In handling technologies and digital products, a dual strategy is needed to prepare for the future: We must strengthen the European market and domestic digital industry while adapting or embedding non-European products as necessary—aiming to use them securely and autonomously. This is only possible through close cooperation among the state, economy, science, and society.

By Claudia Plattner and Florian Seiller

Cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technologies, and mobile standards 5G/6G are key technologies and essential drivers of digitalization. They are transforming our world at tremendous speed, enabling unprecedented innovation for state, economy, science, and society, thus forming the basis of our prosperity and competitiveness. They are indispensable to our economy and increasingly permeate everyday life, from smartphones, tablets, wearables, electric vehicles, smart homes, social media presence, to cloud storage of personal data. Yet we are only at the beginning of profound developments: smart factories, smart cities, eGovernment, automated and connected mobility, eHealth, and New Space may soon become reality. The 2030s might usher in the next megatrend: quantum technologies promising leaps in computing power, communication, sensing, and simulation. Moreover, the number of connected devices is expected to surge to over 39 billion globally by 2033—more than four devices per person.

The cyber threat landscape

To successfully shape digitalization, massive effort and acceleration are required in state modernization, research, market transfer, legislation, and standards, especially if we want to compete in the digital top league and lead in future technologies. Current geopolitical developments confronting the West sharpen our awareness of the inseparability of digitalization and security and the necessity of addressing both jointly as two sides of the same coin.

[related] Particularly in cyberspace, what we call cyber aggression is felt profoundly. It is becoming a central battlefield for hybrid attacks (cyber conflict), a hotspot for criminals (cybercrime), and a sphere of technological dependencies (cyber dominance). Digital espionage, sabotage, disinformation, and propaganda have massively intensified over years, executable from almost anywhere in protected environments far from targets. Attribution is difficult as actors easily mask identities online. The damage caused—both virtual and physical—can be significant. For instance, cyberattacks on a European airport service provider in September 2025 severely disrupted air traffic. Or recall wind turbine disruption due to a satellite network attack in the context of the Ukraine war (2022). Persistent ransomware attacks targeting municipalities or their IT service providers disrupt or paralyze administration. Not only critical infrastructures but also democratic institutions—parliaments, parties, politicians, ministries, authorities, foundations, think tanks, and NGOs—face continuous digital fire aimed at shaking trust in state protection and democracy. A particularly insidious tactic is leaking stolen or manipulated data to discredit victims. Elections, a democracy’s core element, have also been targeted by foreign actors—with Germany’s vigilance keeping substantial success at bay. Many such attacks originate from state or state-affiliated actors such as intelligence services or APT groups with significant financial, technological, and personnel resources.

“Digitalization and security are inextricably linked. It is essential to think of both together.”

Cybercriminals operate sprawling, specialized ecosystems making substantial profits, especially via ransomware. Daily, around 300,000 malware variants appear. Boundaries between cyber conflict and cybercrime are increasingly blurred. The damages from cyberattacks to the German economy are immense: estimates for 2025 are about €202.4 billion, nearly €23 billion more than last year. For comparison, the 2025 federal budget is around €502.5 billion. IT outages from technical problems can also cause massive losses, such as the billions lost in 2024 due to a faulty update of Crowdstrike Falcon security software.

Analogously, Germany experiences continuous espionage and sabotage on land, water, and air, such as drone overflights, arson attacks, airspace provocations, or shadow fleets. Chancellor Friedrich Merz summarized this starkly: “We are not at war, but we are no longer living in peace” (Schwarz Ecosystem Summit, 26.09.2025).

Threat trends in cyberspace exemplified by artificial intelligence

Technological advances significantly shape security and defense policies. Dual-use technology AI is especially powerful, transforming social media, work, research, entertainment, and medicine. However, new technologies can also be misused. Foreign powers, criminals, and politically motivated hackers use innovative technologies to bypass IT defenses and increase digital offensive power. Already, attackers use AI-based methods on IT systems and infrastructure. AI-assisted attack tools speed vulnerability detection and exploitation, evade defenses, deploy malware via tailored social engineering (e.g., almost perfectly personalized phishing emails), or create malicious code—all without deep technical know-how. The darknet offers wide “shopping” options payable in cryptocurrency. AI might even support ransomware payments in cryptocurrency. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) strongly advises against ransom payment. AI also amplifies Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks which temporarily disable web servers via overload. Particularly worrying is generative AI enabling automated attacks.

