This year (June 11, 2026), the Atlantik-Brücke hosted its traditional SACEUR talk at the ILA aerospace show in Berlin. The high-profile discussion brought together General Carsten Breuer, Chief of Defense of the Bundeswehr; General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); Airbus Defence and Space CEO Michael Schöllhorn; and OJ Sanchez of Lockheed Martin – to discuss Europe’s progress in defense, but also to lay bare its remaining gaps, as the continent works to restore its military credibility. The panel was moderated by Robert Wall (Aviation Week).

“This is the first time that the Atlantik-Brücke has held its traditional talk with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Chief of Defense of the Bundeswehr in public,” said Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke, in his welcome remarks. “It is also our premiere with General Alexus G. Grynkewich. And General Carsten Breuer is a steadfast partner in our security policy dialogue.”

“Even six to eight years ago, I couldn’t have imagined holding a discussion about the shift in attitude within the Bundeswehr and the defense industry,” Breuer affirmed.

“2029, this is where it counts. And this is the reason why I put a red line on all our timescales in the Ministry of Defense.”

[related] A recurring theme of the discussion was time. Breuer described how he has drawn a firm deadline in his ministry’s planning: “2029, this is where it counts. And this is the reason why I put a red line on all our timescales in the Ministry of Defense.” He repeatedly pressed for openness between politics, industry, and the armed forces, warning that timelines can no longer simply be pushed back. “We have to be honest to ourself,” he said, arguing that if a goal set for 2029 cannot be met, “then we have to discuss how to mitigate this, because there is no other chance.”

The panelists pushed back on the notion that Europe remains a “paper tiger.” “Most allies have increased their defense budgets. Last year, for the first time, all allies met the target set at NATO’s Wales summit,” said Grynkewich. He cautioned, however, that money alone does not create capability – it requires “delivery through an industrial base that’s healthy, that’s innovative.” “It would be wrong to say that Europe has no defense capability at all. The money is now being made available. We in the defense industry have to ramp up the innovation of our products,” Schöllhorn said, stressing: “The defense industry and the procurement system have to work even more closely together.”

The thorniest capability gap lies in long-range precision strike

The thorniest capability gap discussed on the panel lies in long-range precision strike. Breuer outlined a three-step approach – first relying on US capabilities, then procuring systems, and finally building a European solution – while acknowledging the uncertainty around the first two steps. His guiding criterion, he stressed, is availability by the 2029 horizon: systems must be procured “whenever they are available,” depending on what the market and development timelines allow. “We have to establish transparency about the red lines of our objectives. That means by 2029 we have to have been honest with ourselves. After that, we can no longer afford any delays. If a specific goal is at risk, we have to ask ourselves how to mitigate the resulting threat.”

“As for Europe’s capabilities in long-range precision strike, it’s clear that within NATO and from the US perspective we need certain air and maritime capabilities under certain conditions,” Grynkewich emphasized. And he analyzed: “Long-range weapons help the alliance establish deterrence in the short term. In the medium and long term, long-range precision strike has to be complemented by cyber and space capabilities. For that, research and development has to be adapted.”

“Lockheed Martin is rapidly ramping up its industrial manufacturing capacity. All our systems have to contribute to enabling long-range precision strikes,” Sanchez assured.

“Whoever is able to master the data, is gonna have a decision advantage.”

Both generals converged on a deeper point: networking matters more than individual platforms. “It is all about the data,” Grynkewich said. “Whoever is able to master the data, move it more quickly, apply more effective algorithms to it, is gonna have a decision advantage.” The two industry representatives reiterated the call for common standards, and Breuer warned against deferring standardization: “Don’t delay it because we don’t have the time.”

On the alliance’s future shape, Grynkewich framed a lighter American burden as a strength rather than a retreat. Asked what a transatlantic alliance looks like if the US carries less of the load, he answered: “It looks stronger. It looks more sustainable.” He situated this within a “NATO 3.0” concept that gives Europe a more balanced voice.

Asked about a hypothetical scenario in which Russia were to attack the Baltic states, the SACEUR was unequivocal: “Absolutely we’re ready to fight tonight. We’re ready to fight tonight across all 32 nations.” Breuer added: “Our problem is not within the alliance. Our problem sits in Moscow, and therefore we have to do something against this.”

“Absolutely we’re ready to fight tonight. We’re ready to fight tonight across all 32 nations.”

Breuer closed the discussion with praise for the transatlantic partnership: “I’m absolutely glad to have an American SACEUR here, because this provides – apart from General Grynkewich himself – that transatlantic link, which is also what the Atlantik-Brücke is all about. I think it’s good, and we should keep it this way as long as that’s possible.”

Der Beitrag “2029 is the Red Line”: SACEUR-Talk on Europe’s Defense Buildup erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“How many of you were surprised that the United States attacked Iran? And how many were surprised that they did this exclusively on Israel’s side? I would argue that any American president, under these circumstances, would have seriously considered military action against Iran — a weakened regime, diminished proxies, concrete intelligence — a tempting golden moment after half a century of containment and countless rounds of sanctions.

[related] The Obama administration, too, considered military options. In 2014, Iran was — according to some intelligence assessments — only months away from a so-called breakout. Yet diplomacy still had a chance at that time, not least because Russia and China were equally interested in a multilateral agreement and in curbing Iran’s uranium enrichment. The negotiations, backed by a United Nations Security Council resolution, lasted eighteen months. They were hard-fought, though far from airtight.

Unable to secure a treaty due to Republican opposition in Congress and pressure from Israel, the United States was forced to negotiate a legally non-binding „agreement“. That agreement was time-limited and did not cover Iran’s support for regional proxies or its ballistic missile activities, but most critically, it was not a treaty. After several attempts to persuade the European signatories to expand sanctions and push Iran to extend the terms of the deal (a task I was involved in at the time), Trump ultimately took pleasure in tearing it apart in 2018.

In the years that followed, sanctions were imposed wherever possible — not only on Iran, but also on Venezuela and Russia — essentially maximum pressure against what felt like every oil-producing nation. The more Trump and later Biden rhetorically escalated sanctions, the more the entire concept lost its effectiveness. Switzerland, acting as the U.S. protecting power in Iran, carefully noted the steady flow along long-established smuggling routes into Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan. And the first shadow fleets began to emerge — much like those operating today in the North Sea. From sanctioned Iran across the Atlantic to sanctioned Venezuela, oil tankers continued to move through international waters.

„’Kinetic’ sanctions are a rather striking way to prevent the financing of terrorism.”

The next step, then, could only consist of bombs. The United States already had some experience in this regard. When the Islamic State expanded across the Middle East in 2014 and captured Mosul, it seized a branch of the Iraqi Central Bank that, thanks to continued U.S. payments, was filled with cash reserves in dollars. Physical money, after all, cannot be frozen by sanctions once you march in. So we bombed it — the first „kinetic sanctions“, ladies and gentlemen, in early 2016. An interesting method of preventing the financing of terrorism, wouldn’t you say? And notice the terminology: Ukraine now refers to its strikes on Russian energy infrastructure as kinetic sanctions. And when sanctions failed to bring down Maduro, the United States ultimately resorted to his abduction. The illusion of a quick and clean sanctions regime was replaced by the illusion of a quick and clean military operation. But of course, it is not that simple.

Our New Alliance

The era in which the United States could act unilaterally is over. So too is the time when it could make such decisions and only ask its allies in hindsight: are you with us or against us? Trump’s belated appeals for support once it became clear that the war would quickly grow more complicated than planned are relics of a hegemonic world order that both the United States and Europe assumed would last forever. That is how America operates. That is how thinking in the Situation Room works. One commands instruments of power that others can hardly even imagine, and becomes blind to their limits. The United States can no longer afford to act in this way. Building alliances is slow and demanding — in the past, avoiding that effort was considered bad form. Today, it is a fatal mistake.

I respect that Chancellor Merz, in his first statement, refrained from judging the decisions of Germany’s partners. For it is one thing to comment from the outside and quite another to be in a position where decisions must actually be made. In the end, there are only two options: to press the button or not. And let us be honest: it is not a tenable position for a country like Germany, which seeks to have a voice on the global stage, to say: We are glad the Ayatollah is gone and we support the elimination of Iran’s missile capabilities, but the war itself is illegal. Of course, I also respect the decision of all European governments, under these circumstances and given the two protagonists, Trump and Netanyahu, not to take an active role in the conflict. Even if one were willing to subject oneself to the shifting moods of the U.S. president, what role would Europe have been expected to play in any case — assuming it was not merely a symbolic gesture of deference to the „Big Daddy“ of NATO, but a tactically meaningful contribution? Ideally, Europe would have been involved, but under different conditions.

“The United States wants partners on equal footing, not dependencies”

Believe me: the National Defense Strategy published earlier this year is not a second Clausewitz. But there is one passage that will stay with me and with my generation of security experts in the United States for a long time: „With rare exceptions, allies have too often been content to rely on the United States for their defense while reducing their own defense spending and instead investing in social welfare and other domestic programs. However, the blame does not rest solely with them. It was, of course, their sovereign decision to underinvest in defense. But that decision was often encouraged by earlier U.S. policymakers who mistakenly believed that the United States benefited from allies who were dependencies rather than partners.“  It reads: dependencies, not allies. What does that mean? It means that the United States wants partners on equal footing, not dependents. Trump is a relic — the final incarnation of a hegemony that no longer exists.

I fear that this war will produce no winners, only losers — in economic terms: a net deadweight loss. Iran will need years to recover, regardless of whether sanctions are eased and the country complies with Western demands to limit uranium enrichment. Israel will have neither eliminated an existential threat posed by a theocratic regime nor regained international support — the images from Lebanon and Gaza are still too fresh. And the United States has once again demonstrated its unparalleled military and intelligence capabilities. But it has lost the political game.I am convinced that had Washington taken the time to build genuine alliances with Europe and the Gulf states, the process would have been slower, but it would also have strengthened its own position and likely avoided this outcome. In the end, Iran was never as close to the bomb as many assumed.

„The United States took a shortcut — and the bill is now coming due.“

The United States took a shortcut — and the bill is now coming due. Meanwhile, Russia and China are operating in the background, providing Tehran with intelligence and material support. This is a far cry from 2015, when they still sat together with the West at the negotiating table. Yet wars in a world in transition are like immersion blenders. For that reason, not everything is negative. Ukraine is emerging as a global leader in drone defense and is concluding agreements with Gulf states. These countries — particularly the Emirates, which long flirted with Iran — are now taking action against illegal Iranian financial flows. Lebanon and Israel are discovering a shared adversary in Hezbollah. And, most importantly for this region, Europe is making further progress in defining itself in security policy.

Step by step, information is emerging about an allied mission to secure shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz. These are good news — first, for European security structures: a coherent military response by European actors in the European interest, without U.S. leadership. Second, for Europe’s relations with the Gulf states and other trading partners. Gradually, we are moving toward a European NATO capable of territorial defense — not without the United States, but alongside it, on equal footing. Not a dependency, but an ally.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are currently witnessing a global conflict in fragments. Imagine, for a moment, we were still living in Europe’s colonial world — it would be incomparably worse. What Europe does with the fragments now will be decisive: new alliances with Gulf states, missions to secure sea lanes, support for Ukraine. This is the beginning of a return to global politics for Europe. And that is why this war is also Europe’s war.”

Der Beitrag What the Iran war teaches about partnerships erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

In public discourse, defense still triggers familiar reflexes: images of heavy platforms, complex procurement processes, and cumbersome institutions dominate. But this understanding falls short. Modern warfare is undergoing a fundamental transformation — technologically, structurally, and strategically. In reality, defense is evolving into one of the most dynamic technology fields of our time. The central question is no longer whether technology is changing warfare, but who is developing the systems that will determine Europe’s security and capacity to act in just a few years’ time.

From Product to Capability

[related] A core problem lies in the traditional understanding of procurement. For decades, defense was oriented toward acquiring products: platforms, hardware, clearly defined systems with long life cycles. But the reality of modern operations demands something different. What is needed today are adaptive capability packages that evolve continuously. Software is becoming the central element. Systems no longer consist of self-contained units but of networked architectures — so-called “systems of systems.”

In this context, a drone system is no longer a static product but a dynamic software stack with attached hardware. It requires regular updates, rapid iterations, and immediate user feedback. Equally critical is usability: systems that are not intuitive in the field lose their value regardless of their technical quality. Those who continue to rely on the logic of traditional product procurement risk working past the requirements of modern warfare.

Structural Inertia as the Result of Political Decisions

The often-criticized slowness of existing systems is no accident. It is the result of political priorities set over the past decades. After the end of the Cold War, the deliberate focus was on stability, efficiency, and risk minimization. Today’s system meets precisely those requirements. But it is not designed for speed. With the return of geopolitical tensions and an increasingly dynamic threat landscape, however, the benchmark is shifting. Technological developments and operational requirements are changing in ever shorter cycles. Systems that think in decades are coming under pressure to adapt. The necessary acceleration is therefore less a technical question than a political and structural one.

Innovation Dynamics and Industrial Reality

Technological leaps frequently originate outside established structures. New companies can operate free of institutional baggage, iterate faster, and think consistently from the problem outward. Established players, by contrast, are geared toward stability and long-term commitments. For them, new technologies often mean far-reaching adjustments to existing business models and processes.

This does not create a contradiction but a field of tension: innovation often emerges from new players, while scaling, integration, and long-term operation remain the strengths of established structures. The strategic challenge lies in effectively connecting both worlds.

The Competition for Talent and Technology

It is precisely at this interface that a weakness of the European system becomes apparent. Many technology-driven companies developing solutions to security-relevant problems find only limited suitable conditions in Europe. Two factors are decisive: access to initial contracts and direct contact with users. Without these, innovation stalls at an early stage.

Long procurement cycles and complex procedures make it difficult for young companies to build viable business models. Other innovation ecosystems address this proactively: with rapid pilot projects, early contracting opportunities, and clear pathways to end users. The consequence: talent and companies increasingly gravitate toward locations that enable faster implementation. Europe is not losing this competition for lack of ideas, but because of structural conditions.

Systemic Filter Effects

These conditions act as a filter. Complexity, opacity, and lengthy decision-making processes favor established players, while new companies frequently fail at market entry barriers. The system thus structurally selects against speed. The very players who could contribute to adaptability through new approaches and short development cycles often find no access. At the same time, existing processes reinforce the dominance of established structures. The result is an innovation system that does not fully exploit its own potential.

From Intent to Operational Impact

Numerous initiatives show that the need for innovation has been recognized. Strategy papers, programs, and organizational units are in place. What matters, however, is operational implementation. Effective innovation requires concrete mechanisms: translating real-world needs into actionable problem statements, rapidly deploying solutions in the field, and systematically scaling successful approaches.

