“How many of you were surprised that the United States attacked Iran? And how many were surprised that they did this exclusively on Israel’s side? I would argue that any American president, under these circumstances, would have seriously considered military action against Iran — a weakened regime, diminished proxies, concrete intelligence — a tempting golden moment after half a century of containment and countless rounds of sanctions.

[related] The Obama administration, too, considered military options. In 2014, Iran was — according to some intelligence assessments — only months away from a so-called breakout. Yet diplomacy still had a chance at that time, not least because Russia and China were equally interested in a multilateral agreement and in curbing Iran’s uranium enrichment. The negotiations, backed by a United Nations Security Council resolution, lasted eighteen months. They were hard-fought, though far from airtight.

Unable to secure a treaty due to Republican opposition in Congress and pressure from Israel, the United States was forced to negotiate a legally non-binding „agreement“. That agreement was time-limited and did not cover Iran’s support for regional proxies or its ballistic missile activities, but most critically, it was not a treaty. After several attempts to persuade the European signatories to expand sanctions and push Iran to extend the terms of the deal (a task I was involved in at the time), Trump ultimately took pleasure in tearing it apart in 2018.

In the years that followed, sanctions were imposed wherever possible — not only on Iran, but also on Venezuela and Russia — essentially maximum pressure against what felt like every oil-producing nation. The more Trump and later Biden rhetorically escalated sanctions, the more the entire concept lost its effectiveness. Switzerland, acting as the U.S. protecting power in Iran, carefully noted the steady flow along long-established smuggling routes into Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan. And the first shadow fleets began to emerge — much like those operating today in the North Sea. From sanctioned Iran across the Atlantic to sanctioned Venezuela, oil tankers continued to move through international waters.

„’Kinetic’ sanctions are a rather striking way to prevent the financing of terrorism.”

The next step, then, could only consist of bombs. The United States already had some experience in this regard. When the Islamic State expanded across the Middle East in 2014 and captured Mosul, it seized a branch of the Iraqi Central Bank that, thanks to continued U.S. payments, was filled with cash reserves in dollars. Physical money, after all, cannot be frozen by sanctions once you march in. So we bombed it — the first „kinetic sanctions“, ladies and gentlemen, in early 2016. An interesting method of preventing the financing of terrorism, wouldn’t you say? And notice the terminology: Ukraine now refers to its strikes on Russian energy infrastructure as kinetic sanctions. And when sanctions failed to bring down Maduro, the United States ultimately resorted to his abduction. The illusion of a quick and clean sanctions regime was replaced by the illusion of a quick and clean military operation. But of course, it is not that simple.

Our New Alliance

The era in which the United States could act unilaterally is over. So too is the time when it could make such decisions and only ask its allies in hindsight: are you with us or against us? Trump’s belated appeals for support once it became clear that the war would quickly grow more complicated than planned are relics of a hegemonic world order that both the United States and Europe assumed would last forever. That is how America operates. That is how thinking in the Situation Room works. One commands instruments of power that others can hardly even imagine, and becomes blind to their limits. The United States can no longer afford to act in this way. Building alliances is slow and demanding — in the past, avoiding that effort was considered bad form. Today, it is a fatal mistake.

I respect that Chancellor Merz, in his first statement, refrained from judging the decisions of Germany’s partners. For it is one thing to comment from the outside and quite another to be in a position where decisions must actually be made. In the end, there are only two options: to press the button or not. And let us be honest: it is not a tenable position for a country like Germany, which seeks to have a voice on the global stage, to say: We are glad the Ayatollah is gone and we support the elimination of Iran’s missile capabilities, but the war itself is illegal. Of course, I also respect the decision of all European governments, under these circumstances and given the two protagonists, Trump and Netanyahu, not to take an active role in the conflict. Even if one were willing to subject oneself to the shifting moods of the U.S. president, what role would Europe have been expected to play in any case — assuming it was not merely a symbolic gesture of deference to the „Big Daddy“ of NATO, but a tactically meaningful contribution? Ideally, Europe would have been involved, but under different conditions.