AI is heavily used for creating deepfakes and spreading disinformation, especially around elections, political campaigns, or to damage reputations. Expert knowledge is not always necessary—faces, voices, texts, and photos can be convincingly faked and misused criminally or politically. Experts increasingly struggle to distinguish real from fake due to rapid AI progress. Transparency is key, involving detection and digital “watermarks” to reliably verify content and provenance and identify AI-generated material. Authenticity confirmation from senders is needed—for example, a chancellor’s video should bear the federal chancellor’s office’s signature, while the Vatican would unlikely sign a photo of the pope in a Gucci coat.

Manipulation risk also comes from tampering AI systems by inputting distorted data to extract sensitive information or manipulate IT systems. In sum: AI models, especially large language models (LLMs), make future attacks faster, cheaper, and accessible to less technical hackers. AI’s military significance is evident in the Russian aggression on Ukraine. Autonomous AI hacking tools that independently compromise IT infrastructures do not yet exist, but LLM-based agents automating parts of attacks are deployed by foreign actors. The future will see attacks involving AI and against AI, cloud infrastructures, autonomous systems, or cryptography (e.g., quantum computing). We face a permanent and accelerating race between attackers and defenders.

The good news: new technologies do not only pose uncertainties but also many new opportunities—also for IT security. AI can help detect cyber threats and vulnerabilities faster (prevention), detect anomalies in data traffic (detection), intelligently analyze huge data sets, and automate defensive measures (response).

At the National IT Situation Centre, the operational cyber defense core at BSI, AI is already in use. However, only one in ten companies currently uses AI for cyber defense, so there is significant room for growth. Saarbrücken, a real AI hotspot, houses BSI’s AI expertise, intensively addressing AI and security questions, including digital consumer protection. In summer 2025, BSI published a checklist for AI systems in finance to systematically assess security, transparency, traceability, and fairness.

Technological dependencies exemplified by AI

Europeans’ vulnerabilities stem not only from direct attacks with new technologies but also from longstanding technological dependencies—digital products, quantum computing, 5G components, hardware, clouds, semiconductors. This is noticeable in administration, economy, and research. Surveys show that dependencies on the USA and China are perceived as largest in Germany. International crises and geopolitical tensions—sometimes fought with tariff and trade policy instruments, causing global trade conflicts—directly impact supply chains and can lead to influence via digital product manufacturers accessing data and services. Examples include solar inverter or router manufacturers from states where official bodies exert extensive control and manufacturers are obliged to full cooperation. Sabotage risks, such as in conflict scenarios, are also present. Such influence possibilities (cyber dominance) risk supply security, economy, and general security.

“The USA and China have significant market power.”

In AI, besides manufacturer access, market concentration causes technological dependency. The USA and China dominate, controlling availability of advanced generative AI models and necessary cloud infrastructures. Powerful AI models are usually licensed restrictively or cloud-hosted. Few large US and Chinese firms dominate training and hosting. Hardware is often overlooked: powerful AI systems demand specific, high-performance chips (GPUs, dedicated AI chips) developed and produced by few global companies in specific regions. This creates tangible supply risks and uncertainties. Additionally, dependency on quality training data with unverifiable validity exists.

Measures to strengthen digital sovereignty

As Germany’s cybersecurity authority, BSI believes states must ensure digital key technologies are available and securely usable to successfully and safely advance digitalization, mitigate risks, and reduce dependencies—especially amid hybrid threats and geopolitical rivalries. Our view: a dual strategy is needed:

First, strengthen the European market and domestic digital industry and accelerate digital sovereignty. Large foreign Big Tech companies still have significant lead in some areas; a full and sudden switch to national and European digital solutions is currently impossible. Since alternatives to foreign suppliers in AI are currently limited, European AI promotion must be intensified. Cybersecurity must be considered from the start (security by design).

Fortunately, numerous promising national and European approaches, initiatives, and products now exist in cloud and AI. Germany and Europe must catch up. We must invest more in German and European programs and better foster market readiness of domestic developers and manufacturers to produce internationally competitive products. Often, the hurdle is not fundamental research but market entry. This applies to cybersecurity products as well. Building a cyber market concretely benefits our cybersecurity and is a pillar of BSI’s strategy toward a cyber nation.

“We must invest more strongly in German and European programs.”

Second, adapt or embed international products technically as needed for secure and autonomous use and reliable prevention of undesired data leaks. European norms, standards, and security requirements must guide manufacturers and providers. Core is implementing technical control layers in products and services to better secure technologies and reduce dependencies. Yet extensive research and development effort is required. Securing products also requires close collaboration with manufacturers and open source communities nationally, across Europe, and internationally—practiced by BSI already.

