The briefing paper by David Bosold and David G. Haglund examines the “special relationship” between Canada and Germany through the lens of “strategic culture,” using the symbols of middle power and linchpin as analytical anchors. The authors compare the landmark speeches by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at Davos (January 2026) and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the Munich Security Conference (February 2026), arguing that media coverage has glossed over a crucial divergence: Carney declared a definitive “rupture” with the old transatlantic order and called for broad middle-power solidarity, while Merz urged allies to “repair and revive transatlantic trust” within an explicitly Western, values-based framework.

The paper then turns to Canada’s pending submarine procurement decision — German/Norwegian TKMS 212CD versus South Korean Hanwha Ocean — framing it as a strategic litmus test. The authors argue this choice should not be read as a revival of Pierre Trudeau’s failed “Third Option” trade-diversification strategy, nor should it be driven primarily by economic offsets. Instead, they contend that NATO interoperability, Arctic sovereignty, and transatlantic alliance cohesion must take precedence, making the German/Norwegian bid the strategically superior choice.

Read the full paper here: A different kind of linchpin

Der Beitrag Canada, Germany, and the Future of the Western Alliance erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The focus was on how financial markets, technology, and supply chains are holding their own amid the geopolitical pressures of our time. Key topics included the role of global financial capital in the tension between profit, security, and political stability, as well as the booming defense sector: Where does the line between commercial technology and military power lie in the age of dual-use applications?

Other panels examined the transatlantic AI model, the future of the financial system in the digital age, the geopolitical significance of the semiconductor industry, and the new industrial policies of the major powers. The event concluded with a debate on the resilience of global supply chains.

Our sincere thanks goes to Deutsche Bank, which was an outstanding host of the conference.

Der Beitrag Semiconductors, High Tech, Trade Power: The German-American Partnership Seeks New Answers erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

In public discourse, defense still triggers familiar reflexes: images of heavy platforms, complex procurement processes, and cumbersome institutions dominate. But this understanding falls short. Modern warfare is undergoing a fundamental transformation — technologically, structurally, and strategically. In reality, defense is evolving into one of the most dynamic technology fields of our time. The central question is no longer whether technology is changing warfare, but who is developing the systems that will determine Europe’s security and capacity to act in just a few years’ time.

From Product to Capability

[related] A core problem lies in the traditional understanding of procurement. For decades, defense was oriented toward acquiring products: platforms, hardware, clearly defined systems with long life cycles. But the reality of modern operations demands something different. What is needed today are adaptive capability packages that evolve continuously. Software is becoming the central element. Systems no longer consist of self-contained units but of networked architectures — so-called “systems of systems.”

In this context, a drone system is no longer a static product but a dynamic software stack with attached hardware. It requires regular updates, rapid iterations, and immediate user feedback. Equally critical is usability: systems that are not intuitive in the field lose their value regardless of their technical quality. Those who continue to rely on the logic of traditional product procurement risk working past the requirements of modern warfare.

Structural Inertia as the Result of Political Decisions

The often-criticized slowness of existing systems is no accident. It is the result of political priorities set over the past decades. After the end of the Cold War, the deliberate focus was on stability, efficiency, and risk minimization. Today’s system meets precisely those requirements. But it is not designed for speed. With the return of geopolitical tensions and an increasingly dynamic threat landscape, however, the benchmark is shifting. Technological developments and operational requirements are changing in ever shorter cycles. Systems that think in decades are coming under pressure to adapt. The necessary acceleration is therefore less a technical question than a political and structural one.

Innovation Dynamics and Industrial Reality

Technological leaps frequently originate outside established structures. New companies can operate free of institutional baggage, iterate faster, and think consistently from the problem outward. Established players, by contrast, are geared toward stability and long-term commitments. For them, new technologies often mean far-reaching adjustments to existing business models and processes.

This does not create a contradiction but a field of tension: innovation often emerges from new players, while scaling, integration, and long-term operation remain the strengths of established structures. The strategic challenge lies in effectively connecting both worlds.

The Competition for Talent and Technology

It is precisely at this interface that a weakness of the European system becomes apparent. Many technology-driven companies developing solutions to security-relevant problems find only limited suitable conditions in Europe. Two factors are decisive: access to initial contracts and direct contact with users. Without these, innovation stalls at an early stage.

Long procurement cycles and complex procedures make it difficult for young companies to build viable business models. Other innovation ecosystems address this proactively: with rapid pilot projects, early contracting opportunities, and clear pathways to end users. The consequence: talent and companies increasingly gravitate toward locations that enable faster implementation. Europe is not losing this competition for lack of ideas, but because of structural conditions.

Systemic Filter Effects

These conditions act as a filter. Complexity, opacity, and lengthy decision-making processes favor established players, while new companies frequently fail at market entry barriers. The system thus structurally selects against speed. The very players who could contribute to adaptability through new approaches and short development cycles often find no access. At the same time, existing processes reinforce the dominance of established structures. The result is an innovation system that does not fully exploit its own potential.

From Intent to Operational Impact

Numerous initiatives show that the need for innovation has been recognized. Strategy papers, programs, and organizational units are in place. What matters, however, is operational implementation. Effective innovation requires concrete mechanisms: translating real-world needs into actionable problem statements, rapidly deploying solutions in the field, and systematically scaling successful approaches.

This is precisely the unique role of the Bundeswehr’s Cyber Innovation Hub. As a “Bundeswehr startup,” its mission is to identify and implement unconventional solutions for the troops. The approach is deliberately operational: close to the user, iterative, results-oriented. The focus is not on developing abstract concepts but on concretely improving capabilities in the field. The Hub serves as a bridge between technological innovation and military application — addressing exactly the interface where traditional systems reach their limits.

Time as a Strategic Factor

Modern warfare is increasingly defined by speed. The ability to learn, adapt, and implement quickly is becoming a decisive competitive advantage. Time is thus evolving into a strategic resource. Innovation capability in this context means not only recognizing technological developments but translating them into operational impact — under real-world conditions and within short timeframes.

New players have a central role to play here. They bring speed, new ways of thinking, and technological dynamism into a system that has traditionally been designed for stability.

Conclusion

The transformation of defense is well underway. It concerns not only technologies but also structures, processes, and mindsets. For Europe, this presents a clear challenge: to create an innovation ecosystem that enables speed without sacrificing stability. One that integrates new players without neglecting existing strengths. And one that turns ideas into impact — fast. Modern warfare is not decided on the battlefield alone, but in the capacity to adapt. Or to put it more pointedly: new players are not a trend. They are a strategic factor.

Der Beitrag Why New Players Will Decide Europe’s Security erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The consequences of political misjudgments are often severe and long-lasting. This is especially true for interstate relations. Whether the reasons lie in personal hubris, ignorance, or sheer folly is of secondary importance. Examples of fatal misjudgments that have led to massive instability, crises, and in the worst case war fill entire history books. And yet they keep repeating themselves.

Europe, which for decades saw itself as a bastion of peace, stability, and prosperity, is not immune to this. It studiously ignored Russia’s imperial expansionist ambitions. By 2008 at the latest, when Moscow attacked neighboring Georgia, Europe’s leaders should have grasped that President Putin would not shrink from using massive military force to pursue his fantasies of restoring ‘Russian greatness.’ That he had the pro-European Ukraine particularly in his sights was plain to see for anyone willing to look. It was a classic misjudgment on the part of many European leaders, especially in Germany, to underestimate Putin’s strategic ambitions and his willingness to wage war.

The human, economic, social, financial, and ecological consequences for the people of Ukraine are immense. It will certainly take longer than a generation before Ukraine can recover from Russia’s war. The strategic consequences of the brutal military attacks on Ukraine are equally unforeseeable. This is due above all to a second misjudgment that the majority of European leaders stubbornly cling to even in the fifth year of the war: they continue to hope that the Russian aggressor can somehow be persuaded into a ‘peace compromise’ with the help of U.S. President Trump, provided Moscow is not provoked, the West does not directly participate in Ukraine’s defensive struggle, and Putin is offered the prospect of impunity and coexistence between Russia and the West. Reality shows, however, that the fundamental premises of this calculus are wrong. Vladimir Putin has no interest whatsoever in abandoning his strategic objectives in Europe; and President Trump is neither interested in supporting Ukraine in its defense nor does he view Putin’s Russia as a security threat to Europe. Different as Putin and Trump may be in character, both see themselves as alpha males for whom no rules apply. Europe’s misjudgment of these two central actors means that it remains stuck in a reactive corner, with scarcely any visible capacity to shape the future strategic balance of power on the European continent.

The steps toward European sovereignty have so far been small and tentative

On the other side of the Atlantic, U.S. President Trump is in the process of engulfing the entire Middle East in war and instability. His military campaign against Iran is the product of pathological hubris, a multitude of domestic political motives central to his agenda, and a complete misjudgment of the ethno-religious and politico-economic complexity of the Middle East. That the world would be a better place without the brutal mullah regime in Tehran is beyond dispute. But by what means it could be effectively influenced or fundamentally changed from the outside, which global and regional actors would necessarily need to be involved in such an undertaking, and what multiple consequences for Iran itself, the balance of power in the region, international trade flows, and much more would have to be reckoned with — these and other questions Trump has generously ignored. Instead, he has presented the use of massive military force to the world as being without alternative.

Without being able to predict the concrete outcome of the Iran war, there is already today a wealth of plausible reasons to classify the joint military campaign of the United States and Israel against Iran as yet another historic misjudgment.

Political misjudgments, such as those we have been forced to witness repeatedly in recent years, can be adequately lamented, criticized, or talked up; public and political reactions vary depending on one’s point of view. In theory, however, one could also expect our political decision-makers to acknowledge and correct their mistakes. After all, admitting to errors is still a widespread practice in human relations.

Regrettably, however, Europe’s political decision-makers show no sign of rethinking their fundamental assumptions toward either Putin’s Russia or Trump’s MAGA America. While many capitals are happy to emphasize, frequently and loudly, their willingness to develop greater European sovereignty, the steps in that direction are small, hesitant, and take far too long. Moreover, they are not tied to a convincing narrative of what a future European security order based on democracy and the rule of law could look like.

Yet without a serious political willingness on the part of Europeans to set clear limits on Putin’s military expansionism by all means and above all together with Ukraine, Russia’s war against Ukraine will not end. Without the willingness to distance itself from a kleptocratic Trump-America that is increasingly transforming into an autocratic system, Europe will not learn to stand on its own feet. Those who argue that a deliberate but consistent de-coupling from America is impossible for political, economic, and military reasons are limiting not only Europe’s future prospects but also their own thinking. And those who say that the rules-based order is regrettably dead and that Europe has no choice but to accept the raw power of the ‘jungle kings’ Putin and Trump are reinforcing the already palpably fading belief in Europe. Mistakes can be corrected. Europe should summon the courage to do so.

About the Author: Dr. Stefanie Babst is a German political scientist, strategic consultant, and author. She served on NATO’s International Staff for 22 years—from 2006 to 2012 as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, and subsequently until 2020 as Head of the Strategic Planning Staff. This made her the highest-ranking German woman at NATO Headquarters. Today, she works as a publicist and is a co-founder of the consulting firm Brooch Associates.

Der Beitrag Can Europe Learn from Its Mistakes? erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Florian Hahn

The United States remains our most important ally and partner outside Europe. This is especially true with regard to global challenges and numerous conflicts, foremost among them the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East, and in particular for safeguarding our security, our freedom, and our prosperity. Despite all tensions and contradictions, the transatlantic relationship is a pillar of the federal government’s foreign policy, and the transatlantic alliance is the guarantor of our security. This remains true regardless of sometimes critical perceptions in the public sphere – for example, following the speech by US Vice President J. D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference 2025, concerning US trade policy and discussions about the future orientation of the European security architecture.

Through intensive diplomatic visits, since taking office, the federal government has underpinned this with not just words but deeds, including toward the USA. This success is evident in the good contacts between the Federal Chancellor and Foreign Minister with their US counterparts. Together with the US government and allies in NATO, we worked towards the Hague summit and led it to success as an alliance of 32 allies, with a clear commitment to continued collective defense and Article 5, as well as agreement on significantly increased investments in our deterrence and defense, which are crucial for Euro-Atlantic security—our security as the Federal Republic of Germany—given the long-term threat posed by Russia.