“The United States wants partners on equal footing, not dependencies”

Believe me: the National Defense Strategy published earlier this year is not a second Clausewitz. But there is one passage that will stay with me and with my generation of security experts in the United States for a long time: „With rare exceptions, allies have too often been content to rely on the United States for their defense while reducing their own defense spending and instead investing in social welfare and other domestic programs. However, the blame does not rest solely with them. It was, of course, their sovereign decision to underinvest in defense. But that decision was often encouraged by earlier U.S. policymakers who mistakenly believed that the United States benefited from allies who were dependencies rather than partners.“  It reads: dependencies, not allies. What does that mean? It means that the United States wants partners on equal footing, not dependents. Trump is a relic — the final incarnation of a hegemony that no longer exists.

I fear that this war will produce no winners, only losers — in economic terms: a net deadweight loss. Iran will need years to recover, regardless of whether sanctions are eased and the country complies with Western demands to limit uranium enrichment. Israel will have neither eliminated an existential threat posed by a theocratic regime nor regained international support — the images from Lebanon and Gaza are still too fresh. And the United States has once again demonstrated its unparalleled military and intelligence capabilities. But it has lost the political game.I am convinced that had Washington taken the time to build genuine alliances with Europe and the Gulf states, the process would have been slower, but it would also have strengthened its own position and likely avoided this outcome. In the end, Iran was never as close to the bomb as many assumed.

„The United States took a shortcut — and the bill is now coming due.“

The United States took a shortcut — and the bill is now coming due. Meanwhile, Russia and China are operating in the background, providing Tehran with intelligence and material support. This is a far cry from 2015, when they still sat together with the West at the negotiating table. Yet wars in a world in transition are like immersion blenders. For that reason, not everything is negative. Ukraine is emerging as a global leader in drone defense and is concluding agreements with Gulf states. These countries — particularly the Emirates, which long flirted with Iran — are now taking action against illegal Iranian financial flows. Lebanon and Israel are discovering a shared adversary in Hezbollah. And, most importantly for this region, Europe is making further progress in defining itself in security policy.

Step by step, information is emerging about an allied mission to secure shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz. These are good news — first, for European security structures: a coherent military response by European actors in the European interest, without U.S. leadership. Second, for Europe’s relations with the Gulf states and other trading partners. Gradually, we are moving toward a European NATO capable of territorial defense — not without the United States, but alongside it, on equal footing. Not a dependency, but an ally.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are currently witnessing a global conflict in fragments. Imagine, for a moment, we were still living in Europe’s colonial world — it would be incomparably worse. What Europe does with the fragments now will be decisive: new alliances with Gulf states, missions to secure sea lanes, support for Ukraine. This is the beginning of a return to global politics for Europe. And that is why this war is also Europe’s war.”

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In the latest edition of our web series “Better Be Prepared,” we had the pleasure of discussing these questions with our renowned energy experts Samantha Gross, Director of the Energy Security and Climate Initiative at Brookings Institution, and Dr. Samina Sultan, Senior Economist for Economic Policy and Trade at German Economic Institute. The discussion was moderated by Heike Buchter, U.S. Correspondent in the New York office of Die Zeit.

Watch the full webinar below.

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Check out the last edition of Better Be Prepared, moderated by Jakob Flemming, Senior Program and Research Manager at Atlantik-Brücke, below:

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Check out the last edition of Better Be Prepared, moderated by Jakob Flemming, Senior Program and Research Manager at Atlantik-Brücke, below:

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Interview with Düzen Tekkal

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We were delighted to welcome the following speakers:

• Rushan Abbas, Uyghur American activist and Chairwoman, Campaign for the Uyghurs
• Masih Alinejad, Iranian women’s rights activist and President & Co-Founder, World Liberty Congress
• Leopoldo Lopez, Venezuelan opposition leader and Secretary General & Co-Founder, World Liberty Congress
• Daniel Rothschild, Director of the Center for Civics, Education, and Opportunity, Ronald Reagan Institute
• Florian Hauer, State Secretary for Federal, European and International Affairs, Senate Chancellery of Berlin

Read Daniel Rothschild’s keynote speech here:

