliner Magnus-Haus for a talk by American journalist Steven Erlanger on the topic of „Are We Losing One Another? US-German Relations in the Era of Snowden, Putin and the Euro Crisis“.

Erlanger, who is currently the London bureau chief for the New York Times and previously worked as bureau chief in Paris, Jerusalem, Berlin and Prague, warned about a possible rift between the United States and Germany regarding their foreign and-/security policy and analyzed current challenges for the transatlantic partners.

Erlanger started his presentation with a comparison between the current situation and that of the summer of 2002. When former German Chancellor Schröder refused to send German troops to Iraq, Erlanger felt a significant and painful split between Germany and the US “My fear is that we are again close to another split if we are not very careful,” Erlanger said. The most important task at hand for both nations, Erlanger stated, is to develop a joint strategy on how to deal with Russia. Erlanger criticized Germany for claiming to be an authority on the interpretation of Russian motives and intentions, based simply on its geographical closeness to Russia. Erlanger stressed that Germany should instead try to achieve a joint assessment of the situation together with the United States. Erlanger also argued for putting fears of an escalation of the crisis in Ukraine in perspective – he deemed an armed conflict between the West and Russia highly unlikely.
Erlanger emphasized that Germany remained one of the most important allies for the US and noted Germany’s leading role within the EU. However, Erlanger pointed out that Germany was still reluctant to take on the role of Hegemon within the EU – a reluctance that is met with bewilderment on part of the United States.

According to Erlanger, a greater German commitment to foreign and security policy is desirable. This commitment, according to Erlanger, would not have to take the form of active military involvement, but could also consist of financial contributions to security measures. The topic of the Euro crisis was debated, as well. Erlanger emphasized the essential importance of economic stability of the EU for the US. He criticized that there had been no open discussion in Germany about a Greek exit of the monetary union until very recently. Especially in the light of the Ukraine crisis the transatlantic partners needed to understand that president Putin is pursuing the goal of undermining trust in Western institutions and structures. Thus, it would not be surprising if Putin tried to gain influence in Greece.
Following Erlanger’s speech a lively discussion ensued. Among other topics, the NSA affair was debated. Erlanger seconded the point of view of the audience that the NSA affair and the testimony of Edward Snowden in the past were not helping German-American cooperation in the area of foreign policy. Nevertheless, Erlanger called for a more cool-headed discussion. While German disappointment because of the US’ secret service’s actions was understandable, Erlanger stated that it should not undermine transatlantic cooperation.

Possible solutions for the Ukraine crisis were also discussed. Erlanger stressed that from now on a lot would depend on the people of Ukraine. He was not sure, he added, whether it was for the West to come up with proposals for the future of Ukraine. Erlanger characterized the overall situation as very difficult, making the implementation of an easy solution impossible.

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Carter: The Cold War play book is outdated

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:34:56 +0000

U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has sent out an unmistakable message to the world during his first official visit to Berlin: The play book of the conflict between the East and the West is not compatible with the challenges of the current crisis in Eastern Ukraine, the Democrat said during his speech at Atlantik-Bruecke’s invitation in the Allianz Forum on Pariser Platz. His remarks were directed at the Kremlin leadership. “Vladimir Putin cannot turn the clock back in Europe. Russia’s aggressive actions have no place in today’s world.” The German Federal Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, who welcomed Carter, emphasized the great significance of the transatlantic relationship. The day of the event, she pointed out, had not been chosen without a reason. Von der Leyen reminded the audience of the dismantling of Checkpoint Charlie on June 22, 1990, and of the Two-plus-Four Talks shortly thereafter which ultimately lead to the reunification of a divided Germany. “We will never forget that after World War II the United States lent us a helping hand. And without the assistance of our Atlantic partners a peaceful unification would have never taken place”, the Minister pointed out. Friedrich Merz, Chairman of Atlantik-Bruecke, welcomed Carter in the presence of guests from the fields of politics, economics, and the media by stating: “Here, you are among friends.” Merz concluded his address with a promise that there will always be a forum for a friend like Ashton Carter – especially at the Brandenburg Gate.

Link to the speech by U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter

Link to the speech by the German Federal Minister of Defense Dr. Ursula von der Leyen

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Germany’s New Responsibilities in Global Policy

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:34:15 +0000

Germany has repeatedly expressed its readiness to assume increased international responsibility. The Federal Republic understands the global political framework and the available policy options; furthermore, Germany is aware of the expectations of both its European and global partners. In this context, it is particularly relevant to address the question of whether Germany recognizes its own identity as a key player in international security policy. The White Paper working group 2016 of the Federal Ministry of Defense and members of Atlantik-Brücke focused on this very question in an expert discussion round. The participants quickly reached the consensus that political decision-makers as well as think tanks and the media have led the public discourse on Germany’s involvement and responsibility in the world, and the general public should be participating in these discussions more. The participation phase of the White Paper Project 2016 has already successfully enabled an increase in public involvement.

The experts agreed that it is important to proceed with caution in regards to security policy in the fundamental and core documents of the German Federal Government. Goals should – when possible – be set in harmony and be proportionate with the resources and capabilities of the German Bundeswehr. The participants also recommended that it would be prudent to take into consideration whether a mechanism for verifying and, if need be, updating the fundamental security policy documents would enable a swifter, more effective response to developments in crises and conflicts. In this regard, perhaps a recommendation of the Commission for Verifying and Securing Parliamentary Rights in Regards to the Bundeswehr’s Foreign Deployment Mandates (In German: Kommission zur Überprüfung und Sicherung der Parlamentsrechte bei der Mandatierung von Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr), under the leadership of former Defense Minister Volker Rühe, could serve as a starting point: the German Federal Government should document yearly which international alliances it is involved in and what specific obligations arise from them.

Dependable and active engagement

Germany’s partners and allies want to see the German Federal Government dependably and actively engaged in international politics, particularly in questions of security and defense. Germany’s increased geopolitical responsibility is reflected in these expectations. The fact that Germany’s identity within the security realm is still being shaped and realized, is yet another incentive for its active participation in influencing future decisions and for it to provide support in the implementation phases.

It is possible that majority rule as opposed to consensus decision-making would aid the institutions and states involved in the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to improve their capacity for quick and decisive reactions in times of ever-increasing global insecurity. As the refugee crisis has demonstrated, the immediacy and time-sensitive nature of the crisis has challenged and compelled EU member states to coordinate political negotiations. Majority decision-making pertaining to the crisis has served as a litmus test for the states’ capacity to proactively respond in crisis situations. The participants in the expert discussions expressed that it is plausible that Germany will be an important contributor to strengthening Europe from the center outwards. More concretely, this means working on a larger scale and in cooperation with institutions like the United Nations, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), African Union, or the Arab League to not only utilize effective defense policy, but also in order to fulfill its responsibility to the global community. Furthermore, collaborative development work, especially in the German Federal Government, should focus primarily on integrating education policy and security policy. The international transfer of responsibility must be executed within the guidelines of a comprehensive, holistic concept and not be restricted to the military dimension.

In the view of several participants of the discussion round, the German Federal Government is not alone despite its changing international role, especially in the European Union which is its immediate geographic and political sphere of influence. In particular, if the EU-States implement the Pooling and Sharing concept seriously and consistently, it would not only enable for the joint financing of technical devices and armament as well as their coordinated usage, but it would also help to alleviate the individual burden on states for educating and training soldiers and other military personnel. Other than the general expectation of increased efficiency, many experts also anticipate an estimated savings in the tens of billions. Through the successful pilot projects in cooperation with Poland and the Netherlands, Germany has already contributed to further cooperation and consolidation of European integration in the area of defense policy.

Protection of freedom

Three possible dependencies and corresponding goals were another focus of the discussion’s participants: firstly, the high degree of exchange in free trade and of investments between European states; secondly, peace and security; and thirdly, the stability of their democratic systems. The moral imperative to protect freedom itself emerges from these considerations. The experts recommended to select and shape the proceeding action plan in such a way that it will not become obsolete in light of inevitable changes to international security policy.

The strategy must be robustly planned and represented, in order to allow for flexible and adaptable security policy reactions even on short-notice. Certain premature considerations in regards to potential missions could prove to be a hindrance for some defined objectives, for instance if the White Paper working group was to describe and define no-go areas in which Germany should not engage in. The developments in the Ukraine conflict as well as the threats of the terrorist organization IS in Iraq, Syria, and Libya have made it abundantly clear how difficult it is to foresee – even drastic – political changes. New security developments can also lead to redefined priorities; however, on the meta-level, the constant must remain that German Federal Government’s defense policy imposes restraint and remains primarily defensive as opposed to starkly offensive. This also belongs to a pragmatic view of Germany’s new responsibility in global policy.

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„Serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Germany has been the honor of my life“

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:32:40 +0000

With a festive dinner, 200 members and guests bid US-Ambassador John B. Emerson farewell on January 18. The Ambassador adressed the guests with a moving farewell speech:

“Thank you, Tom Buhrow. And Friedrich, once again thank you for that warm welcome. And I say “once again” because, in addition to the many times you and I have worked together and shared podiums over the past three and a half years, you and the members of the Atlantik Brücke were the first to officially welcome the Emerson family to Berlin back in August of 2013. I remember that very vividly. And I must say, it was a little intimidating to come into that tent, filled with so many of Germany’s luminaries, waiting to take the measure of the new Ambassador. But you all made us feel so welcome, and quickly put us at ease.

We have become dear friends with so many of you who are here tonight. And in particular, I want to thank you for inviting many of my colleagues from Mission Germany, with whom I have had the honor of working.

And so, it is an understatement to say that this occasion is truly bittersweet; because in 36 hours, before the President-elect takes the oath of office, the Emerson family will board a plane and return to our home in Los Angeles. Tonight is our official farewell to you, and to the people of Germany.

On behalf of Kimberly and our entire family, I would like to thank all of you for your friendship and your support over the course of our time here. Serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Germany has been the honor of my life; and it has been an enormous privilege for each and every one of us.

Our three girls have been a significant part of our presence here in Germany. Taylor and Hayley finished high school and then took a gap year in Berlin, before beginning their freshman year at Washington University, St. Louis. During their three years in Germany, they were able to further develop their soccer and musical skills (as some of you saw last week on MorgenMagazin) – and found many new friends on the Fussballfeld, on the stage, and in their various gap year internships.

In the fall of 2013 Jackie, our oldest daughter, started her freshman year at Stanford University, just a month after I arrived as a “freshman” Ambassador. Last year she was able to do a semester abroad at Stanford’s Berlin campus, and she has spent most of her vacations here in Germany. All three girls are missing their first week back at school so they can be here for our final goodbyes; and when they heard we had purchased an apartment in Berlin, they cried tears of joy.

As a board member of Human Rights Watch, as well as proving that with the Emersons, Germany got two Ambassadors for the price of one, Kimberly became deeply engaged in Germany’s humanitarian, arts, and entrepreneurial communities. As the refugee crisis unfolded, she worked proactively to help. And Kimberly has built so many close friendships here in Germany that we could not leave without getting that apartment!