Security

[related] The Russian airspace violations in NATO territory this September—whether by drones over Poland and Romania or fighter jets over Estonia—show us how tense the current situation is. In this critical situation, the importance of the transatlantic alliance—the most important and successful defense alliance ever—cannot be overstated. This is particularly true for Germany: about 37,000 American soldiers are stationed here, with key military facilities and infrastructure of the US armed forces located here. It is all the more important that we—together with our allies and European partners—do more for our own security and take responsibility.
The federal government has taken a decisive step with the reform of the debt brake to invest in our own defense capabilities. Like our NATO allies, by 2035 we will spend 5 percent of GDP—3.5 percent for defense expenditures and 1.5 percent for security- and defense-related tasks. At the European level, we have established an instrument that supports European member states in investing in their defense industry and thus their defense capabilities. Both are successes of determined German diplomacy that create new cooperation opportunities—including with the USA. This determination of the federal government to invest more in its own and European security and to strengthen the European pillar in NATO is also positively recognized by the US government.
Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, its military build-up, and revisionist goals beyond Ukraine represent the greatest threat to our security. Despite mediation efforts by the US president, Putin shows no serious willingness to negotiate. A ceasefire or an end to the war is not in sight. It is clear to us: we cannot do without the USA. Therefore, a determined and sustainable engagement by the USA—whether through supporting Ukraine with US weapons systems and sharing intelligence, or through coordinating sanctions and other pressure measures within the G7—is an even more important signal to Russia. At the same time, we Europeans must, within our means, do more to support Ukraine. Since 2022, Germany has already provided or committed bilateral military support amounting to 40 billion euros for the coming years. By supporting the financing of US arms deliveries through a newly established NATO mechanism of up to 500 million euros and the Chancellor’s proposals for the legally secure use of immobilized Russian assets to support Ukraine, we are going a step further. We call on our European EU partners and NATO allies to follow our example.

Freedom

The USA, through their landmark decisions after World War II and their support for German reunification, remain a guarantee of security, freedom, and prosperity in Germany and Europe. Without the courageous decisions of the then US government, there would neither be a reunified, democratic, and economically strong Germany nor a free Europe. For this, we remain very grateful to the USA.
However, this gratitude does not mean that we would adopt every critical statement about freedom of expression and democracy in Europe, not even those from some representatives of the current administration. On the contrary: the values that make Europe strong and the liberal-democratic basic order of Germany are the cornerstones of our freedom. Freedom of expression and democracy are highly valued in Germany and Europe and are preserved and defended through our rule of law.

Prosperity

The numbers are clear: The USA are the most important destination for German exports outside the EU. The USA are the largest non-European investor in Germany. Germany, in turn, is the third-largest investor in the USA. German subsidiaries currently provide about 870,000 jobs in the USA, US subsidiaries in Germany about 640,000, underpinning the importance of the transatlantic economic area. Such close economic interconnections have developed over decades and cannot be substituted in the short term. It is also not in mutual interest to dissolve these closely intertwined supply chains—partly in critical sectors—and thus weaken the resilience of the transatlantic market in the face of major geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges.

“The values that make Europe strong are the cornerstones of our freedom.”

Looking ahead, transatlantic cooperation holds immense potential: together, Europe and the USA account for 43 percent of global GDP and nearly 30 percent of global trade in goods and services. European research institutions, universities, and companies are innovation engines for the critical technologies of tomorrow. To fully exploit this potential, it will be important to strengthen our competitiveness and innovative strength in Europe as well—and thus to meet the USA on equal footing.

From the outset, the federal government has supported the removal of mutual barriers. The trade agreement achieved between the USA and the EU should only be an intermediate step, as its asymmetry poses great challenges to our companies and increases the risk of fragmentation of free trade. However, it creates short-term security and predictability for German and European companies and has prevented an escalation of the trade conflict with potentially serious consequences for the European economy. Therefore, the federal government supports the European Commission in negotiations with the USA along our economic policy interests. At the same time, the federal government advocates European unity among member states and promotes further diversification of EU trade relations.

New lessons, new fields of action

Looking at developments in all three fields—security, freedom, prosperity—since the start of the US government and the federal government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, it becomes clear: current developments in transatlantic relations also contain an important lesson for German foreign policy. Germany must “relearn” self-confident, interest-oriented targeted cooperation with states in the sense of the triad of security, freedom, and prosperity. This applies especially or even particularly when these states do not or no longer fully share our values.

What does that mean? In the case of the USA as a central partner and ally, opportunities and challenges present themselves equally. It is clear that we must preserve the long-grown shared values and interests and build them up where consensus is possible. At the same time, in the transatlantic relationship, alongside core topics of security and economy, we must also define new fields of action along our interests to not only secure this cooperation but also to bring it into a new era.

New target groups

Relations with the USA are changing—especially with regard to our populations: historically, fewer and fewer people in the USA and Germany are socialized transatlantically. To keep relations stable in the USA, it must also be about strengthening them in the middle of our respective societies. Therefore, we need to take care to reach the next generation of Transatlanticists. We want Germany to be positively perceived in all its dimensions in the USA. This means reaching as many diverse population groups as possible. In recent years, the federal government and its predecessors have invested a lot: we have intensified exchanges of our cultural mediators, alumni, and honorary consuls in the USA, strengthened cooperation with subnational partners such as state parliaments, mayors, and other officials in the states, and brought new target groups to Germany through customized programs.

We do not want to rest on achievements and will intensify our efforts. This includes, among others, sports diplomacy at upcoming major events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. It includes the Goethe-Institut opening new locations away from the coasts in Houston and St. Louis. It also includes winning many people in the USA who have contact points with Germany—for example alumni of exchange and scholarship programs or veterans who served in Germany—as ambassadors for Germany. Many of them are willing to actively commit to the German-American partnership.

Future technologies

Whether artificial intelligence, quantum computing, or space travel: when it comes to the critical technologies of the future, European researchers and companies are always involved. Even if we cannot always keep up with the entrepreneurial speed in the USA and the financing opportunities there, cooperation in sensitive technology areas is only possible among like-minded states for reasons of technical and national sovereignty. This is why there is great potential for deepened cooperation between Germany/Europe and the USA. We should focus on space travel; German space start-ups are already important suppliers for US giants SpaceX and Blue Origin, and ESA is already an important partner for NASA. We need to build on and offer proposals here since cooperation with the USA can also be a driver for our own economy and innovation strength. For us, this also means continuing to invest in our own innovative capacity and research security to be an attractive and trustworthy partner.

New partnerships

Whether in the Indo-Pacific or Latin America: the federal government has made it its task to establish new partnerships worldwide and deepen existing ones. This includes our commitment to the timely conclusion of EU free trade agreements with MERCOSUR and Indonesia, support for EU negotiations for free trade agreements with India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, as well as intensifying our relations with Canada. This strengthens the resilience of the European economy, diversifies risks, and creates new starting points for cooperation with the USA and transatlantic relations.

“We must continue to invest in our own innovation capabilities and research security.”

This also applies particularly to Latin America: The US government aims to focus more on Latin America in foreign policy. This involves—especially in competition with China—the question of who will set narratives and exert influence in South America in the future. Germany has a close network on the continent and is seen as a credible partner in many countries. That is why we should coordinate our commitment with the USA and act jointly wherever possible. Especially in connectivity, we can offer alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative with the EU’s Global Gateway and deepen economic ties. We can also contribute importantly in crisis contexts. For example, Germany pledged another five million euros at the UN General Assembly to support international efforts to restore peace and security in Haiti. This sent a signal of our engagement for the region that was closely observed in Latin America and the USA.

Outlook

Our relations with the USA have rarely been straightforward since the end of World War II but have always been of central importance to the Federal Republic of Germany. Even more than a year after Donald Trump’s election as the 47th US president, they will continue to intensively occupy German and European politics. It is therefore all the more important to continue investing beyond everyday business and beyond the major lines of our time in the future of these relations, in the USA and beyond.

About the author: Florian Hahn (CSU) is Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Foreign Office.

[Disclaimer: This text was originally written in German. The English translation was produced with the help of AI.]

Der Beitrag “Reaching the next generation of transatlanticists” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Carsten Breuer

International conflicts and their effects are increasingly coming into our consciousness with great force. They are becoming topics of conversation not only on news programs, talk shows, and in surveys, but also at the kitchen table at home. The defense of our security has long ceased to be an abstract task—it is a concrete necessity. This is especially apparent when looking at Ukraine. Russia’s illegal war of aggression has lasted nearly four years. Above all, it is a war of attrition. We see high-tech drones in trench warfare, archaic violence in war crimes in Bucha, and battles to the bitter end in Bakhmut. Putin’s neo-imperialist ambitions have already cost hundreds of thousands of lives. And there is no end in sight. Russia switched to a war economy some time ago.

Its military now receives more spending than all other policy areas combined. Weapons and ammunition are being produced at full speed or, in some cases, refurbished from old stockpiles. Not all of this goes directly to the front, but also to new military units currently being established along the entire NATO eastern flank. Personnel-wise, Putin is preparing for further confrontations: by the end of 2026, Russian armed forces are expected to grow significantly again, to around 1.5 million soldiers. That is twice as many as before the war began on February 24, 2022. According to military analysts, Russia could be capable of launching large-scale attacks on NATO territory within a few years.

[related] Not necessarily as a campaign of conquest, but perhaps as intensified provocation right at the brink of open war, aiming to undermine the Western alliance system, weaken NATO’s security guarantees, and expand its own sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. This is not a prediction, but a plausible possibility. We must take seriously the intentions and goals behind this massive rearmament. Putin is not interested in expanding his massive empire by a few square kilometers. He wants a new world order, and he wants to achieve it through force. Analysts view 2029 as a potential “culmination point,” but the threat is already real today. Putin has long viewed himself as being engaged in a “(shadow) war” against the West. This is evidenced by the increasing number of hybrid attacks that Europe is exposed to.

Even in Germany, we observe a wide range of systematic attacks in the gray area between peace and war: cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, severed data cables in the Baltic Sea, sabotage planning, drone-assisted espionage, disinformation campaigns on social media, and even foiled attack plans. All these “pinpricks” are intended to shake confidence in our state. They aim to undermine the cohesion of our societies. Germany plays a particular role—as Ukraine’s main supporter in Europe and as a hub for the Allies in deploying to NATO’s eastern flank. These hybrid attacks strike us—deliberately scalable and capable of being scaled—at the boundary between internal and external security, specifically at the intersection of different responsibilities. It is essential to act in a coordinated fashion at this point of entry, both nationally and internationally.

“Russia’s quest for power remains, for the foreseeable future, the greatest and most immediate threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.”

Russia’s quest for power will remain, for the foreseeable future, the greatest and most immediate threat to the Euro-Atlantic area. But it is by no means the only one. Across the globe, other crisis hotspots demand our vigilance. The conflict in the Middle East—or rather, conflicts—continue to concern us and require action. Crises overlap, blend into one another, and reinforce each other. And every conflict has the potential to have global effects. This can be seen, for example, with North Korea, which is supporting Russia in the war against Ukraine with soldiers and weapons. Resources flow back—not only financial, but military expertise and, above all, weapons components, including those for carrier rockets that can be equipped with nuclear warheads. Thousands of North Korean soldiers are fighting against Ukraine—and dying for Russia.

“We must view all the seemingly separate crises and theaters of war in the world as a whole.”

The losses are immense, but this way North Korean soldiers gain combat experience. Their baptism of fire against Ukraine increases the combat effectiveness of all North Korean armed forces. What is already clear: this destabilization through such interactions is occurring not only in Europe but also in East Asia. These complex interconnections make it clear: we must view all these seemingly separate crises and theaters of war around the world holistically, from a 360-degree perspective. We must recognize and discuss dependencies, interactions, and connections at all levels of action. In military terms: we have to consolidate the strategic situation, draw the necessary conclusions—at the speed required. And right now, that speed is very high. We are at the threshold of a new world order. In this period of upheaval, the West—and we—bear the responsibility to defend our liberal values with resolve. If we do not engage, we risk becoming the plaything of autocrats. This is not only a moral duty, but a fundamental realpolitik self-interest.

A world in which the rule of law is replaced by the law of the strong is something we cannot and must not accept. And in terms of global challenges, the world is shrinking: crises, and possible solutions, are moving closer together. This challenges us as never before. And it won’t get easier. That is why readiness is today not only our own currency, but that of the entire NATO. For more than 30 years, we have lived in peace in Europe. That is over, and it is hard to get used to. But we have no choice. Credible deterrence is our “best-case scenario.” At the NATO Summit in The Hague in June 2025, all 32 Allies agreed on how and with what military means they will position themselves in the future. They set out, in binding terms, who will take responsibility in which areas.

After the United States, Germany provides the second-largest so-called capability package. We are on the way to becoming the engine of European defense. This means, for example, that we will establish new combat troop units, broaden our industrial base, and strengthen multinational cooperation. Ultimately, it also means that in the future we will spend 3.5 percent of GDP on defense and 1.5 percent on military infrastructure. With the help of the special fund, we have already set many things in motion: we have ordered tanks, ships, aircraft, drones. We expect key deliveries this and next year; unfortunately, armaments are not available off the shelf like at the hardware store around the corner. With the constitutional amendment that exempts defense spending above 1 percent of GDP from the debt brake, we have made another major step to cope with the expanded range of orders.