The more trustworthy products available, the more sovereign decisions and secure digitalization become. It is about assessing and mastering technologies. Without this ability, we cannot master digitalization or cybersecurity. Assessing security properties and deriving requirements for products and services is a core BSI task. Close exchange with international partners, especially transatlantic, is indispensable.

This is why we also value dialogue at Atlantik-Brücke: it provides a forum for exchange among state, economic, and societal representatives on both sides of the Atlantic, strengthens mutual trust, and brings the transatlantic value community to life amid massive security threats. We look forward to continued exchange and jointly shaping cybersecurity in the future!

About the authors: Claudia Plattner is President of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Dr. Florian Seiller works in Department K24 – Strategies and New Approaches to Information Security (BSI).

[Disclaimer: This text was originally written in German. The English translation was produced with the help of AI.]

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Following the event, he emphasized in a video interview with Atlantik-Brücke the need for increased defense spending – specifically 5% of GDP or 3.5% for military investments – in order to meet the requirements of modern warfare, especially in the areas of cyber and space, which will be central to the future. In the past, the focus was on land, air, and sea forces, Badia said, but today cyber and space operations are crucial for dominance, which is why significant financial resources are needed for holistic capability development.

Despite the differing national interests of the 32 NATO member states, Badia emphasizes the alliance’s shared values. He describes how consensus-based decision-making is based on the search for alternatives, so that a rejection (“no”) often leads to an “alternative yes.” Over his 41-year career, the security policy landscape has changed constantly – from the Cold War to German reunification and out-of-area operations to new threat scenarios. Nevertheless, the community of values of the “free Western alliance” has always remained capable of action.

Badia is optimistic that, despite tensions between national sovereignty and common alliance interests, actions will always be taken in the interests of the West and that NATO plus its 35 partners stand on a stable, value-based foundation.

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Interview: Tyson Barker

Dr. Polyakova, when we talk about disinformation campaigns and political warfare the year 2016 stands out. The presidential election in the United States and the Brexit referendum were the wake-up call for the West. What has happened since and what is the next iteration of this threat?

[related]What happened in 2016 was not new in terms of Russia’s global desire to undermine influence politics in other countries like Ukraine, Georgia and countries closer to Russia that it considers to be the legitimate testing grounds for these kinds of operations. This tool kit has become so diffuse. We are seeing other state actors using these kinds of techniques. Iran, North Korea and China will eventually enter this space in a significant way as well. If you look at what the Russian intentions and activities have been in places like Ukraine, we can make some assertions about what we might expect.

First of all disinformation campaigns especially in social media have not stopped. Secondly they have certainly evolved in the sense that we now see a lot of content that we can identify as disinformation from the Russian side jumping across platforms and being amplified by Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. Google results are being manipulated when it comes to certain search terms. The social media companies have responded to a certain extent. In my view, their response is relatively superficial and minimal. They have started taking down disinformation networks and reducing automated accounts in rank. However, we are quite far behind in truly addressing this threat.

The social media companies have responded to a certain extent. In my view, their response is relatively superficial and minimal.

Ukraine has been the laboratory for these kinds of tools and techniques. Do we see new mutations of these tools being used in Ukraine?

The positive outcome of the exposure to these influence operations in the information space has been hyperawareness. There has been a general acknowledgement that Ukraine has been the primary victim and target of Russian efforts. There have been attacks on critical infrastructure systems, especially on electrical grids. We are going to see much more of these kinds of aggressive attacks. The presidential elections in Ukraine in March are just around the corner. This is going to be an event to watch.

You wrote an excellent report at Brookings entitled “Weapons of the Weak” in which you highlighted the return on investment of so-called Deep Fakes. What exactly are we talking about here?

‘Deep Fakes’ has become the term of a catch-all-concept for manipulation of audio and video content online. Deep Fakes are A.I. driven and produced, incredibly advanced and original content. Doctored videos and images are nothing new. But this concept is profoundly different because our ability to detect manipulated video and audio has not caught up with the ability of these algorithms to produce this false audio and video material.

Deep Fakes are A.I. driven and produced, incredibly advanced and original content.

Can you give us an example?

Here is a quick and famous one: If you google Obama and Deep Fake, you will see four videos of President Obama speaking. I regularly show these and give talks about them. I always ask the audience: which one is the real Obama? People pick one, but of all them are fake of course! This signals to us that AI is closely linked to Big Data. If you can feed a huge amount of data into this algorithm, it can produce a new video. It looks so real and so convincing that we can’t detect it is false content.