As several of you have noted tonight, our time here has been anything but uneventful. We have often worked together on many of the challenges Germany and the United States faced over the past three and a half years, most of which were not even on the radar screen when I was nominated for this job in the spring of 2013. Consider the following: the NSA disclosures; the civil war in Syria; the brutality of ISIL and the metastasizing of terrorism into Europe; the Russian incursion into Ukraine, its illegal annexation of Crimea, and NATO’s collective response to Russian aggression; the resilience of the Taliban in Afghanistan; Ebola; the Greek financial crisis; Brexit; the loud, vocal opposition to T-TIP in the one European country that will benefit most from that agreement; the demise of “safe harbor” and the damage that posed to inter-company data transfers; the threat to our governments, our economies, our societies, and our politics of increasingly sophisticated cyber-attacks by both state and non-state perpetrators; and the greatest movement of refugees through Europe since the end of the Second World War.

The extent of Germany’s engagement on these issues has been remarkable. I remember vividly my first Tag der Deutschen Einheit back in 2013, and President Gauck’s eloquent speech, in which he urged Germany to become more engaged globally. And he spoke about trust, thanking Germany’s friends and partners for their steadfast belief that one day this country would be re-united, respected worldwide for its vibrant and stable democracy, and its economic strength. This morning I was privileged to attend his farewell speech, and he built upon many of those same themes.

During the seminal and critical early post-war years, the transatlantic partnership was born out of a trust that was defined and nurtured by the members of newly-formed organizations such as the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany. Both were designed to promote reconciliation and understanding between Germans and Americans, and to build connections so that people could not only follow, but understand, developments in both countries. Over the decades, transatlantic partners have invested heavily in this relationship, and strengthened their trust.

And to that point, let me unequivocally state that the European Project, which has long had, and continues to have, bipartisan support in the United States, is one of the great success stories of world history. When Europe and the EU prosper, so too does the United States. And if some in the incoming Administration do not understand that now, I am hopeful that in time they will.

Well, as it turned out; trust became a major theme of my Ambassadorship, and a challenge as well. As noted, tonight serves as a bookend to my introductory speech to this organization, when I acknowledged a “very large elephant in the room” – the disclosures about the NSA. And from day one, my main priority was to re-build the trust between our countries that had been so badly shaken.

At that time, cooperation between our intelligence services was seen in a very negative light. To put it bluntly, the whole concept of intelligence, and its relationship to law enforcement, was radioactive. From the beginning, I stressed the need to reform; but to do so in a way that did not jeopardize one of the fundamental responsibilities of our governments: the protection of our citizens. Well, President Obama implemented important reforms. And the tragic re-appearance of terrorists in Europe underscored that we have to take necessary steps to obtain and share information within Germany, within Europe, and between the U.S. and Europe, for the purpose of disrupting, and ultimately stopping them.

The reality is we live in an era where non-state actors and metastasized terrorist groups, having gone to school on how our intelligence services operate, thanks to highly publicized hacked and leaked information, have become very adept at using evolving technology to recruit, train, plan, and carry out their attacks.

Accordingly, it is essential that we continue working together to stay one step ahead of them. The good news, as I look back over the last three and a half years, is that we have never worked together more cooperatively or effectively than we are today.

And yet, to be sure, in today’s world there is no such thing as 100 percent security. The attack last month in the heart of a traditional Christmas market, nestled around the Gedächtniskirche, brought home to us once again the threat of violent extremism in our societies. Nevertheless, in the face of such horrific violence, it is even more important that we hold fast to our values, and not allow acts of terror to incite xenophobic resentment or subvert our way of life. I have been so moved by the manner in which Berliners came together throughout the holiday season, undeterred by this terrible tragedy, in solidarity and in strength.

Now I know that this attack, and others before it, has added to the ongoing debate regarding Germany’s decision not to turn a blind eye to the humanitarian crisis on its borders in the summer of 2015. Yes, there are likely some terrorists who came in to Germany through the refugee trail. But make no mistake: the vast majority of individuals who have been committing these terrible acts in Europe are home grown. And the idea that by somehow closing all its internal borders to those seeking refuge, Europe could eliminate acts of terrorism; or the related assumption that those bent on inflicting harm cannot otherwise find their way into Europe, is preposterous.

The course that Chancellor Merkel has charted, while difficult and challenging, is a demonstration of moral leadership, in a world where that is far too rare. It is a course that, as President Obama said in Berlin last November, gives voice to the principles that bring people together, rather than divide them; something that is very much in the long term national security interests of both of our countries.

Chancellor Merkel and Aussenminister Steinmeier describe the German-American relationship as a cornerstone of their country’s foreign policy. And from an American perspective, there are few other countries that project the same resolve, capability – and trust – on the world stage as Germany. Our partnership is indispensable. And in these complex times, a certain amount of predictability will be important as we go forward, which brings me to the topic that is, of course, on everyone’s mind: what will be the priorities of the new Administration, especially as it relates to Europe and to Germany? Let me share a few thoughts.

First, in terms of foreign policy, it is no secret that there may well be some significant differences between the incoming and outgoing presidential Administrations: attitudes about climate change, immigration, Russian aggression, the Mid-East, the Iran Nuclear Deal, and the role of multilateral institutions, to name a few.

Possible changes in our relationship with Russia have been in the news quite a bit these past few days. President Obama has always believed it is important to have a good working relationship with Russia – that is clearly in all of our interests. But having a strong relationship with another country does not preclude standing up for our values. And after the lessons of the past century, we need to send a clear message to powerful nations that the unilateral re-drawing of boundary lines of adjacent weaker countries cannot and will not be tolerated; and neither will attempts to manipulate the electoral processes of sovereign nations.

The international community needs to stand up when this happens; there need to be consequences; they cannot be allowed to simply fade away because maintaining them seems to be inconvenient, politically awkward, or because someone says something nice about you. And as we saw during last week’s Senate confirmation hearings, many members of the United States Congress strongly believe this as well.

More broadly speaking, President-elect Trump campaigned on a foreign policy platform that was much more isolationist in nature than the long held bipartisan consensus in administrations going all the way back to President Truman and the Marshall Plan; yet many of the challenges we face are not ones that America or Europe can solve on their own.

President Obama said that one of the main topics of his discussion with the President-elect, right after the election, concerned the crucial role of the United States in addressing global challenges. The fact is, good leadership on behalf of one’s own country requires engaging the world as a whole, and participating effectively in multilateral institutions. That means that the United States, Germany, the G7, the G20, and the European Union all need to maintain, and in some cases expand upon, our engagement in the transatlantic alliance and in global affairs.

I know there is some concern here on this topic. But as President Obama pointed out, once you’re in the White House, once you begin interacting with world leaders, once you have visibility to the full complexities of the challenges we face, the demands of that office tend to shape and in some cases significantly modify your thinking. And the fact that the President-elect’s designated Secretaries of Defense, State, and Intelligence are career-long internationalists is a positive sign. So we shall see.

A second topic: I am fairly certain that one of the President-elect’s priorities will be strengthening the American economy in hard-hit areas of the formerly industrial mid-West and in the rural communities of the United States. That is where he got most of his support. The question is: how he will go about accomplishing this? Through a combination of domestic infrastructure spending and global economic engagement, or through a more protectionist approach?

I think most of us here tonight believe that trade can be a key to expanding global economic prosperity. But, trade was also a red-hot focal point of the presidential campaign. I am sure you all heard that the President-elect has declared the Trans-Pacific Partnership dead – and the leadership in Congress, which was previously supportive of TPP, went along with that, failing to push for its approval during the lame duck. This is unfortunate. When you consider that China is seeking to advance its own trade agreement with countries in the region, it is clear that the U.S. may have lost an opportunity to have helped set higher standards for global trade.

Now, the domestic politics of T-TIP in the U.S. are not as difficult as those for TPP; yet it is highly unlikely that the new Administration will make this a priority either, as I said repeatedly over the past year. And, candidly, given the reluctance of many European politicians to forcefully confront the vocal opposition to T-TIP, and the embarrassment of the EU’s efforts to approve CETA, Europe will need to make clear to the United States that it wants, and can implement, a newly negotiated T-TIP – whether by that or another name.

Beyond that, I know there is some concern here over recent comments about Germany’s trade surplus with the U.S. I trust that in time the new Administration will come to understand that there is a difference between trade surpluses that are generated by low wage, low standard economies with control over their own currencies, that have erected their own protectionist barriers, and those generated by high wage, high standard economies operating on a much more level playing field, that simply make high quality goods that Americans want to buy. And by the way, BMW is on track to make more cars in Charleston, South Carolina than it does in Bavaria!

At some point, hopefully, trade negotiations of some sort will commence between the U.S. and Europe. You all know the arguments for T-TIP; and many of you have led efforts to explain its potential benefits to a skeptical public here in Germany. But clearly, when we finally do go forward, we need to do a much better job. Complain as we might about the well-funded, often truth-challenged opposition to T-TIP, we waited far too long to get the positive story out, in ways that were clear and understandable. The days when governments can go off and spend years quietly negotiating a trade agreement and then unveil it to an eagerly awaiting public are over.

With well-funded, perpetual advocacy groups, many of which depend on a bogey-man to generate their grassroots funding, and with pervasive social media allowing for the creation of silos where information and misinformation are exchanged back and forth at ever increasing volumes, the effort to explain the purposes and benefits of a trade agreement needs to begin with a well-structured, well-funded, proactive campaign, from day one.

There also needs to be greater transparency, from day one; not conducting negotiations in public, but explaining what the objectives are; what is included in the negotiations and what is not; where progress is being made and where it is not. Otherwise, as we’ve seen, a vacuum of information is created which can be filled by anxiety-ridden fears and misinformation.

And from the outset, the fact that every trade agreement will have some dislocating effects must be acknowledged. Our governments need to work just as hard at addressing the impact of that dislocation, as they do at negotiating the actual agreement.

Now, don’t get me wrong; there will always be those who oppose any trade agreement – but by taking these steps we will have a much greater likelihood of success in the future.

The third issue I would like to discuss is something I have heard from virtually everyone I have spoken to in Germany since the election, and that is the concerns so many have about the possible impact of our election on those coming up in France, Germany, and the EU this year and next.

Well, we all know what happened in the U.S.; and it wasn’t exactly how I – and many others – thought things would turn out. Of course, any time you have a very close election, there are multiple factors and events that could have swung it one way or the other. But at a fundamental level, what happened, and why?

The very complexity of our world – fueled by the rapid pace of globalization and technological change – has created a pervasive sense of unease. Increasing economic, cultural, demographic, and social changes, coupled with a polarization in government and in society that makes it harder to get things done, have significantly diminished public confidence in the political process. In the U.S. and in Europe, people on both extremes of the political spectrum are increasingly angry because they don’t think government, or any establishment institution – including the business world – is working for them.