Three months after Natan Sharansky was freed from the gulag in 1986, he paid a visit to President Reagan at the White House. The president had long advocated with the Soviet leadership for the release of Sharansky, as well as other refuseniks and religious minorities held captive within the Soviet Union. Somewhat to President Reagan’s surprise, he learned that Sharansky and other dissidents in Soviet prisons knew in real time about his 1983 speech where he called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” and “the focus of evil in the modern world.” Soviet news agencies reported on the speech in a way designed to inflame public tensions against the United States and rally public opinion to the side of the regime. A jailer gave Sharansky a copy of the edition of Pravda with the coverage on the front page. It had the opposite of the intended effect.

[related] “By tapping on walls and talking through toilets,” Sharansky later recalled, “Word of Reagan’s ‘provocation’ quickly spread throughout the prison. We dissidents were ecstatic. Finally, the leader of the free world had spoken the truth.” Reagan was thrilled to learn this. The evening of their meeting, he wrote in his diary: “Met with Anatoly Sharansky. It was fascinating to hear the story of his imprisonment by the Soviets. “I learned that I’m a hero in the Soviet Gulag. The prisoners read the attacks on me in TASS and Pravda and learn what I’m saying about the Soviets and they like me.” President Reagan knew that words mattered. He knew that presidential rhetoric mattered. He knew that moral clarity mattered. He knew that what a president says—or does not say—doesn’t just move markets: It could move the world to freedom.

Another president, Theodore Roosevelt, famously referred to the presidency as a “bully pulpit,” a venue to use rhetoric to advance an agenda and a view of the world. President Reagan knew that the power of the presidency, especially in the age of mass media and global telecommunications, was not merely found in the powers granted the office by the U.S. Constitution. And so he used that power, that bully pulpit, to advance the cause of freedom around the globe. It was that moral clarity that led to the Brandenburg Gate speech, and what historian William Inboden calls “the most famous four words of the Cold War.”

In writing that address, the speechwriting personnel in the White House and the leadership at the State Department came to an impasse: the diplomats wanted a reserved message, and the speechwriters wanted a broadside against the Soviets. Diplomats dismissed early drafts as “sentimental fluff” with too much “good-guys versus bad-guys.” Drafts flew back and forth up until shortly before the president left for Berlin. President Reagan settled the dispute by telling his team, “That passage about tearing down the wall. That’s what I want to say to the people on the other side.”

The President knew how this message would land. In the car on the way to the Brandenburg Gate, he told his deputy chief of staff, “The boys at State are going to kill me. But it’s the right thing to do.” President Reagan knew his audience wasn’t just the crowd assembled to hear him speak. He had been told that the speech would be broadcast and, depending on if weather conditions were favorable to signal propagation, might be heard as far east as Moscow.

“Tear down this wall” was more than a mere rhetorical flourish. It was a statement of American policy: that America would not seek peace with totalitarianism, America would seek its end.

Reagan knew from Sharansky that his speeches were heard in the gulags. And he knew that he would be speaking not just to those in front of the wall, but those behind it in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and even the USSR itself. “Tear down this wall” was more than a mere rhetorical flourish. It was a statement of American policy: that America would not seek peace with totalitarianism, America would seek its end. Within three years, the wall that President Reagan called “as ugly as the idea behind it” had been torn down.

Today, Western societies, including the United States, are beset with a new moral relativism that denies the universalism of human freedom. This view, long associated primarily with the politics of the left, today infects parties and people of both the left and the right. Unfortunately, too many so-called leaders treat relativism as a sophisticated position, or suggest that certainty about moral claims implies certitude about strategic or tactical considerations. They imply, or even directly claim, that moral clarity implies strategic naiveté. When presented with political imprisonment, hostage taking, and ethnic or gender repression, they equivocate.

President Reagan shows that one can have a strong moral compass—a clear sense of right and wrong—but not deny the shades of gray in the world. Throughout his presidency, he faced many questions where there was significant moral and strategic nuance. But he never lost sight of the fact of good and evil in the world—and he never lost the ability to call out the latter for what it was.