If you can feed a huge amount of data into this algorithm, it can produce a new video. It looks so real and so convincing that we can’t detect it is false content.

Frankly, some implications of this phenomenon are frightening. An audio voicemail being left for troops serving in the Baltic states or an e-mail coming in with a video of the commanding officer sharing what is actually false and misleading information take some time to verify. Meanwhile, that will subserve the role of disorientating potential military operations. Fake videos are often much more fun to look at because they are more sensationalist than accurate content. They are spread much faster than accurate content, and it takes longer to debunk their false narratives. It is open source based, so it is out there. We have to prepare ourselves for this.

Russia will probably not be the developer of this technology but more of an early adopter and weaponizer of it. Who is developing this technology?

Russia has great military capacities and of course a nuclear arsenal. But if you look at its financial capabilities, its struggling economy and its declining demographics, Russia doesn’t look like a great power. From the Russian perspective, investing in these kinds of technologies and asymmetric threats is a great way to balance out the other inequities that the country experiences vis-à-vis Western Europe and the United States.

From the Russian perspective, investing in these kinds of technologies and asymmetric threats is a great way to balance out the other inequities that the country experiences vis-à-vis Western Europe and the United States.

Well, who are the innovators? Certainly, it is a global market. If we look at a few different indicators, it becomes very clear who is going to be an innovator. Obviously, you need well trained, sophisticated, highly skilled individuals in machine learning. You also need access to massive amounts of data. A.I. has been around for decades, some of the first A.I. algorithms were written in the 1950s. In fact, the new algorithms are not that different. However, the critical change has been that we now have the ability to process data and that we have a mass availability of data. China will consequently lead in this sphere. Whoever controls the data, will control the world.

Another leader in this space is the United States. How should governments regulate A.I. to protect our democracy from these kinds of technologies being weaponized in the civil society?

I haven’t seen any serious regulatory and legislative efforts in the United States so far to grapple with this problem. Mainly because we don’t see a clear technological solution. On the regulatory side it is very difficult to see where this will go. There is a general reluctance among policy makers in the Republican and Democratic parties around regulatory efforts for the big tech firms who are driving so much of the economic growth in the United States and are also funding many congressional campaigns.

There is a general reluctance among policy makers in the Republican and Democratic parties around regulatory efforts for the big tech firms who are driving so much of the economic growth in the United States and are also funding many congressional campaigns.

We have to start from the very beginning. This means policy makers need to know what they are talking about before they start legislating. Right now, there is a serious gap between tech and policy regarding the understanding of technology. There is some precedence showing how to deal with big new industries and big revolutionary changes, like forcing these companies to have common terms of use. This is something that the U.S. Congress has forced on credit card companies, it has also forced regulatory efforts on big tobacco back in the 1960s.

Is there an increasing pressure on the companies to take more responsibility?

The pressure is certainly there. Facebook and Twitter have made some efforts to deal with this. If I had to rank them in terms of how cooperative they have been with researchers and government, Twitter is most transparent in sharing data on some of the networks that are identified as being malicious. The companies now call this kind of manipulative behavior an offensive coordinated activity. We have heard a lot of very highly publicized takedowns of networks on Facebook and pages associated with Sputnik for example. But we don’t have a good sense whether this really makes a difference. We are very much at the tip of the iceberg. The platforms are perfectly designed to be the vectors of the diffusion of disinformation.

The platforms are perfectly designed to be the vectors of the diffusion of disinformation.

How do you deter an authoritarian state where a civil society doesn’t really exist?

That is where governments can be most effective. They should send very clear messages via intelligence as to the consequences to specific actions on our critical infrastructure. You have to convey that there is a price to pay if you attack our societies. There has to be an economically punitive component. Others have suggested not so much a defensive strategy but an offensive strategy. But this is very dangerous.

You have to convey that there is a price to pay if you attack our societies. There has to be an economically punitive component.

Tyson Barker is Deputy Director and Fellow at the Aspen Institute Germany. He is a foreign and economic professional with in-depth experience working at senior levels in government and the think tank community. He is a 2014 Young Leader Alumnus of Atlantik-Brücke.