We have put security first. We now no longer have a time-limited special fund, but an uncapped budget. Uncapped, however, does not mean unlimited. More than ever before, we must justify every cent to the parliament. We can do that. And we will do so. We have already prioritized which capabilities the Bundeswehr needs most urgently. These include systems for air defense, as well as ammunition and means for electronic warfare, among others. It is important that not only the Bundeswehr now has planning certainty, but also industry and startups that must first ramp up their capacities. Equally important is looking well beyond 2029 at the future of warfare. That is why we must think and plan in at least two categories: In the short term, until 2029, the priority is readiness. In the long term, far beyond 2029, it is anticipation, flexibility, and keeping pace with disruptive developments.

Because we now have new technological possibilities that are changing the established paths of technology development and military strategy. In the past, the military was the driver of technological development—today, it is the reverse: technological progress generates strategic challenges. Long term, this will also influence the development of our doctrine and lead us to rethink war—even down to the battlefield. The innovation cycle for drones in Ukraine, for example, is about two weeks. We need to be similarly agile in peacetime—even without war dictating it. Threats on the battlefield force armed forces to constant adaptation. Therefore, we must also become more flexible, agile, and consequently faster in procurement. Wherever necessary, we must also break new ground. We must ask: Where are we not looking today—what do we not yet know, what can we not yet grasp?

But also: How do we ensure the Bundeswehr becomes both a driver of technology and can quickly and reliably incorporate new technologies? There are cooperation opportunities, for example, in the digitization and flexibilization of defense systems through software-based control, in Software Defined Defence. The use of artificial intelligence to analyze data or to support military decision-making is another field where armed forces depend on research and development in business and industry. Therefore, there must be close coordination between business and military strategy development.

“The responsibility for our security and freedom cannot rest solely on uniformed shoulders. It is a task for society as a whole.”

Clearly, the current threat situation can only be met with a comprehensive societal effort, with united forces—state and private. The armed forces are only as strong as the defense industry that stands behind them. It is not only about the ability to innovate, but also about the willingness to take risks—for a higher good.

Soldiers are trained to take risks. They must be able to fight and win. Because they have to win. This does not only apply to soldiers. NATO currently has around 500,000 men and women in high readiness. But for me it is equally clear: responsibility for our security and freedom cannot rest solely on uniformed shoulders. It is a task for society as a whole. Only together can we defend our country; only together can we deter. We must think and act holistically, even now in peacetime. We must become more closely and strongly interlinked. That lays the foundation for resilience. A combat-ready Bundeswehr is only one side of the coin. On the other side, we need equally resilient civil structures—in other words: a society capable of defense.

Both together create the prerequisites for credible deterrence. We soldiers may be the ones who win battles—but modern wars must be confronted by and with a society. The economy plays a major part. The better and faster we can equip our armed forces, the better we will be able to deter. And we must deter. The more credible our deterrence, the greater our chances of protecting the freedom so dear to us. The better our prospects of living in the future as we do now—and of preventing war in Europe. We will only succeed with this effort together—carried by the certainty that a life in freedom and security is worth it.

About the author: Carsten Breuer is a general in the German Army and, since March 17, 2023, the 17th Inspector General of the German Armed Forces.

[Disclaimer: This text was originally written in German. The English translation was produced with the help of AI.]

Der Beitrag “A whole-of-society effort” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Prof. D. Michael Hüther

Three recent developments are shaping the discussion about how Europe can regain military strength:

1. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported this week that “in 2024, global arms sales reached the highest level we have ever recorded — totaling 679 billion US dollars.” The 26 European defense companies increased their revenues by 13 percent, outpacing their 39 U.S. competitors, who grew by 3.8 percent.

2. Negotiations between the EU and the United Kingdom over the latter’s participation in the €150 billion SAFE defense fund have so far failed.

3. European armies still operate roughly four times as many weapons systems as the United States — a sign of their fragmented defense market.

The rearmament drive began back in 2015 and continues to accelerate. European NATO members now face the challenge of meeting their defense needs in overheated markets while keeping spending sustainable. A major handicap lies in their inability to overcome the patchwork of small-scale contracts. Military buyers also have a preference for customization — unlike in the U.S., where standardized procurement enables economies of scale, albeit at the price of dependence on a few major suppliers. The 2024 sales figure cited above was generated by just 100 companies worldwide.

Market Order for the Defense Buildup

Europe’s ongoing armament push raises a fundamental question: under conditions of catch-up and accelerated rearmament, how should the security and defense sector be organized according to sound economic principles? Ideally, it would operate in a competitive market that offers governments multiple choices while avoiding excessive profits from strategic urgency.

In practice, defense technology creates tight interdependencies between clients and manufacturers. Production typically relies on complex partnerships and consortia, which reduce competition. Moreover, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 346 TFEU) exempts military procurement from internal market rules.

The EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), launched in 2017, has so far failed to scale up joint defense projects effectively, as national export and transfer regulations still dominate.

Limited Cooperation So Far

Industrial partnerships — such as the Franco-German effort to develop a “tank of the future” by 2040 — remain rare exceptions and have yielded little evidence of efficiency gains, even if the European Commission granted approval relatively quickly. The EU estimates that roughly 80 percent of defense equipment is still purchased nationally. Appropriately, reforms to speed up procurement are also being advanced at the national level, as shown by Germany’s defense procurement law passed this summer.

The Case for a Common Defense Fund

The SAFE fund aims to create stronger incentives for joint procurement. But London’s participation — after years of obstructing deeper defense cooperation while still in the EU — remains elusive. Brussels’ insistence on a fair financial contribution that reflects both industrial capacity and expected economic benefit is understandable, given the rule that at least 65 percent of contracts must generate value within Europe.

From a competition perspective, that requirement can be questioned, but Europe’s need for technological resilience strongly supports it. Germany’s 2022 purchase of 35 F‑35 jets illustrates the risks of U.S. dependency, as each deal still hinges on Washington’s approval.

A Dedicated Defense Bank

One new idea gaining traction is the creation of a specialized European defense investment bank to finance arms procurement, modeled after the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In light of fiscal constraints across the eurozone, such an institution could pool capital contributions from member states to leverage significant lending capacity through high credit ratings. It could then finance both national buyers and defense firms, potentially bundling orders for global tenders — though this might raise concerns about strategic resilience.

Defense Capability as a Fiscal Test

Ultimately, the strain on public budgets cannot be concealed. Europe faces a political and social reckoning over how to allocate tax revenues between domestic spending and defense — a classic distributional conflict. The temporary exemption of defense spending from Germany’s constitutional debt brake cannot last indefinitely if debt ratios are to remain stable.

In the medium term, all defense expenditure must be reintegrated into the federal core budget. The fiscal groundwork for this needs to be laid now. Defense capability, after all, is not just a military issue — it is a matter of societal balance and geopolitical survival.

About the author:
Since 2004, Prof. Michael Hüther has headed the German Economic Institute (IW) in Cologne. From 1995 to 1999 he served as Secretary-General of the German Council of Economic Experts and later worked as an economist in the private sector at DekaBank. Hüther is deputy chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke.

This article was first published by Süddeutsche Zeitung Dossier.

Der Beitrag The costly search for defense capabilities erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The weakening of Hezbollah, successful strikes in Lebanon and Iran, and Israel’s military dominance in Gaza have all contributed to Hamas’ eventual acceptance of Trump’s peace plan. Meanwhile, after decades of attempts to integrate Putin’s Russia into the international community of values, the mainstream consensus has shifted toward supplying Ukraine with advanced weapons, rearming its European allies, and imposing new sanctions. Is hard power becoming the new path to peace?

Ben Hodges: I’m not sure that Hamas has accepted President Trump’s peace plan. They have agreed to release hostages and are working to return the remains of those hostages who were killed or died in captivity.  There is still a lot of fighting so we can’t yet say that there is even a full ceasefire which I think will be a prerequisite for any lasting peace.  But the point of your question is valid.

Hard power, alone, is never going to be the path to peace.  But hard power, or the threat of employing it, is an essential component of achieving and protecting peace, when properly balanced with diplomatic, economic, and informational power.  Achieving peace in Ukraine starts with #1 a diplomatic effort resulting in a unified effort by the West, hopefully with the US included, acknowledging that Russia is the aggressor and recognizing that it is in the strategic interest of the West that Ukraine successfully defends its sovereignty, forcing Russia to live within its own borders.  #2 is the employment of the full weight of the economic power of the West, including sanctions, without loopholes and which are fully enforced, which will actually change Kremlin behavior.  It also includes the use of frozen Russian assets as proposed by the European Commission to help pay for Ukraine’s defense and reconstruction.  And it includes the disruption of Russia’s shadow fleet vessels which are transporting Russian oil to China and India.  #3 is the provision of all the weapons and ammunition and capabilities, without restrictions, that Ukraine needs to successfully defend its sovereignty, including Taurus and Tomahawks.

David Ranan: Europe is emerging from an era of hopeful belief in peaceful diplomacy and must now confront a new reality, with its own demands and shifting priorities. Hard power – once protected under a U.S. security umbrella that can no longer be fully relied – has, at least under the current U.S. administration, become Europe’s own responsibility. Still, the notion that hard power could serve as “the new path to peace” seems overly optimistic. Let us not forget that the Cold War, for all its tensions, nevertheless managed to preserve peace.

Neither the recognition of Palestine by several European countries nor Chancellor Merz’s show of solidarity with Israel seems to have influenced the course of the Middle East war—credit for the Israel-Hamas deal largely goes to Donald Trump. And while Europe remains a key donor to Ukraine, the country still relies heavily on U.S. weapons, with Trump sidelining it in his decisions. With all eyes on Washington, is Europe still seen as a significant player in the U.S. and the Middle East?

Hodges: I don’t agree that there is an Israel-Hamas deal yet…only the return/exchange of the hostages and Palestinian detainees. For there to be a lasting peace in the region, the nations of the Middle East, Türkiye, and Europe will have to be a part of the comprehensive effort.

Europe is only sidelined because it has allowed itself to be sidelined. A more forceful policy that uses all the elements of national and coalition power, to include sanctions and provision of security forces, will give Europe a ‘seat at the table’. Germany in particular must lead by example….defending principles of democracy and human rights while balancing its sense of historical responsibility.  Use clear language and be consistent in actions.  It cannot assume that the US, under this Administration, will take care of everything.

I do agree that the Trump Administration has done much to help bring the region to where it is now, particularly with the work it did during the first Trump Administration. But it’s going to take more to achieve the goal of a lasting peace and that means a two state solution. Europe can play a key role here.

Ranan: As Russia’s aggression intensifies, Europe concerned for its own security – has a clear self-interest in strengthening its defenses and supporting Ukraine. This is not only about helping Ukraine resist Russia but also about sending a strong message to President Putin. That is the essence of its significance. The Middle East, however, presents a far more complex challenge. Europe has long supported Israel – a stance Germany has particularly championed – but this creates a somewhat paradoxical situation, raising fundamental questions of principle: how can Europe back both Israel, an occupying power, and Ukraine, a nation defending itself against Russian aggression? If Europe were guided strictly by international law, it would instead support Palestinians resisting Israeli occupation since 1967. With Israel effectively a client state of the United States, Europe remains a secondary player in the region. Yet by moving beyond Germany’s rigidly pro-Israel position, Europe could potentially gain meaningful influence and play a more constructive role in Middle Eastern affairs.

Russia’s war on Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East are currently dominating the headlines. In your view, which other conflict or crisis is receiving too little attention?

Hodges: The US government is shifting its military priority away from Europe and apparently, possibly, the Indo-Pacific region and towards South America, especially Venezuela. I’m not against taking firm measures to stop the flow of drugs from Central and South America to the United States. Thousands of Americans every year die from Fentanyl.  But Fentanyl is actually coming from Mexico, not Venezuela. So the strikes on so-called Venezuelan drug boats with the use of expensive Hellfire missiles are not actually addressing the Fentanyl problem. This is being done without Congressional oversight and without explanation of the necessity for the use of military force to the American public.  This should receive much more scrutiny.

Ranan: The combined effects of war and climate change-induced famine in Sub-Saharan Africa are causing immense human suffering and staggering death tolls, including an appallingly high rate of infant mortality. This crisis is not only a profound humanitarian challenge for the Western world but also a matter of strategic self-interest for Europe. Ensuring that these countries – whose citizens understandably seek refuge in Europe – become safe and sustainable places to live is both a moral imperative and a practical necessity. While it may be challenging to convince China, Russia, and other global powers to act purely for Europe’s benefit, it should be entirely possible to forge an international pact grounded in humanitarian responsibility, uniting nations around the urgent need to save lives.

This interview took place after the event „David & Goliath: Debating War, Peace, and the Fragility of Global Order“ with Ben Hodges (on the left), Lieutenant General (ret.), U.S. Army; FBH Geostrat Consulting GmbH & Dr. David Ranan (on the right), Political Scientist & Author.