But it’s not just a question of economic well-being. Increasingly, since the 1980s, Americans are also divided by views regarding cultural questions, such as LGBT rights, abortion, gun control, religion, climate change, race and immigration. These differences in views are most pronounced between rural and urban communities, the areas of America that coastal elites quite literally look down on as “fly over country;” and these cultural issues, which cynical political operatives exploit as “wedge issues,” have created deep emotional cleavages in our country. The opposing camps are so entrenched that rational discussion seems almost impossible. We need to get beyond that.

And polarization in society has been enhanced by the instantaneous news environment, where a 140-character tweet can capture the news cycle for an entire day; and by the tendency of social media and ideologically targeted cable news programs to create silos where people can easily isolate themselves, getting information only from sources which reflect their pre-existing points of view. People increasingly “choose their news,” and their opinions are shaped in a post-factual environment. The danger, as we have seen, is that this ‘siloization’ creates an echo chamber of misinformation and, ultimately, of anger that can be used to generate political support; or to undermine confidence in our electoral process.

This anger, and the anxiety from which it arises, contributed to the Brexit vote; to the rise of populism, both right and left, in much of Europe; and to the anti-establishment voting we saw in our Election 2016, as well as the anti-trade, anti-immigrant movements that we’re seeing on both sides of the Atlantic. So the dislocating effect of globalization must be acknowledged and addressed; so too the relationship between social media, the press, perpetrators of fake news, and our politics, especially with the European elections coming up. This might be a topic for further examination by the Atlantik Brücke.

Now, I know there is a great deal of concern in Germany over the incoming administration; but I am convinced that the significance and importance of our relationship with Germany will not diminish over the coming years. History and politics, as President Obama says, never moves in a straight line. In his words: “We zig and zag and sometimes we move in ways that some people think is forward and others think is moving back.” What’s important is that we retain our faith in democracy, and the lively, open debate that it presupposes.

Returning to the question about the next Administration’s priorities, for those who are trying to read the tea leaves for some answers, I have some words of advice. First, don’t over-react to the tweets. Pay attention to them, but don’t get distracted or spun up by them. Tweets are not policy, and often what a President says is modified substantially after it comes out of the policy making machine that is the U.S. government.

Second, it is a truism in government that people are policy. So, pay attention to the confirmation hearings, which began last week. And by the way, who is asking what questions may be as revealing about how Congress will react to proposed Administration policies, and how those policies will be shaped, as the answers themselves.

Third, listen to Friday’s Inaugural Address. This should be an aspirational statement of an incoming President’s vision, goals, and priorities; a high level road map for the next four years. Listen to what is said; what is not said; and of equal importance, the tone of how he says it.

Then, finally, look closely at the budget that is proposed by the new Administration in late February. A President’s proposed budget is an operational blueprint. Closely examine what will be spent, and what will be cut. This will show you what their priorities truly are.

Accordingly, I would urge folks here in Germany to approach the incoming administration with some patience, and with a sense of objectivity, but without hesitating to promote our shared values; and I would encourage you to emphasize how our close economic ties and trading relationship help to raise the prosperity of both countries’ citizens.

So, where do we go from here? Yes, Chancellor Merkel and President Obama have a strong personal connection. But it wasn’t always so. German-American relations go far beyond the name or political affiliation of the current President.

The basis of our close relationship is at its core the personal contact between our citizens. Our people flow across the Atlantic as writers, journalists, researchers, scientists, artists, students, business people, employees and tourists. Our two-way trade and investment opens new opportunities for synergies, new products, and innovations in technology. And strong institutions like the Atlantik Brücke and the American Academy in Berlin are dynamic platforms for German-American collaboration on issues of global importance. So we need to re-double our efforts on the people-to-people and the business-to-business fronts, especially as we enter choppy waters.

I concluded my remarks in that first speech to you three and a half years ago, by talking about the crucial importance of reaching out to young people. And those will also be my parting thoughts this evening.

One of the most indelible connections Europe and the United States share as partners is the miracle of 70 years ago when, from the ashes of global devastation and genocide, new principles were crafted and implemented for governing relations among states, and safeguarding the fundamental rights and dignity of all people.

There are entire generations of Germans and Americans, however, who did not live through the searing experiences of the second half of the 20th century. People for whom the Luftbrücke, “Ich bin ein Berliner,” “Tear down this wall,” and reunification are so much as ancient history. Our vibrant trans-Atlantic relationship is not an inherited trait; its value needs to be transmitted from one generation to the next. That’s why we in Mission Germany consistently include youth in all of our public diplomacy efforts.

During his visit to Berlin shortly after our elections, at a small lunch in the Embassy, President Obama was asked what gave him the greatest concern, and what gave him the greatest hope. On the concern side, by the way, climate change. But without hesitating, Barack Obama placed his hope in young people. He then noted, in a radio interview, that we have to do more than “celebrate or despair around presidential elections”; that we need to do more to help young people find their voices, hone their activism, and help to make a difference.

Politics can be frustrating, but as many are seeing for the first time in their lives, especially in the UK and the U.S., elections have consequences. We need to focus on how, in our day-to-day lives, in our local civic lives, in our media, in our culture, we can all be part of the solution. And that is what so much of the work of the Atlantik Brűcke is all about.

The fact is, today we find ourselves at a crossroads. Simply put: we are indeed stronger when we work together. We must seize the opportunity to shape the future, based on our values and our ideals.

And so, in closing, Kimberly and I would again like to thank all of you for your dedication to building upon the close relationship between Germany and the United States, and for your friendship. Yes, both Europe and the United States face a set of longer-run challenges. But on all of these, we have much we can learn from each other; and with pragmatism, cooperation, flexibility, creativity, and hard work, there will be much we can do together in the months and years to come.

Vielen Dank.”

Link zur Rede von Botschafter Emerson

Atlantik-Brücke: Interview mit U.S. Botschafter John B. Emerson from Atlantik Brücke on Vimeo

Der Beitrag „Serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Germany has been the honor of my life“ erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“Europe matters, this relationship matters” – a conversation with Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:31:16 +0000

On the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, Atlantik-Brücke held a lunch discussion at Hotel Bayerischer Hof on February 19, 2017. Dr. Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, spoke on “The Democratic World Order Under Siege”. He expressed concerns that the current world order was coming increasingly under pressure. In his speech, Kagan appealed to shared transatlantic values and the important role of Europe in mastering current global challenges. In the follow-up, the approximately 70 members, Young Leaders alumni and guests of Atlantik-Brücke were given the opportunity to discuss the future of transatlantic cooperation with the speaker. The event was hosted in cooperation with KPMG AG.

In an interview with Robert Kagan, Dr. David Deissner, Managing Director of the Atlantik-Brücke, further explored some topics of the lecture:

David Deißner: In his speech at the Munich Security Conference, Vice President Mike Pence delivered the reassuring message that the United States ‘strongly supports NATO and will be unwavering in its commitment to this transatlantic alliance’. Nonetheless, there is still serious concern among Europeans with regard to the future of this alliance. What did you make of the vice president’s speech?

Robert Kagan: The United States will not pull out of NATO. That is not really the issue. I still wonder how significant Vice President Pence speech was, because I do not think that anyone outside Trump’s very small circle of advisors has any say over what happens in American foreign policy. Clearly Pence was given authority to say all these encouraging things, so at the very least the president has no intention of making any fundamental changes at this time. But if you asked me what is in the President’s heart and mind, I still think he is not a big fan of Europe. I think he does not know how important Europe is for the United States. I don’t think he has a clear understanding of the economic relationship. So Europe needs to be vigilant. Most of all, it is very important that Europe itself will come together and be as strong and capable as possible. If there are two pillars of the world order that we all value, it is Europe and the United States. The United States is the one in question right now. So it is more important than ever that Europe is a strong pillar.

President Trump has endorsed the so-called Brexitiers, those in favor of Britain leaving the EU. We also heard from the administration that they would be in favor of bilateral trade deals rather than having a comprehensive trade agreement with Europe. How should Europeans make clear that the unity of Europe is crucial also for the Unites States?

Well, it is obviously very important. Pence talked about the two world wars of the 20th century. The United States happened to be involved in these two wars. But he doesn’t talk about the importance of European unity in preventing a recurrence of that. The EU is an economic organization, but at its heart, it is a political answer to the past. The United States needs to go back to understanding that European unity is important. The president and his advisors should understand that America is dependent on the European market, and that it would be wrong to implement a strictly bilateral, beggar-thy-neighbor economic policy. If the European economy has troubles, the American economy has troubles.

At this year’s Munich Security Conference, it has been repeatedly emphasized that Germany and Europe as a whole will finally have to make an appropriate contribution to NATO. Doesn’t the new administration have a right to complain that Europe comes late in taking action?

This is true. And it has been true for a long time. I think Europe would be a more powerful actor on the world scene if it had more military capacity. And I want Europe to be a more powerful actor on the world scene, because Europe is a pillar of this order. The only part that I do not accept is the ‘or-else-argument’, which says: if Europe does not do this or that, America would have to rethink. I am not interested in re-thinking the relationship. It is too important.

Many Republicans would say that the new administration does not get its fair chance, because the media is overwhelmingly biased against the president and his team, and portrays them in a negative light. Maybe the media is too hasty to condemn an administration which has not yet fully settled, let alone presented political measures and strategies in more detail?

I think the administration has been treated more kindly by the press than it deserves. The press has just exercised normal journalistic criticism. We have a president who says outrageous things. We cannot expect the press to ignore the things Trump said about judges, things he said about the press itself, being the ‘enemy of the American people’. In addition, there was the obvious mishandling of the executive order regarding immigration. No one could claim that this wasn’t a disaster. Or think of Michael Flynn, who was talking to the Russians about foreign policy before the administration had taken power. No one would question the capability of people like James Mattis and Rex Tillerson, but their role in making policy is yet to be determined. At the moment it seems that all policy is being decided upon by a very small group of people immediately surrounding the president. This fact has not even been reported enough. So, I do not think they are getting a bad rap.

What would be your recommendation to Europeans, and in particular an institution like ours which is devoted to transatlantic dialogue and partnership. What should we focus on in these turbulent times?

This is an opportunity for Europeans and institutions like yours to speak up, certainly more than has been necessary before. Before the election you were maintaining ties which were pretty healthy. Now you have to be more active in letting Americans know that Europe matters, that this relationship matters. Europeans should speak up and say: When you Americans are doing the right thing we are going to support you. When America is doing the wrong thing, we are going to tell them that it is the wrong thing. Speaking up will have a beneficial effect.