This is precisely the unique role of the Bundeswehr’s Cyber Innovation Hub. As a “Bundeswehr startup,” its mission is to identify and implement unconventional solutions for the troops. The approach is deliberately operational: close to the user, iterative, results-oriented. The focus is not on developing abstract concepts but on concretely improving capabilities in the field. The Hub serves as a bridge between technological innovation and military application — addressing exactly the interface where traditional systems reach their limits.

Time as a Strategic Factor

Modern warfare is increasingly defined by speed. The ability to learn, adapt, and implement quickly is becoming a decisive competitive advantage. Time is thus evolving into a strategic resource. Innovation capability in this context means not only recognizing technological developments but translating them into operational impact — under real-world conditions and within short timeframes.

New players have a central role to play here. They bring speed, new ways of thinking, and technological dynamism into a system that has traditionally been designed for stability.

Conclusion

The transformation of defense is well underway. It concerns not only technologies but also structures, processes, and mindsets. For Europe, this presents a clear challenge: to create an innovation ecosystem that enables speed without sacrificing stability. One that integrates new players without neglecting existing strengths. And one that turns ideas into impact — fast. Modern warfare is not decided on the battlefield alone, but in the capacity to adapt. Or to put it more pointedly: new players are not a trend. They are a strategic factor.

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The consequences of political misjudgments are often severe and long-lasting. This is especially true for interstate relations. Whether the reasons lie in personal hubris, ignorance, or sheer folly is of secondary importance. Examples of fatal misjudgments that have led to massive instability, crises, and in the worst case war fill entire history books. And yet they keep repeating themselves.

Europe, which for decades saw itself as a bastion of peace, stability, and prosperity, is not immune to this. It studiously ignored Russia’s imperial expansionist ambitions. By 2008 at the latest, when Moscow attacked neighboring Georgia, Europe’s leaders should have grasped that President Putin would not shrink from using massive military force to pursue his fantasies of restoring ‘Russian greatness.’ That he had the pro-European Ukraine particularly in his sights was plain to see for anyone willing to look. It was a classic misjudgment on the part of many European leaders, especially in Germany, to underestimate Putin’s strategic ambitions and his willingness to wage war.

The human, economic, social, financial, and ecological consequences for the people of Ukraine are immense. It will certainly take longer than a generation before Ukraine can recover from Russia’s war. The strategic consequences of the brutal military attacks on Ukraine are equally unforeseeable. This is due above all to a second misjudgment that the majority of European leaders stubbornly cling to even in the fifth year of the war: they continue to hope that the Russian aggressor can somehow be persuaded into a ‘peace compromise’ with the help of U.S. President Trump, provided Moscow is not provoked, the West does not directly participate in Ukraine’s defensive struggle, and Putin is offered the prospect of impunity and coexistence between Russia and the West. Reality shows, however, that the fundamental premises of this calculus are wrong. Vladimir Putin has no interest whatsoever in abandoning his strategic objectives in Europe; and President Trump is neither interested in supporting Ukraine in its defense nor does he view Putin’s Russia as a security threat to Europe. Different as Putin and Trump may be in character, both see themselves as alpha males for whom no rules apply. Europe’s misjudgment of these two central actors means that it remains stuck in a reactive corner, with scarcely any visible capacity to shape the future strategic balance of power on the European continent.

The steps toward European sovereignty have so far been small and tentative

On the other side of the Atlantic, U.S. President Trump is in the process of engulfing the entire Middle East in war and instability. His military campaign against Iran is the product of pathological hubris, a multitude of domestic political motives central to his agenda, and a complete misjudgment of the ethno-religious and politico-economic complexity of the Middle East. That the world would be a better place without the brutal mullah regime in Tehran is beyond dispute. But by what means it could be effectively influenced or fundamentally changed from the outside, which global and regional actors would necessarily need to be involved in such an undertaking, and what multiple consequences for Iran itself, the balance of power in the region, international trade flows, and much more would have to be reckoned with — these and other questions Trump has generously ignored. Instead, he has presented the use of massive military force to the world as being without alternative.

Without being able to predict the concrete outcome of the Iran war, there is already today a wealth of plausible reasons to classify the joint military campaign of the United States and Israel against Iran as yet another historic misjudgment.

Political misjudgments, such as those we have been forced to witness repeatedly in recent years, can be adequately lamented, criticized, or talked up; public and political reactions vary depending on one’s point of view. In theory, however, one could also expect our political decision-makers to acknowledge and correct their mistakes. After all, admitting to errors is still a widespread practice in human relations.

Regrettably, however, Europe’s political decision-makers show no sign of rethinking their fundamental assumptions toward either Putin’s Russia or Trump’s MAGA America. While many capitals are happy to emphasize, frequently and loudly, their willingness to develop greater European sovereignty, the steps in that direction are small, hesitant, and take far too long. Moreover, they are not tied to a convincing narrative of what a future European security order based on democracy and the rule of law could look like.

Yet without a serious political willingness on the part of Europeans to set clear limits on Putin’s military expansionism by all means and above all together with Ukraine, Russia’s war against Ukraine will not end. Without the willingness to distance itself from a kleptocratic Trump-America that is increasingly transforming into an autocratic system, Europe will not learn to stand on its own feet. Those who argue that a deliberate but consistent de-coupling from America is impossible for political, economic, and military reasons are limiting not only Europe’s future prospects but also their own thinking. And those who say that the rules-based order is regrettably dead and that Europe has no choice but to accept the raw power of the ‘jungle kings’ Putin and Trump are reinforcing the already palpably fading belief in Europe. Mistakes can be corrected. Europe should summon the courage to do so.

About the Author: Dr. Stefanie Babst is a German political scientist, strategic consultant, and author. She served on NATO’s International Staff for 22 years—from 2006 to 2012 as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, and subsequently until 2020 as Head of the Strategic Planning Staff. This made her the highest-ranking German woman at NATO Headquarters. Today, she works as a publicist and is a co-founder of the consulting firm Brooch Associates.

Der Beitrag Can Europe Learn from Its Mistakes? erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Florian Hahn

The United States remains our most important ally and partner outside Europe. This is especially true with regard to global challenges and numerous conflicts, foremost among them the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East, and in particular for safeguarding our security, our freedom, and our prosperity. Despite all tensions and contradictions, the transatlantic relationship is a pillar of the federal government’s foreign policy, and the transatlantic alliance is the guarantor of our security. This remains true regardless of sometimes critical perceptions in the public sphere – for example, following the speech by US Vice President J. D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference 2025, concerning US trade policy and discussions about the future orientation of the European security architecture.

Through intensive diplomatic visits, since taking office, the federal government has underpinned this with not just words but deeds, including toward the USA. This success is evident in the good contacts between the Federal Chancellor and Foreign Minister with their US counterparts. Together with the US government and allies in NATO, we worked towards the Hague summit and led it to success as an alliance of 32 allies, with a clear commitment to continued collective defense and Article 5, as well as agreement on significantly increased investments in our deterrence and defense, which are crucial for Euro-Atlantic security—our security as the Federal Republic of Germany—given the long-term threat posed by Russia.

Security

[related] The Russian airspace violations in NATO territory this September—whether by drones over Poland and Romania or fighter jets over Estonia—show us how tense the current situation is. In this critical situation, the importance of the transatlantic alliance—the most important and successful defense alliance ever—cannot be overstated. This is particularly true for Germany: about 37,000 American soldiers are stationed here, with key military facilities and infrastructure of the US armed forces located here. It is all the more important that we—together with our allies and European partners—do more for our own security and take responsibility.
The federal government has taken a decisive step with the reform of the debt brake to invest in our own defense capabilities. Like our NATO allies, by 2035 we will spend 5 percent of GDP—3.5 percent for defense expenditures and 1.5 percent for security- and defense-related tasks. At the European level, we have established an instrument that supports European member states in investing in their defense industry and thus their defense capabilities. Both are successes of determined German diplomacy that create new cooperation opportunities—including with the USA. This determination of the federal government to invest more in its own and European security and to strengthen the European pillar in NATO is also positively recognized by the US government.
Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, its military build-up, and revisionist goals beyond Ukraine represent the greatest threat to our security. Despite mediation efforts by the US president, Putin shows no serious willingness to negotiate. A ceasefire or an end to the war is not in sight. It is clear to us: we cannot do without the USA. Therefore, a determined and sustainable engagement by the USA—whether through supporting Ukraine with US weapons systems and sharing intelligence, or through coordinating sanctions and other pressure measures within the G7—is an even more important signal to Russia. At the same time, we Europeans must, within our means, do more to support Ukraine. Since 2022, Germany has already provided or committed bilateral military support amounting to 40 billion euros for the coming years. By supporting the financing of US arms deliveries through a newly established NATO mechanism of up to 500 million euros and the Chancellor’s proposals for the legally secure use of immobilized Russian assets to support Ukraine, we are going a step further. We call on our European EU partners and NATO allies to follow our example.

Freedom

The USA, through their landmark decisions after World War II and their support for German reunification, remain a guarantee of security, freedom, and prosperity in Germany and Europe. Without the courageous decisions of the then US government, there would neither be a reunified, democratic, and economically strong Germany nor a free Europe. For this, we remain very grateful to the USA.
However, this gratitude does not mean that we would adopt every critical statement about freedom of expression and democracy in Europe, not even those from some representatives of the current administration. On the contrary: the values that make Europe strong and the liberal-democratic basic order of Germany are the cornerstones of our freedom. Freedom of expression and democracy are highly valued in Germany and Europe and are preserved and defended through our rule of law.

Prosperity

The numbers are clear: The USA are the most important destination for German exports outside the EU. The USA are the largest non-European investor in Germany. Germany, in turn, is the third-largest investor in the USA. German subsidiaries currently provide about 870,000 jobs in the USA, US subsidiaries in Germany about 640,000, underpinning the importance of the transatlantic economic area. Such close economic interconnections have developed over decades and cannot be substituted in the short term. It is also not in mutual interest to dissolve these closely intertwined supply chains—partly in critical sectors—and thus weaken the resilience of the transatlantic market in the face of major geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges.

“The values that make Europe strong are the cornerstones of our freedom.”

Looking ahead, transatlantic cooperation holds immense potential: together, Europe and the USA account for 43 percent of global GDP and nearly 30 percent of global trade in goods and services. European research institutions, universities, and companies are innovation engines for the critical technologies of tomorrow. To fully exploit this potential, it will be important to strengthen our competitiveness and innovative strength in Europe as well—and thus to meet the USA on equal footing.

From the outset, the federal government has supported the removal of mutual barriers. The trade agreement achieved between the USA and the EU should only be an intermediate step, as its asymmetry poses great challenges to our companies and increases the risk of fragmentation of free trade. However, it creates short-term security and predictability for German and European companies and has prevented an escalation of the trade conflict with potentially serious consequences for the European economy. Therefore, the federal government supports the European Commission in negotiations with the USA along our economic policy interests. At the same time, the federal government advocates European unity among member states and promotes further diversification of EU trade relations.

New lessons, new fields of action

Looking at developments in all three fields—security, freedom, prosperity—since the start of the US government and the federal government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, it becomes clear: current developments in transatlantic relations also contain an important lesson for German foreign policy. Germany must “relearn” self-confident, interest-oriented targeted cooperation with states in the sense of the triad of security, freedom, and prosperity. This applies especially or even particularly when these states do not or no longer fully share our values.

What does that mean? In the case of the USA as a central partner and ally, opportunities and challenges present themselves equally. It is clear that we must preserve the long-grown shared values and interests and build them up where consensus is possible. At the same time, in the transatlantic relationship, alongside core topics of security and economy, we must also define new fields of action along our interests to not only secure this cooperation but also to bring it into a new era.

New target groups

Relations with the USA are changing—especially with regard to our populations: historically, fewer and fewer people in the USA and Germany are socialized transatlantically. To keep relations stable in the USA, it must also be about strengthening them in the middle of our respective societies. Therefore, we need to take care to reach the next generation of Transatlanticists. We want Germany to be positively perceived in all its dimensions in the USA. This means reaching as many diverse population groups as possible. In recent years, the federal government and its predecessors have invested a lot: we have intensified exchanges of our cultural mediators, alumni, and honorary consuls in the USA, strengthened cooperation with subnational partners such as state parliaments, mayors, and other officials in the states, and brought new target groups to Germany through customized programs.

We do not want to rest on achievements and will intensify our efforts. This includes, among others, sports diplomacy at upcoming major events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. It includes the Goethe-Institut opening new locations away from the coasts in Houston and St. Louis. It also includes winning many people in the USA who have contact points with Germany—for example alumni of exchange and scholarship programs or veterans who served in Germany—as ambassadors for Germany. Many of them are willing to actively commit to the German-American partnership.

Future technologies

Whether artificial intelligence, quantum computing, or space travel: when it comes to the critical technologies of the future, European researchers and companies are always involved. Even if we cannot always keep up with the entrepreneurial speed in the USA and the financing opportunities there, cooperation in sensitive technology areas is only possible among like-minded states for reasons of technical and national sovereignty. This is why there is great potential for deepened cooperation between Germany/Europe and the USA. We should focus on space travel; German space start-ups are already important suppliers for US giants SpaceX and Blue Origin, and ESA is already an important partner for NASA. We need to build on and offer proposals here since cooperation with the USA can also be a driver for our own economy and innovation strength. For us, this also means continuing to invest in our own innovative capacity and research security to be an attractive and trustworthy partner.

New partnerships

Whether in the Indo-Pacific or Latin America: the federal government has made it its task to establish new partnerships worldwide and deepen existing ones. This includes our commitment to the timely conclusion of EU free trade agreements with MERCOSUR and Indonesia, support for EU negotiations for free trade agreements with India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, as well as intensifying our relations with Canada. This strengthens the resilience of the European economy, diversifies risks, and creates new starting points for cooperation with the USA and transatlantic relations.

“We must continue to invest in our own innovation capabilities and research security.”

This also applies particularly to Latin America: The US government aims to focus more on Latin America in foreign policy. This involves—especially in competition with China—the question of who will set narratives and exert influence in South America in the future. Germany has a close network on the continent and is seen as a credible partner in many countries. That is why we should coordinate our commitment with the USA and act jointly wherever possible. Especially in connectivity, we can offer alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative with the EU’s Global Gateway and deepen economic ties. We can also contribute importantly in crisis contexts. For example, Germany pledged another five million euros at the UN General Assembly to support international efforts to restore peace and security in Haiti. This sent a signal of our engagement for the region that was closely observed in Latin America and the USA.

Outlook

Our relations with the USA have rarely been straightforward since the end of World War II but have always been of central importance to the Federal Republic of Germany. Even more than a year after Donald Trump’s election as the 47th US president, they will continue to intensively occupy German and European politics. It is therefore all the more important to continue investing beyond everyday business and beyond the major lines of our time in the future of these relations, in the USA and beyond.