Der Beitrag “Hard power, alone, is never going to be the path to peace” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

This year, Brussels—at the heart of European policy-making—hosted the 4th Transatlantic Forum on Geoeconomics on 30 September 2025. The discussions centred on transatlantic priorities, framed by escalating geopolitical tensions and growing economic volatility. The agenda drew heavily on high-level exchanges, most notably with US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker and EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, who brought both candor and nuance to their respective fields.

“America will protect every inch of the Alliance’s territory.”

Ambassador Whitaker sent a clear signal of enduring American commitment to NATO’s collective defense, insisting that “every inch” of the Alliance’s territory will be protected. He described how sustained diplomatic engagement had moved President Trump to a position of robust support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, emphasizing that a united front is needed to impose real costs on Moscow. Recent Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace—over Poland and the Baltic countries—were cited as stark reminders of persistent threats, but also as proof of the Alliance’s responsive capabilities and deterrence posture. Whitaker voiced frustration, however, that some European allies still “drag their feet” on defense spending, warning that failing to reach the newly established 5 percent GDP benchmark could undermine both credibility and deterrence. For Whitaker, a secure Alliance is inseparable from balanced burden-sharing—an aspiration now hard-wired into the “Hague defense commitment” but requiring vigilance to ensure meaningful year-over-year increases.

“Fostering a climate for innovation will be key to both economic and security resilience.”

On the European side, Commissioner Šefčovič reflected on a fundamental transformation: Europe, he argued, began as a peace project but is now compelled to reassess its security and defense posture amid rapidly shifting geopolitical realities. He stressed the importance of treating the US as a strategic partner—not only by stepping up defense investment, but also by making Europe’s own defense sector more attractive to investors. Echoing Whitaker, Šefčovič acknowledged that without sustained economic growth, it is simply not possible for any government to invest 5 percent of GDP in defense—and that fostering a climate for innovation will be key to both economic and security resilience.

Some panels focused on trade and tariffs. The participants agreed that the current moment marks the beginning of a “new chapter in trade,” characterized by ongoing uncertainty and drastic shifts in global goods traffic. New US tariffs would force Europe to rethink its supply chains. In addition, Europe would have to carefully consider how much of its steel industry it would allow to migrate to China. Anahita Thoms, Partner, Head of Germany’s International Trade Practice, Baker McKenzie, made it clear that “tariffs hurt, but uncertainty destroys” and that a return to the old global trade order was not to be expected. Instead, Europe must diversify its trade relations, for example through new agreements with Mercosur, while at the same time stabilizing and deepening transatlantic economic relations, the panelists emphasized.

„Deep partisan devide is a real internal threat of the position of the US dollar.“

Another thread running through the Transatlantic Forum was the question of the US dollar’s global standing. Both American and European speakers noted that the dollar’s supremacy now faces internal threats from the ideological split in American politics. ‘We don’t really know when the decline of the US dollar started,’ said Selesha Mohsin, Bloomberg’s senior Washington correspondent. „Deep partisan devide is a real internal threat of the position of the US dollar.“ This has sparked a broader European reevaluation of payment systems and a search for greater financial sovereignty, with calls to create new platforms less exposed to external shocks.

„Europe is the only world region where the demand for energy has declined which is a sign of deindustrialization.“

In the critical field of energy, the Transatlantic Forum stressed that Europe is unique as the only major region experiencing declining demand. Andrew Puzder, the new US ambassador to the European Union, said: „Europe is the only world region where the demand for energy has declined which is a sign of deindustrialization.“ This trend, conference voices emphasized, must be confronted if Europe is to avoid long-term erosion of its industrial base and safeguard energy security.

„The AI race is decided by capital and talent.”

Finally, the discussion turned to artificial intelligence and digital competitiveness. Europe’s lag in generative AI adoption was framed as both a challenge and a call to action. „Only 37 percent of German companies use generative AI“, said Michael Hüther, Director & Member of the Presidium, German Economic Institute (IW). „AI is important for Germany to come back to the mid range of economic groth“, he stressed. And Jens Wiese, managing partner at Leitmotif, added: „The AI race is decided by capital and talent. European companies would be illed advised to sacrifice the transatlantic ties by trying to search more AI opportunities in China“.

The speakers at the Transatlantic Forum agreed that closing this gap will require pragmatic regulation, capital investment, and—most importantly—retaining the strength of the transatlantic relationship rather than seeking shortcuts in collaboration with other players. For now, only the US possesses the scale and dynamism needed to lead in AI, highlighting the limits of Europe’s fragmented financial markets.

Throughout the 4th Transatlantic Forum, the message was clear: the challenges of security, economic competitiveness, innovation, and resilience can only be met through renewed transatlantic solidarity—anchored in both shared values and real investment on both sides of the Atlantic.

Briefings on the Conference Topics

The following policy briefs offer a deep dive into the conference topics:

“Points of Vulnerability in the Battery Cell Industry” – Kai Müller, Chief Financial Officer of PowerCo SE, and Sören Pippart, Senior Expert for Public Affairs at PowerCo SE, outline Germany’s weaknesses and possible courses of action in the battery sector.

“Waiting for the Big Bang: Executing the European Defense Build-Up in Germany” – Robin Fehrenbach, Head of Analysis and Documentation at Atlantik-Brücke, Jakob Flemming, Senior Program and Research Manager at Atlantik-Brücke, and Julia Friedlander, CEO of Atlantik-Brücke, describe how Germany is attempting to become defense-ready in record time.

“The dollar in the fight for US primacy” – Martin Mühleisen, former official at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, analyzes how the US under President Trump uses economic policy as a tool to advance foreign policy priorities.

“How to dismantle a reserve currency” – Daniel McDowell, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, reflects on whether the days of the dollar as a reserve currency are numbered and whether the euro is ready to take its place.

“The Road to Turnberry” – Elizabeth Baltzan, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center and former advisor to the US Trade Representative, assesses the latest trade deal between the European Union and the United States.

“The summer of AI action plans” – Alisha Chhangani, Assistant Director at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center, and Ananya Kuma, Deputy Director, Future of Money, at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center, analyze the widening gap between the US, China, and Europe on artificial intelligence.

Watch a look back at the forum here:

Watch the full recording of the Transatlantic Forum here:

Watch here exclusive Video interviews with the Pannelists:

Der Beitrag Responding to Global Shifts erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Following the event, he emphasized in a video interview with Atlantik-Brücke the need for increased defense spending – specifically 5% of GDP or 3.5% for military investments – in order to meet the requirements of modern warfare, especially in the areas of cyber and space, which will be central to the future. In the past, the focus was on land, air, and sea forces, Badia said, but today cyber and space operations are crucial for dominance, which is why significant financial resources are needed for holistic capability development.

Despite the differing national interests of the 32 NATO member states, Badia emphasizes the alliance’s shared values. He describes how consensus-based decision-making is based on the search for alternatives, so that a rejection (“no”) often leads to an “alternative yes.” Over his 41-year career, the security policy landscape has changed constantly – from the Cold War to German reunification and out-of-area operations to new threat scenarios. Nevertheless, the community of values of the “free Western alliance” has always remained capable of action.

Badia is optimistic that, despite tensions between national sovereignty and common alliance interests, actions will always be taken in the interests of the West and that NATO plus its 35 partners stand on a stable, value-based foundation.

Der Beitrag “You have to concentrate on cyber today” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Outgoing Consul General Norman Thatcher Scharpf talks about the development of transatlantic relations.

Dear Consul General Scharpf, when you took over the position as Consul General in Frankfurt in summer 2021, the world was a different place and Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine on full scale. How have the transatlantic relations developed since Russia’s attack on Ukraine, have the United States and Europe moved closer together in your view? 

When I arrived in Frankfurt, we were just starting to come out of the COVID pandemic, so there has been a lot of evolution since my arrival.  With respect to the transatlantic relationship, Germany and United States have been strong partners for a long time, based on shared democratic values, and on cooperation regarding security, trade, and research.  It’s important to remember that Russia had already invaded Ukraine in 2014 and annexed Crimea.  But I do think that since Russia’s 2022 attack, there is a sense that the post-WWII rules-based international order – which has given us unprecedented security, stability, prosperity, and peace – is fragile and must be defended.  I think that the U.S.-German relationship has become stronger because of the realization that so much of our security and prosperity is mutually dependent, and that there are adversaries – like Russia, China, and Iran – who want to dismantle that rules-based order.

The impression may often arise that the transatlantic partnership seems to be losing importance, especially among younger generations. Do you perceive a similar development, or do you have a different impression?

I would disagree.  In my travels around southwest Germany, I have – particularly over the past year – found a growing awareness that our partnership is something very special, to be treasured, and that it benefits both sides of the Atlantic tremendously.  But we cannot repeat this often enough.  With all the foreign manipulated information out there and the misinformation and disinformation that tries to sow divisions, we have to constantly remind the public – particularly young people – and talk to businesses and civil society organizations about why democracy and human rights are fundamental to our societies and speak clearly about what is at stake.

The close relationship between Germany, Europe and the US has grown historically and is characterized by the experiences of the post-World War II period and the Cold War. How should transatlantic relations change in the 21st century in order to become more resilient vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes and terrorist groups and not to lose significance on both sides of the Atlantic?

As a result of our adversaries’ ability and intent to manipulate information, our democracies are under threat in the United States and in Europe.  We have a responsibility to inoculate our citizens by training our young people in critical thinking, by talking constantly about the importance of democracy, and by reminding our citizens of the benefits that the post-WWII rules-based order has brought.  Democracy is not the natural order of humanity.  Governance throughout most of human history has been characterized by feudalism, autocracy, and various forms of authoritarianism.  We have benefitted from democracy for only a brief period of the entirety of human history, and we need to keep investing in it and constantly improving it.  We have to talk to young people about why democracy is not just a privilege, but that it also comes with responsibilities, including taking an active role.

Der Beitrag “Democracy comes with responsibilities” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Ms. Taussig, is there a war between liberal and autocratic systems and ideas?

Great power competition today is not only a competition over security, economic and technological interests; it is also a struggle over the role and influence of democracy in the international order. Both Russia and China, using different means and with different strength, seek to weaken democratic institutions and norms that challenge their own internal power and legitimacy. This contest of ideas runs across states and also through them, as illiberal and authoritarian-leaning leaders and parties are consolidating control within democratic states. Current governments in Hungary, Poland and Turkey represent the forefront of the illiberal challenge in the EU and NATO. Their advancements are emblematic of the separation of liberal principles – individual liberties, and legislative and judicial checks on the executive – from democratic processes and elections. Even more than democratic setbacks, these developments highlight a crisis of liberalism in the West.

Current governments in Hungary, Poland and Turkey represent the forefront of the illiberal challenge in the EU and NATO.

Has the West lost its credibility due to its own internal political turmoil?

Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic must engage in a meaningful debate of democratic renewal in order to compete with increasingly confident and powerful authoritarian states such as China. First and foremost, to strengthen democracy internationally, it first must be shown to work. This means reinforcing basic democratic fundamentals on the rule of law, minority protections, free and fair elections and free media across western and non-western democracies. This also means developing policies of inclusive growth to tackle rising economic inequality and pro-growth policies to address societal and rural-urban imbalances across advanced democracies.

Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic must engage in a meaningful debate of democratic renewal in order to compete with increasingly confident and powerful authoritarian states such as China.

How can the transatlantic partners counter expanding military and economic influence by autocratic states?

[related]Militarily, burden sharing will remain a critical component of NATO’s ability to counter Russian aggression in Europe. In addition to higher European defense spending, strong and principled American leadership is needed, as well as stronger responses to democratic backsliding within NATO’s ranks, which hurts cohesion and trust in the alliance. In the Indo-Pacific, European partners should invest greater resources in upholding the rules-based order. Positive examples include Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) carried out by the British and French Navies in the South China Sea, while more is needed from Germany. Economically, corruption is a primary vehicle for authoritarian influence in democratic states. This is why strengthening the rule of law and shining a light on corrupt practices and networks can counter outside influence, as well as internal practices that weaken trust in democratic institutions and free market economies.

Are Western democracies well equipped to react to external interferences with their institutions?

Recent examples of Russian political influence have garnered significant attention. Examples include Moscow’s interference and disinformation efforts in the 2016 U.S presidential election, attempts to influence the Brexit referendum, and ongoing financing and tactical support for far-right political parties throughout Europe. Russia’s efforts are primarily opportunistic, as they exploit existing vulnerabilities within societies and political systems. Chinese influence is more strategic and subtle. How Chinese economic engagement across Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America may result in political influence that hinders good governance and transparency is still a little understood phenomenon that will require more focus in the years ahead – particularly as it becomes more technologically advanced.

Russia’s efforts are primarily opportunistic, as they exploit existing vulnerabilities within societies and political systems. Chinese influence is more strategic and subtle.

Is the liberal multilateral international order beyond saving?