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Losing the Bigger Brother – Foreign Policy Discussion

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:30:34 +0000

Donald Trump’s presidency is forcing a rethink in Germany of many things that had been taken for granted before. “The big brother, who we could always lean on when we needed to, is no longer there,” observed Dr. Thomas Bagger, the designated Director of Foreign Policy in the Office of the Federal President, on the chill in German-U.S. relations since President Trump’s inauguration. On the eve of the first meeting between the German chancellor and the American president, Thomas Bagger and Martin Klingst, Senior Political Correspondent for Die Zeit, discussed the future of transatlantic relations in this new era.

Trump’s protectionist and nationalistic plans pose new challenges for Germany. His foreign policy approach centers around military armament rather than international cooperation – a point made clear by his budget proposal, said Martin Klingst. Trump sees himself less as the head of government and more as the leader of a political movement. This is also reflected in his confrontational governing style. Thomas Bagger added that it remains to be seen whether Trump will align himself more with the ideological wing, as spearheaded by his chief strategist Stephen Bannon, or pursue more pragmatic solutions.

Both speakers agreed that European self-assurance is an important prerequisite for successful transatlantic cooperation. Only then will Europe be able to protect its values and make a careful determination of common interests with the U.S.

To ensure continued dialogue across the Atlantic, it will be important to establish a smooth personal relationship between Chancellor Merkel and President Trump. This is likely to be a formidable task, given their vastly different personalities and divergent views. However, the initially rather distant relations between President Obama and the chancellor also evolved into a friendly relationship over time.

Approximately 40 members and Young Leaders alumni attended the event in the Magnus Haus. They engaged in a discussion with the speakers about President Trump’s prospects of success, the similarities between the Tea Party and the positions of the new administration, as well as the differences between Trump’s and Obama’s relations with Europe.

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“Russia is aggressive, Europe apathetic – and the US absent”

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:29:47 +0000

When an American journalist and Young Leader alumnus of Atlantik-Brücke pens a book entitled “The End of Europe”, there’s clearly a pressing item on the transatlantic agenda. It was no surprise, then, that around 60 members and guests gathered in Berlin to hear James Kirchick discuss his newest book with Dr. Richard Herzinger, politics and society correspondent of the daily DIE WELT.

What was surprising, however, was that Kirchick, an author and fellow at the center-right Washington, D.C. think tank Foreign Policy Initiative, started his remarks to the audience and moderator Katja Gloger, editor at large at STERN, by stating: “I’ve written a pro-European book.” It is about a crisis of the old continent’s values, Kirchick said. Speaking one day after the United Kingdom’s official application to leave the European Union, Kirchick explained that several member states no longer represented the values of the bloc and violated the commonly agreed set of rules. Hungary and Poland were named as examples.

“Russia is aggressive, Europe is apathetic – and the US absent.” This is how the author summarized the core thesis of his recently published book. Russia is, according to Kirchick, boosting its military budget while perfecting the art of hybrid warfare. On top of that, the Kremlin led by Vladimir Putin considers Chancellor Angela Merkel public enemy number one because she is the mostly likely leader to unite the West. “There is a high probability that there will be a cyber-attack on the German federal election,” Kirchick warned.

Brexit could not have come at a worse time for Europe, Kirchick went on to say. Demographic pressures as well as dismal economic growth has eroded trust in European societies and fueled the rise of populist movements and growing resentments towards foreigners in face of the refugee challenge.

Kirchick offered plenty of criticism of his own country as well. President Donald Trump is “hostile towards the European idea” and publicly advocated for Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. Fundamentally, the 45th US president fails to grasp NATO’s basic premise, Kirchick explained: “You can’t attach a price tag to the value of the protection and security of Europe.” Trump‘s election has reinvigorated NATO’s long-standing burden-sharing debate. According to Kirchick, the president can cause considerable damage internationally, especially through his inaction. Specifically, Trump’s calling into question of the collective defense clause in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty poses a grave risk, the author said.

A plea for strength and unity

At this point in the discussion, Dr. Richard Herzinger suggested that “The End of the West” would have been a more fitting title for the book, given the nationalistic and isolationist tendencies that can been observed in the United States. In the eyes of the WELT correspondent, there is a glimmer of hope for Europe’s future despite recent developments on both sides of the Atlantic. On the one hand, anti-American sentiment is on the rise across Europe. In Germany in particular, this anti-Americanism is highly irrational because the federal republic is the country that has benefitted most from America’s preeminence since post-World War II. “On the other hand, many citizens are becoming aware of the value of the Western alliance that must be defended,” Herzinger said. The key question for him is whether the West is able to stand its ground against the new authoritarianism. In this context, Herzinger accused European politicians of fundamentally misunderstanding Putin and Russia. The Russian president is already pursuing “hot wars in the Ukraine and Syria”. The only way to counter this is with unified strength – both in foreign and security policy as well as economically.

Not all hope is lost for Europe and the United States, even for Kirchick. Rather, he called on the transatlantic partners to stand up for the shared principles they have built up over more than 70 years. Constant and tireless efforts are required to raise awareness of the strengths of the liberal world order. “Angela Merkel is the most experienced politician of the West and the free world,” Kirchick said. Yet even she will not be able to solve this difficult task alone.

The Transatlantic Dialog is a cooperation of Atlantik-Brücke with Microsoft Germany.

Interview with James Kirchick

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Congressman: Transatlantic Partnership still a matter of crucial importance

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:27:07 +0000

During a dinner-discussion hosted by the Atlantik-Brücke in Berlin, the Democratic Congressman Brendan Boyle assured the importance of the transatlantic partnership. But Boyle, who is a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and has represented Pennsylvania´s 13th Congressional District since 2014, added that this partnership could not be taken for granted anymore. Nevertheless, the current foreign policy position of the White House towards the United States´ European partners is only partly representative since Congress still believes in the outstanding importance of the transatlantic relations.

Boyle also talked with around 20 guests about President Donald Trump´s governing style. So far, the president has shown little respect for democratic institutions. But especially the judiciary has kept the White House in check, Boyle stated. Moreover, he regards Trump´s constant attacks on the media, by which the president targets the first amendment too, as “deeply worrying”. These attacks have neither boosted President Trump´s approval ratings nor helped him passing his agenda. Despite Trump´s behavior, only a few Republican Members of Congress have publicly spoken out against the president in order to avoid possible backlashes in their constituencies and states.

The discussion group touched on the future strategic focus of the Democratic Party as well. Today, the Democrats are no longer perceived as a “Big Tent Party”, which represents people from all parts of society and throughout the United States. Instead the party brand is mainly associated with the interest of minorities as well as progressive, affluent voters on the East and West Coast. Especially blue-collar Americans feel disconnected from the party nowadays and, therefore, voted for the outside candidate Donald Trump, Boyle said. Hence, the Democrats must try to win these voters back and offer them an alternative. In the end, the message of the Democratic Party for the midterm elections in 2018 and the presidential election in 2020 will also depend on the further course of Trump´s presidency, the Congressman concluded.

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Panel Discussion “Geopolitics of Falling Oil Prices”

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:23:16 +0000

On the evening of Monday, May 11, 2015, Atlantik-Brueckes’s Foreign and Security Policy working group met to discuss »Geopolitics of Falling Oil Prices: Opportunities and Challenges for Germany and Europe«. The invited speakers were Michael Schmidt, Chairman of the Executive Board of BP Europa SE and Board Chairman of the Association of the German Petroleum Industry (MWV), Ralf Fücks, Chairman of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, as well as Peter Fischer, Deputy Director General for Globalisation, Energy and Climate Policy at the German Federal Foreign Office. The discussion was moderated by Professor Dr. Friedbert Pflüger, Managing Director of Pflüger International GmbH and Director of the European Centre of Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS) at King’s College London.

Friedbert Pflüger started off the discussion by giving an overview on current geopolitical implications arising through the low oil price.

Michael Schmidt was the next in line to speak. From an oil industry point of view he stressed that the oil price has always been subject to natural fluctuations of the market. The current low price, he said, is mainly caused by the United States’ increase in shale oil and gas production, which does not only result in a short-term oversupply but also in a substantial extension of the “Oil Age”. “The USA will not let themselves be driven out of their beneficial position,” Schmidt added. He also pointed out how the growing global need for energy, especially in emerging countries, will render a decreasing demand and the reduction of oil production highly unlikely. In his opinion, one cannot afford to discriminate against any form of energy, no matter if from a fossil or a renewable origin.

Peter Fischer offered his foreign policy point of view and brought attention to the importance of oil exports in political conflicts. The economic sanctions on Russia and Iran have only been so successful due to the low oil price, he said. Fischer also mentioned that the ongoing oil production in Saudi Arabia and the United States has disclosed those countries’ high dependence on their oil resources. Moreover, he noticed the fact that a new political environment has been developing in terms of climate change which has been benefitting the development of renewables. These new energy politics, however, were not influenced by the low oil price, but constitute a specific challenge for the global energy sector. While Fischer considered the low oil price a “stimulus package” for Germany and the EU, he also acknowledged the problematic economic consequences the current price situation has on oil export-dependent countries, such as Venezuela, Iraq, and Nigeria.

Ralf Fücks laid emphasis on the consequences the oil price and -production has been exerting on the global energy transition. He sees industrial nations under an increasing pressure to act. Business as usual in the field of energy policy is no longer tenable, he remarked. Fücks added that energy security and independence of the European Union are only to be achieved by closer energy related networking among its member states. The EU would therefore have to open up towards innovative opportunities for renewable energy production. He stressed that in light of the development towards a situation of “peak demand” instead of “peak oil”, the connection of energy consumption and economic growth has begun to dissolve.

The largest debate issue of the evening was in how far future energy supply will rely on further oil production. While Peter Fischer and Ralf Fücks held on to their view that demand for fossil based energy will decrease, both Michael Schmidt and Friedbert Pflüger stated that a peak demand will only be reached when the oil sources run dry in a few decades. There was broad consensus on approving a political energy union within the European Union. To different extents, the discussants agreed on the increasing role of renewable energy sources for confronting climate change as effectively as possible and for ensuring a secure energy supply.

In the following Q and A session the planning uncertainties of small and medium sized companies, caused by the high volatility of the oil price as well as in-transparent energy politics, were discussed.

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In Search of the German Bundeswehr of the Future

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:22:38 +0000

The 2016 White Paper working group of the Federal Ministry of Defense and additional experts have resumed the process of discussing defense and security policy guidelines for the next ten years. After the inaugural event with more than 200 participants in February of this year, further expert workshops took place in the last several weeks with approximately 80 participants each from the fields of politics, economics, and thing-tanks as well as the media. Recently, representatives of the working group met with a delegation of eight members and guests of Atlantik-Brücke to continue the dialogue. The discussion was moderated and led by Professor Dr. Burkhard Schwenker, the chairman of the working group on foreign and security policy. The goal of the meeting was to contribute ideas and suggestions in the early phases of the discussion and to incorporate perspectives from various fields including politics, economics, civil society, and the media. The following passages document the results and conclusions reached in this discussion.