About the author: Florian Hahn (CSU) is Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Foreign Office.

[Disclaimer: This text was originally written in German. The English translation was produced with the help of AI.]

Der Beitrag “Reaching the next generation of transatlanticists” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Sigmar Gabriel and Julia Friedlander

In October, a delegation from Atlantik-Brücke visited the NATO headquarters in Brussels. During our conversations on site, we discussed the most pressing challenges for the alliance, the state of the transatlantic partnership, and Germany’s renewed commitment to strengthening its defense sector. We also gained insights into how the startup ecosystem can contribute to building Germany’s defense capacity by providing specific technologies to the state. After the exchange, it was clear to all of us that the world in which we had grown comfortable over past decades no longer exists. But we also recognized that this new world simultaneously sparks the desire to solve problems and invent new solutions.

NATO’s primary focus is once again on deterring potential adversary Russia, to prevent any aggression against Europe. In some ways, it feels as if we have returned to a Cold War mindset. We are at a historic crossroads, that much is certain. But what, you may ask, comes next?

Transatlantic Relations Remain Strained

The transatlantic partnership has been notably strained under US President Donald Trump, as core interests and priorities continue to diverge. The introduction of special tariffs and Trump’s rigid “America First” trade policy have placed significant strain on economic relations. At the same time, Trump openly questions Europe’s defense capabilities. Even after an increase in defense spending by European partners to five percent of GDP, there is considerable uncertainty about the USA’s future role in NATO.

Europe, increasingly faced with security policy challenges—such as Russia’s repeated provocations on NATO’s eastern flank—must urgently strengthen its defense capabilities, yet finds itself under internal political pressure, not least due to the rise of populist movements. Not only in defense policy but also economically, Europe remains dependent on transatlantic ties. It appears likely that the EU’s strategic direction will remain fragmented in the future. While pragmatic cooperation in security crises is temporarily conceivable, in the long term, intraregional divisions will prove too burdensome.

Russia and the Challenge to NATO

[related] Putin currently sees no reason to change his strategy. Peace in Ukraine is unlikely to materialize soon. Russia will continue to be at the center of European security concerns in the coming years. Through repeated border violations—including drone attacks on NATO territory—Moscow is testing the political and military cohesion of the West and is increasingly relying on hybrid warfare. Ultimately, Moscow aims to establish a regional zone of influence modeled along the borders of the former Soviet Union. This not only strains NATO, but also significantly shapes European future planning. At the same time, Russia is deepening its cooperation with countries such as North Korea and China in an effort to form multipolar power blocs against the West. Against this backdrop, Germany is currently undergoing a security policy paradigm shift. The federal government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz aims to make the Bundeswehr Europe’s strongest conventional army in the coming years—a strategic objective backed by a significantly increased budget, broad structural reforms, and the recruitment of new personnel.

The Global South and New Independence

In the Global South, claims to leadership are becoming louder, corresponding to the redistribution of economic power. Countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia are increasingly pursuing independent development paths and partnerships. China, of course, is a key anchor here, massively expanding its infrastructure projects and trade links. But Donald Trump’s aggressive trade and migration policies have also forced other countries into new cooperations. At the end of August, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in China. The three countries promised deeper geopolitical cooperation. We do not know whether this anti-Western signal marks the start of a genuine realignment between India and China. What is clear is that a country like India is trying to maintain its geostrategic balance with radical pragmatism, making Europe’s approach to values-based foreign policy seem less like yesterday’s program and more like something from a past century.

Middle East: Instability and New Power Structures

The Middle East—especially Israel, Iran, and Gaza—remains a region of geopolitical unrest, yet with continually shifting spheres of influence. While the USA, despite its close ties with Israel, seeks closer relations with Gulf states, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey continue to gain geopolitical significance. The constant in this ever-changing region between Syria and Yemen is its permanent state of unrest, an imbalance in which political power can fragment and reassemble at any given moment. The diplomatic role of Germany should not be underestimated in this power carousel. Israel remains the focus of international attention as it continues to face persistent instability in Gaza. For Europe, the pressing question is how to uphold the fragile ceasefire and ensure humanitarian access. Germany remains explicitly committed to Israel’s security and existence as part of its national raison d’état, a position emphasized by Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul. At the same time, many voices in politics and society call for a more nuanced debate, considering the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and growing political pressures within Europe.

AI and Fears of a Crash

Looking to the future today must extend not only to the political but—above all—to the technological realm. The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) contains the promise of rapid technological progress with implications for the distribution of geopolitical power. In the defense sector especially, AI has become a key topic; the Bundeswehr and its European partners are investing heavily in AI-driven systems—from automated analysis of satellite and drone data to optimized logistics processes and autonomous defense systems and scenario analysis. However, the use of AI requires ongoing regulatory and ethical oversight, especially as military applications increasingly push into sensitive dual-use areas. Meanwhile, global competition for semiconductors and access to critical raw materials—especially rare earths—is heightening geopolitical uncertainty.

China, above all, uses export controls as a strategic lever against Western industrialized nations, whose high-tech and defense industries depend on secure supplies. The dependence of Europe and the USA on a few supplier countries carries substantial risks for industrial value chains, defense capabilities, and economic sovereignty. Diversifying supply chains, investing in technological innovation, and forging targeted resource partnerships are therefore central tasks for the future, vital for securing Europe’s long-term prosperity and agency.

AI also carries the risk of an investment bubble that could threaten the American—and thus global—financial system. Credit-financed investments in gigantic infrastructure such as data centers and specialized chips already account for a major portion of US economic growth. If they fail to meet expectations, a chain reaction could ensue, spreading from the tech sector to finance and, ultimately, the real economy. Such a crisis would have far-reaching repercussions for consumer confidence, credit markets, and economic growth. Political support and regulatory measures will therefore be crucial for managing risks and unlocking the sustainable potential of AI.

The Threat of Authoritarian Forces

Donald Trump has fundamentally changed the transatlantic partnership. Hoping for a time after Trump is, however, not sound advice for Europe. For the current situation facing Europeans reveals a structural dilemma: the tactic of delaying conflict through appeasing the US President remains a risky and potentially deceptive strategy—regardless of who is in power in Washington. Europe’s security architecture is still too dependent on the goodwill of the USA; true European sovereignty is not on the horizon.

Domestic American attacks on democracy—from voting rights restrictions to the erosion of rule-of-law institutions—already have effects beyond the United States. They could serve as blueprints for authoritarian forces in other Western democracies. Polarization and rising populism are weakening social cohesion and, with it, the resilience of democratic systems worldwide. Europe’s most important task is thus to learn from the dangers in the USA: by fostering independent institutions, resilient communications structures, and a willingness to take its own responsibility in security and defense policy.

The Future Is Multipolar and Fragmented

With regard to a future Europe, we must abandon the idea that Western hegemony can be sustained. There will no longer be an “old liberal” Europe following in the slipstream of the USA, even if many wish for this out of fear of economic decline and loss of political significance. In an era when China and the Global South are gaining strength, it is becoming ever harder for Europe to defend its interests. But we should finally come to terms with the seriousness of the situation and face the multipolar world order, rather than try to resist it. The coming upheaval will be at least as momentous as the dawn of the age of industrialization. We should strive to actively shape it, not oppose it.

Atlantik-Brücke can count itself fortunate to have access to a strong network in this fragmented world. We are ready to help solve problems and provide orientation. As always, we count on your commitment and expertise!

[Disclaimer: This text was originally written in German. The English translation was produced with the help of AI.]

Der Beitrag What’s next? erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Carsten Breuer

International conflicts and their effects are increasingly coming into our consciousness with great force. They are becoming topics of conversation not only on news programs, talk shows, and in surveys, but also at the kitchen table at home. The defense of our security has long ceased to be an abstract task—it is a concrete necessity. This is especially apparent when looking at Ukraine. Russia’s illegal war of aggression has lasted nearly four years. Above all, it is a war of attrition. We see high-tech drones in trench warfare, archaic violence in war crimes in Bucha, and battles to the bitter end in Bakhmut. Putin’s neo-imperialist ambitions have already cost hundreds of thousands of lives. And there is no end in sight. Russia switched to a war economy some time ago.

Its military now receives more spending than all other policy areas combined. Weapons and ammunition are being produced at full speed or, in some cases, refurbished from old stockpiles. Not all of this goes directly to the front, but also to new military units currently being established along the entire NATO eastern flank. Personnel-wise, Putin is preparing for further confrontations: by the end of 2026, Russian armed forces are expected to grow significantly again, to around 1.5 million soldiers. That is twice as many as before the war began on February 24, 2022. According to military analysts, Russia could be capable of launching large-scale attacks on NATO territory within a few years.

[related] Not necessarily as a campaign of conquest, but perhaps as intensified provocation right at the brink of open war, aiming to undermine the Western alliance system, weaken NATO’s security guarantees, and expand its own sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. This is not a prediction, but a plausible possibility. We must take seriously the intentions and goals behind this massive rearmament. Putin is not interested in expanding his massive empire by a few square kilometers. He wants a new world order, and he wants to achieve it through force. Analysts view 2029 as a potential “culmination point,” but the threat is already real today. Putin has long viewed himself as being engaged in a “(shadow) war” against the West. This is evidenced by the increasing number of hybrid attacks that Europe is exposed to.

Even in Germany, we observe a wide range of systematic attacks in the gray area between peace and war: cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, severed data cables in the Baltic Sea, sabotage planning, drone-assisted espionage, disinformation campaigns on social media, and even foiled attack plans. All these “pinpricks” are intended to shake confidence in our state. They aim to undermine the cohesion of our societies. Germany plays a particular role—as Ukraine’s main supporter in Europe and as a hub for the Allies in deploying to NATO’s eastern flank. These hybrid attacks strike us—deliberately scalable and capable of being scaled—at the boundary between internal and external security, specifically at the intersection of different responsibilities. It is essential to act in a coordinated fashion at this point of entry, both nationally and internationally.

“Russia’s quest for power remains, for the foreseeable future, the greatest and most immediate threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.”

Russia’s quest for power will remain, for the foreseeable future, the greatest and most immediate threat to the Euro-Atlantic area. But it is by no means the only one. Across the globe, other crisis hotspots demand our vigilance. The conflict in the Middle East—or rather, conflicts—continue to concern us and require action. Crises overlap, blend into one another, and reinforce each other. And every conflict has the potential to have global effects. This can be seen, for example, with North Korea, which is supporting Russia in the war against Ukraine with soldiers and weapons. Resources flow back—not only financial, but military expertise and, above all, weapons components, including those for carrier rockets that can be equipped with nuclear warheads. Thousands of North Korean soldiers are fighting against Ukraine—and dying for Russia.

“We must view all the seemingly separate crises and theaters of war in the world as a whole.”

The losses are immense, but this way North Korean soldiers gain combat experience. Their baptism of fire against Ukraine increases the combat effectiveness of all North Korean armed forces. What is already clear: this destabilization through such interactions is occurring not only in Europe but also in East Asia. These complex interconnections make it clear: we must view all these seemingly separate crises and theaters of war around the world holistically, from a 360-degree perspective. We must recognize and discuss dependencies, interactions, and connections at all levels of action. In military terms: we have to consolidate the strategic situation, draw the necessary conclusions—at the speed required. And right now, that speed is very high. We are at the threshold of a new world order. In this period of upheaval, the West—and we—bear the responsibility to defend our liberal values with resolve. If we do not engage, we risk becoming the plaything of autocrats. This is not only a moral duty, but a fundamental realpolitik self-interest.

A world in which the rule of law is replaced by the law of the strong is something we cannot and must not accept. And in terms of global challenges, the world is shrinking: crises, and possible solutions, are moving closer together. This challenges us as never before. And it won’t get easier. That is why readiness is today not only our own currency, but that of the entire NATO. For more than 30 years, we have lived in peace in Europe. That is over, and it is hard to get used to. But we have no choice. Credible deterrence is our “best-case scenario.” At the NATO Summit in The Hague in June 2025, all 32 Allies agreed on how and with what military means they will position themselves in the future. They set out, in binding terms, who will take responsibility in which areas.

After the United States, Germany provides the second-largest so-called capability package. We are on the way to becoming the engine of European defense. This means, for example, that we will establish new combat troop units, broaden our industrial base, and strengthen multinational cooperation. Ultimately, it also means that in the future we will spend 3.5 percent of GDP on defense and 1.5 percent on military infrastructure. With the help of the special fund, we have already set many things in motion: we have ordered tanks, ships, aircraft, drones. We expect key deliveries this and next year; unfortunately, armaments are not available off the shelf like at the hardware store around the corner. With the constitutional amendment that exempts defense spending above 1 percent of GDP from the debt brake, we have made another major step to cope with the expanded range of orders.

We have put security first. We now no longer have a time-limited special fund, but an uncapped budget. Uncapped, however, does not mean unlimited. More than ever before, we must justify every cent to the parliament. We can do that. And we will do so. We have already prioritized which capabilities the Bundeswehr needs most urgently. These include systems for air defense, as well as ammunition and means for electronic warfare, among others. It is important that not only the Bundeswehr now has planning certainty, but also industry and startups that must first ramp up their capacities. Equally important is looking well beyond 2029 at the future of warfare. That is why we must think and plan in at least two categories: In the short term, until 2029, the priority is readiness. In the long term, far beyond 2029, it is anticipation, flexibility, and keeping pace with disruptive developments.

Because we now have new technological possibilities that are changing the established paths of technology development and military strategy. In the past, the military was the driver of technological development—today, it is the reverse: technological progress generates strategic challenges. Long term, this will also influence the development of our doctrine and lead us to rethink war—even down to the battlefield. The innovation cycle for drones in Ukraine, for example, is about two weeks. We need to be similarly agile in peacetime—even without war dictating it. Threats on the battlefield force armed forces to constant adaptation. Therefore, we must also become more flexible, agile, and consequently faster in procurement. Wherever necessary, we must also break new ground. We must ask: Where are we not looking today—what do we not yet know, what can we not yet grasp?

But also: How do we ensure the Bundeswehr becomes both a driver of technology and can quickly and reliably incorporate new technologies? There are cooperation opportunities, for example, in the digitization and flexibilization of defense systems through software-based control, in Software Defined Defence. The use of artificial intelligence to analyze data or to support military decision-making is another field where armed forces depend on research and development in business and industry. Therefore, there must be close coordination between business and military strategy development.

“The responsibility for our security and freedom cannot rest solely on uniformed shoulders. It is a task for society as a whole.”