The liberal international order developed in the wake of WWII has very much been a U.S.-led order. American withdrawal of its support for longstanding military alliances, political partnerships, democratic norms, and the rules-based trading system would weaken the order, regardless of whether other nations were willing to “pick up the slack.” That being said, critical progress must be made on burden sharing and institutional reform if this order is to withstand new and evolving transnational challenges and the rise of powerful authoritarian states that seek to make the order less liberal.

You can find Torrey Taussig’s detailed curriculum vitae here.

Der Beitrag A Crisis of Liberalism in the West erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Robin Fehrenbach

Jamie Fly was used to harsh criticism whenever he landed in Berlin. That’s what happened to him in 2003, when he worked for the George W. Bush administration and was asked tough questions about the war in Iraq. Ten years later – working for President Barack Obama – he experienced the outrage of the German partners over the NSA affair. Today, Fly’s situation is completely different, as the Senior Fellow of the GMF and Atlantik-Brücke Young Leader Alumnus conveyed at a dinner discussion in Berlin. For two years, Germans have been asking him to explain President Trump’s policies. What used to be irritation has turned into helplessness.

[related]Fly, who also acted as a foreign and security policy advisor for Republican Senator Marco Rubio, began his domestic policy analysis with the recent congressional elections. “After the Midterms, it looked as if Trump would emerge relatively unscathed. Although the majority in the House of Representatives was lost, the Republicans were pleased with winning seats in the Senate.” But the government shutdown, which became the longest in US history, shattered trust. The economic impact, Fly predicted, would be enormous. “The shutdown was a tactical misstep by the President. What has he achieved? He didn’t get the money to build a wall at the Mexican border,” Fly noted. He said he expected the new Congress to use more of its oversight authority to keep the executive branch in check, but this would likely aggravate the deadlock in US politics.

Fly was worried about the American people. The continuing domestic political squabbles and the negative experiences with military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were increasingly tiring the population of US foreign policy. Before the Midterms, polls showed that only 6% of US citizens considered foreign policy to be an important issue. Fly regretted that the current administration continued to act erratically in this field. The high turnover of key foreign policy officials was also related to this. There is a long list of common challenges facing the United States and Europe, such as the search for solutions to social problems or the handling of Artificial Intelligence. However, there is no impetus on the part of the United States to push this transatlantic agenda forward. “The will to play a leading role in world politics is disappearing. This break with decades of continuity will bring fundamental changes for Europe, but also for the Middle East,” said Fly. As a consequence, Europe must work out what it wants to achieve internationally and, above all, how it wants to succeed. Germany in particular should become much more involved in Asia, especially Japan.

In the subsequent discussion, Fly addressed “a general crisis of confidence in our societies,” noting that the fear of globalization, immigration and digitization is real. “This is where real transatlantic cooperation should become the driving force for countering populism and nationalism,” Fly noted. At the end of the event, Fly and the members and Young Leaders of Atlantik-Brücke discussed the state crisis in Venezuela and the trade conflict with China.

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General Philip Breedlove would welcome “Germany’s recapitalization and retraining of its military forces.” In our interview, the former Commander of the United States European Command and NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) calls for a higher readiness of the whole Western alliance to cope with massive and complex threats. You can read an edited version of our podcast “Atlantik-Brücke On The Record” with General Breedlove below. The podcast was produced on the occasion of a discussion on the future of NATO, hosted by Atlantik-Brücke.

General Breedlove, how would you describe NATO’s current situation?

Our alliance is strong and it continues to be an important and successful alliance. However, I would also note that we are facing challenges now that are tough and we haven’t really faced some of these challenges in a long time. They force us to take a look at ourselves and to say: Are we ready for the threats that we see out there today? That is the biggest challenge to NATO.

What are the most pressing internal challenges which the Alliance is facing at the moment?

[related]Our current challenges began when the Russians invaded Crimea and the Donbass. A lot of attention again began to be paid to this neighbor to the North and East that was threatening Ukraine. Many of the former Soviet Warsaw Pact nations felt threatened again. There was a very strong focus on the fact that Russia was not going to be a partner but might actually once again be an opponent. At the same time, we were seeing massive migration problems in the South emanating from Northern Africa and from the civil war in Syria where Bashar al-Assad was murdering his people. Large numbers of people began to flee Syria.

One of those really tough internal problems in NATO is that we had a division in worry, a division in concern in that we saw this belligerent Russia to the East and the North, and we saw this very tough societal problem of immigration being caused by problems in Syria and Northern Africa. NATO had to come to grips with it. At one point, we created the ‘Strategic Direction East’ and ‘Strategic Direction South’ to label these internal problems. One of the biggest internal concerns is that NATO has to be able to address all of the challenges to its nations.

One of those really tough internal problems in NATO is that we had a division in worry, a division in concern in that we saw this belligerent Russia to the East and the North, and we saw this very tough societal problem of immigration being caused by problems in Syria and Northern Africa.

What are other severe external threats which NATO has to cope with?

There are other threats that may emanate from the same places, but they are different kind of threats. Clearly, the cyber threat that we face today is different than two decades ago. Cyber is a tool that is being used in everyday conflicts. We are having issues in cyber with our opponent to the East every day. These sets of old tools that many label hybrid war – Mr. Gerasimov (the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia; remark of Atlantik-Brücke) calling it ‘indirect means and asymmetric methods’ – are being used in a new way.

What worries you most?

Our nations are under a lot of pressure to address societal challenges and the policy solutions battle for the same budget that must be used to ensure that the militaries of NATO are ready to carry out the missions that they must accomplish. As the SACEUR it was clear to me that the readiness of our militaries in NATO was not adequate. It was not appropriate to the task that we saw from a resurgent and recalcitrant Russia. We need to address the readiness and recapitalization of our militaries.

As the SACEUR it was clear to me that the readiness of our militaries in NATO was not adequate. It was not appropriate to the task that we saw from a resurgent and recalcitrant Russia.

Being the former SACEUR and being equipped with the knowledge of your 39 years lasting military career, how do you assess the military exercise “Vostok 18” that was carried out by roughly 300.000 Russian soldiers as to the security of the NATO area?

First and foremost we should not be alarmed that Russia is exercising. We exercise. It is every nation’s right to exercise. The issue is that we must exercise responsibly. It is important that we are transparent in what we are doing, how long we are doing it, where we are doing it, who we are doing it with. Things that NATO advertises every day about its exercises. Vostok is an exercise towards the East. What worried me more as the SACEUR were the Zapad exercises. Those were the exercises done in the West. They were rarely open and transparent.

First and foremost we should not be alarmed that Russia is exercising. We exercise. It is every nation’s right to exercise. The issue is that we must exercise responsibly.

Do we witness the entering into a Russian-Sino phase at least on a military level when analyzing the participation of 3.000 Chinese soldiers in “Vostok 18”?

We should not be surprised. We as the West have issues working with Russia. We also have issues working with China. Geostrategically, why would we not expect them to possibly message us by collaborating? We also need to sit back and understand that the Russians have issues with the Chinese and the Chinese have issues with the Russians. It is not appropriate to overdramatize and to draw any major geostrategic conclusions from them exercising together.

Would you recommend any adaptations to NATO regarding its general strategy for the European security architecture?

We have been through two decades of fighting counter-insurgency and we have lost our focus on large scale war fighting operations. We do not have a focus yet on the size of operations that article 5 would require. We need to regain our ability through training and exercises. We need to regain our ability to understand how to command and control large formations against a dedicated opponent.

We need to regain our ability through training and exercises. We need to regain our ability to understand how to command and control large formations against a dedicated opponent.

Do you show understanding for Germany’s foreign and security policy that has not reached NATO’s 2-percent-goal yet?

I am not going to pretend to criticize or advise Germany. But the young Captain Breedlove who served during the Cold War here in Europe eight times and in Germany five times experienced that the Bundeswehr and the Luftwaffe of the Cold War was an incredibly capable military force. It was a leader on the European landmass. It is important for Germany to lead in NATO on the European landmass. I am not saying this at the exclusion of other large countries. But I would like to see that Germany’s recapitalization and retraining of its military forces show that leadership in NATO.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

The same role it played for the last seventy years. NATO is not perfect and it hasn’t kept perfect peace here in Europe. We have had some issues that we had to work through. But what NATO has done, is to prevent the kind of wars that ravaged Europe multiple times. NATO will continue to do that. NATO is a very capable and very important alliance. The mission that it has had for the last seventy years will be important for the next seventy years.

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When I wonder how the Russian claim to power affects the everyday life in Lithuania in concrete terms, I immediately have two incidents in mind. One can recall the story of Russian supplies of oil via the pipeline “Druzhba”. Back in 2006 Lithuanian Government went for privatization of a major oil refinery that was and still is a major supplier of oil products to the region. Russia was pressing to sell the refinery to a Russian company for a low price. Lithuanian Government went for an open and transparent international privatization tender. The Polish company “Orlen” won. A few months later oil supplies via the “Druzhba” pipeline stopped, and the pipeline branch coming to Lithuania has been dry until this day. Official Russian explanation was that the pipeline needed repair. It still needs …

In Lithuanian efforts to develop alternative energy sources or to establish alternative routes of supply, there were various obstacles generated by Russia related actors. They ranged from financing, or, in fact, bribing local people to wage a campaign against extraction of shale gas up to engaging Lithuanian LNG terminal developers into lengthy litigation in courts. We also witnessed Russian efforts to question Lithuanian Government’s ability to meet its international commitments. For example, Russian representatives in UNESCO waged a campaign of allegations on, as if, environmental harm done by the construction of Lithuanian LNG terminal.

The same pattern in any maritime area considered by Russia as its zone of influence

[related]There is another case deserving serious attention. In 2014 and 2015, the power cable connecting the Lithuanian and Swedish electricity grids, called NordBalt, was being laid on the Baltic seabed. Russia launched a series of naval exercises in the vicinity of NordBalt power cable itinerary. Under an excuse of caring for safety, Russian navy chased away all the ships from the area. The area, de facto closed by Russian navy, encompassed a big sector of the Lithuanian exclusive economic zone. And, surprise, surprise, that was the area in which NordBalt cable had to be laid down. Russian navy exercises lasted more than half a year. In extreme case, in April 2015, the area was closed for 26 days. Completion of NordBalt was delayed and costs of the project increased significantly. This pattern could be applied in any maritime area considered by Russia as its zone of influence or interest. It has also to be noted that the Baltic Sea is quite shallow, and it is not so simple to change the established sea routes. Therefore, the approaches to the seaports on the Eastern Baltic coast could be severely hindered.

The examples that I have mentioned refer to several challenges posed by Russia. It is about Russian effort to take over the assets of our major companies. It is about using those companies as a major lobbying or corrupting instrument in politics. It is about steps to preserve and abuse a dominant role in the energy supply and about using it to achieve a major policy change of the country. It is about testing ways and means to disrupt major supplies and thus to tire out our population. It is about testing ways to hinder deployments of NATO reinforcements in the Baltics when the time comes.

Hostile activities against the IT systems are on the rise

Russian cyber attacks on our country pose another very dangerous threat. Russian hostile activities against the IT systems of the Lithuanian state sector and critical infrastructure are on the rise. Last year almost 55,000 cyber incidents were dealt with by Lithuanian National Cyber Security Centre. One fourth of them occured in our energy sector. Government institutions are also frequent targets. For example, features of a cyber and information operation were identified after the news portal of Lithuanian TV channel had been hacked and fake information about the Defense Minister had been placed on it. Subsequently an email containing a malicious document was distributed to the media and government institutions. The email contained a link to the fake article, in order to attract the recipients’ attention and increase the spread of the malware. The main goal of the hacker group associated with the Russian intelligence services was not an information operation but spreading the malware in the networks of state institutions.

The National Cyber Security Center now operates as the main national computer emergency response unit for management of cyber incidents. It also operates as the main Accreditation Authority of all types of IT systems and networks in Lithuania. The Centre has an R&D division for creating tools, necessary for managing cyber incidents and executes cyber exercises. A secure network of main state institutions, which could be capable of exploiting the benefits of peacetime systems and ensuring their viability in case of possible military action, is being developed. It is expected that approximately 550 most important state and municipal authorities will be interlinked by this network. It will be capable of operating separately from the public internet and remain resilient to the cyber threats. Lithuania initiated and leads the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defense policy (PESCO) project called “Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security”. The first outcome of the project is expected at the beginning of 2019 and should assist the participating nations to counter a cyber attack or an incident. This project will help participating EU member states to mobilize collective expertise in order to jointly strengthen their cyber security resilience and facilitate cooperation in combating cyber threats through mutual assistance. This year, NATO exercise Steadfast Cobalt will again take place in Lithuania. Thus, we try to contribute to the development of practical cyber security capabilities of the Alliance.

Contributions by our European allies, and, first of all, those by Germany, to increase our security are very much appreciated. However, the transatlantic factor is crucial. Russia must know that even in case of a limited incursion, it would immediately enter a military conflict with the whole Alliance including the nuclear powers and particularly the United States. Russians try to avoid namely that, and this is a major deterrence factor.