The discussion focused heavily on the definition of hybrid warfare, the challenges that it poses, and how to effectively combat it. The first challenge that the experts faced and extensively discussed was the question of how to define hybrid warfare. The initial observation made by the experts is that it is important to emphasize the combination of conventional warfare and the intensive utilization of cyberspace. The latter can come in the form of propaganda used to support armed conflicts; for example, it can be utilized in social media and other platforms or even take the form of a cyber attack. Just several weeks ago, the internal network of the German Bundestag was subject to a digital attack by anonymous hackers. In an effort to describe the current situation, the participants put forth the thesis that hybrid warfare does not necessarily equate to war; however, it is also not symptomatic of peace. Another defining element of hybrid warfare that the experts identified is the fact that it is difficult to identify specific actors and aggressors. An additional cornerstone of hybrid warfare is that intimidation tactics are utilized to pressure companies and organizations with the overarching goal of gaining leverage to influence the actions of governments. The discussion group also emphasized that the technical components of speed and diversity enabled by cyber networks are key ingredients of hybrid warfare.

Exemplary conflict in Ukraine
The participants classified the phenomenon as a legitimate threat that is currently manifesting itself in social networks with the implication that it has the capacity to affect society as a whole. Traditional forms of media, including newspapers and television networks, are vulnerable to be used as instruments of propaganda. Large volumes of letters to the editor and audience reactions are additional methods of attack on the media. More integrated strategies are necessary to combat these forms of attacks. Furthermore, to effectively combat hybrid challenges the approaches must constantly be evaluated for their financial viability. The experts agreed that the current situation in Ukraine exemplifies this form of conflict; however, they were divided on whether or not the terrorist activity of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria fits the mold. In the preliminary summary, the experts identified that in hybrid warfare, aggressors exploit various avenues – the military, communication, and economic means – with the objective of creating instability and uncertainty.

The fact that boundaries between domestic and foreign security are not always distinct was also extensively discussed. In this context, it is necessary to approach hybrid warfare with a holistic, 360-degree strategy that addresses both domestic and foreign issues in addition to the areas that they overlap. The experts compared the current issue with the disruptive changes that digitalization has brought upon the economy. At the onset of the digital age, many companies questioned whether or not their business models were still viable or if partnerships within the industry, divesting business, or further acquisitions made more sense in light of digitalization.

All elements are vulnerable to threats
The experts emphasized the comprehensive, integrated methods of hybrid warfare, and extrapolated five ways for German security policy to approach and combat them. Virtually all elements of politics and economics are vulnerable to these threats. The largest task is finding a way to integrate these fields in such a way that provides adequate protection against weaknesses and has the capacity to overcome vulnerabilities. It is imperative to react to these threats swiftly and with a high degree of flexibility. The five areas where the Bundeswehr can take action include: early identification of crises through collecting and accurately analyzing relevant data, increasing resilience of critical infrastructure, improving strategic communication, cooperating with the EU and NATO, and lastly employing defense-policy as a tool for deterrence.

The participants in the discussion also noted that aggressors have the ability to execute their attacks quicker and with more ease relative to the traditional conflicts of the twentieth century. This is largely a result of the fact that digital interconnectivity leads to internal unmanageability and increased vulnerability externally which poses more difficult challenges for defense policy than ever before. Adequately addressing these challenges will require consideration for how to optimize and reform the German security apparatus. The idea of creating an institution focused on maintaining a constant overview of the field of hybrid warfare was also discussed. This poses the difficult question of how the German Defense Ministry will approach these challenges and create and implement individual, future-oriented strategies. The group of experts spoke in favor sharing the experiences of the centrally organized defense policy’s management with the USA, France, Great Britain, and Finland.

The democratic values of Western and European countries do not make it possible for them to respond to hybrid threats with the same means that the aggressors employ in their attacks. The experts view the Bundeswehr as an instrument to ensure preventative national security. In terms of the organization of the military, the process of reorienting and restructuring is still ongoing. The specialists concluded that the emergence of hybrid warfare and the operations of non-governmental actors will make it increasingly difficult for the Bundeswehr to anticipate patterns of attack; therefore, making early, preemptive discussions like this one indispensable to addressing future challenges.

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European Defense Cooperation after Post-Cold War Peace Dividends

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:22:03 +0000

How will the increasing cost of national defense in the European Union and in NATO be collectively financed? This long-standing and critical security policy question was addressed in an internal discussion round by a select-group of experts from Atlantik-Brücke. The discussion was part of a larger conversation and exchange with the 2016 White Paper working group of the Federal Ministry of Defense on the challenges that hybrid warfare poses for the Bundeswehr. This fall, the 2016 White Paper proceedings are focusing on addressing the question of European security and defense cooperation. The participants in the discussion, moderated by Professor Dr. Burkhard Schwenker, Chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke’s Working Group on Foreign and Security Policy, operated under the assumption that the acquisition of armaments and equipment as well as the modernization of the armed forces is currently commiserate with the growing threats in Europe and will continue to do so – especially as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. Setting aside the prolonged refugee crisis in Europe, the question of security cooperation is of vital importance as it holds direct fiscal consequences. As the need for greater defensive spending increases, the strain placed on total budgets must be addressed through the assumption of further debt, higher taxes, or the restructuring of existing budget items. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the peace dividends brought about by the fall of the Soviet Union, disarmament, and further economic integration of the EU that allowed for the allocation of funds away from defense purposes, are no longer a given.

The current German budget plan for defense policy forecasts that the expenditures will grow by 538.8 million Euros or 1.7 percent up from 32.4354 billion Euros in 2014 to 32.9742 billion Euros in the current year; however, a more nuanced look at the budget reveals that not all of the budget line items are uniformly growing. The operational costs, including personnel expenses and material expenses, will increase by 289.9 million Euros or 1.5 percent. In contrast, armament-intensive expenses in the form of research, development, testing, and military procurements will decrease by 532.7 million Euros – a decrease of 9.6 percent. Further investment expenditures for military facilities including NATO infrastructure in addition to the acquisition of IT devices are expected to decline by 35.5 million Euros or 3.3 percent. Lastly, expenditures on pensions are expected to grow by 339.4 million Euros or 6.6 percent.
Defense budgets have been steadily declining

A comparison of European countries shows that, on the whole, domestic defense budgets are on a downward trajectory. According to a study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, expenditures in 2014 were, on average, eight percent lower than in 2010. The Center for Security Studies at the ETH Zürich identified the following distinct and divergent developments: when employing the US-Dollar exchange rate as a control and constant, they observed that the defense spending increased in Great Britain and fell in France between 1990 and 2011. The British defense budget increased from 54.298 billion US-Dollars in 1990 to 57.875 billion US-Dollars in 2011. On the other hand, France’s defense budget decreased from 65.774 billion US-Dollars at the end of the Cold War to 58.244 billion US-Dollars in 2011.

The experts agreed that the shift from conventional warfare to hybrid warfare, as a tactic employed by aggressors, also has immediate consequences for the technical and material equipment of the Bundeswehr. The need for modern devices and corresponding technology is rapidly increasing and it is doing so on a more condensed timeline than during the Cold War; therefore, there is increased pressure on political decision-makers in Germany and in the rest of Europe to handle the growing demands for financial resources necessary for evolving security policy in a manner that is both sustainable and responsible. The thesis, that new challenges in the acquisition of military equipment can be faced effectively and efficiently with the help of a jointly-shared European financing scheme, was highlighted by the experts as an applicable and important part of the solution.

On the path towards Pooling and Sharing
For this reason, it is critical for countries to be willing to sacrifice a degree of national sovereignty in the defense sector. If the Europeanized form of financing is successful, it is possible that the Bundeswehr and the other European armed forces will regain the same capacity to respond to threats that they possessed back in 1989. In the meantime, national defense policy path dependencies have manifested themselves in the fields of planning, acquisition, and structure that have stymied pan-European military-industrial solutions. The dominant European-based defense industry is globalizing and, at the same time, third-party suppliers abroad are attempting to enter and compete in the European market; these trends threaten to fragment the defense sector in Europe. The experts in the discussion recommended impeding this trend through policy and implementing the concept of Pooling and Sharing as a tool against it. In sum, it is important for the EU and European NATO states to work together to create new European and transatlantic defense resources and to share these resources with one another. The benefits lie in improved coordination of defense technology, compatible armies, and in the case of emergency, a higher degree of operational capability and strength resulting from newly-achieved economies of scale.
The fundamental acknowledgement that purely domestic solutions to security policy are no longer possible and that a higher degree of flexibility is necessary has long been part of the discourse on this topic. To this end, the experts have identified some positive developments that include the joint path taken in the development of the NATO Spearhead Force and cooperation with the Netherlands, whose 11th air brigade has been supporting the Rapid Forces Division of the Bundeswehr since June of 2014. Furthermore, one of the eight German armed forces brigades is under European control. These examples demonstrate that the EU and NATO member states have begun the process of integration as outlined by the Pooling and Sharing concept. The participants agreed on a substantial argument for a comprehensive financial Europeanization of security and defense policy: while it would not be productive for the White Paper working group to define military emergencies in every imaginable form, it is also important not to exclude any probable critical scenario from the discussions. Against the backdrop of this extensive task, it is clear that in order to respond to attacks adequately, it is necessary to have coordinated, jointly-financed, sophisticated, and diversely-equipped European defense cooperation.

To achieve this goal it is imperative to conduct this discussion in the strategic community and to convey the importance to the general public. The experts emphasized that the debate should center on what kinds of leadership roles are necessary and what responsibility and commitment mean for international security policy in concrete terms. Most importantly, it will be important to discuss what it means to be an active member of NATO. The political decision-makers will not attract the public with the maxim „leadership from the center“, because this claim is too vaguely formulated and implies that Germany will retreat from responsibilities and rely on US security guarantees on European soil. Those responsible should make abundantly clear that the EU and NATO have a serious security problem on their periphery; furthermore, European states should develop collective legitimacy and solidarity to operate as a counterpart to the transatlantic defense alliance. Indeed, the crisis in Ukraine poses an inevitable problem for the western allies as well, because threats to security are ever-growing and should not be underestimated in economic or technical scope.

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Speech by German Federal Minister of Defense von der Leyen

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:19:36 +0000

Berlin, 11 November 2016. At the invitation of Atlantik-Brücke, Federal Minister of Defense Dr. Ursula von der Leyen spoke on the future of German foreign and security policy in front about 100 guests at Hotel Adlon in Berlin. In the light of Donald Trump’s election as US President just a few days before, she emphasized the importance of a continued effort to strengthen the transatlantic partnership and of further advancing political cooperation within the European Union. Von der Leyen started with a short analysis of the U.S. presidential election. She pointed out that the victory of Donald Trump was the result of deep divisions and an almost boundless anger at the political establishment in American society. While it is difficult to say how many of Donald Trump’s statements were just election rhetoric, changes in America’s foreign and security policy should certainly be expected. Trump’s worldview can be summarized as “America first”. Whether a policy serves American interests appears to be the focus of Trump’s approach to international security policy. While von der Leyen sees this as legitimate, she questioned whether this kind of cost-benefit analysis can be the sole standard, especially in defense policy where trust, reliability and a strong commitment to shared values are of central importance. In the rest of her speech, von der Leyen focused on three issues on which the European Union will have to take a clear stance and work constructively now: The war in Syria, Donald Trump’s demand for a greater European contribution to NATO’s defense, and the future relations between the United States and Russia.