Clearly, the current threat situation can only be met with a comprehensive societal effort, with united forces—state and private. The armed forces are only as strong as the defense industry that stands behind them. It is not only about the ability to innovate, but also about the willingness to take risks—for a higher good.

Soldiers are trained to take risks. They must be able to fight and win. Because they have to win. This does not only apply to soldiers. NATO currently has around 500,000 men and women in high readiness. But for me it is equally clear: responsibility for our security and freedom cannot rest solely on uniformed shoulders. It is a task for society as a whole. Only together can we defend our country; only together can we deter. We must think and act holistically, even now in peacetime. We must become more closely and strongly interlinked. That lays the foundation for resilience. A combat-ready Bundeswehr is only one side of the coin. On the other side, we need equally resilient civil structures—in other words: a society capable of defense.

Both together create the prerequisites for credible deterrence. We soldiers may be the ones who win battles—but modern wars must be confronted by and with a society. The economy plays a major part. The better and faster we can equip our armed forces, the better we will be able to deter. And we must deter. The more credible our deterrence, the greater our chances of protecting the freedom so dear to us. The better our prospects of living in the future as we do now—and of preventing war in Europe. We will only succeed with this effort together—carried by the certainty that a life in freedom and security is worth it.

About the author: Carsten Breuer is a general in the German Army and, since March 17, 2023, the 17th Inspector General of the German Armed Forces.

[Disclaimer: This text was originally written in German. The English translation was produced with the help of AI.]

Der Beitrag “A whole-of-society effort” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The weakening of Hezbollah, successful strikes in Lebanon and Iran, and Israel’s military dominance in Gaza have all contributed to Hamas’ eventual acceptance of Trump’s peace plan. Meanwhile, after decades of attempts to integrate Putin’s Russia into the international community of values, the mainstream consensus has shifted toward supplying Ukraine with advanced weapons, rearming its European allies, and imposing new sanctions. Is hard power becoming the new path to peace?

Ben Hodges: I’m not sure that Hamas has accepted President Trump’s peace plan. They have agreed to release hostages and are working to return the remains of those hostages who were killed or died in captivity.  There is still a lot of fighting so we can’t yet say that there is even a full ceasefire which I think will be a prerequisite for any lasting peace.  But the point of your question is valid.

Hard power, alone, is never going to be the path to peace.  But hard power, or the threat of employing it, is an essential component of achieving and protecting peace, when properly balanced with diplomatic, economic, and informational power.  Achieving peace in Ukraine starts with #1 a diplomatic effort resulting in a unified effort by the West, hopefully with the US included, acknowledging that Russia is the aggressor and recognizing that it is in the strategic interest of the West that Ukraine successfully defends its sovereignty, forcing Russia to live within its own borders.  #2 is the employment of the full weight of the economic power of the West, including sanctions, without loopholes and which are fully enforced, which will actually change Kremlin behavior.  It also includes the use of frozen Russian assets as proposed by the European Commission to help pay for Ukraine’s defense and reconstruction.  And it includes the disruption of Russia’s shadow fleet vessels which are transporting Russian oil to China and India.  #3 is the provision of all the weapons and ammunition and capabilities, without restrictions, that Ukraine needs to successfully defend its sovereignty, including Taurus and Tomahawks.

David Ranan: Europe is emerging from an era of hopeful belief in peaceful diplomacy and must now confront a new reality, with its own demands and shifting priorities. Hard power – once protected under a U.S. security umbrella that can no longer be fully relied – has, at least under the current U.S. administration, become Europe’s own responsibility. Still, the notion that hard power could serve as “the new path to peace” seems overly optimistic. Let us not forget that the Cold War, for all its tensions, nevertheless managed to preserve peace.

Neither the recognition of Palestine by several European countries nor Chancellor Merz’s show of solidarity with Israel seems to have influenced the course of the Middle East war—credit for the Israel-Hamas deal largely goes to Donald Trump. And while Europe remains a key donor to Ukraine, the country still relies heavily on U.S. weapons, with Trump sidelining it in his decisions. With all eyes on Washington, is Europe still seen as a significant player in the U.S. and the Middle East?

Hodges: I don’t agree that there is an Israel-Hamas deal yet…only the return/exchange of the hostages and Palestinian detainees. For there to be a lasting peace in the region, the nations of the Middle East, Türkiye, and Europe will have to be a part of the comprehensive effort.

Europe is only sidelined because it has allowed itself to be sidelined. A more forceful policy that uses all the elements of national and coalition power, to include sanctions and provision of security forces, will give Europe a ‘seat at the table’. Germany in particular must lead by example….defending principles of democracy and human rights while balancing its sense of historical responsibility.  Use clear language and be consistent in actions.  It cannot assume that the US, under this Administration, will take care of everything.

I do agree that the Trump Administration has done much to help bring the region to where it is now, particularly with the work it did during the first Trump Administration. But it’s going to take more to achieve the goal of a lasting peace and that means a two state solution. Europe can play a key role here.

Ranan: As Russia’s aggression intensifies, Europe concerned for its own security – has a clear self-interest in strengthening its defenses and supporting Ukraine. This is not only about helping Ukraine resist Russia but also about sending a strong message to President Putin. That is the essence of its significance. The Middle East, however, presents a far more complex challenge. Europe has long supported Israel – a stance Germany has particularly championed – but this creates a somewhat paradoxical situation, raising fundamental questions of principle: how can Europe back both Israel, an occupying power, and Ukraine, a nation defending itself against Russian aggression? If Europe were guided strictly by international law, it would instead support Palestinians resisting Israeli occupation since 1967. With Israel effectively a client state of the United States, Europe remains a secondary player in the region. Yet by moving beyond Germany’s rigidly pro-Israel position, Europe could potentially gain meaningful influence and play a more constructive role in Middle Eastern affairs.

Russia’s war on Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East are currently dominating the headlines. In your view, which other conflict or crisis is receiving too little attention?

Hodges: The US government is shifting its military priority away from Europe and apparently, possibly, the Indo-Pacific region and towards South America, especially Venezuela. I’m not against taking firm measures to stop the flow of drugs from Central and South America to the United States. Thousands of Americans every year die from Fentanyl.  But Fentanyl is actually coming from Mexico, not Venezuela. So the strikes on so-called Venezuelan drug boats with the use of expensive Hellfire missiles are not actually addressing the Fentanyl problem. This is being done without Congressional oversight and without explanation of the necessity for the use of military force to the American public.  This should receive much more scrutiny.

Ranan: The combined effects of war and climate change-induced famine in Sub-Saharan Africa are causing immense human suffering and staggering death tolls, including an appallingly high rate of infant mortality. This crisis is not only a profound humanitarian challenge for the Western world but also a matter of strategic self-interest for Europe. Ensuring that these countries – whose citizens understandably seek refuge in Europe – become safe and sustainable places to live is both a moral imperative and a practical necessity. While it may be challenging to convince China, Russia, and other global powers to act purely for Europe’s benefit, it should be entirely possible to forge an international pact grounded in humanitarian responsibility, uniting nations around the urgent need to save lives.

This interview took place after the event „David & Goliath: Debating War, Peace, and the Fragility of Global Order“ with Ben Hodges (on the left), Lieutenant General (ret.), U.S. Army; FBH Geostrat Consulting GmbH & Dr. David Ranan (on the right), Political Scientist & Author.

Der Beitrag “Hard power, alone, is never going to be the path to peace” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

This year, Brussels—at the heart of European policy-making—hosted the 4th Transatlantic Forum on Geoeconomics on 30 September 2025. The discussions centred on transatlantic priorities, framed by escalating geopolitical tensions and growing economic volatility. The agenda drew heavily on high-level exchanges, most notably with US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker and EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, who brought both candor and nuance to their respective fields.

“America will protect every inch of the Alliance’s territory.”

Ambassador Whitaker sent a clear signal of enduring American commitment to NATO’s collective defense, insisting that “every inch” of the Alliance’s territory will be protected. He described how sustained diplomatic engagement had moved President Trump to a position of robust support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, emphasizing that a united front is needed to impose real costs on Moscow. Recent Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace—over Poland and the Baltic countries—were cited as stark reminders of persistent threats, but also as proof of the Alliance’s responsive capabilities and deterrence posture. Whitaker voiced frustration, however, that some European allies still “drag their feet” on defense spending, warning that failing to reach the newly established 5 percent GDP benchmark could undermine both credibility and deterrence. For Whitaker, a secure Alliance is inseparable from balanced burden-sharing—an aspiration now hard-wired into the “Hague defense commitment” but requiring vigilance to ensure meaningful year-over-year increases.

“Fostering a climate for innovation will be key to both economic and security resilience.”

On the European side, Commissioner Šefčovič reflected on a fundamental transformation: Europe, he argued, began as a peace project but is now compelled to reassess its security and defense posture amid rapidly shifting geopolitical realities. He stressed the importance of treating the US as a strategic partner—not only by stepping up defense investment, but also by making Europe’s own defense sector more attractive to investors. Echoing Whitaker, Šefčovič acknowledged that without sustained economic growth, it is simply not possible for any government to invest 5 percent of GDP in defense—and that fostering a climate for innovation will be key to both economic and security resilience.

Some panels focused on trade and tariffs. The participants agreed that the current moment marks the beginning of a “new chapter in trade,” characterized by ongoing uncertainty and drastic shifts in global goods traffic. New US tariffs would force Europe to rethink its supply chains. In addition, Europe would have to carefully consider how much of its steel industry it would allow to migrate to China. Anahita Thoms, Partner, Head of Germany’s International Trade Practice, Baker McKenzie, made it clear that “tariffs hurt, but uncertainty destroys” and that a return to the old global trade order was not to be expected. Instead, Europe must diversify its trade relations, for example through new agreements with Mercosur, while at the same time stabilizing and deepening transatlantic economic relations, the panelists emphasized.

„Deep partisan devide is a real internal threat of the position of the US dollar.“

Another thread running through the Transatlantic Forum was the question of the US dollar’s global standing. Both American and European speakers noted that the dollar’s supremacy now faces internal threats from the ideological split in American politics. ‘We don’t really know when the decline of the US dollar started,’ said Selesha Mohsin, Bloomberg’s senior Washington correspondent. „Deep partisan devide is a real internal threat of the position of the US dollar.“ This has sparked a broader European reevaluation of payment systems and a search for greater financial sovereignty, with calls to create new platforms less exposed to external shocks.

„Europe is the only world region where the demand for energy has declined which is a sign of deindustrialization.“

In the critical field of energy, the Transatlantic Forum stressed that Europe is unique as the only major region experiencing declining demand. Andrew Puzder, the new US ambassador to the European Union, said: „Europe is the only world region where the demand for energy has declined which is a sign of deindustrialization.“ This trend, conference voices emphasized, must be confronted if Europe is to avoid long-term erosion of its industrial base and safeguard energy security.

„The AI race is decided by capital and talent.”

Finally, the discussion turned to artificial intelligence and digital competitiveness. Europe’s lag in generative AI adoption was framed as both a challenge and a call to action. „Only 37 percent of German companies use generative AI“, said Michael Hüther, Director & Member of the Presidium, German Economic Institute (IW). „AI is important for Germany to come back to the mid range of economic groth“, he stressed. And Jens Wiese, managing partner at Leitmotif, added: „The AI race is decided by capital and talent. European companies would be illed advised to sacrifice the transatlantic ties by trying to search more AI opportunities in China“.

The speakers at the Transatlantic Forum agreed that closing this gap will require pragmatic regulation, capital investment, and—most importantly—retaining the strength of the transatlantic relationship rather than seeking shortcuts in collaboration with other players. For now, only the US possesses the scale and dynamism needed to lead in AI, highlighting the limits of Europe’s fragmented financial markets.

Throughout the 4th Transatlantic Forum, the message was clear: the challenges of security, economic competitiveness, innovation, and resilience can only be met through renewed transatlantic solidarity—anchored in both shared values and real investment on both sides of the Atlantic.

Briefings on the Conference Topics

The following policy briefs offer a deep dive into the conference topics:

“Points of Vulnerability in the Battery Cell Industry” – Kai Müller, Chief Financial Officer of PowerCo SE, and Sören Pippart, Senior Expert for Public Affairs at PowerCo SE, outline Germany’s weaknesses and possible courses of action in the battery sector.

“Waiting for the Big Bang: Executing the European Defense Build-Up in Germany” – Robin Fehrenbach, Head of Analysis and Documentation at Atlantik-Brücke, Jakob Flemming, Senior Program and Research Manager at Atlantik-Brücke, and Julia Friedlander, CEO of Atlantik-Brücke, describe how Germany is attempting to become defense-ready in record time.

“The dollar in the fight for US primacy” – Martin Mühleisen, former official at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, analyzes how the US under President Trump uses economic policy as a tool to advance foreign policy priorities.

“How to dismantle a reserve currency” – Daniel McDowell, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, reflects on whether the days of the dollar as a reserve currency are numbered and whether the euro is ready to take its place.

“The Road to Turnberry” – Elizabeth Baltzan, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center and former advisor to the US Trade Representative, assesses the latest trade deal between the European Union and the United States.

“The summer of AI action plans” – Alisha Chhangani, Assistant Director at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center, and Ananya Kuma, Deputy Director, Future of Money, at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center, analyze the widening gap between the US, China, and Europe on artificial intelligence.

Watch a look back at the forum here:

Watch the full recording of the Transatlantic Forum here:

Watch here exclusive Video interviews with the Pannelists:

Der Beitrag Responding to Global Shifts erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

by Robin Fehrenbach, Jakob Flemming, and Julia Friedlander

Since Germany’s reunification, defense spending has been a taboo topic in the country. Russia’s war with Georgia and incursions into Ukraine in 2014 raised relatively few strategic concerns in Berlin, and it took until February 2022 to shake the system loose. From guns versus butter debates to the unwinding of spending orthodoxies and industrial transformations, the last several years have witnessed a small revolution in the national dialogue as well as in the broader economy. The country has begun building a military-industrial complex essentially from scratch and exploiting all means to finance it—including using the public purse, commercial banking, and private capital. Policymakers and industry leads must deliberate what will be financed nationally, in consortium or through European Union (EU) and NATO mechanisms. It is all new.

European institutions are also expanding their mandate. The European Commission appointed Lithuanian Andrius Kubilius as its first commissioner for defense in a bid to draw defense consolidation into the technocratic machine best known for streamlining trade and financial regulation across the bloc. In November 2024 at the Berlin Security Conference, then-Commissioner-Designate Kubilius called for a “Big Bang” approach in defense policy, which would entail “producing a clear Industry Output Plan, based on the analysis of capability gaps according to NATO evaluations and covered by European production of defence equipment where we have capability gaps, with a clear target date to fulfil this Plan around 2030.” [1]

The political will is there – and the private sector is ready to contribute

The June 2025 commitment of NATO Allies to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on security and defense until 2035 provides the new baseline and blueprint for European defense [2]: 3.5 percent is to be invested into weapon systems and ammunition, 1.5 percent into critical infrastructure. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte articulated this shift after pre-summit consultations with President Donald Trump, but he already had the facts to back up his assertions to the US president [3]. Just weeks earlier, Germany had upended its constitutional debt brake for security and defense investments and created the Sondervermögen for infrastructure.