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Part XIV of our series: Magnus Nordenman calms the inhabitants of Guam and Hawaii: After initial irritations, the U.S. government under President Trump adheres firmly to Article 5. The Director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council points out however that the United States’ counter-terrorism strategy for NATO is hardly developed. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke in Washington, D.C. Nordenman also explains that the special quality of the Alliance’s new command structure rests on the better reinforcement build-up.

Mr. Nordenman, how steadfast is the U.S. government’s commitment to Article 5 under President Trump?

We’re in a better place than we were at the beginning of this administration. As a presidential candidate, Trump called NATO and America’s commitment into question. And the first summit in Brussels with President Trump was not a good day for NATO. But since then a lot has happened. The vice president has relayed America’s commitments, as have Secretary Mattis, Secretary Tillerson and the president himself. In that sense, the worst is over. We’ve removed most of the doubts about America’s commitment to Article 5 and European security. That’s not to say there won’t be turbulent times ahead. But at least, on that basic level, we are in a better place than we were in early January of 2017.

The first summit in Brussels with President Trump was not a good day for NATO.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

Russia is trying to extend its spheres of influence. The Baltics and Poland, in particular, feel threatened by Russia’s aggressive behavior. How reliable is NATO’s security guarantee in this European region?

[related]It’s getting better. The implementation of the Warsaw Summit decisions with an enhanced forward presence in the Baltic States and Poland is a first step. But now we need to do more in the maritime domain, in the air domain, and in reinforcement. NATO is on the right track, and it actually got there surprisingly quickly. One important point that isn’t discussed much in Europe is the fact that European nations are stepping up their efforts – with Germany having the lead in Lithuania, the UK in Estonia and Canada in Latvia. It’s crucial to understand that America is not alone in its commitment to security in the Baltic region.

That’s a contribution to transatlantic burden sharing.

Correct. It’s not enough, and more needs to be done. But the political point is important: this is not a scenario in which America has to shoulder the entire burden.

North Korea has threatened to attack the island of Guam, which is a territory of the United States. Would such an event invoke NATO’s Article 5 on collective defense?

It might. That’s an unknown factor that wasn’t considered when NATO was first established because the focus back then was obviously on Europe. But Guam is an alliance territory and the only time Article 5 has been invoked was actually in response to the attack on the U.S. Guam is obviously open to legal discussion. A more interesting case is probably Hawaii, which is actually a state in the Union. Hawaii is also within missile range, and North Korea has commenced nuclear missile drills again for the first time since the Cold War. In this new, globally interconnected security environment, both Canada and the U.S. – as Pacific countries and allies – have to be prepared for Pacific events that might also impact NATO.

In this new, globally interconnected security environment, both Canada and the U.S. – as Pacific countries and allies – have to be prepared for Pacific events that might also impact NATO.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

Would you recommend NATO to think through these legal issues surrounding Guam?

It makes a lot of sense for NATO to focus primarily on the East and South. That’s where we have intense security challenges. But it’s always good to give your mental muscles a work out and at least think things through to conclusion. It ensures that the decision makers are better equipped to cope with unexpected events. It’s also worthwhile thinking about worst case scenarios. This has been a longstanding challenge for the alliance. If you told someone that NATO would be engaged in central Asia in early 2000, people would have thought you were joking. But then 9/11 happened, and all of a sudden NATO was undertaking its largest expeditionary operation for almost 15 years. So it’s healthy for any alliance to regularly consider the impossible.

Which strategy for NATO does the United States under the Trump administration seek to develop?

This administration, at least at the senior level in the White House, really has two priorities: a better balance of burden sharing and a NATO role in counter-terrorism. A couple of rungs down things get a bit more detailed and granular. One example is the Department of Defense under Secretary Mattis, who has a very good understanding of  the Russian challenge and the importance of defense and deterrence. There’s a lot of good, practical work going on there.

This administration, at least at the senior level in the White House, really has two priorities: a better balance of burden sharing and a NATO role in counter-terrorism.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

How far developed is this strategy already?

There’s a growing sense in Washington that the burden sharing discussion is going in the right direction. Then we can move on to the reasons. Is this being driven by Putin or Trump? Europeans tend to argue that it is actually being driven by Putin rather than Trump. Trump supporters tend to argue that it is all being driven by Trump. I like to think the truth is somewhere in between. But whoever is driving it, and however long it takes to get there, this discussion is moving in the right direction.

The counter-terrorism strategy is much less developed. Both Washington and the alliance agree that NATO is not a counter-terrorism organization. There are also different opinions within the alliance on how counter-terrorism should be implemented and what institutions have to be worked through. This opens the door to European NATO members to come to Washington with their ideas and proposals on what NATO’s role in counter-terrorism could be.

President Trump’s ‘America First’ strategy seems to put American protectionism in a broad range of policy fields. To what extent does this impact NATO’s strength and the United States’ longstanding aspiration to shape the liberal world order?

You are seeing two separate directions in American foreign policy. I’m less worried about the defense and national security situation. As I said, we’re already past the worst in terms of America’s commitment to NATO. The burden sharing issue is also going in the right direction, and the U.S. is maintaining strong defense relationships with partners such as Australia, Japan and South Korea.

More damage is probably being done on the trade agenda, with President Trump’s proposal to withdraw from the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement and his pulling out of the TPP negotiations. TTIP also seems to have been abandoned for the moment. In that sense, multilateral trade agreements are more at risk than America’s military and security alliances. On a day to day basis these are unrelated. But they do say something about America’s commitment to multilateral solutions and rules-based institutions. At a philosophical level they certainly reinforce each other. So there is a danger of a divide opening up, and of American engagement in the world resting on the single pillar of defense, whereas before it rested on two – the other being multilateral trade.

Multilateral trade agreements are more at risk than America’s military and security alliances. On a day to day basis these are unrelated. But they do say something about America’s commitment to multilateral solutions and rules-based institutions. At a philosophical level they certainly reinforce each other.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

The Ukraine crisis remains unresolved. Would the revitalization of the NATO Russia Council help to improve both the situation in Ukraine and the American-Russian relationship?

Broadly speaking, the U.S.-Russia relationship is at its worst since the Cold War in spite of the hopes of the White House to try and restore it. We’ve arrived at this point for a number of different reasons – first and foremost as a result of Russian interference in the U.S. election and its continued aggression in Ukraine. The relationship has taken a turn for the worse since President Trump took up office. There is some consistency here, because the administration is saying the relationship cannot improve until we have a political solution for Ukraine, which puts this administration in line with the Obama administration’s position. The Ukraine remains a huge issue and the topic of supplying arms to Ukraine is back on the table. It was ultimately rejected by the Obama administration but is now being seriously discussed again in Washington.

What is your key takeaway from the NATO Russia Council?

We aren’t going to see any major breakthroughs. Talks are taking place for the eminently good reason that talking to each other is better than not talking to each other. On the one hand we are moving to deter Russia, and on the other we are attempting to engage in constructive cooperation. This isn’t just the European view. Secretary Mattis is also on the record talking about the importance of strong deterrence and dialogue.

NATO’s new command structure and additional headquarters will enhance its troop deployment capabilities. Do you think these changes go far enough to be an effective deterrent against Russia?

This is another very important building block of our deterrence construct, which relies on reinforcements. We’re never going to have enough troops from day one in Poland, or in the Baltic States, or in Romania. It will always be a reinforcement build-up. By the way, it was also a reinforcement build-up during the Cold War. The U.S. certainly has fewer troops in Europe than it had during the Cold War, but even back then a key objective was to channel reinforcements into Europe. It is easy to forget. People like to talk about fighter jets, artillery, and tanks. But these structures, logistics, supplies and reinforcements all keep NATO going. I’m glad we’re finally getting to it because this has been underappreciated for a long time.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

That’s a great question! NATO will continue to play a central role supporting America’s national security. The EU has an incredibly important set of European institutions. In that respect we will always be an outsider, but this doesn’t mean there won’t be close cooperation or a close U.S.-EU partnership. We were a founding member of NATO and we’re also one of the leading members of the alliance. NATO will always be important. I remain optimistic about NATO and the transatlantic relationship. We’ve been through bad times and crises in our relationship before. It’s particularly striking how many aspects of the situation today remind me of 2002, 2003 and 2004, another period in which many Europeans believed that America was a rogue country that wasn’t respecting its allies and international institutions.

NATO will always be important. I remain optimistic about NATO and the transatlantic relationship.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

You’re talking about the war in Iraq.

Correct. There was talk in Berlin and Paris back then about it being time for Europe to go its own way and reduce its dependence on the United States. But we overcame that relationship crisis. I’m not saying that the situation then is comparable to the situation today. Very different factors are involved. But I’ve heard talk like this before. Domestically, in the U.S., I’m beginning to see a pretty healthy counter-reaction – especially if you look at congressional interest in NATO, congressional delegations traveling to Europe, members of the Senate and the House talking about the importance of NATO and American commitments to Europe, and more funding for the European Deterrence Initiative. The U.S. is definitely going through a turbulent and challenging time, and there is a lot of uncertainty. But I am beginning to see the outlines of a counter-reaction. People here in Washington are waking up and realizing that we can’t take the transatlantic relationship for granted. It is something that we have to nurture as well.

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Part XIII of our series: Rose Gottemoeller regards the Alliance’s security guarantee for the Baltics and Poland as reliable. NATO Deputy Secretary General demands that Russia complies with its commitments to transparency of its military exercises in this region. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke Gottemoeller also stresses that the Alliance’s new command structure will be “robust, agile and fully fit for purpose”.

Mrs. Gottemoeller, Russia is trying to expand its spheres of influence. Especially the Baltics and Poland feel threatened by Russia’s aggressive behaviour. How reliable is NATO’s security guarantee in this European region?

In recent years, Russia has threatened and used military force against its neighbours. NATO has responded in a defensive and proportionate way. The response includes the four multinational battlegroups that are operational in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Our measures are strictly defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments. They aim at preventing conflict and preserving the peace.

Our measures are strictly defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

This is a clear demonstration that we stand together, and is the essence of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. But our deterrence and defence does not rely on four battlegroups alone. They are part of a broader posture that involves national home defence and other NATO forces. We have, for example, tripled the size of our multinational NATO Response Force to 40,000 troops – with a 5,000-strong spearhead force ready to deploy within 72 hours. We have also enhanced air patrols over the Baltic and Black Seas. Our defences are now stronger than at any point since the Cold War. That sends a clear signal.

Our policy towards Russia is consistent: strong defence and openness to dialogue. We are delivering on both tracks. While our practical cooperation with Russia has been suspended, we remain open to a periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue. We held six meetings of the NATO-Russia Council over the past two years, and are continuing to look for further opportunities.

There are regular reports about a gap of exercises between NATO and Russia. How severe is this problem in the perception within the alliance’s Headquarters?

[related]All nations have the right to exercise their armed forces; it is essential that in doing so they respect their commitments to transparency and predictability. Transparency has also been a priority for NATO in its discussions with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council, and it will remain a priority as we continue our dialogue with Russia. Exercises such as ZAPAD last year – together with the overall increase in Russian military activities – underline the need for close dialogue between NATO and Russia to avoid incidents and miscalculations.

Russia has regularly under-reported the size of its exercises to avoid mandatory observations by the OSCE. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has never opened an exercise for the mandatory observation outlined in the Vienna Document. We continue to urge Russia to be fully transparent about the scope of its exercises and to comply with the requirements of the Vienna Document. Allies are also making efforts within the OSCE to modernise the Vienna Document in order to close loopholes and ensure transparency of military exercises.

Russia has regularly under-reported the size of its exercises to avoid mandatory observations by the OSCE.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

As for what NATO does in this area, we ensure that all we do is defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments – including those outlined in the Vienna Document. Exercising is important to test our capabilities and make certain that we are fit for purpose and ready for the challenges we might face.

In May and June, NATO Allies will conduct a range of exercises in the Baltic Sea region – testing the ability of Allied forces to operate together. In the bigger picture, our measures strike the right balance between a greater military deterrence in the east and the ability to quickly send reinforcements. So, our approach remains firm, defensive and proportionate.

We will do what we believe is necessary to ensure that we are capable of defending our territories and populations. But I want to make clear that we do not want a Cold War, and we will not let ourselves be dragged into a new arms race. NATO remains determined to defend all Allies against any threat. We will maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent, as well as strong conventional forces. And we will continue to engage in a meaningful dialogue with Russia, to increase predictability and reduce risk.

We do not want a Cold War, and we will not let ourselves be dragged into a new arms race.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

NATO’s new command structure with additional headquarters aims to accomplish a better capability of deploying troops. Do you think the potential deterrence towards Russia deriving from this step goes far enough?