Link to Minister von der Leyens Speech (in German)

Atlantik-Brücke would like to thank Roland Berger for the kind support.

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XXII Arthur Burns Memorial Lecture

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:03:46 +0000

Fundamentals of the German-American partnership were themes of the Arthur Burns Memorial Lecture given by German Federal Minister of Defense Dr. Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg on February 8, 2011. The event, which brought together 250 members and guests of Atlantik-Brücke, was held at the DZ Bank in Frankfurt am Main. Guttenberg’s speech addressed the concern that the significance of the transatlantic relationship could fade behind the US’s increasing interest in Asia. Guttenberg suggested that the German-American relationship should not be defined by common values and historical solidarity alone. More emphasis should be put on current challenges.

The Defense Minister, who is himself a Young Leader Alumnus of Atlantik-Brücke e.V., remains positive about the future of the German-American partnership. He cites the development of NATO over the past decades, a clear success story in his eyes, as a reason for the optimism. Guttenberg notes, however, that the European Union’s collective security policy and its cooperation with NATO need to be markedly improved.

Friedrich Merz, the Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke e.V., thanked the Minister for his remarks. For Merz, Guttenberg’s link between a security/foreign policy perspective and economic points attest to a realistic perception of the situation, one that does justice to the multifaceted nature of the transatlantic relationship.

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Between the Conflict in Ukraine and the Threat of ISIS

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 04:00:47 +0000

The twenty-third expert meeting with the U.S. European Command took place on November 18 in the Magnus-Haus in Berlin. Admiral Mark Ferguson, Commander Allied Joint Force Command Naples, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Naval Forces Africa, and Lieutenant General Erhard Bühler, Director Defense Plans & Policy at the German Ministry of Defense, presided over the meeting. Friedrich Merz, Atlantik-Brücke Chairman, gave the opening remarks at the meeting. Since 1990, Atlantik-Brücke has invited high-ranking representatives of the U.S. European Command and the Bundeswehr along with other experts from federal ministries, parliament, think tanks, the media, and business to discuss current security and defense policy issues.

From a German perspective, the integration of the topic started off with a focus on the recent process of drafting a new white paper which outlines the basis for the security and defense policy of the German government for the next ten years. A central element of the strategy is embedding German security and defense strategy into multinational cooperation – especially into NATO. From NATO’s point of view, the defense against hybrid warfare plays an increasingly important role.

The central topics of the debate were two major challenges for NATO: the crisis in Ukraine and the relationship with Russia as well as the imminent threat by the terrorist group “Islamic State” (ISIS), which primarily operates from Syria and Iraq. With its attacks in Paris, ISIS has now also hit Europe. The participants emphasized that a possible cooperation of the Western alliance with Russia against ISIS in Syria does not change the evaluation of Russia’s role in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Russia’s breech of international law when it annexed Crimea and its violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty cannot be tolerated. As a consequence, NATO has increased its bilateral and multilateral exercise maneuvers ever since the summit in Wales. NATO has also initiated more than 40 projects for the collective defense in the eastern regions of the alliance and strengthened its infrastructure, especially to reassure its Baltic partners. NATO aims to further enhance the transparency of its strategy to communicate its actions and the defensive character of the alliance more clearly to the public.

With regards to the fight against ISIS, the need for a political solution was emphasized. Financial sources of the terrorists need to be cut off and political leadership in the Middle East and moderate Islamic clerics need to be strengthened and supported. The possibilities for military support are very limited. Such an approach should includethe European Union and civil society organizations, as well. The cooperation between NATO and the EU in Kosovo was given as an example. In light of the Paris attacks, it was debated which options the Lisbon treaty offers and which consequences may arise: Article 42.7, which may cause a declaration of the EU mutual defense clause, or the solidarity clause of Article 188r, which calls for the support of EU member states hit by a terrorist attack.
Further topics that were discussed included the upcoming NATO summit in Warsaw and NATO enlargement.
Matthias Naß, international correspondent at DIE ZEIT, moderated the discussion.

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German Canadian Conference 2015 “Foreign and Security Policy”

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 26 Oct 2017 03:59:12 +0000

As the de facto capital of the European Union and NATO, Brussels was the appropriate venue for this year’s German-Canadian Conference on foreign and security policy. From April 15 to 18, challenges arising through terrorism as well as energy security, hybrid warfare and cyber security were discussed. The German and Canadian conference participants from the fields of politics, business, journalism and science talked about possible strategies of European-Canadian cooperation and drew comparisons between the two sides.

Among the guest speakers were Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, MEP (ALDE), Jonathan Parish, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning, Dr. Jamie Shea, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, Dr. Peter Boehm, Senior Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Helga Schmid, Deputy Secretary General & Political Director, European External Action Service, and Kerry Buck, Political Director and Assistant Deputy Minister, International Security and Political Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada.

The conference was hosted by Alan Bowman, Deputy Head of Mission, Mission of Canada to the European Union, Ambassador Reinhard Silberberg, Permanent Representative of the German Republic to the European Union, Michael Hinterdobler, Head of the Bavarian Mission to the European Union, Ambassador Martin Erdmann, Permanent Representative of Germany to NATO, and Dr. Marc Jan Eumann, State Secretary for Federal Affairs, Europe and Media of North Rhine-Westphalia.

The German-Canadian Conference is carried out in cooperation with the Atlantik-Bruecke Canada.

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“Working shoulder to shoulder” – Interview with Canadian Ambassador Stéphane Dion

Atlantic Bridge — Thu, 28 Sep 2017 06:07:43 +0000

The Honorable Stéphane Dion, Canadian Ambassador to Germany and Special Envoy to the European Union and Europe, speaks about the German elections, transatlantic cooperation, immigration and integration and CETA.

The most pressing issue on the table right now for Germany is the outcome of the elections. What has been the feedback in Canada to the German election results?

Canada was really comfortable with the two front runners. The Prime Minister has a strong relationship with Frau Merkel and a good relationship also with Mr. Schulz. The relationship between Canada and Germany is so positive. We work shoulder to shoulder around the world. German has been supportive of the free trade agreement between Canada and the EU. Frau Merkel now needs to find a coalition government, and the parties that she will negotiate with are also completely acceptable for Canada. From that point of view, we are very pleased that the winner is a friend of Canada.

One of the big issues here in Germany in the election was the relative success of the right-wing AfD. Many pundits have commented that this was due to fear of the current big wave of immigration. Canada is very successful at integrating immigrants into society. Are there are any lessons that Germany could learn from Canada?

We are always pleased to share our experience with our friends. Prime Minister Trudeau is convinced that diversity is a fact. Our population is aging. The work force is coming from other continents. And then, inclusion must be the choice. Because if there is no inclusion, there will be xenophobia and populism and that is not a good, not the right path. That being said, we are not here to lecture anyone. If you want to see how we do it – in a completely different context –, why Canada is strong not despite but because of its diversity, we are happy to share all the experience we have. In Europe and especially in Germany there is a lot of curiosity about the way we deal with these issues. It is a core part of Canadian identity. There is no need to copy our Canadian experience exactly in Germany or elsewhere. But maybe the Canadian case can be a source of more optimism about the capacity to integrate people from all over the world.

You mentioned the trade agreement between Canada and the EU, which has just provisionally come into effect a few days ago. Especially in Germany, there have been many critics of the agreement. Many people are worried that it might hurt consumers. What words of reassurance would you offer these critics?

We are not at all going to have a race to the bottom regarding workers’ rights, food safety, the environment. To the contrary, the agreement is very strong on that. The ability of the government to regulate and of parliament to legislate for the common good is protected. In fact, we will show our populations in Germany, in Europe, in Canada, and in the world, that we should never choose between trade and progress. We should bring them together and that is what we have done through CETA. And now that the tariffs are gone, now that we have the implementation of the agreement, I am convinced that many people will see that the sky is still blue and they did not need to be so nervous about it. We work together, confident in the new opportunities that this market has to offer. Canada for Europe and Europe for Canada.

Let us shift focus to your neighbor to the south. Since the new U.S. administration has come into office, the tone has become somewhat confrontational; old alliances are not relied upon as much as they used to. What does this mean for Canada and for the European-Canadian relationship?

One of Canada’s roles in the world is to encourage our American friends to work within the multilateral institutions of the world and not try to isolate themselves or try to rule the world without allies. While cultivating a strong relationship with President Trump, Prime Minister Trudeau makes sure to point out that multilateralism is the way to go. Our national interest is linked to the interest of other countries. The countries of the European Union are among them. Canada is strongly supporting the integration of European countries in the European Union and we are making this point frequently with the president of the United States and his entourage. We have a lot of support in American society. It’s the same with trade. Protectionism is not the solution and we are making this point very clear. The fact that we have a strong support here in Europe with Angela Merkel and the other leaders is a great help.

As Ambassador to Germany and Special Envoy to the European Union and Europe, what is at the top of your agenda?

Our priority is to make sure that the free trade agreement will be a success, to create jobs in Canada and in Europe and to show the world that yes, we need to trade and we need to be open to progressive policies and to sustainable solutions for the environment. We should not miss this opportunity. The environment, cultural policies, social policies, the social framework, all of this will be enhanced.

When you speak to friends in Canada these days, is there anything about Berlin that you find so remarkable that you always point it out to them?

What I find remarkable is that I have failed to meet one person, only one, who is unhappy to be in Berlin. Berlin is a city where you have all the advantages and none of the inconveniences of a big city. You have the arts, you have the beauty, you have the parks, but you don’t have a cost of living that is prohibitive, the traffic is still relatively acceptable and people are not as stressed as you see in the other big cities in the developed world. I think it is fantastic to be in Berlin.

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“Time to brace”

Atlantic Bridge — Wed, 05 Jul 2017 06:13:57 +0000

By Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook

Just months into his young presidency, it is clear that Europe cannot presume an even keel, firm alliance, or historically-shared interests with the United States of Donald Trump. The West, as long understood, is in hiatus. Europe must act accordingly.

The presumption of a steady, stabilizing US posture in foreign policy undeniably ended in May 2017 during the President’s first trip abroad, where he scolded and physically bullied allies in Europe, praised autocrats, and trivialized the Holocaust. That first trip underlined that he – not the presumed “adults in the room,” his National Security Advisor, Defense Secretary or even Secretary of State – would make the final call in foreign policy matters. Rex Tillerson seems adrift and far out of ear-shot of the President in critical foreign policy matters. National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster has been dressed-down numerous times in front of colleagues. While the Secretary of Defense has fared better, General Mattis’ statements are regularly undercut by the White House.