After years of circuitous debate, the presumed new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, invoked the outgoing German Bundestag mandate to relax the debt brake [4]. The move ultimately gained support across the centrist political spectrum, ensuring that both state-driven and external financing mechanisms would be used to reach NATO pledges. The drastic increases in defense spending remain broadly in line with fiscal principles, requiring what some would call an accounting trick, and others a compromise. Defense investments are now exempt from the constitutional debt brake and can total up to 1 percent of GDP [5]. Anything beyond 1 percent of GDP for defense investments requires credits in special funds, usually referred to as Sondervermögen. While on-budget expenditures and investments in security and defense depend on the incoming tax revenues of the German economy, discretionary spending is effectively freed from these constraints, imposing no specific limit on such extra funding. Defense spending has gone from a crawl to a sprint, overnight.

It is a sea change that the government will now rely on private funding to uphold its national security obligations.

Government stimulus tends to trigger private sector interest, which is poised to play a crucial role in scaling up defense-related resources, increasingly billed as a reliable, growing, and even socially responsible investment sector. Commercial and investment banks as well as private equity and venture capital firms are rapidly developing products for both institutional and private clients, reflecting broader awareness among decision-makers from the public and private sectors that capital is needed to meet defense spending goals. As Deutsche Bank Chief Executive Officer Christian Sewing put it, “we need to efficiently combine public funds with private capital to finance expansion. Banks and investors are ready for this – for example, Deutsche Bank’s corresponding loan portfolio amounts to a mid-double-digit billion-euro amount.” [6]

Two recent high-level events that the Atlantik-Brücke hosted in Berlin brought together stakeholders from the military and private sector to discuss how private capital can fund the German defense build-up, sending a clear signal that private investors are ready to channel capital into Germany’s defense capabilities. It is a sea change that the government will now rely on private funding to uphold its national security obligations.

Based on this assessment, the EU created a program, SAFE (Security Action for Europe), to provide €150 billion in long-maturity loans for procurement efforts and fund projects based on common procurement [10]. SAFE projects should involve “at least one Member State benefitting from SAFE and another Member State, as well as Ukraine and EEA-EFTA [European Economic Area-European Free Trade Association] countries,” but will also temporarily fund individual member states’ procurement in acute security crises. It remains to be seen whether SAFE can fulfill Commissioner Kubilius’ big promise from September 2025 to “unify our fragmented defence procurement.” [11] For the time being, nation-states and private capital will provide the lion’s share of required funding, largely due to the direct economic impulse defense spending gives to national economies and their flagship contractors.

Through defense, Germany’s economy can change in shape and scope

Increased investment in military systems will impact the overall industrial and economic landscape in Germany. In addition to defense allocations, the Sondervermögen also includes €500 billion for infrastructure and climate protection [12]. It has not escaped the governing parties that the security crisis in Europe provides an opportunity to ignite a long-needed growth stimulus for the German economy. Germany remains the third-largest economy in the world, but is poised to record a third consecutive year of zero or negative growth. This year most likely will not bring the turnaround: In the second quarter of 2025, Germany’s economy decreased by 0.3 percentage points compared with the first quarter [13]. All major economic institutes in the country as well as the International Monetary Fund predict hardly any economic growth for Germany in 2025 [14].

Germany’s defense industry will also play a crucial role in building Ukraine’s deterrence capabilities.

Germany’s economy has developed formidable strengths in the automotive, machine engineering, and chemical industries over the past few decades, leading to its export-oriented position in the global economy. This has changed significantly, especially over the past five years, as global competitors have improved their research and development in all kinds of industrial sectors, their labor force skills, and their knowledge. More robust supply chains and much lower energy costs have also contributed to the successes of foreign economies, mostly in the Indo-Pacific region and in South America.

Der Beitrag Waiting for the Big Bang: Executing the European Defense Build-Up in Germany erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Julia Friedlander 

Two weeks ago I was asked on a panel whether Trump was good or bad for Europe. I took the bait and said unequivocably yes, and after the audience did its requisite heckle, all of my co-panelists, none of us by any stretch a fan of the U.S. president, fell behind me. Why? I relayed this dynamic two hours later to my father-in-law, a long-professed West Berlin pacifist, over customary Sunday afternoon coffee and cake, and his response was: so we can get off our asses!

We are on our way to a new alliance, not based on unilateral dependency—either on American defense dominance or enforcement of WTO-related trade rules, but on mutual reinforcing capabilities and opportunities in both trade and defense. I’m not saying the road there will be easy—but although I will lament a few things throughout this talk, I am going to stick to my optimism. 

 An Overdue Breakup of the Comfort Zone  

The Atlantik-Brücke wasn’t founded by a bunch of starry-eyed romantics, but by several intrepid German Jews who returned home after the war. Germany lay in ruins, and the only way back to growth and prosperity was to tie itself as closely to the occupying power, the hegemon. There was no other reasonable geopolitical choice, except risking further influence by the Soviet Union. Our founders were instrumental in convincing the Truman Administration to grant West Germany the Marshall Plan and to admit the new federal republic to NATO just a few years later. This was good Realpolitik. But after reunification, this dynamic made less and less sense. But the dynamic, where the US got to feel like the global policeman and continue to steer Europe because it felt good, and Europe could enjoy the fruits of dependence in security but independence economically, also because it felt so good, meant that no one dared break the addiction. 

[related] As Germany rose to the third slot in the global economy and the European Union grew and consolidated its trade and regulatory power, the world was becoming multipolar, and doing so much more quickly than US politicians realized. No longer were the institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO, which we created as multilateral institutions in our image so that they acted in our image, acting in that image. But the US was still footing the bill for these institutions, buying the allegiance that was no longer there, or taking the US role as the beneficent hegemon for granted. This is why Trump says the “EU was founded to rip off the United States.”  

Most European politicians when speaking in public refer to the EU primarily as a dovish peace project or decry its bureaucracy, when in fact, especially after the Lisbon Treaty, they know very well it’s a mechanism to compete globally, including with that beneficent hegemon. Economic liberals in America like myself have always cheered the EU on—we want strong sophisticated markets everywhere and that will lead to an overall increase in citizen welfare. But the new elites in America say, not so fast, how dare they regulate our companies when we’ve kept them from being mopped up by Russia for 80 years? 

America’s Inconvenient Truths 

When the US was an unchallenged hegemon, all this didn’t matter so much, but the country is now coming to terms with its own loss of economic power, and doing this rather inelegantly. So believe me when I say this: the tariff blackmail of the Trump Administration is not a sign of American strength, it is a sign of American weakness. Because the international institutions will not render the outcomes that suit America, America will resort to the next best thing, and this is where Trump is an expert: identify points of disproportionate leverage and exploit them. But you can only do this once or twice, and after that, your dragon has blown its fire.  

Take note that although the EU caved to tariffs in its recent negotiations with the US, it held fast to its most sacred regulations where it has a strategic advantage, namely on agriculture and data. Why did the Administration rename the Department of Defense the Department of War? When I read that I honestly started laughing: wie unselbstbewusst kann man wirken? Does America really need that self-reassurance that we can fight a war? Does Pete Hesgeth have to show us all his war-fighting tattoos to prove to us he’s a warfighter? It’s like a signal to China that we feel threatened. 

This self-confidence crisis suits Trumpland well. It’s his inclination to treat the global economy like a contractor for an Atlantic City casino, but I don’t think it was inevitable that his personal tactics would gain broader appeal. There is little resistance to his “dealmaking” right now because several administrations have tried to maintain American predominance through other means—and with mixed results. When it comes to China, both the first Trump Administration, of which I was a part, and the Biden Administration tried to double down on the big American tent—near-shoring and ally-shoring of critical industries where the line between civilian and military use was undefined at best.  

“The Trump administration’s tariff blackmail is not a sign of American strength, but a sign of American weakness.”

The most prominent example was the government-wide regulatory effort through export controls and investment restrictions to slow China’s development of advance chips, which in turn would facilitate Beijing’s aggression against Taiwan. This ended in byzantine compliance problems, massive evasion through third-countries, and China doubling down on its own research and development, and all this culminated in the release of DeepSeek. Strategically, it was worth the shot, but just a few years later we see how naïve such policies might have been, or that we were just too late.  

The Biden Administration even tried to host a “summit of democracies” with whom we would ideally “ally-shore” our economy. This turned into a spectacular failure because the US had to invite our steadfast NATO-Ally but imperfect democracy–Kaczynski’s Poland, but didn’t invite Hungary. I think that will have been the last time the US got to decide who made the cut. Last week, a group of DC think tankers gave a presentation to my team, showing that we are “losing” South Africa to the China, Russia, Iran nexus. They were certainly correct in identifying disturbing political trends in the country but did so through the traditional lens of good and bad. It supposes that these countries see the world in such a dichotomy, and also that the US has the authority to determine what that is in the first place. 

New “Rules” 

Against this backdrop, there is a strange relief in American transactionalism. American rhetoric, from the justification for military intervention in the name of democracy to words about the exceptionalism of our own political experiment, has become hollow, almost eyeroll-inducing rhetoric. If you are a millennial, as I am, chances are you will point to the financial crises that set back the earnings and savings potential of a generation and foreclosed on millions of family homes while the banks were bailed out, or that your generation fought two endless wars that ended with American retreat.  

As the gap between rich and poor becomes painfully acute, as inflation and interest rates alternatively hit the working and middle class, many ask: is this what you’re calling exceptional? In that context, it’s only being honest if America says I’ll shown you mine if you show me yours. Donald Trump’s dealmaking, blackmailing America, may unfortunately be a more genuine impression of how the country has come to function than the words we may or may not have used to cloak the reality that America is a transactional place.  

We have to remain cautious but open-minded about America’s drift to state-driven capitalism. Here, European firms can find strange comfort in the fact that Trump’s extortionary tactics are not reserved for foreign partners. There are many transactional domestic deals to be made as well. It is unprecedented for an American president to demand “golden shares” to approve a foreign acquisition or maintain a government subsidy, such as in the case of Nippon steel and Intel, or a share of profits in order to approve NVIDIA’s export license to China. The administration is also threatening firms that shutter mid-West factories with various penalties. The bi-partisan Chips and Science act passed under the Biden Administration offered tax incentives and loans to chip manufacturers who produced in the United States and created jobs. That was a carrot. Trump is trying the stick.   

In Trump-land, businesses risk descending into cronyism and an economy of fealty. Trump’s definition of legal and illegal is what he can get away with and what he can’t, and whoever combines a request with praise, usually gets a green light. If we are trying out a brand of, forgive me, European-style nationalization, by taking shares in troubled industries of choice, then I absolutely wish we had a better ringleader. I never thought there would be all that much overlap between Trump and Biden, but this is a perfect example of the political horseshoe theory. Some of Biden’s left leaning trade advisors are welcoming Trump’s actions. Why? Trump is invoking state-driven capitalism to account for shortcomings in strategic sectors where market-driven decisionmaking has produced outcomes that are not aligned with employment targets or national security. I have long argued that the lines between national security and economic policy were falsely divided. Chancellor Merz also noted in his speech opening this year’s ambassador’s conference that there is no line between foreign and domestic policy.  

“Global trade is proving surprisingly resilient, demand is robust, and customers are willing to accept a certain price premium.”

While we grapple with the Western world’s new embrace of industrial policy,  trade economists are trying to determine whether the tsunami of market disruptions (war in Ukraine, corona, Chinese dumping, Trump) will have medium or long-term impacts on supply chains. Some friends of mine are developing artificial intelligence tools just for this purpose, because the multitude of factors extend beyond the capabilities of excel spreadsheets. In some respects, global trade is proving surprisingly resilient, demand is robust and customers are, generally speaking, willing to accept a certain price premium. But that doesn’t mean there has been no adaptation. Security of supply, political disruptions and shipping concerns have forced a regionalization of markets. Limited ad-hoc trade arrangements are sprouting up along the shores of the Indian Ocean, in Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Presumably none of these mini-deals fall under the rubric of the most-favored-nation standard of the WTO. More like those of the Silk Road.  

Is this a new blueprint for global trade rules? It is plausible, that a new set of concentric circles of aligned economic interests that extend beyond geopolitical tensions—such as the recent rapprochement between China, Japan, and South Korea—are the amoebic breeding ground for new trade standards. The positive spin would that, over time, a new version of the “most favored nation” principle develops, not based on price maximization but models that allow countries to protect certain domestic markets. And perhaps these new marriages of convenience will help mitigate physical conflict.  

 There are certainly areas where the laws of the jungle and ad hoc deals will dominate the market until new, non-governmental exchanges are established to regulate global prices. For example, a scramble for critical minerals will lead to one off deals with China or firm-based deals with mining countries such as Congo and South Africa, unless resource-rich democracies such as Canada and Australia, alongside the United States, develop a sophisticated market and pricing mechanism. Such mechanisms of course exist for the diamond industry and the oil, and grain. It’s important to look for positive outcomes and not only problems in the current environment. 

Europe’s Gearshift 

If they remain in their current form, Europe could stand to gain from America’s tariffs, but this will entail major internal reforms and not just new trade agreements. Germany has “discovered” Canada, as if the country’s vast natural resources and advanced manufacturing sectors just popped up like magic mushrooms since January. Still, the bloc cannot pretend that regionalization isn’t happening. Every time I see a minister jumping in an airplane to initiative trade negotiations with another corner of the globe, I shake my head a little. Mercosur is great, and so is a deepened partnership with Indonesia, but it cannot be easier to conclude a trade agreement with a country on the other side of the world than unwind barriers within the single market of the European Union. You cannot just look for other customers, hoping that external demand with be upheld. This is a palliative, a postponement of an inevitable restructuring of the European economy, and of the European institutions that were set up to deal with another set of global circumstances. 

This is a banking symposium, so let me stop the capital markets beat once more. What is the tipping point on capital markets, when a compromise can be reached? At this point, it is almost willful negligence. Capital markets integration is not only a growth driver for businesses and finance institutions that will allow the immense wealth in Germany to contribute directly to economic growth. Can we really say that due to discrepancy in insolvency rules, European leaders willing to sell out their start-ups to America, or perpetuate an unsustainable reliance on tax revenues to uphold citizens’ welfare as they age?  

“The arms industry is rapidly becoming the new flagship of European industry and a lifeline for deindustrialization.”