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When I wonder how the Russian claim to power affects the everyday life in Lithuania in concrete terms, I immediately have two incidents in mind. One can recall the story of Russian supplies of oil via the pipeline “Druzhba”. Back in 2006 Lithuanian Government went for privatization of a major oil refinery that was and still is a major supplier of oil products to the region. Russia was pressing to sell the refinery to a Russian company for a low price. Lithuanian Government went for an open and transparent international privatization tender. The Polish company “Orlen” won. A few months later oil supplies via the “Druzhba” pipeline stopped, and the pipeline branch coming to Lithuania has been dry until this day. Official Russian explanation was that the pipeline needed repair. It still needs …

In Lithuanian efforts to develop alternative energy sources or to establish alternative routes of supply, there were various obstacles generated by Russia related actors. They ranged from financing, or, in fact, bribing local people to wage a campaign against extraction of shale gas up to engaging Lithuanian LNG terminal developers into lengthy litigation in courts. We also witnessed Russian efforts to question Lithuanian Government’s ability to meet its international commitments. For example, Russian representatives in UNESCO waged a campaign of allegations on, as if, environmental harm done by the construction of Lithuanian LNG terminal.

The same pattern in any maritime area considered by Russia as its zone of influence

[related]There is another case deserving serious attention. In 2014 and 2015, the power cable connecting the Lithuanian and Swedish electricity grids, called NordBalt, was being laid on the Baltic seabed. Russia launched a series of naval exercises in the vicinity of NordBalt power cable itinerary. Under an excuse of caring for safety, Russian navy chased away all the ships from the area. The area, de facto closed by Russian navy, encompassed a big sector of the Lithuanian exclusive economic zone. And, surprise, surprise, that was the area in which NordBalt cable had to be laid down. Russian navy exercises lasted more than half a year. In extreme case, in April 2015, the area was closed for 26 days. Completion of NordBalt was delayed and costs of the project increased significantly. This pattern could be applied in any maritime area considered by Russia as its zone of influence or interest. It has also to be noted that the Baltic Sea is quite shallow, and it is not so simple to change the established sea routes. Therefore, the approaches to the seaports on the Eastern Baltic coast could be severely hindered.

The examples that I have mentioned refer to several challenges posed by Russia. It is about Russian effort to take over the assets of our major companies. It is about using those companies as a major lobbying or corrupting instrument in politics. It is about steps to preserve and abuse a dominant role in the energy supply and about using it to achieve a major policy change of the country. It is about testing ways and means to disrupt major supplies and thus to tire out our population. It is about testing ways to hinder deployments of NATO reinforcements in the Baltics when the time comes.

Hostile activities against the IT systems are on the rise

Russian cyber attacks on our country pose another very dangerous threat. Russian hostile activities against the IT systems of the Lithuanian state sector and critical infrastructure are on the rise. Last year almost 55,000 cyber incidents were dealt with by Lithuanian National Cyber Security Centre. One fourth of them occured in our energy sector. Government institutions are also frequent targets. For example, features of a cyber and information operation were identified after the news portal of Lithuanian TV channel had been hacked and fake information about the Defense Minister had been placed on it. Subsequently an email containing a malicious document was distributed to the media and government institutions. The email contained a link to the fake article, in order to attract the recipients’ attention and increase the spread of the malware. The main goal of the hacker group associated with the Russian intelligence services was not an information operation but spreading the malware in the networks of state institutions.

The National Cyber Security Center now operates as the main national computer emergency response unit for management of cyber incidents. It also operates as the main Accreditation Authority of all types of IT systems and networks in Lithuania. The Centre has an R&D division for creating tools, necessary for managing cyber incidents and executes cyber exercises. A secure network of main state institutions, which could be capable of exploiting the benefits of peacetime systems and ensuring their viability in case of possible military action, is being developed. It is expected that approximately 550 most important state and municipal authorities will be interlinked by this network. It will be capable of operating separately from the public internet and remain resilient to the cyber threats. Lithuania initiated and leads the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defense policy (PESCO) project called “Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security”. The first outcome of the project is expected at the beginning of 2019 and should assist the participating nations to counter a cyber attack or an incident. This project will help participating EU member states to mobilize collective expertise in order to jointly strengthen their cyber security resilience and facilitate cooperation in combating cyber threats through mutual assistance. This year, NATO exercise Steadfast Cobalt will again take place in Lithuania. Thus, we try to contribute to the development of practical cyber security capabilities of the Alliance.

Contributions by our European allies, and, first of all, those by Germany, to increase our security are very much appreciated. However, the transatlantic factor is crucial. Russia must know that even in case of a limited incursion, it would immediately enter a military conflict with the whole Alliance including the nuclear powers and particularly the United States. Russians try to avoid namely that, and this is a major deterrence factor.

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