Let me close on a note of optimism. As President Reagan predicted in his 1982 address to the British Parliament, Marxism-Leninism today lies “on the ash-heap of history” along with other “tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people.” And as these totalitarian “isms” have fallen one by one, there have been no new all-encompassing competing worldviews to take their place. Most of today’s “new bad ideas” are in fact “old bad ideas.”

Call evil by its name, support dissidents, and speak so the imprisoned can hear.

Communism, Nazism, fascism, and religious totalitarianism still have their redoubts—and if we are honest, they are growing in size. But a quarter of the way into the twenty-first century, there have been no new grand ideological innovations with the power to intoxicate. Our charge is to reclaim the moral high ground for freedom—and to use it: call evil by its name, support dissidents, and speak so the imprisoned can hear.

As Peter Robinson, the author of those famous four words, noted in his back-and-forth with the State Department, it was not enough for the president to say, “One day, this ugly wall will disappear.” The Berlin Wall wouldn’t just fall on its own. It had to be torn down. It was. And it was helped in that process by an American president willing to say to his Soviet counterpart, “Öffnen Sie dieses Tor! Reißen Sie diese Mauer nieder!”

For a glimpse into the event, watch Leopoldo López impassioned speech:

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Listen to the conversation:

Interview: David Deißner

Joshua Walker, on October 9th of this year Turkey launched a military offensive in northern Syria which is directed against the Kurdish YPG militia. This step was facilitated through the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. What does this mean for the credibility of the United States in the Middle East?

American credibility and foreign policy have suffered not just in the Middle East. Although you could shrug and say American credibility has been suffering for a long time, not just under the Trump presidency, but ever since the so-called red line that was set by the previous administration in Syria. Nobody should have been surprised. The U.S. has sold out the Kurds numerous times. This was inevitable in coming, but it is still tragic to watch all the human suffering. It was not a matter of if but a matter of when. The surprising nature of this is how quickly it escalated and became a global crisis. To see the way in which the power vacuum that the United States has left in Syria has been filled by Russia, Iran, and now Turkey which used to be on different sides is particularly interesting to watch. October 9th joked at our military officials who have been working so closely with our Kurdish allies.

Which role does NATO member Turkey play in this situation in northern Syria regarding the Kurdish forces?

[related]From the beginning, the Turks have been the main protagonist. Turkey is the second largest military power in NATO in terms of the number of forces, and it is a sophisticated fighting force. The fact that it is also the Muslim majority power has always led Turkey to have a larger seat at the table. Turkey shares one of the longest land borders with Syria. From the very beginning of the Syrian uprising, Turkey has been very clear about its position: It is against Assad, but it also believes that the YPG or the PKK is a terrorist organization that represents an existential threat to the republic of Turkey. Turkey has been waging a war against this group for a good thirty-year period from the eighties onward. Thousands of lives have been lost.

There is a domestic context here for Turkey as well. President Erdogan, who has been flagging with his popularity, needs to find a reason to continue his policy given on what happened with the Istanbul municipal election recently. There is no political party in Turkey, with the exception of the HDP, that does not believe that this is the right course of action. There has been a steady drumbeat of war. Erdogan seized the opportunity.

There has been a steady drumbeat of war. Erdogan seized the opportunity.

What happens if Turkey invokes Article 5 of its NATO membership if it is attacked by some Kurdish forces?

First of all, a lot of us thought that because Turkey is a NATO member, perhaps it would not take these actions in Syria. Invoking Article 5 could cause an internal crisis in NATO. The bigger discussion in Washington is the following: With allies like this, what should we be thinking of NATO as we know it is no longer a relevant force inside of Turkey because of Turkey’s behavior, not just in this particular case with Syria, but also with the Russian S-400 weapon systems that have been bought? We as transatlantic friends struggle with this question.

Will Russia and Iran, which both protect the regime of President Bashar al-Assad geopolitically, benefit from the new reality on the ground in Syria?