This remains a hard pill for European leaders to swallow. For months, they attempted to assuage their own nervous publics that the long arc of American commitment to European security and prosperity could not be so easily diverted by one man. But, as the President wiped references to Article V from his prepared script at NATO, it became obvious his advisors will not serve in the stabilizing roles European leaders imagined. As North Korea provokes, cyber attacks destabilize market flows and sands shift in the Middle East, and as an erratic American President grows restless with a domestic agenda that is slow to advance, we are entering a dangerous phase in international politics.

As global leaders gather in Hamburg for the G-20 Summit – a meeting that by design contradicts a Trumpian world-view – European leaders are duty-bound to shoulder additional responsibility for the global economic and security architecture. Their public agrees: On average 72% of Europeans questioned for the latest Pew Research Center poll does not trust President Trump to “do the right thing.”

Time is of the essence: European leaders must pursue a range of parallel policy avenues, focusing on what might lie ahead.

First, they must (and have already begun to) consolidate the gains of European integration, particularly in intelligence-sharing, security and economic defense matters. External pressures from Russia and the US are forcing these moves – but they were long overdue. This means expanding cyber-capacities to secure markets and people; deepening the Framework Nations Concept in NATO and yes, committing to 2% GDP spending – over the course of 10 years agreed upon in Wales. All in. And it means making uncharacteristically rapid advances on stabilizing the Eurozone.

Second, European leaders must triangulate: The EU-Japan trade deal is one such move. Further careful engagement with China is another. Europe has interests, it’s time the Union articulated them clearly and underlined its intentions to act on them.

Third, they must co-opt and extract value: Where overlap exists between the President’s domestically-focused agenda, European leaders must lean in. But they should craft artful deals, and ‘grow the pie’ in the process. The President wants to borrow labor market strategies, manufacturing and entrepreneurship strategies from European countries to revitalize the American heartland? Let there be trade-offs for that type of knowledge-sharing.

Fourth, they must collaborate: America’s military might, economic heft and cultural influence dictates that isolation is not an option. Re-upping commitments in the international institutional architecture, upholding strong diplomatic ties with the Trump administration are the standard elements. More importantly, European leaders must retain their holistic view of the United States as one of the most vibrant democracies in the world. Partnering with cities, states, civil society – creating networks and linkages and functioning systems to support these – as mapped out in the priorities of the 2017 G-20 agenda is the right, the only way to develop anticipatory responses to the inter-connected, transnational challenges of the 21st century.

It’s time to brace and deepen European security effectiveness and integration and to prepare European citizens for these shifts in global responsibility with honesty and openness. It is an opportunity for Europeans to forge their own “shining city on a hill,” while the world’s historic guarantor of global order is on hiatus.

Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook is the founding Executive Director of the Future of Diplomacy Projectat the Harvard Kennedy School and was a 2012 Atlantik-Brücke Young Leader. She will serve as an expert commentator for ARD-Television during the G-20 Summit in Hamburg in early July 2017.

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“Predictable Unpredictability”

Atlantic Bridge — Wed, 05 Jul 2017 06:12:40 +0000

By Jeremy Shapiro

Donald Trump is returning to Europe twice in July, with stops in Poland, Germany, and France. After the conspicuous disaster of his first trip to Europe at the end of May, the press is fairly quivering with excitement at the possibilities for mischief and mayhem surrounding America’s volatile commander-in-chief.

And, if experience is any guide, Trump will probably deliver. He could easily do for the Polish-German relations what he did for Saudi-Qatar relations on his last trip to the Persian Gulf. He could go into snit because of the protests against his visit. Or maybe he could just tweet out some insult about Angela Merkel’s look. It is all possible.

But it is also all a distraction. Because regardless of whom Trump insults or whom he flatters on this particular trip, serious questions about the Trump administration should persist for all of Europe. Five endless months into his tenure, a few points about his presidency have already become abundantly clear to reasonably attentive European observers:

Trump is more of a clown than an ideologue — he is basically uninterested in most aspects of policy and in any case incapable of carrying through complex policy initiatives such as health care or immigration.
He is more of a bully than a savvy negotiator – he has backed down or given up on almost everything so far including declaring China a currency manipulator, dumping the Iran deal, and getting Mexico to pay for the wall. Like most bullies, he gives up easily when actually challenged.
He is more of an egotist than a strategist. He values symbolic “quick win” actions like bombing Syria that make him look decisive more than he cares for consistency or coherence. His policy therefore changes at the speed of a tweet.

All of this means that the essence of Trump’s policy is its incoherence and unpredictability. Nonetheless, in Europe, many policymakers have a certain complacency about his presidency. They note that the nastier elements of his campaign rhetoric — the hostility toward NATO, the indifference to the European Union, and the support for populist forces in Europe — have largely disappeared.

To their relief, Trump has put into place a foreign policy team that fits well within the bounds of normal Republican parameters. Beneath the daily tumult of Trump-induced chaos, people like Secretary of Defense James Mattis, National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, and U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley are working assiduously to reassure allies and to fashion a foreign policy that, while distinct from that of former U.S. President Barack Obama, is hardly revolutionary.

In stark opposition to candidate Trump, his administration’s foreign policy seeks to continue American leadership in the world, and indeed signals greater involvement in the Middle East and a greater willingness overall to commit American power to regional stability around the world.

This is not ideal from the perspective of many Europeans who remember the travails of the Bush administration, but it is quite familiar. It does not represent a collapse of world order. All the Europeans need to do is appeal to Trump’s ego at ceremonial occasions, be especially nice to Ivanka, and then do the serious business with the grownups in the next room. This is the emerging Trump management strategy around the world, from Japan to Saudi Arabia to Germany. People are gaining confidence in it.

This confidence is an illusion. Trump’s (lack of) character traits have already sunk his domestic agenda and even endangered his presidency. To the extent that Trump’s foreign policy has worked at all so far, it is because he has not been very interested or involved.

Yet American presidencies have a certain trajectory. They begin with a president committed to a domestic agenda — health care, immigration, taxes, etc. Usually within a year or two, they confront the fact that presidential power is very limited on domestic issues, and the U.S. Congress is a gridlocked mess. Looking to remain relevant and proactive, the president naturally turns to an area where he has greater power to take decisive action. Unfortunately for Europe and the world, that area is foreign policy.

As in domestic policy, the coherence of the Trump administration’s foreign policy will not survive the intervention of the president. The office of the presidency is central to U.S. foreign policy — Trump can with an errant tweet or an impulsive missile strike undo months or years of careful planning.

And he might at any time. On a host of issues, the president is not on the same page as his national security team. On Russia, particularly, he seems completely at odds with his team’s own policy, even as Russia-related scandals engulf his administration. It is folly to believe that the United States and Europe can construct a long-term transatlantic policy to deal with a growing Russian challenge while the president divulges top-secret intelligence to the Russians in the Oval Office.

European complacency risks tying Europe’s fate to an unstable and unpredictable U.S. president. European policymakers hope that he will listen to his team, live up to their promises, and not destroy the NATO alliance or the European Union in a fit of pique. They would be wiser to hedge against his predictable unpredictability and seek their own means of securing their position in the world. This means developing a European defense capability and a European policy on Russia that doesn’t depend on the United States and its mercurial president.

Jeremy Shapiro is Research Director at ECFR. Previously he was a fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy and the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, where he edited the Foreign Policy program’s blog Order from Chaos. Prior to Brookings, he was a member of the U.S. State Department’s policy planning staff, where he advised the secretary of state on U.S. policy in North Africa and the Levant. He was also the senior advisor to Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon, providing strategic guidance on a wide variety of U.S.-European foreign policy issues.

An earlier version of this article was published under the title “Trump and Europe: The NASCAR Summit?” on ECFR’s website.

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America and Europe can only succeed together – An appeal for transatlantic cooperation by Atlantik-Bruecke

Atlantic Bridge — Mon, 13 Feb 2017 05:13:32 +0000

A shorter version of this appeal was published in the print version of the German daily WELT on February 12, 2017, and on February 15 on »WELT online

In his inaugural speech, President Donald Trump emphasized that he does not want to dwell on the past. He only wants to look ahead now. And he feels committed to the welfare of his country above all: “America first”. During his first days in office, President Trump showed what he means by this.

We know and do not question that any government is committed to the welfare of its own country, first and foremost. But peace and freedom throughout the world are also dependent on large and small nations taking responsibility beyond their own borders. Looking ahead only takes you in the right direction if experiences from the past are heeded and tried and trusted institutions, which were established on the basis of these experiences, are not casually abandoned. It is with great worry that we witness the political developments on either side of the Atlantic.

The first half of the twentieth century was characterized by war, destruction, genocide and unfettered barbarity. After two world wars, responsible politicians in America and Europe were able to create a new political order, which has given us a unique period of peace and freedom lasting over seven decades. President Truman, who laid the foundations for Germany’s reconstruction with the signing of the Marshall Plan, saw the historic turning point here. Following the “era of national suspicion, economic hostility and isolationism”, a new age of “mutual cooperation, to increase the prosperity of people throughout the world” was called to life.

This political order is still characterized by common values and the conviction that a reliable partnership between nations and communities of states is only possible when the rules of our coexistence, which we have established through democratic processes, are complied with, when existing institutions of international cooperation such as the United Nations, NATO and the European Union, are respected and when discussions and negotiations regarding their ongoing development are shaped by mutual respect and understanding.

This is exactly why bankers Eric M. Warburg and Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen, entrepreneur and politician Erik Blumenfeld, journalists Marion Graefin Doenhoff and Ernst Friedlaender and entrepreneur Hans Karl von Borries founded Atlantik-Bruecke 65 years ago. They were convinced that open discussions and meetings would overcome the mistrust between the young Federal Republic of Germany and America, leading to trusting cooperation. Since then Atlantik-Bruecke has brought together thousands of Germans and Americans, and their exchange of ideas and knowledge has led to new mindsets and initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic and close personal friendships. In Atlantik-Bruecke, people of different political and professional experiences, of all skin colors and ways of life are linked by the conviction that the transatlantic partnership is and will remain a prerequisite for peace on our continents in the future.

We are not ignoring the fact that following the changes in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, new answers and new forms of international cooperation are urgently needed. We know and also regret that the European Union is not currently meeting these challenges. Nationalism, isolationism and protectionism are, however, the wrong answers.

In our countries we are confronted with new types of conflict and new risks to our domestic and international security. Both America and Europe are threatened by terrorism in the same way. We must respond to this firmly and consistently. The quality of our open, free societies, however, will reveal itself in the respect and protection with which we treat our basic values and liberal principles in the face of these threats. With all the differences there are between Europe and America, this is the common foundation on which we stand and from which we are able to act. Only together can Europe and America continue to ensure freedom, democracy and human rights in the future. If doubts about this premise continue to grow, this will be very damaging for Europe and America.