In the end, it’s not only the “elite” topic as often made out to be. Given the debate raging right now over pension reform, politicians have the opportunity to reframe as a matter of consumer choice. If you’re listening to podcasts these days, you may often be interrupted by an ad for stock trading platforms, which offers access to US markets via a license at the Lithuanian or Irish central bank. The demand is obviously there—why do we need to rely on these kinds of workarounds? Insurance providers describe how customers are rushing through the door to open market-based retirement accounts. There have to be more alternatives for long-term savings.  

The defense industry is rapidly becoming the new posterchild for European industry and rescue mechanism for deindustrializiation. We’ve all read the headlines about Rheinmetall taking over automobile plants. But when building a military-industrial complex essentially from scratch, there are opportunities to avoid pitfalls that mire the US defense industry inefficiency—endless levels of contractors and subcontractors and consultants, long waiting times and price explosions that derive from an oligopoly of providers and monopsony consumer, namely, the state.   

The finance industry has heard the call and is rapidly developing investment portfolios targeting defense and infrastructure. Given the interest of family offices and private equity in new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence, private actors can hopefully provide incentives to avoid cost and production overruns. Poland just used eyewateringly expensive materiel to shoot down the inexpensive drones that Russia provocatively flew into NATO airspace, proving that the Alliance has prepared well for conventional war of yesterday and not today. And the European defense market is still a scrambled web of national interests and lack of coordination—which country can provide which capability and which company will do it? How do we build new military consortia? My hope is that the finance industry, which is inherently transnational, can provide a rubric to help consolidate politicians and contractors, because ministries by their very nature live in silos and cannot see out of them.   

Conclusion: the New Alliance 

We are at the beginning of the modern NATO Alliance, and a new Germany. This isn’t an easy moment. Two founding principles of the Federal Republic are being shaken to the bone. The first is the hegemony of the United States, and the second is the allegiance to the Israeli State. How will this country react to the scrappy, deal-making America that does not act in a normative universe or pay it forward to maintain an “international rules-based order” in its image? And how will Germany truly react when, as now seems highly probable, Israel formally annexes the West Bank, and plausibly shortly thereafter, Gaza? Friedrich Merz isn’t attending the UN General Assembly this week to tackle domestic issues. But his European compatriots are there, recognizing a Palestinian State, while the two pillars of Germany’s post-war foreign policy identity stand together, fiercely opposed.  

Germany is the crux of this equation. This country can longer be populated by happy vassals. In the post-war period, and even after reunification, the US and other NATO Allies remained apprehensive of German strength, and that apprehension and lessons of history understandably pervaded the education system and public perception of the country’s role in the world. But at some point, that assessment flipped for Germany’s partners. I think the point may, ironically, have been after Germany’s abstention at the UN Security Council in March 2011 over the military operation in Libya against the Qaddafi regime. That was the beginning of my professional lifetime, and since then I cannot recall any conversations within the US government to keep Germany small—it was the opposite Through American disappointment came American expectations, when Germany’s abdication of responsibility became its greatest liability in the greater transatlantic theater. But Germany clung to the original narrative, perhaps because it was self-serving, or perhaps no one ever laid it out just so clearly as Russia now has.  

If we can firmly pull back from these old dependencies, we may also lose some of the resentment with America and experience less anti-Americanism, even with Trump’s America. America is not a phenomenon, it’s a country, and it’s in trouble. I hope that, in helping to establish a new balance in the multipolar world we now inhabit, Europe can also help rescue American from its confusion.  

 Thank you for your time and I look forward to discussing this further with you.  

Der Beitrag “The course has been set for a modern NATO alliance” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Following the event, he emphasized in a video interview with Atlantik-Brücke the need for increased defense spending – specifically 5% of GDP or 3.5% for military investments – in order to meet the requirements of modern warfare, especially in the areas of cyber and space, which will be central to the future. In the past, the focus was on land, air, and sea forces, Badia said, but today cyber and space operations are crucial for dominance, which is why significant financial resources are needed for holistic capability development.

Despite the differing national interests of the 32 NATO member states, Badia emphasizes the alliance’s shared values. He describes how consensus-based decision-making is based on the search for alternatives, so that a rejection (“no”) often leads to an “alternative yes.” Over his 41-year career, the security policy landscape has changed constantly – from the Cold War to German reunification and out-of-area operations to new threat scenarios. Nevertheless, the community of values of the “free Western alliance” has always remained capable of action.

Badia is optimistic that, despite tensions between national sovereignty and common alliance interests, actions will always be taken in the interests of the West and that NATO plus its 35 partners stand on a stable, value-based foundation.

Der Beitrag “You have to concentrate on cyber today” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Judging a US president’s first hundred days began with Franklin Roosevelt.  For Donald Trump, however, certainly on national-security issues, comparison to Napoleon’s hundred-days campaign may be more apt, ending as it did in disaster for both the emperor and France.

[related]Trump’s indifference to Ukraine and his conciliatory approach toward Russia are only one of several shocks to trans-Atlantic relations.  Disdain for NATO and the ever-present specter of US withdrawal, or even substantial disengagement, like renouncing the supreme European command, are also dangerous.  Combined with Trump’s chaotic, incoherent, economically illiterate trade decisions, there is reason to despair.

The good news, such as it is: Trump is not pursuing a grand strategy, or even “policy” as we normally understand that word.  He sees everything transactionally, through the prism of personal ties, and how he benefits from them, politically or economically.  If he and Vladimir Putin have good rapport, he believes America and Russia have good state-to-state relations.  This is not unique to Putin.  Trump said about North Korea’s Kim Jung Un: “We fell in love.”

Putin certainly sees Trump as an easy mark, not a friend, manipulating him on Ukraine, for example, by agreeing that Trump was correct to say that the Ukraine war would not have happened had he been president.  Putin then released a US hostage, followed by Belarus also doing so, always a winner with Trump.  Moscow has just recently exchanged yet another US citizen, even as Russia has been slow-rolling cease-fire negotiations.  This is not about a Trump strategy, but about his susceptibility to flattery and exploitation.

Trump is an aberration in American politics, someone entirely absorbed with himself.  That he has been elected twice says more about his opponents’ weaknesses than voter devotion to Trump personally, or his actions as president.  His public support is dropping and will drop significantly more if his newly launched trade wars cause an economic downtown.  Republicans in Congress are finally beginning to distance themselves from Trump and will steer further away as the 2026 elections approach.  Democrats, by contrast, still have not regained a pulse since last November’s election.

The answer is not to panic or do things that give Trump further excuses to quit Europe.  During the Cold War, Soviet leaders sought to split the Atlantic alliance.  Their failure to do so contributed significantly to Moscow’s defeat. This is not the time for us to do to ourselves what the Kremlin could not.

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General Hodges, President-elect Trump has regularly criticized NATO, especially when it comes to the financial imbalance of the national defense budgets in the USA and in Europe. How will the U.S. commitment to the alliance alter under the new Trump administration and what would this mean for NATO’s credibility? 

It’s not helpful that the incoming President creates doubt and uncertainty about US’s commitment to NATO and Europe. But my sense is that he won’t actually pull out of NATO or turn his back on NATO because enough of the GOP leadership in Congress understand how important it is for US security and prosperity and I think President Trump will as well. But he’ll continue to be harsh and demanding in his interactions with some Allies, especially since he believes he’s the one who forced many countries to increase spending.

How will the new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and the new U.S. President get along? 

I think Secretary General Rutte will do very well. He’s already demonstrated a strong, savvy understanding of Mr Trump and his visit to Mar a Lago was a good example. But he’ll be tested throughout, especially if nations like Germany continue to fall short. And a divergence on how to deal with Ukraine and Russia could be a source of friction.

How may Trump’s cabinet picks, Marco Rubio for Secretary of State and Mike Waltz for National Security Advisor, affect the incoming administration’s commitment to the transatlantic alliance? 

The good news is that both Rubio and Waltz are pro-NATO and Russia hawks. But will they be able to achieve policy successes if others who influence Mr Trump disagree, for example, DJT Jr, Elon Musk, etc?

Trump has already announced to once again leave the Paris Climate Agreement. Which value will alliances in general, treaties, Western and rules-based institutions have, if the United States pulls this democratic international framework into question? 

I think most nations and agencies are already expecting it and should be adapting, preparing for it.

Would Germany, the United Kingdom, France and other major European countries be able and willing to tremendously increase their military support for Ukraine, if the new Trump administration decided to stop supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia? 

They certainly have the economic power to do it…but I haven’t seen that they have the political will to do this. But I would expect that countries like Poland, Italy, Finland and the Baltic countries will do this…they do have the political will…because they are not confused about the threat from Russia. The center of gravity of resistance to Russia is shifting to the East.

Which political approach will the new U.S. government most probably follow in Israel’s war against Hamas, Hezbollah, Huthis and other proxies from Iran in the Middle East? 

I don’t know yet…signals from Trump about not getting involved in the post-Assad Syria are not encouraging. But clearly we should try to influence what happens there…no Russian or Chinese influence, no export of terrorism, and return of Syrian refugees to Syria. We should strengthen our relationship with our NATO Ally, Turkey. And of course I expect a Trump Administration to be very close to the Netanyahu government in Israel.

Since America’s pivot to Asia the Indo-Pacific has become the most important world region for the USA from a geopolitical and geostrategic standpoint. What U.S. strategy for China do you expect in the next four years with regard to the rising tensions surrounding Taiwan? 

This is not clear…there is a divide even in the GOP about how to do this. A successful deterrence of China will require military as well as economic and diplomatic strength, all of which requires collaboration with Allies, including our European allies. But the best way to deter China now is for them to see that we are willing to do whatever it takes to help Ukraine stop Russia. I fear that China sees that we in the West don’t have the political Will to defeat Russia and so they are emboldened to do what they want to challenge the international rules based order in the IndoPacific region.

Frederick Benjamin “Ben” Hodges III is a retired United States Army officer who served as the commanding general of United States Army Europe. He has been a Senior Advisor to Human Rights First since June 2022 and also serves as NATO’s Senior Mentor for Logistics. He previously held the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis. He retired from the U.S. Army in January 2018, is a board member of Atlantik-Brücke, and lives with his wife in Frankfurt, Germany.

Der Beitrag “A successful deterrence of China requires collaboration“ erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Sweden’s application for NATO membership and its accession is a historic paradigm shift. Since Sweden is leaving behind more than two centuries of military non-alignment – this is a Swedish “Zeitenwende”. After Russia´s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the then Social Democratic government under Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson immediately appointed an inter-parliamentary working group to analyze the new security policy consequences of the attack for Sweden and for Europe. The working group concluded that Russia would pose a serious threat to European and Swedish security also in the long term and that it was therefore in Sweden’s national interest to join NATO together with Finland.

Sweden and Finland will extend NATO’s operational depth in the Baltic Sea region and link the far north, the North Atlantic, more closely with the Baltic Sea region.

With Sweden as a member, our sea, airspace and territory can be used for reinforcements to be deployed quickly from Swedish soil to the Baltic states. In addition, Sweden’s geostrategic position will make a decisive contribution to being able to deploy also reinforcements from North America in Europe.

At the same time, this means also a greater responsibility for Sweden in protecting sea transports through the Baltic Sea, above all to secure supplies for Finland. We will assume this responsibility in our neighbourhood and contribute to the deterrence policy of the Alliance and all Allies.

Sweden also has some unique military capabilities. Our fighter planes will participate in NATO’s Baltic Air Policing and Sweden’s unique naval forces, which are particularly suited to the conditions of the Baltic Sea, will be able to jointly with the German navy control the Baltic Sea approaches.

The Swedish government recently decided to reinforce the Canadian-led Nato presence in Latvia with a battalion. All in all, our defence spending has been doubled between 2020 and 2024. This means that Sweden has already reached the NATO standard of 2% of GDP this year.

To conclude: NATO is making Sweden safer – and Sweden is making NATO stronger!

About the author: Veronika Wand-Danielsson is Sweden’s Ambassador to Germany since September 1st of 2023. Prior to this position she was Director of the department for Europe and North America and of the department for America in Sweden’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs. From 2014 until 2020 she was Sweden’s Ambassador to France and Monaco.

Der Beitrag Sweden has finally come home erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

On 4 April 1949, delegates from 12 countries – including the UK – gathered in Washington, D.C., to commit their nations to one another’s defence in the hope of avoiding another devastating war and to safeguard the democracy and freedom of their peoples.

Ever since NATO’s foundation, the United Kingdom has played a leading role at the heart of this transatlantic Alliance. It could even be said that NATO has British DNA:  its first headquarters were in London; its first Secretary General British; and the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was instrumental in negotiating its establishment.

Three quarters of a century later, NATO is now the most successful defensive Alliance in history. NATO is bigger, stronger, and more united than ever, keeping its one billion people safer and more secure with its “one for all and all for one” security guarantee. It is essential for the maintenance of peace and security of its members and has been the bedrock of European security for 75 years.

NATO is bigger, stronger, and more united than ever, keeping its one billion people safer and more secure with its “one for all and all for one” security guarantee.

[related]Two of the leading members of this Alliance are the UK and Germany. Indeed, Germany of course plays a unique role in enabling NATO’s defence capabilities. For example, more than a quarter of the British Army’s collective training takes place in Germany, leveraging the country’s strategic location at the heart of Europe. Additionally, Germany’s role as the “Drehscheibe” allows the UK to effectively prepare, deploy, and support forward defence forces along the NATO Alliance’s Eastern Flank.

Furthermore, Germany and the UK are the only NATO countries that conduct fully integrated air policing operations. This seamless integration of air defence capabilities across the Alliance is a testament to our strong defence cooperation.

As British Ambassador to Germany, I am also particularly aware of the pivotal role Berlin played in the formation of NATO. The Berlin Blockade which began in 1948 by Soviet forces cutting off links to West Berlin and the subsequent Allied airlift efforts may have ended peacefully after nearly a year. However, a few weeks after the end of the blockade, East and West Berlin officially separated. Over a decade later, on 13 August 1961, the world awoke to over 100km of barbed wire encircling West Berlin. This was one of the darkest days for post-war Europe.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and challenged global security

This year marks not only NATO’s 75th anniversary, but also 35 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yet, the optimism and hopefulness in the early 1990s that followed its fall is now only a faint memory. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine two years ago has shattered peace and stability in Europe and challenged global security.

This security crisis, of Russian President Putin’s making, threatens our way of life. The UK, Germany and our NATO allies must act to protect our societies – and both resource and resolve are required. Germany’s support of Ukraine since the Russian invasion began – a total of €28 billion in military support provided or pledged (including at least €7 billion in 2024) – has therefore been invaluable. It is however clear that if Russia succeeds, the outcome will be far more expensive than helping Ukraine now. Ukraine is not only defending its right to exist as a sovereign and democratic country; it is defending the right of peoples of all nations to live in freedom, without fear of aggression.