Absolutely. The Astana process by which Russia, Turkey, and Iran have been negotiating these issues, even when there was a more adversarial relationship between the three capitals, has picked up to be one of the main deciding factors. If I am Syrian today, unlike in the past when I would need to go to Switzerland or New York to try to figure out what my fate would be, increasingly this is beginning to flow through Moscow and Teheran and to a lesser extent through Ankara. Because Ankara is playing much more like a regional player. Turkey seems to be focusing its energies on its regional aspirations and particularly protecting its sovereign territory, versus Russia, who is playing the role of a spoiler. Wherever it can really stymie unity or international efforts, it is doing so in a powerful way. It is really breathtaking to watch how Russia, which is from a purely numbers point of view a very weak power, is punching well above its weight. The difference between Russia’s actions and Iranian actions is that Iran has a much larger regional game here that is playing out with Hezbollah, Lebanon, and its antagonism of Israel.

It is really breathtaking to watch how Russia, which is from a purely numbers point of view a very weak power, is punching well above its weight.

Syria that has been in a civil war for more than eight years becomes once again a site of further combat operations. These cause an ever-increasing number of deaths and force tens of thousands of people to flee. Which responsibility does the West bear for this tremendous humanitarian crisis?

It is easy to point fingers. The West did not inspire the movements that led out of the Arab spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. However, if the West had lifted a finger and put it on the scales in the Syrian War on one side or the other, we would have clearly made a difference and changed the outcome. If we had had even half or a third of the political will, that the Iranians or the Russians had in protecting Assad, in eliminating him, it would be over. Ultimately, we are all to blame for where we are. We are in the worst of both worlds.

Where do you see the qualitative difference between the Obama administration’s approach to this issue and the current administration’s policy?

There is an amazing amount of continuity with our policies. Even when Obama decided not to enforce the red line, there were still American forces there: State Department, U.S. Aid, intelligence, and defense. With the “New Beginning” speech in Cairo, the Obama administration put the rhetoric out ahead of its actions. When the actions did not meet up to the rhetoric, there was a real disappointment and cynicism that developed about America’s intentions in the region.

When Trump came in, there was an initial honeymoon period. Trump does not seem to have any appetite for foreign intervention and seems to want to get everybody out of the so-called endless wars. Yet many of the agencies I described continued to do business as usual in the region. Until last month, when Trump telegraphed Erdogan that he is not doing anything more and pulling American soldiers out. Now you see a real anger and backlash when you look at the Republican response to President Trump’s abandonment of the Kurds. Almost all foreign policy professionals were uniform in saying this is a pretty significant and bad move on Trump’s part. This is a lose-lose situation in a worst-case scenario.

Now you see a real anger and backlash when you look at the Republican response to President Trump’s abandonment of the Kurds.

German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer suggested to establish an internationally controlled security zone along the Syrian-Turkish border in cooperation with Turkey and Russia. What is your take on this?

I am disappointed about what I am seeing because it seems like it is too late. If there is one silver lining, it is to see that Germany is realizing it has to play a larger role. But while this proposal sounds really forceful and it is a great talking point and headline, the Europeans should have been more proactive and focused on Turkish concerns beforehand. That is not even to mention the EU membership, which we do not even talk about anymore. That used to be the biggest driver of Turkish foreign policy. I am concerned that clearly the EU does not seem to feel like a real foreign or security power when it comes to Turkey.

If there is one silver lining, it is to see that Germany is realizing it has to play a larger role.

Is the EU at least to some extent prepared for new high numbers of refugees seeking shelter in the European Union? Or is this rather not the case, and Europe is very much depending on the agreement it has completed with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan so that more than three million Syrian refugees living in Turkish camps do not enter the European Union?

The EU is clearly dependent on Turkey. The EU has simply made the short term negative case of saying: We will pay you to keep the refugees there. There is no long-term solution. Turks are now literally piling refugees into trucks and driving them into Syria. Generally speaking, it would be a mistake to give up on Turkey. The Europeans are in danger of losing their relationship with Turkey over their fears related to national security concerns.

What are the ramifications of the latest developments for a potential reinvigoration of ISIS in the Middle East?