Our ability to deploy troops wherever they are needed is key to deterrence in peacetime and to our collective defence in times of crisis. This must go hand in hand with a NATO command structure that is robust, agile and fully fit for purpose. Last November, NATO Ministers agreed in principle on the outline for such an adapted NATO Command Structure, and in February of this year, Allies agreed the proposed design for the adapted command structure. We will discuss resources, timelines and locations at the next Meeting of Defence Ministers in June.

The new command structure will include a number of new elements. A Command for the Atlantic will help protect the sea lines of communication between Europe and North America. There will be a new Command to ensure the mobility of our forces within Europe. We also agreed on the need for a renewed focus throughout the command structure on logistics and movement, situational awareness, resilience and on cyber defence. I expect we will finalise all aspects of the adapted structure ahead of the Brussels Summit in July.

Since 2014 there has also been good progress in improving national legislation, removing many bureaucratic hurdles to allow us to move forces across Allied territory. This is important, but we still have work to do. We need to have enough transport capacity at our disposal, and we need to improve infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, railways, runways and ports.

This is not a job for NATO alone – it requires close coordination across national governments and with the private sector. The EU has an important role to play as well, so NATO and the EU will continue to work very closely on this vital issue.

Russia has supposedly violated the INF Treaty by having developed the ballistic missile SSC-8 that is expected to have a range of more than 500 kilometres. What role does this threat play in NATO’s strategic considerations?

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons that threatened Europe, and which were associated with the ability to launch attacks with little warning. We remain fully committed to the preservation of this historic arms control treaty. The INF Treaty is a crucial element of Euro-Atlantic security. Full compliance with the INF Treaty is essential.

The United States has determined that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty. US Defence Secretary Mattis updated Allies on this issue in November of last year. In December, Allies issued a statement calling on Russia to address these serious concerns in a substantial, transparent and verifiable way.

The United States has determined that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

Allies welcome the continued efforts by the United States to engage Russia to resolve concerns about Russia’s compliance with the Treaty.

The relationship between NATO and Russia is very strained since the annexation of Crimea. Which approach should NATO take in order to accomplish a convergence with the Kremlin?

We have seen a broad pattern of reckless behaviour by Russia over many years. This includes the illegal annexation of Crimea, the military support to separatists in Eastern Ukraine, and its military build-up from the North of Europe to the Middle East. Russia’s military presence in Moldova and Georgia is against the will of either of these countries’ governments. There have also been attempts to subvert democratic processes and institutions, and we have seen an increase in cyber attacks. In March, Allies expressed their deep concern about the nerve agent incident in Salisbury in the United Kingdom, the first use of a nerve agent on Alliance territory. Subsequently over two dozen countries expelled people who had been accredited as Russian diplomats from their countries. NATO’s Secretary General withdrew agreement for the appointment of seven individuals accredited to the Russian Mission to NATO and denied the pending accreditation of three others.

This is certainly a challenging time, but NATO’s policy remains unchanged. We have strengthened our deterrence and defence in response to Russia’s actions, while we remain open for a meaningful dialogue with Russia. We held six meetings of the NATO-Russia Council since 2016, and we are working to hold another. This dialogue is difficult – but it is vital to increase transparency and reduce risk. So, NATO’s approach to Russia combines strength and dialogue. And we are delivering on both fronts.

Michael O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, supports the hypothesis that the end of NATO’s eastward expansion and the implementation of a zone of neutral nations would reduce tensions with Russia. How do you assess this proposal?

Russia’s western borders have never been safer. NATO enlargement poses no threat to Russia. NATO’s Open Door policy is enshrined in the Washington Treaty and has helped spread stability and prosperity, just like the European Union’s enlargement. And Russia has benefitted from this stability and prosperity as well. Our door remains open to European nations able to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Russia’s western borders have never been safer. NATO enlargement poses no threat to Russia.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

Every country has the right ”to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance.” These principles are enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. All OSCE member states have signed up to these principles, including Russia.

NATO membership is not imposed on countries. All countries that have joined NATO have done so freely, and in accordance with their domestic democratic processes. To join NATO, countries are expected to adhere to the values of NATO, and to meet strict political, economic and military criteria. NATO Allies are keeping the progress of aspirant countries under close review. In any event, accession to NATO is for individual candidate countries and the Alliance to decide. No third country has the right to interfere in this process.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

NATO has kept the peace in Europe for almost seventy years. It is the most successful military Alliance in the world because we have been able to adapt. In an unpredictable world, we will continue to adapt to new challenges and continue to keep our nations and populations safe and secure.

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Professor Nye, in your book “Is the American Century Over?”, written in 2015, you express the expectation that the United States will still be playing a leading geopolitical role in 2041. Have you changed your position after one year of the Trump presidency?

Certainly, Donald Trump has put some doubts in the back of my mind. It is possible that he could derail these predictions. The Americans will generally still have the capacity to play a leading geopolitical role, but I am not sure if they are going to have the will. In the 1930s Americans drew inward, even though they were the strongest country in the world. This led to a terrible decade.

Is it perhaps too early to say after one year?

Trump has drawn upon a strand of populist nationalism which is common now in all countries in the developed world. It is, however, not dominant. If you look at public opinion polls, the majority of Americans still want overseas involvement including cooperation with other countries. But the strand that Trump has called upon is there. Even if Trump goes away, which I hope he will after four years, Trumpism or populist nationalism will persist. So, there is a certain danger that we face. We have to be careful to not just pin it on Trump’s difficult personality.

Trump has drawn upon a strand of populist nationalism which is common now in all countries in the developed world.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

You invented the term “soft power” describing the ability to attract and persuade. Did the United States become less or more attractive under Trump’s presidency?

[related]The evidence is very clear. I wrote a column for Project Syndicate saying that Trump has definitely reduced American soft power. There is a Gallup poll that shows that American attractiveness has gone down in more than 130 countries. There is a similar poll that was taken by Pew with results that were very much like those of the Gallup poll. Finally, there is an index of the soft power called the Soft Power 30 which is published in London by Portland, the British consultancy. The Americans dropped from first place in the last year of Obama to third place in the first year of Trump. That is not just a political statement or bias. There is evidence to substantiate that view.

What can be done to alter this course?

It is going to be difficult for President Trump because he tends to a bullying and unilateralist style which antagonizes others. If you use a phrase like ‘America first’ all the time, by definition this means that everybody else is second. That is not exactly the way to attract others. With that being said, however, let us note that Trump is able to make changes in his policy. Before he was elected he said NATO was obsolete. After a few months in office he discovered NATO was not obsolete. There are a lot of areas where he has initially challenged the traditions of American foreign policy but has come around to embrace those traditions. If you combine that with a resurgence in the economy, which he expects to get through his fiscal stimulus, and if that does not go off the rails into inflation, Trump can recover some of the American soft power. But he has to change his style to be able to fully recover.

If you use a phrase like ‘America first’ all the time, by definition this means that everybody else is second. That is not exactly the way to attract others.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

Which role will the United States be playing especially within NATO in 20 years’ time?

Probably since the 1950s, since the Suez Crisis, there have been articles and predictions about the death of NATO. That is now obsolete. NATO has proven a far more resilient concept and structure because of two reasons: One is the relatively open organization for democratic societies which enables them to interact with each other, more than just at the top level. The second point is that geopolitically, Russia still is a problem or a puzzle. If Russia remains that sort of a puzzle then NATO will not be obsolete. I am leery of these views that say NATO is finished.

And what will the role of the Unites States within NATO look like?

The United States will continue to seek its interests as it has since 1945 in being closely tied to an open and democratic Europe. That requires NATO and American participation in NATO.

Trump’s “America first” strategy seems to foster American protectionism. Does this affect NATO’s strength and the United States’ long-known aspiration to shape the liberal world order?

It does. The attitude which Trump and some of his close advisors have taken, that a trade surplus is a measure of moral failure, is simply not good economics. The basic view of most regular economists is that your trade surplus and deficit has more to do with your savings and investing rates. As Trump has pressed this issue that trade surpluses are rogue and demanded renegotiation, it does spill over into other aspects of alliances. Look at the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement or at the problems that Trump has had with his visits with Chancellor Merkel. This is a real problem.

Trump urges the Europeans to invest more in their military abilities. Is he right?

Asking the Europeans to do more to contribute to common defense has a long, long history. The 2-percent-target goes back many years. But because of his bluster and style Trump may be more credible than Obama on that.

Does he have more credibility by being more forceful in that matter?

Sometimes nastiness as a hard power is more effective than soft power.

Do you think the United States would ultimately appreciate a stronger European commitment within NATO?

The US has been interested in a stronger European military for some time, well before Donald Trump. There was a period when I was in the Defense Department in the 1990s when there were certain fears that France was trying to lead Europe out of NATO or reduce the American role in the alliance. That is ancient history. The view for a decade and more has been that a stronger Europe inside NATO is better for the United States. That is actually a pretty widely shared view among those people in the United States who pay attention to foreign policy.

What are the main and most urgent strategic challenges for NATO?

The issue of the return of great power politics and the issue of how Russia will behave will require a combination both of deterrence and also a way to think about retaining the democratic processes in Eastern and Central Europe. Both challenges are going to be central to NATO. I don’t expect countries like Poland or Hungary to defect to Russia. That is not plausible. But the quality of democracy in some of these former Visegrád countries has been under challenge from this same type of right-wing populist nationalism which has affected the United States. In addition to having a strong deterrent posture to prevent Russia from using its strength to bully its neighbors and expand, both NATO and the European Union have to think about the internal quality of democracy.

The issue of the return of great power politics and the issue of how Russia will behave will require a combination both of deterrence and also a way to think about retaining the democratic processes in Eastern and Central Europe.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

Are you less optimistic than 20 years ago that there will ever be a world in which Russia does not see NATO, the United States and Europe as competitors or even enemies?

20 years ago, we believed there was a profound change going on in terms of democratization and liberalization of Russia. That has been reversed. Part of it may have been mistakes made by the West. The Bush administration’s efforts to expand NATO membership right to the borders of Russia in Georgia and so forth were not appropriate in terms of reassurance for the Russians. But it is also true that some of the changes that occurred inside Russia have to do with problems in Russian society and economy which were not caused by NATO expansion.

But this serves as a good explanation for Russia blaming NATO for its domestic difficulties …

That is right. If one looks back at Putin’s policies and especially his Munich Security Conference speech in 2007, you can see this kind of blaming. The views that we had in the 1990s, when Yeltsin was in power and we used the NATO-Russia Council as a way to integrate Russia into NATO were overly optimistic. But if you take a long-run view we certainly should be hoping that changes inside Russia will allow a Europe that includes Russia again. But I don’t expect that in the near term, unfortunately.

When Obama was president one could get the impression that the relationship with Russia was not at the top of his agenda. Could that change with Donald Trump?

Ironically, one of the things that Trump got right in foreign policy was to think of ways to try to reduce the tensions with Russia and to improve the relationship. It is not that one has to accept Russian behavior. But it is true that Russia is a great power. We have to do business with them. To sharpen antagonism is not healthy for Russia, for Europe and the United States. In that sense, Trump’s insight might have been better even if his motives were somewhat unclear. Putin and the Russian intelligence overachieved in their efforts to interfere in the 2016 election and they have made rapprochement with Russia so radioactive inside American politics that not even Trump can do anything about it.

Putin and the Russian intelligence overachieved in their efforts to interfere in the 2016 election and they have made rapprochement with Russia so radioactive inside American politics that not even Trump can do anything about it.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

The Munich Security Conference 2018 will focus in particular on the future role of the European Union as a global actor and its relations with Russia as well as the United States. What is your opinion on the EU’s future role?

The EU plays a very important role. I have always thought of the EU as a magnet which should draw others towards an open, rules-based society both domestically and internationally. On the other hand, there is a historical danger of Central Europeans like Germany being drawn too much into the Russian orbit. The effort is to build bridges – but sometimes in the effort to build bridges they may go too far. The key question for Europe is whether it is careful enough not to be played by Putin in order to divide the United States from Europe. It is interesting to me that the sanctions were applied to show that a country cannot steal its neighbor’s territory without paying a price. Those sanctions applied after the annexation of Crimea have maintained an important role and the West is not divided on that so far.

Do you think the sanctions should stay for the near future?

Yes. Until you see changes in Russian behavior. One could imagine steps that might be taken to reduce Russian interference in Luhansk and Donbass for example which could lead to some degree of relaxation of sanctions in a step-by-step process. A total removal of sanctions right now would be a mistake.

There is much more movement within the European Union than in the United States. Some countries are in favor of lifting the sanctions …

Correct. Italy and other countries like the former Visegrád countries would like to see more rapid progress than is healthy. What is interesting to see is that the transatlantic relationship has survived these temptations.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

NATO provides a security blanket in the sense of reassurance. Despite of different national interests and different political pressures which tend to pull states in different directions there is an overarching security framework which helps states to avoid rash or desperate types of actions. NATO in that sense is a complement to the EU. But the heart of the future of Europe is obviously to find ways to continue the process that has begun under the rubric of the European Union. That does not mean a federation. The political and public opinion do not back this kind of system right now.