Putin has underestimated NATO. When he invaded Ukraine in 2022, he said he wanted less NATO – what he got was more.

Putin has underestimated NATO. When he invaded Ukraine in 2022, he said he wanted less NATO – what he got was more. Finland and Sweden becoming allies makes NATO stronger and all of us more secure. NATO continues to deter Russia, strengthen its defence industrial base, and build its partnerships.

2024 will be a historic year for NATO. As the Alliance celebrates its 75th birthday, the combination of the ongoing war in Ukraine, growing geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific, and emerging technologies will require NATO and its allies to show it can adapt to meet the challenges of the next 75 years.

In this more contested and less secure world, NATO’s importance is only set to expand. This anniversary is the moment to renew our historic pledge to this Alliance and to say that no matter what or who tests us, we will not waiver.

About the author: Jill Gallard was appointed British Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany on 11 November 2020. Before joining the Embassy, she was the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Deputy Political Director (2018-2020) and Director of Human Resources (2014-2018). From 2011 to 2014 Gallard served as British Ambassador to Portugal.

Der Beitrag The bedrock of European security has British DNA erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Nik Nanos

In a world marked by political volatility and uncertainty, many wondered whether Canada was an outlier. In 2015, Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau swept to power on his proverbial “sunny ways” campaign, advancing a moderate, progressive, inclusive vision for Canada firmly fixed on helping Canada’s middle class. In the period between the 2015 and the 2019 federal elections, Canadians were unsettled by U.S. President Donald Trump’s drive to scrap the North American Free Trade Agreement and to remake the North American relationship. Indeed, for Trump, it was not just about remaking America’s role in the world, it was about shaking up the world order ranking from NAFTA, to NATO to America’s relationship with China.

[related]This brief will examine the political context in Canada ranging from the domestic political situation as manifested in the 2019 General Election through to the perceptions of Canada’s major allies. Together they paint a picture of domestic uncertainty coupled with a reaching out to economic and security partners that have a potential to provide stable positive relations.

Leading up to the 2019 General Election, the Liberals enjoyed a comfortable 10 to 15 point advantage over the Conservative Party. This consistent and prolonged honeymoon in the first three years of the mandate was more of a political Potemkin Village than a continuation of the warm embrace of Trudeau’s sunny ways. The two major opposition parties, the right wing Conservatives and the New Democrats which are a left-wing social democratic alternative to the Liberals were both leaderless for a significant portion of the mandate of the Liberals. In the absence of a clear counterpoint or alternative, the Liberals, on paper, looked strong. Fast forward to 2019, and the resignation of two senior women cabinet ministers over perceived interference in the SNC Lavalin legal proceedings which deal with corruption charges and the ‘sunny ways’ of the Trudeau Liberals turned into dark days. Indeed on the very first day the election writs were issued and the campaign began the Liberals were on the defensive responding to new revelations in the SNC Lavalin Affair.

With the Bloc surge in Quebec and blockbuster revelations about Trudeau wearing a brown-face 19 years ago, the Liberals scrambled to hold on to government.

The structural game changer for the Liberals was the rise of the separatist Bloc Quebecois in the French-speaking province of Quebec. Ahead of the campaign, the popular wisdom was that the Liberals would lose seats in many of Canada’s regions but gain in the province of Quebec at the expense of the sagging New Democratic Party. However, Bill 21, Quebec Provincial Legislation banning the wearing of religious symbols for public employees like civil servants, teachers and police officers, reignited Quebec nationalist sentiment which rallied around the Bloc Quebecois. With the Bloc surge in Quebec and blockbuster revelations about Trudeau wearing a brown-face 19 years ago, the Liberals scrambled to hold on to government.

Over the course of 37 campaign days of nightly tracking done by Nanos Research for The Globe and Mail and CTV News, the Conservatives led on 22 evenings and the Liberals led on 15 nights. The seesaw battle continued – with Trudeau being on the defensive and the Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer, also, on the defensive over his personal position on abortion, same sex marriage, holding dual citizenship and fuzziness about his professional accreditation as an insurance broker.

The Conservatives won the popular vote but the Liberals won the greatest number of seats and held on to power largely on the inefficient distribution of Conservative support which was highly concentrated in the energy rich Prairie provinces in the West. With that the Liberal majority was lost and the Liberals now have to work with other parties to stay in power.

The other major shift over the course of the last four years has been in the views of Canadians of their major allies. For the first time in memory.

Setting aside the election and the Liberal set back from majority to minority, the other major shift over the course of the last four years has been in the views of Canadians of their major allies. For the first time in memory. Among the key shifts is a lack of confidence in the ability of Canada to have a positive relationship with the United States. Views of Mexico are currently more positive than views of the United States with is in contrast to the historical public opinion trend. Canadians are more likely to self declare a greater affinity for Europe as a place of shared values, commitment to the rule of law and outright stability. The views that Canadians have of Germany, over the course of the past 15 years are steadily becoming more positive when it comes to perceptions related to shared business values and shared values on human rights.

The message for the Trudeau minority government is that with an uncertain domestic political situation and an unsettled relationship with the United States, greater and closer engagement with Europe represents a potential anti-dote to the anxiety that Canadians have about the future, who our partners will be and where Canada should look. Driven by geography and history, the relationship with the US will continue to be the foundational bilateral focus of Canada. However, given the current situation, Canada is at a moment in time where an increasing number of Canadians would welcome a diversification of Canada’s outward view of it’s economic and security partners. On that front, Europe now more than ever is positively on the radar of Canadians.

Professor Nik Nanos is the Chief Data Scientist at Nanos Research.

Hier sehen Sie die Präsentation der Studie von Professor Nik Nanos, auf der dieser exklusive Text für die Atlantik-Brücke basiert.

Der Beitrag Domestic instability and uncertainty with the U.S. may propel Canada closer to Europe erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Listen to the conversation:

Interview: David Deißner

Joshua Walker, on October 9th of this year Turkey launched a military offensive in northern Syria which is directed against the Kurdish YPG militia. This step was facilitated through the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. What does this mean for the credibility of the United States in the Middle East?

American credibility and foreign policy have suffered not just in the Middle East. Although you could shrug and say American credibility has been suffering for a long time, not just under the Trump presidency, but ever since the so-called red line that was set by the previous administration in Syria. Nobody should have been surprised. The U.S. has sold out the Kurds numerous times. This was inevitable in coming, but it is still tragic to watch all the human suffering. It was not a matter of if but a matter of when. The surprising nature of this is how quickly it escalated and became a global crisis. To see the way in which the power vacuum that the United States has left in Syria has been filled by Russia, Iran, and now Turkey which used to be on different sides is particularly interesting to watch. October 9th joked at our military officials who have been working so closely with our Kurdish allies.

Which role does NATO member Turkey play in this situation in northern Syria regarding the Kurdish forces?

[related]From the beginning, the Turks have been the main protagonist. Turkey is the second largest military power in NATO in terms of the number of forces, and it is a sophisticated fighting force. The fact that it is also the Muslim majority power has always led Turkey to have a larger seat at the table. Turkey shares one of the longest land borders with Syria. From the very beginning of the Syrian uprising, Turkey has been very clear about its position: It is against Assad, but it also believes that the YPG or the PKK is a terrorist organization that represents an existential threat to the republic of Turkey. Turkey has been waging a war against this group for a good thirty-year period from the eighties onward. Thousands of lives have been lost.

There is a domestic context here for Turkey as well. President Erdogan, who has been flagging with his popularity, needs to find a reason to continue his policy given on what happened with the Istanbul municipal election recently. There is no political party in Turkey, with the exception of the HDP, that does not believe that this is the right course of action. There has been a steady drumbeat of war. Erdogan seized the opportunity.

There has been a steady drumbeat of war. Erdogan seized the opportunity.

What happens if Turkey invokes Article 5 of its NATO membership if it is attacked by some Kurdish forces?

First of all, a lot of us thought that because Turkey is a NATO member, perhaps it would not take these actions in Syria. Invoking Article 5 could cause an internal crisis in NATO. The bigger discussion in Washington is the following: With allies like this, what should we be thinking of NATO as we know it is no longer a relevant force inside of Turkey because of Turkey’s behavior, not just in this particular case with Syria, but also with the Russian S-400 weapon systems that have been bought? We as transatlantic friends struggle with this question.

Will Russia and Iran, which both protect the regime of President Bashar al-Assad geopolitically, benefit from the new reality on the ground in Syria?

Absolutely. The Astana process by which Russia, Turkey, and Iran have been negotiating these issues, even when there was a more adversarial relationship between the three capitals, has picked up to be one of the main deciding factors. If I am Syrian today, unlike in the past when I would need to go to Switzerland or New York to try to figure out what my fate would be, increasingly this is beginning to flow through Moscow and Teheran and to a lesser extent through Ankara. Because Ankara is playing much more like a regional player. Turkey seems to be focusing its energies on its regional aspirations and particularly protecting its sovereign territory, versus Russia, who is playing the role of a spoiler. Wherever it can really stymie unity or international efforts, it is doing so in a powerful way. It is really breathtaking to watch how Russia, which is from a purely numbers point of view a very weak power, is punching well above its weight. The difference between Russia’s actions and Iranian actions is that Iran has a much larger regional game here that is playing out with Hezbollah, Lebanon, and its antagonism of Israel.

It is really breathtaking to watch how Russia, which is from a purely numbers point of view a very weak power, is punching well above its weight.

Syria that has been in a civil war for more than eight years becomes once again a site of further combat operations. These cause an ever-increasing number of deaths and force tens of thousands of people to flee. Which responsibility does the West bear for this tremendous humanitarian crisis?

It is easy to point fingers. The West did not inspire the movements that led out of the Arab spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. However, if the West had lifted a finger and put it on the scales in the Syrian War on one side or the other, we would have clearly made a difference and changed the outcome. If we had had even half or a third of the political will, that the Iranians or the Russians had in protecting Assad, in eliminating him, it would be over. Ultimately, we are all to blame for where we are. We are in the worst of both worlds.

Where do you see the qualitative difference between the Obama administration’s approach to this issue and the current administration’s policy?

There is an amazing amount of continuity with our policies. Even when Obama decided not to enforce the red line, there were still American forces there: State Department, U.S. Aid, intelligence, and defense. With the “New Beginning” speech in Cairo, the Obama administration put the rhetoric out ahead of its actions. When the actions did not meet up to the rhetoric, there was a real disappointment and cynicism that developed about America’s intentions in the region.

When Trump came in, there was an initial honeymoon period. Trump does not seem to have any appetite for foreign intervention and seems to want to get everybody out of the so-called endless wars. Yet many of the agencies I described continued to do business as usual in the region. Until last month, when Trump telegraphed Erdogan that he is not doing anything more and pulling American soldiers out. Now you see a real anger and backlash when you look at the Republican response to President Trump’s abandonment of the Kurds. Almost all foreign policy professionals were uniform in saying this is a pretty significant and bad move on Trump’s part. This is a lose-lose situation in a worst-case scenario.

Now you see a real anger and backlash when you look at the Republican response to President Trump’s abandonment of the Kurds.

German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer suggested to establish an internationally controlled security zone along the Syrian-Turkish border in cooperation with Turkey and Russia. What is your take on this?

I am disappointed about what I am seeing because it seems like it is too late. If there is one silver lining, it is to see that Germany is realizing it has to play a larger role. But while this proposal sounds really forceful and it is a great talking point and headline, the Europeans should have been more proactive and focused on Turkish concerns beforehand. That is not even to mention the EU membership, which we do not even talk about anymore. That used to be the biggest driver of Turkish foreign policy. I am concerned that clearly the EU does not seem to feel like a real foreign or security power when it comes to Turkey.

If there is one silver lining, it is to see that Germany is realizing it has to play a larger role.

Is the EU at least to some extent prepared for new high numbers of refugees seeking shelter in the European Union? Or is this rather not the case, and Europe is very much depending on the agreement it has completed with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan so that more than three million Syrian refugees living in Turkish camps do not enter the European Union?

The EU is clearly dependent on Turkey. The EU has simply made the short term negative case of saying: We will pay you to keep the refugees there. There is no long-term solution. Turks are now literally piling refugees into trucks and driving them into Syria. Generally speaking, it would be a mistake to give up on Turkey. The Europeans are in danger of losing their relationship with Turkey over their fears related to national security concerns.

What are the ramifications of the latest developments for a potential reinvigoration of ISIS in the Middle East?

First of all, the killing of Baghdadi was a real blow. The fact that other top ISIS deputies were being knocked out may be the one positive silver lining. The broader ramifications are that there is a power vacuum. Russia has no interest in stopping a reinvigoration of ISIS, and Assad doesn’t really control all of his territory yet. If the Kurdish forces, which were fighting ISIS do not see any incentive to continue doing this, extremist forces like ISIS and al-Qaida will come back. I just worry, that we are so reactive at this point in time that we are just one terrorist attack away from something major.

I just worry, that we are so reactive at this point in time that we are just one terrorist attack away from something major.

What kind of overall strategy would you recommend to the transatlantic partners with regard not only to Syria but to the whole region in the Middle East?

One of the challenges we have for an overall strategy is that all of us are very distracted at home. You have to start at home. We as transatlantic partners have to focus on our core interests that we still share as a community of nations. NATO as the largest and most powerful and historic military alliance still has a role to play in protecting us and also in terms of working together. We are stronger together than individually. Turkey is a perfect example for us to cooperate with. Nobody has an interest for Turkey and its economy to go off the ledge. We need to find a way to reorientate our relationship with Turkey in a realistic manner. There are bright spots that we should be looking at, particularly in the economic sphere, when it comes to the Turkish youth and education system.

Here you can find Joshua Walker’s profile site at Eurasia Group.

Der Beitrag “The U.S. has sold out the Kurds numerous times” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Mr. Hodges, free and safe international shipping routes are essential for peace and stability in the globalized world. Now the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz poses a severe threat for international oil tankers. Are you disappointed about the German government’s decision not to join a combined British-U.S. naval mission?

Yes, I am.  Germany is a long-time, reliable ally, so I’m a bit surprised at their reluctance, thus far, to join this mission. German leadership is essential for stability in many of the critical regions of the world, including the Middle East. The brand name, “Made in Germany”, is respected around the world and other nations take note when Germany decides to act or not. Whether in the construct of a multilateral coalition, NATO, or a European construct, Germany would add real value to this mission in terms of diplomatic, information space, and economic value as well as military support.

Surprisingly, Germany is also a “Non-participant” in the four EU PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) projects that are directly related to maritime security. This seems unusual for a leading nation in the EU and NATO and a global economic trading power that depends on freedom of navigation for its economic security and prosperity.