Ultimately, open societies and open markets belong together. We cannot overlook the fact that global development over recent decades has not only brought benefits. The United States and the EU must jointly set a good example in order to halt the dramatic effects of climate change. We must ask ourselves how we can guarantee that everyone benefits from globalization. Here too, however, nationalism, isolationism and protectionism are the wrong answers. The increase in wealth over recent decades has been greatest where borders are open and there is a climate of respect, a willingness to take responsibility and social equality. So at Atlantik-Bruecke we are not only committed to free trade, but above all continuing to uphold our joint values including freedom of expression, religious freedom, freedom of the press and academic freedom.

America and Europe must not only turn inwards. Governments and parliaments, institutions of civil society and not least the economy on both sides of the Atlantic now have an obligation and responsibility to work closely in partnership in the face of big international challenges and threats.

The Executive Board of Atlantik-Bruecke:
Friedrich Merz, Chairman
Dr. h.c. Edelgard Bulmahn MdB, Vice Chairman
Professor Dr. Burkhard Schwenker, Vice Chairman
Professor Dr. Andreas Dombret, Treasurer
Dr. David Deissner, Executive Director

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Turkey Should Welcome Kurdish Gains in Northern Syria

Atlantic Bridge — Fri, 26 Jun 2015 06:31:33 +0000

by Max Hoffman, Center for American Progress
Syrian Kurdish rebel forces fighting under the banner of the People’s Protection Units, or YPG—along with a brigade from the U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army, or FSA, and Assyrian Christian fighters—captured the town of Tel Abyad in northern Syria from Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, last week. The offensive was enabled by persistent coalition air strikes coordinated with YPG fighters on the ground.

Tel Abyad sits on the Syrian-Turkish border along one of the main highways south from Turkey to Raqqa, the Syrian city that ISIS has declared as its capital. As such, the city served as an important entry point for foreign fighters and supplies destined for Raqqa and service with ISIS. By taking the city and continuing their push south toward Raqqa this week, the Kurdish YPG and their FSA allies have cut this important supply line and dealt a blow to ISIS. In addition, the threat to Raqqa has most likely forced ISIS to divert forces from elsewhere in order to bolster its capital’s defenses, relieving the pressure on other areas that are resisting ISIS advances. But Turkish officials in Ankara have not welcomed these positive developments in the campaign against ISIS as they should.

Fear underscores Turkish reaction to Kurdish success

Instead of applauding the blow to ISIS, Turkish officials have reacted with alarm, fearing the creation of a permanent, autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Syria. Turkey, a NATO ally, has long feared such an outcome, which its leaders believe could foment separatism among Turkey’s own Kurdish population. The Turkish state has struggled for 30 years to stamp out an intermittent separatist insurgency in mostly Kurdish southeastern Turkey led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which Turkey, the United States, and the European Union label a terrorist organization. The PKK has upheld a unilateral ceasefire for the past three years and appears open to a peaceful solution offered by the Turkish state. But officials in Ankara still fear that the Syrian Kurdish enclave—governed by the Democratic Union Party, or PYD, a sister organization to the PKK and the political party closest to the YPG forces that took Tel Abyad—could offer encouragement and sanctuary to the PKK should the group reopen hostilities in Turkey.

These fears underpin the hostile reaction of Turkish officials to the YPG’s gains against ISIS. Two weeks ago, when the advance on Tel Abyad began, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan warned that “The West, which is hitting Arabs and Turkmen of Tel Abyad from the air, is sadly settling the PYD and PKK terror organizations in their places.” Several days later, President Erdoğan added that the YPG’s seizure of Tel Abyad “could lead to the creation of a structure [independent state] that threatens our borders.” U.S. support for the Kurds, including coordinated air strikes and shared intelligence, has contributed to tension between Washington and Ankara, part of a wider disagreement over what course to pursue in Syria.

Five reasons Turkey should welcome Kurdish progress against ISIS

Despite the historical animosity between Ankara and the Kurdish groups that are active in Syria today and the reactions of Erdoğan and other Turkish leaders, the gains achieved by Syrian Kurdish fighters and their allies against ISIS are good for Turkey’s security. Turkey should welcome these developments for five reasons.

1. It strengthens the Turkey-Syria border
The YPG and its allies have pushed ISIS back from long stretches of the Turkish border, which enhances Turkish security by making it more difficult for ISIS operatives to infiltrate southern Turkey. Turkey has been criticized in some quarters for failing to crack down on the flow of foreign fighters and logistical support to ISIS across its southern border, including public criticism from President Obama two weeks ago. But it is a long, porous border with many towns straddling the divide and long-standing family and trade ties; this makes it very difficult to patrol, let along seal off. Turkey has therefore been—and remains—very vulnerable to possible cross-border attacks from ISIS should the group turn against Turkey. The YPG gains will insulate against this vulnerability, to some extent, and should be welcomed in Ankara.

2. It weakens ISIS
Almost anything that weakens ISIS is good for regional security and good for Turkey. The YPG is one of the few groups that effectively resisted and pushed back ISIS, with the help of its Arab and Assyrian allies and coalition airstrikes. This effectiveness is enhanced because YPG fighters have now successfully cut ISIS’ primary supply line to its capital, hampering its efforts to recruit fighters and resupply and forcing the group to shift forces from other fronts. ISIS forces are vulnerable to coalition air strikes when executing such redeployments, particularly if the group tries to move heavy weaponry or armored vehicles to the new front. ISIS will have to either accept YPG gains or face battle on terrain chosen by the Kurdish group and the coalition, in the open, away from civilian populations, and where they are most vulnerable to aerial attacks.

3. It supports moderates
The YPG and its Arab and Assyrian allies represent a relatively moderate array of forces that reject the violent Salafist ideology that motivates so many armed actors in Syria. While information is difficult to verify, it seems the PYD and YPG have avoided widespread abuse of civilians, so common elsewhere in Syria, and have sought to design a new social contract and legal system. The groups allowed Human Rights Watch to investigate the cantons under their control and pledged to address serious concerns of arbitrary detention and abuse raised by the monitoring group. The YPG’s cooperation with Assyrian Christians, Arab tribes, and the Euphrates Volcano—an FSA-linked rebel group—during the Tel Abyad campaign is encouraging. While the YPG and the PYD should continue to reach out across ethnic and sectarian lines and can certainly do more to include non-PYD voices in the administration of the Syrian Kurdish cantons, they are making the best of a bad situation amid a chaotic and bloody sectarian war.

4. The Syrian PYD does not seek an independent state
The Turkish government overestimates the potential for an independent Kurdish state on its border. Syrian PYD leaders have repeatedly said that they do not seek an independent state and that they support the territorial integrity of Syria and consider themselves Syrian. A PYD official repeated this assertion this week, saying “We have no plan to take a part of Syria. Indeed, we are part of it and we will fight to maintain an independent, democratic and united Syria with our allies.” The Kurds have declared autonomy in the context of the Syrian war but say that this will not change their commitment to be a part of a future Syria. Kurdish leaders argue they are merely seeking assurances about their status—including more control of local government—in a future, post-Assad Syria. Given the history of anti-Kurdish racism and state repression of Kurdish political participation, including the denial of citizenship, this position is reasonable.

5. Syrian Kurdish autonomy will not undermine negotiations with the PKK
Turkey is misjudging the impact that the Syrian Kurdish struggle is having on its negotiations with the PKK and overall relations with Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Ankara fears that Syrian Kurdish autonomy, alongside Iraqi Kurdish autonomy, could lead Turkish Kurds to demand such status for themselves or, more dramatically, seek to join them in an ethnic Kurdish federation. Such fears are far-fetched and ignore the political and linguistic differences between Kurds, personal and political rivalries and animosity between Iraqi Kurdish leaders and the PKK and PYD, deep energy and economic ties linking the Iraqi Kurds to Baghdad and Ankara, the hostility of regional powers and the United States to such an outcome, and the stated goals of Kurdish leaders on all sides to pursue greater political status within their current national borders. As previously mentioned, the PYD seeks a future within Syria, and the PKK dropped demands for independence years ago. Meanwhile, Iraqi Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani has put plans for an independence referendum on hold and pledged that any plan would be peaceful and negotiated with the Iraqi central government.

In fact, Turkey is ignoring several positive effects that the Syrian Kurdish struggle is having on Turkey’s peace talks with the PKK. First, young Kurdish men and women who seek to fight in in the name of Kurdish ethnic nationalism are now drawn to Syria to fight ISIS, rather than targeting the Turkish state. Second, for the first time, the United States has leverage over the PKK and PYD due to its air campaign in support of their fighters—leverage it can use to ensure peace in Turkey. Without U.S. air support and intelligence, the Syrian Kurdish cantons would be very vulnerable to ISIS. This Kurdish reliance on the United States dramatically reduces the odds of the PKK reopening the armed struggle within Turkey: Such a move would lead the United States to immediately cut support for Syrian Kurdish groups linked to the PKK, likely causing a split within the broader Kurdish movement and widespread anger toward the PKK leadership.

But Ankara’s outlook is complicated by two preoccupations of the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government in Ankara. Having just lost their outright parliamentary majority, the AKP must now form a coalition government. The most likely partner is the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, which strongly opposes Kurdish autonomy and favors a hard line toward the Syrian Kurdish cantons, making accommodation difficult. The AKP may therefore be ramping up the rhetoric against the Kurds in order to secure a coalition agreement. Second, Turkey’s primary goal in Syria has been to overthrow Assad, which has led Turkey to support quite extreme Islamist rebel groups—many of whom are hostile to the YPG and their allies. Still, on matters of fundamental national importance such as securing the border and combating ISIS, the Turkish government must take a long-term view.

Turkey must adapt to the new security situation

The bottom line is that Turkey must get over its preoccupations and adapt. Overall, U.S. support for Syrian Kurdish fighters and their allies in the fight against ISIS is improving the security situation in northern Syria and alleviating humanitarian suffering. The capture of Tel Abyad and the wider gains of Syrian Kurdish groups and their allies are good for Turkish security and should be welcomed by Ankara. Indeed, a more productive course would be for the United States and Turkey to cooperate to support the Syrian Kurdish cantons against ISIS and provide more substantial humanitarian support. If the United States and Turkey jointly support these groups, the two nations could bring considerable leverage to bear, as Kurdish fighters in Syria do not have deep-pocketed or committed external backers, unlike many Islamist groups and, indeed, the Assad regime. This means the United States and Turkey could use their leverage to force the YPG and the PYD to open up to diverse ethnic and political groups, cooperate more deeply with the moderate Arab FSA groups, and ensure civilian safety in the areas under YPG/PYD control. More importantly, such joint U.S. and Turkish support could improve the lives of ordinary Syrians who are caught up in the maelstrom. And, of course, such cooperation would project unity in the face of the ISIS threat and, perhaps, lay the foundation for a post-war Syria.

Max Hoffman is a Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress.

Link zum Artikel auf der Website des Center for American Progress

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