NATO and the EU are complementary, like hard and soft power.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

NATO and the EU are complementary, like hard and soft power. The danger is that the Trump administration disrupts this larger picture. So far – and it is only a little over a year into his presidency – he has adapted more than I expected and has not broken that basic consensus in the Atlantic area. I don’t want to sound like somebody who is a Trump supporter because it is very clear that I am not. But it is important that we keep what he is doing in some degree of perspective. So far he has not broken the basic hard power framework which underlies a smart power policy.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. was interviewed by Juliane Schäuble, head of the politics department at the Berlin daily paper Der Tagesspiegel.

Listen to the Transatlantic Call:

Der Beitrag Nye: “Nastiness can be more effective than soft power” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Part IX of our series: Michael O’Hanlon demands that NATO’s eastward expansion must come to an end. The Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and author of the book “Beyond NATO” suggests an alternative security architecture in Europe. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke he insists that neutral countries should have every option to join any other organization.

O’Hanlon’s main assumptions at a glance:

1. NATO’s eastward expansion has gone far enough
2. Negotiations of Western nations with potentially neutral countries in eastern Europe would reduce the risk of war with Russia
3. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova
4. The neutral countries could join the European Union in the future
5. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination

Dr. O’Hanlon, in your book “Beyond NATO” you outline the hypothesis that the end of NATO’s eastward expansion and the implementation of a “zone of neutral nations” would reduce tensions with Russia. Do you see any signs in the actual political landscape for this approach to be seriously considered?

I am not going to be so audacious as to say that this strategy is being followed now. But it has a chance. Let me add two points. First, I am not the original proponent of this kind of thinking. This architecture is mine. But the basic notion that we have to think differently about the East than we would think about other parts of Europe has a number of other adherents. Henry Kissinger is one, the late Zbigniew Brzezinski another, perhaps even chancellor Merkel. We know that going back to the 2008 NATO summit, president Bush and secretary Condoleezza Rice wanted to expand NATO and give both the Ukraine and Georgia membership action plans to join within a short time. Many Europeans held them back. We already saw foreshadowing of this thinking with European reluctance to go that far.

What is your second point?

I would not propose this architecture simply as a gift to Russia or as a unilateral concession on our part not to expand NATO further. Because for one thing we would be leaving Ukraine and Georgia in the lurch, since we did promise them eventual membership. Secondly, if we conceded this Eastern area as a non NATO zone without making any other efforts to define a new architecture this could almost seem like Jalta II where we are giving Russia its own sphere of influence suggesting, that it should have domineering powers over other countries. I don’t want to propose that.

If we conceded this Eastern area as a non NATO zone without making any other efforts to define a new architecture this could almost seem like Jalta II where we are giving Russia its own sphere of influence suggesting, that it should have domineering powers over other countries.[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

What is at the core of your proposed new security architecture?

[related]The concept combines neutrality with an insistence that these countries have every option to join any other organization that might be open to them. Obviously they are not yet candidates for EU membership. If the European Union ever wanted to include Ukraine and Georgia, Russia would have to say: ‘That is okay.’ Russia also needs to solve Donbass, South Ossetia, and Abchasia, in other words the territorial disputes with Ukraine and Georgia. All these things need to be wrapped together. Or you can’t call it an architecture. If we agree on all of this, here is the additional sweetener for Russia: EU sanctions can be lifted as well, because the idea is that we will actually have created a new path forward. The goal is to normalize the relations with Russia.

In order to call it a strategy something has to happen in return, correct?

Exactly right. It has to be seen as an agreement that requires Moscow to do some things, too. That is fair and even favorable to the neutral countries themselves. I will acknowledge that most of the emails that I have received from the neutral countries since I have published this work have not been that favorable. They see this as an abandonment. I try to argue that this is not an abandonment. Because in fact right now they are being promised something that they will probably never get. I don’t see any realistic movement towards NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia or other former Soviet republics. We have left them out on a limb, exposed and with no protection. My plan is better for those neutral countries. But it will only be better for them if every other prerogative of normal sovereignty is protected.

I don’t see any realistic movement towards NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia or other former Soviet republics. We have left them out on a limb, exposed and with no protection.[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

You believe that NATO’s expansion has gone far enough. Do you thereby call into question that several countries in eastern Europe have decided independently and in a self-determined way to join NATO after the end of the cold war?

This is a very difficult and delicate question. I admit I walk a very fine line. I do not believe the West can go into a negotiation for a new security architecture without any kind of apology to Moscow. I do not try to relitigate previous rounds of NATO expansion except to try to understand how Putin and Russia have gotten to where they are mentally and strategically.

NATO expansion was offered to independent countries that had often been under the Soviet yoke for a long time. Countries that the West helped consolidate their democracies, for example with civilian control of the military, and stability of borders. That was good. That all expanded the zone of peace in Europe and helped a number of these countries make remarkable progress. If you compare Poland to Ukraine today for example, they started out in the post cold war era more or less identical in size, population and GDP. Today, Poland despite its recent problems with governance is three times as wealthy as Ukraine.

Also, NATO worked very hard to reach out to Russia throughout this period creating the NATO-Russia Council and the partnership for peace. Moreover, NATO promised not to station major combat forces east of where they had been located previously. We generally kept to that promise. Now we are slightly modifying that approach but Russia gave us no choice because of the threat they have been posing to the East.

What does your analysis mean for potential future NATO member states?

People sometimes quote the Helsinki final act of 1975 which says that any state should be able to join any organization it wishes. They will say: ‘Doesn’t that mean that Moldova should be able to join NATO if it wants?’ I have three replies to that. First, the 1975 Helsinki final act was a long time ago. It did not really envision the cold war ending with one of the alliances resolving and the other going strong and expanding.

Second, the 1949 Washington Treaty that created NATO explicitly said in Article 10 that membership could be offered to other countries provided that it was seen to be in the interest of the security and strategic stability of the existing members and of Europe in general. It was not an open-ended blank check that anybody who wants in can be immediately assumed to be eligible.

My third argument is a little bit more crass. This almost sounds like Donald Trump. From our perspective one could ask: ‘Why are you assuming that I want to send my daughters to fight and die in the defense of your country?’ If I were an American diplomat I would not say that. But frankly, it reminds people of the stakes. NATO is a mutual defense organization in which the member states are sworn to each other’s protection. The United States has always taken that very seriously. We are the country that would probably bear the largest burden in terms of deployable combat forces apart from any country that has been attacked. We are entitled to ask: ‘Would it be good for us?’

Your core concept centres around a security architecture of permanent neutrality. In the best case, it would include from north to south Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus and Serbia. Are these states willing to stay neutral forever?

First of all, we can’t prevent them nor should we try to prevent them from joining other security organizations or creating new ones. If the Caucasus countries wanted to create a Caucasus security organization that would help them feel like they were part of a common body, prepare for peace keeping missions overseas, handle counter-terrorism locally through coordination, and resolve their own territorial disputes, that might be good. I do not try to rule that out. But NATO should not offer membership to these countries.

If the Caucasus countries wanted to create a Caucasus security organization that would help them feel like they were part of a common body, prepare for peace keeping missions overseas, handle counter-terrorism locally through coordination, and resolve their own territorial disputes, that might be good.[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

How could the neutral countries be integrated into the EU security architecture?

If these countries do join the EU there needs to be some care about the mutual defense provisions of the European Union Treaty which sound almost like the Article 5 provisions of the NATO Treaty. Maybe, those EU security provisions need to be either deleted or clarified for a new member. This would not mean that the entire EU would deploy forces as an entity to the defense of Moldova for example. Because that would violate the spirit of what I am proposing. The main idea is that NATO countries are no longer going to extend their Article 5 protections further east.

It would take huge diplomatic efforts to establish such a neutral zone in eastern Europe. You suggest the following steps: first, setting a new framework within NATO. Second, deliberation with the potentially neutral countries and, third, formal negotiations with Russia. How big is the risk that the Kremlin would perceive this kind of procedure as Western dominance once again?

Since we have the honor of sitting at Atlantik-Brücke’s office right next to the chancellor’s apartment: If someone like her with a greater diplomatic skill and experience than myself liked the main idea, but wanted to pursue it in a somewhat different way, I would be okay with that. I am not insisting that the exact sequence of what I am proposing is imperative. But the NATO members are sworn to each other’s defense. We have agreed that in security terms there is no daylight between us. Therefore, it makes sense to begin any discussion about NATO’s future within the alliance.

Then you have the question: Do we go over the heads of the neutral countries and talk to Moscow or do we involve these countries first? I am not in favor of NATO membership for Ukraine. Period. However, I am sensitive to the fact that Ukrainians are a proud and sovereign people. They deserve protection and safety. They gave up nuclear weapons after the cold war as we asked them to do. We had a promise that we would watch over their security. Arguably, we have failed in that. Rather than just go over Ukraine’s head and start talking to Vladimir Putin about how to divide up the world which is how this would be portrayed if we didn’t allow the neutral states to discuss this with us first, we have to go to them. This cannot be seen as Jalta II. It does not mean we have to keep Putin in the dark. I will send him a copy of my book, and maybe Donald Trump and chancellor Merkel could inscribe it and say: ‘Vladimir, we are trying to do something like this. We look forward to your reactions once we are a little more organized internally.’

It does not mean we have to keep Putin in the dark. I will send him a copy of my book, and maybe Donald Trump and chancellor Merkel could inscribe it and say: ‘Vladimir, we are trying to do something like this. We look forward to your reactions once we are a little more organized internally.’[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

You argue that it is required that Russia commits to help uphold the security of especially Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. This means, Russia would have to withdraw its troops. For years now there is no indication at all that Russia would agree to such a step. How realistic is this option?

Let me start with the hardest problem: Crimea. Russia will not give Crimea back. And we should not make the entire idea for a new security architecture contingent on Russia giving Crimea back. The way I would finesse that is that we should tell Russia we are not going to recognize the annexation of Crimea but otherwise put the issue aside.

Secondly, in regard to Moldova and the Transnistria region I don’t have a strong view on that question. The Moldovans there may welcome or be willing to tolerate the presence of Russian troops. This issue should be solved through a legitimate mutual agreement between Moldova and Russia that is ratified by the Moldovan parliament.

What does your assessment for eastern Ukraine and Georgia look like?

I know for a fact that Ukraine and Georgia don’t accept Russian troops. Russia is going to have to withdraw its troops. Maybe there could be international peacekeepers or a creation of a temporary buffer zone. We need to establish a credible monitoring body like the OSCE which is already in the Ukraine. Then at some point, maybe give a six month grace period, Russia will have had the opportunity to make enough adjustments to its presence in eastern Ukraine that the OSCE can certify that there is no longer a Russian military presence.

Certainly, in northern Georgia you could argue that there is a Russian speaking population so that autonomy in some kind of concept could be explored. We know that the Minsk II process for Ukraine would envision political autonomy for eastern Ukraine. There are ways for Russia to get an agreement where it can say that it is partially protecting the Russian speakers in those two countries. What is hardest to describe is the resolution of the territorial problems with eastern Ukraine and northern Georgia. Those would take some negotiation. However, we already know the geographic contours of the disputed areas and we know the kinds of autonomy that could realistically be provided.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years‘ time?

NATO is a fantastic organization. I want NATO to stay strong and the European Reassurance Initiative and Operation Atlantic Resolve to continue. We need to clarify to Vladimir Putin that the alliance is fully committed to all 29 member states and that there are no degrees of seriousness, no different categories of which member is truly worthy of Article 5 protection. Everybody is! Any other position would be an invitation to Russian mischief, even more than we are seeing already. I very much want NATO to continue as an Article 5 based, territorial and mutual defense organization for Europe and North America. It has accomplished that goal remarkably. That is by far and away its most important purpose. Even though I am a supporter of the mission in Afghanistan, NATO’s ability to do something like that is far less important than NATO’s ability to vouch for the security of its member states.

We need to clarify to Vladimir Putin that the alliance is fully committed to all 29 member states and that there are no degrees of seriousness, no different categories of which member is truly worthy of Article 5 protection. Everybody is![quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

Let me also add that I admire the European Union. Right now, the deterrence of Russia that we are accomplishing by making sure the Russians don’t come even further into Ukraine for example is largely because of EU sanctions and their ability to deprive Russia of the richest market on earth. This economic power is just as influential in shaping Vladimir Putin’s decision making as anything we are doing within the alliance. Hence, NATO needs to stay closely coupled with the EU. We need the EU to be strong to complement NATO and work together to create this overall western foreign policy of military and economic deterrence which is keeping Putin from doing any more damage than he has already done.

Der Beitrag O’Hanlon: “The goal is to normalize relations with Russia” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..