First of all, the killing of Baghdadi was a real blow. The fact that other top ISIS deputies were being knocked out may be the one positive silver lining. The broader ramifications are that there is a power vacuum. Russia has no interest in stopping a reinvigoration of ISIS, and Assad doesn’t really control all of his territory yet. If the Kurdish forces, which were fighting ISIS do not see any incentive to continue doing this, extremist forces like ISIS and al-Qaida will come back. I just worry, that we are so reactive at this point in time that we are just one terrorist attack away from something major.

I just worry, that we are so reactive at this point in time that we are just one terrorist attack away from something major.

What kind of overall strategy would you recommend to the transatlantic partners with regard not only to Syria but to the whole region in the Middle East?

One of the challenges we have for an overall strategy is that all of us are very distracted at home. You have to start at home. We as transatlantic partners have to focus on our core interests that we still share as a community of nations. NATO as the largest and most powerful and historic military alliance still has a role to play in protecting us and also in terms of working together. We are stronger together than individually. Turkey is a perfect example for us to cooperate with. Nobody has an interest for Turkey and its economy to go off the ledge. We need to find a way to reorientate our relationship with Turkey in a realistic manner. There are bright spots that we should be looking at, particularly in the economic sphere, when it comes to the Turkish youth and education system.

Here you can find Joshua Walker’s profile site at Eurasia Group.

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Mr. Hodges, free and safe international shipping routes are essential for peace and stability in the globalized world. Now the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz poses a severe threat for international oil tankers. Are you disappointed about the German government’s decision not to join a combined British-U.S. naval mission?

Yes, I am.  Germany is a long-time, reliable ally, so I’m a bit surprised at their reluctance, thus far, to join this mission. German leadership is essential for stability in many of the critical regions of the world, including the Middle East. The brand name, “Made in Germany”, is respected around the world and other nations take note when Germany decides to act or not. Whether in the construct of a multilateral coalition, NATO, or a European construct, Germany would add real value to this mission in terms of diplomatic, information space, and economic value as well as military support.

Surprisingly, Germany is also a “Non-participant” in the four EU PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) projects that are directly related to maritime security. This seems unusual for a leading nation in the EU and NATO and a global economic trading power that depends on freedom of navigation for its economic security and prosperity.

Is U.S. President Trump’s “policy of maximum pressure” vis-à-vis Iran and the future of the Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA) an effective way to guarantee peace in this region?

[related]I would have preferred that the USA remain in the JCPOA. Not because it was a good or the best agreement, but because I believe in the value of having and working with strong allies towards a common objective. The JCPOA was inadequate to address all of the key security issues. And the current Iranian regime has clearly been creating instability in the region in support of various extremist organizations for years. Many American soldiers died in Iraq as a result of EFP (explosively formed penetrator) IED’s (improvised explosive devices) which were manufactured in Iran and supplied to insurgent forces. But by working closely with the leading nations of the international community, especially Germany, I believe we could have continued to press Iran using all the elements of national strength and of the coalition’s power. This is what we call the DIME construct (diplomacy, information, military, and economy).

Stability in the region is a necessary precursor for prosperity in the region and, because of the importance of energy resources, much of the rest of the world. The best way to guarantee stability in the region is to involve all the parties interested in the process, to enforce international law, and to maintain a united front.

What are your hopes for transatlantic cooperation in the Middle East in the upcoming weeks and months?

Transatlantic cooperation is essential, there is no other way to achieve meaningful, lasting results. NATO is the most successful alliance in the history of the world. There is a reason it has continued to grow since its founding in 1949. As Secretary General Stoltenberg recently said, NATO means that every member has 28 other friends with common values and shared interests.

None of us has adequate capabilities in any of the DIME domains to go it alone. And we are indeed much stronger together, when we can prevent potential adversaries or the relevant regional parties from driving wedges between us.

Germany has a key role to play in the region not only because of its economic requirements and the need for energy for customers of the German auto industry, but because of its moral authority. Germany is respected around the world and currently has a key seat on the UN Security Council. This, combined with its leadership in the EU, make it the nation that I believe is America’s most important ally. I hope that my country will pursue Germany as our most important ally. I also hope that Germany will step up to accept a leading role in the region.

Learn more about Ben Hodges on his CEPA-profile site.

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