Is U.S. President Trump’s “policy of maximum pressure” vis-à-vis Iran and the future of the Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA) an effective way to guarantee peace in this region?

[related]I would have preferred that the USA remain in the JCPOA. Not because it was a good or the best agreement, but because I believe in the value of having and working with strong allies towards a common objective. The JCPOA was inadequate to address all of the key security issues. And the current Iranian regime has clearly been creating instability in the region in support of various extremist organizations for years. Many American soldiers died in Iraq as a result of EFP (explosively formed penetrator) IED’s (improvised explosive devices) which were manufactured in Iran and supplied to insurgent forces. But by working closely with the leading nations of the international community, especially Germany, I believe we could have continued to press Iran using all the elements of national strength and of the coalition’s power. This is what we call the DIME construct (diplomacy, information, military, and economy).

Stability in the region is a necessary precursor for prosperity in the region and, because of the importance of energy resources, much of the rest of the world. The best way to guarantee stability in the region is to involve all the parties interested in the process, to enforce international law, and to maintain a united front.

What are your hopes for transatlantic cooperation in the Middle East in the upcoming weeks and months?

Transatlantic cooperation is essential, there is no other way to achieve meaningful, lasting results. NATO is the most successful alliance in the history of the world. There is a reason it has continued to grow since its founding in 1949. As Secretary General Stoltenberg recently said, NATO means that every member has 28 other friends with common values and shared interests.

None of us has adequate capabilities in any of the DIME domains to go it alone. And we are indeed much stronger together, when we can prevent potential adversaries or the relevant regional parties from driving wedges between us.

Germany has a key role to play in the region not only because of its economic requirements and the need for energy for customers of the German auto industry, but because of its moral authority. Germany is respected around the world and currently has a key seat on the UN Security Council. This, combined with its leadership in the EU, make it the nation that I believe is America’s most important ally. I hope that my country will pursue Germany as our most important ally. I also hope that Germany will step up to accept a leading role in the region.

Learn more about Ben Hodges on his CEPA-profile site.

Der Beitrag Hodges: “Germany’s reluctance surprises me” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

It really is an era coming to an end. After ten years, Friedrich Merz as the chairman is leaving and John Emerson has already left – but not really. Let me start with you, dear Friedrich Merz. You are looking back on ten important and successful years. What was your biggest success, the most positive transatlantic event?

[related]FM: First of all, I am really happy to co-host the biggest German-American Conference we ever had at Atlantik-Brücke together with the American Council on Germany (ACG) tonight and tomorrow. It is a great honor that we are attracting so many people to our conference. Sitting here and looking over to the Adlon Hotel, I am reminded of one of the best meetings I had in my capacity as chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke with John’s predecessor Bob Kimmitt. At the very beginning of my tenure, I invited him for dinner there. It was not an easy conversation because cooperation between the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke had been a little fraught before. I said: Bob, let’s talk about what has happened and let’s look forward to what we can do jointly in the future. We came to the conclusion that we should leave the past behind and restore our cooperation. This was the continuation of a very fruitful collaboration between our two organizations, which we should make sure we continue in the future.

Which moment worried you the most?

FM: The biggest disappointment was the failure of TTIP. When I see what is happening in the US these days, I wish that we at least had TTIP. But to be honest, I am not so sure if this would really help as long as the American President is not willing to stick to the agreements the US government entered into. Nevertheless, we should come back to a rules-based cooperation between Europe and the United States. A transatlantic free trade agreement is one of the most important things we could and should achieve in the future. We all worked very hard on TTIP and we met in several places in Germany to fight for TTIP.

The biggest disappointment was the failure of TTIP.[quoter]Friedrich Merz[/quoter]

John Emerson, you said the two of you were working together for six years. You were trying to achieve TTIP, and you are still true friends. Can you describe your cooperation and what is the key to this special friendship?

JE: I have to say what a great pleasure it is to sit up here and look into this room and see so many friends. Old friends, new friends, but particularly friends from our time in Germany. Secondly, I have to say, that there was probably no one I enjoyed working with in Germany more than Friedrich Merz. Friedrich hosted the opening dinner at which I spoke when I got introduced to some in this room and many in the German public the day I presented my credentials to President Gauck. And then literally the last speech that I gave and the last event that Kimberly and I and our girls attended, Friedrich hosted with Atlantik-Brücke again. He threw an incredible party for us. On behalf of all of us, we are really sad to see you go.

I have to say, that there was probably no one I enjoyed working with in Germany more than Friedrich Merz.[quoter]Ambassador John B. Emerson[/quoter]

There are three levels to the German-American friendship and relationship. There is a government to government level – and sometimes there are things that we agree on and sometimes there are things that we don’t agree on. There is also the business to business level. There is no reason in the world that we cannot continue negotiating a great trade agreement. And then there is the people to people level, which is very much reflected by what we see tonight in this room.

Friedrich Merz, you recently said, and I quote you directly: We are eyewitnesses of a fundamental political and economic shift. You underlined that change while mentioning the election of the 45^thU.S. President and the party convention of the Communist Party of China in October 2017. What exactly are these tectonic changes that we are facing?

FM: I mentioned a third date, which was the 23^rdof June 2016, when the majority of the British decided Britain should leave the EU. These three events, the Brexit vote, the American election and the party convention of the Communist Party in China mark a fundamental change in our history. When we look back at these events some time from now, we will realize what really happened. Let me quote Professor Heinrich August Winkler, who said: We are in the midst of a cultural fight about the future of our liberal order. He concludes that it is really uncertain whether we will win. But there is something that makes me optimistic: when I travel to the United States, my experience is that in these complicated times, more Americans than ever before are willing to defend what we achieved over the last seven decades. Let’s preserve our freedom and our liberty.

These three events, the Brexit vote, the American election and the party convention of the Communist Party in China mark a fundamental change in our history.[quoter]Friedrich Merz[/quoter]

John, what do you think about this?

JE: If you talk to most Americans and tell them that there is a real crisis in the German-American relationship, they say: What are you talking about? We love Germany. Angela Merkel still is probably, if not the most, one of the two most respected foreign leaders in the United States of America. The multilateral institutions that were created over the last 70 years, as creaky and in need of reform as some of them are, have been largely responsible for helping to create 70 years of peace and prosperity, growth and national security throughout the West. As we move away from working in and through those institutions towards a more transactional nation to nation approach, we risk moving away from the values that hold us together.

As we move away from working in and through multilateral institutions towards a more transactional nation to nation approach, we risk moving away from the values that hold us together.[quoter]Ambassador John B. Emerson[/quoter]

John, Sigmar Gabriel, the possible next chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, said Europeans only care about themselves, for world issues they rely on the United States.Is this description true?

JE: Absolutely. President Obama got a lot of heat for an interview with The Atlantic, in which he talked about free riders in terms of the whole burden sharing concept. In fairness to Sigmar Gabriel’s commentary on Europeans, Americans didn’t necessarily mind that we were running things. That wasn’t a role that the United States of America shrunk from, particularly during the Cold War. However, those issues that Friedrich talked about are significantly growing. Particularly in relation to China and to the rise of nationalist populism around the world that has much more of a cultural genesis than an economic genesis, particularly here in Europe where immigration is the jet fuel for that movement. Those are issues that we can confront best when we are working together.

Friedrich Merz, you are one of the voices who constantly mentions that, let me put it in my words, Germany is punching below its weight. Where exactly should Germany step up?

FM: It is not only the Trump administration which is complaining about our defense budget. When former defense secretary Robert Gates left office, he gave a public speech on the deficit of funding and the NATO budget. Still, the majority of Germans is not aware of the fact that the U.S. is paying 70 percent and that Europe is only contributing 30 percent to the NATO budget. On the other hand, the question is: What is the right answer from the European side of the Atlantic to these challenges we are facing? The bigger problem within the transatlantic relationship is on our side of the Atlantic. The member states of the European Union have to start speaking with one voice.

The bigger problem within the transatlantic relationship is on our side of the Atlantic.[quoter]Friedrich Merz[/quoter]

Can you give us an example?

FM: When Jean-Claude Juncker travelled to Washington, D.C. in July of 2018 and had a debate with President Trump in the Oval Office, he gave a very clear statement about trade. He could only convince the President not to implement more tariffs on European goods because he had a letter signed by 28 European heads of state backing his point. Europe has to be clearer and we have to be united. That brings me to another point: The Germans have to take on more leadership within the European Union. Germany has a big responsibility to bring all Europeans to the table to agree on a common European position.

Germany has a big responsibility to bring all Europeans to the table to agree on a common European position.[quoter]Friedrich Merz[/quoter]

Do you agree with that, John?

JE: That’s a very fair statement. Thinking about the effort to get the EU member states agree on sanctions against Russia as consequence of the illegal annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine, I do recall Angela Merkel being very insistent on making sure everybody is lined up. But we were constantly talking to Germans about investing more in the southern part of Europe where we have all this youth unemployment, and not worrying so much about the Schwarze Nullin our budget. If Germany does not take a lead in investing in national security and in other areas, no other country is going to do it.

If Germany does not take a lead in investing in national security and in other areas, no other country is going to do it.[quoter]Ambassador John B. Emerson[/quoter]

In 2015, Atlantik-Brücke presented President Bush Senior with an award. You, Friedrich Merz, were invited to Bush’s house in Kennebunkport, Maine. Please share those moments and describe why exactly you awarded President George H. W. Bush.

FM: That was one of the most moving events in my tenure at Atlantik-Brücke. We had a very long Saturday in their private home in Kennebunkport. It was very encouraging to see that the President was still very interested in Germany. We had a deep conversation on German reunification and the events that led up to it. He was very interested in hearing how the country is governed from Berlin now, a city which was very close to his heart because of its  history.

JE: At least Germans of a certain age never ever forget that the man is absolutely revered here. Angela Merkel did not go to his funeral because of protocol. She went to his funeral because she wanted to be there.

Talking about the future, we have to jumpstart a dialogue with the America of tomorrow. The majority of the Americans soon won’t have European roots. What would you recommend, how can we start this dialogue?

JE: We underestimate the impact and the importance of youth. When you see the impact of the kids in Florida, who were the survivors of that school shooting or when you see the girl from Sweden who’s led the grassroot effort on climate change, it actually gives me great hope. For organizations like us both having Young Leaders programs, we have to keep building on this asset and maintaining it. We ought to empower our young people more and to listen to them more.

We underestimate the impact and the importance of youth.[quoter]Ambassador John B. Emerson[/quoter]

We will come to an end. Chancellor Merkel said in her commencement speech recently at Harvard University, I quote: Nothing can be taken for granted, democracy is not something we can take for granted, neither is peace, neither is prosperity. What should we do to fight for these shared values?

FM: The most important point is to show people in our respective countries that we are still sharing these values. I would like to give you one clear indication that this is really working. We are going to the US with our annual delegation in October every year. Last year we went to Oklahoma, a state where we had never been to before. The people there were so enthusiastic about the German-American cooperation and their hospitality was outstanding. It’s quite simple: People have to meet people.

What can you add, John?

JE: Living in Los Angeles, which is Berlin’s sister city, I couldn’t agree more with that. Look at the Paris climate change agreement for example. The reality is: We are actually doing quite well. Because the state level, the local level, the business level and the people to people level are realizing this plan. The federal government isn’t that important. And that can happen on issue after issue. Additionally, democracy and the values that we hold dear are like a marriage – you’ve got to work on it. You have to always be thinking about it, you have to be flexible and willing to grow and change. I want to give a shout-out to the members of the press, because you are having a tough experience in today’s world. The fact is, it is your responsibility to hold the rest of us accountable to live up to the values that we claim we are living up to.

I want to give a shout-out to the members of the press, because you are having a tough experience in today’s world. The fact is, it is your responsibility to hold the rest of us accountable to live up to the values that we claim we are living up to.[quoter]Ambassador John B. Emerson[/quoter]

This conversation was moderated by Tina Hasselwho is the Berlin Bureau Chief of ARD German Television.

Der Beitrag In conversation with true Atlanticists Friedrich Merz and Ambassador John Emerson erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Interview: David Deißner and Robin Fehrenbach

Elbridge, in 2018, the U.S. government has fundamentally changed its National Defense Strategy. One could argue that it focuses more than before on the great power competition. What are the implications of this strategy for Europe and for NATO?

[related]As former Secretary of Defense James Mattis put it, the number one national security priority and particularly defense priority for the United States is no longer terrorism, it’s the great power competition. This means above all China because of the scale and sophistication of its military, but also Russia. From a military perspective in Europe it’s going to mean a greater focus on Russia. Over the last 15 years, the Russians have quite assiduously worked on developing a range of capabilities, particularly conventional forces to pursue a theory of victory against eastern NATO by using the fait accompli and coupling that with their nuclear forces to create new facts on the ground. NATO would be very loathe to try to reverse them.

You have recently co-authored an article with Walter Slocombe in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung regarding the collapse of the INF treaty. You wrote that “this is not a problem that will be solved by threatening targets deep into Russia.” Your advice is instead to blunt a Russian assault against NATO. Could you elaborate on this approach?

The real danger that Russia poses from a military perspective is that it might very rapidly seize territory in the Baltics or in eastern Poland and then create a hardened defensive position. After the long period of time it might take the alliance to build up the forces to eject Russia, people will be so accustomed and so loathe to risk what would be required to eject them that they will accept the new reality. That would fundamentally undermine NATO.

The real danger that Russia poses from a military perspective is that it might very rapidly seize territory in the Baltics or in eastern Poland and then create a hardened defensive position.

Instead of waiting, our forces have to be better able to blunt a Russian assault from the beginning. European forces, along with American forces, can get forward very quickly and engage Russian forces that might be invading. That sounds aggressive, but actually it’s considerably less destabilizing than some of the alternatives. If Germany wants to avoid an arms race, it could put a bit more effort and resources into redeveloping at least a fraction of the Bundeswehr that existed in 1988. That would go a long way to solve this problem.

The US has repeatedly called upon NATO member states to commit themselves to the 2-percent-target. What is the US asking of Germany and other European NATO allies beyond spending 2 percent of their respective GDP on security and defense?

Two percent is a good marker. But what we really want is output. As an alliance we want forces that can defend our common territory. Europe must be able to contest Russian aggression from the get-go. Germany could put three divisions in the field. In 1988 Germany had 15 divisions available. So, this would be one fifth of what Germany could do in 1988. Today Germany is much richer and much more secure. Germany is really the crucial state: It’s the country that has the largest economy in Europe and it has a significantly latent military capability. Meeting some of these objectives would be well within Germany’s ability without imposing a strain on its society.

Germany could put three divisions in the field. In 1988 Germany had 15 divisions available.

How is the German reluctance to the 2-percent-target perceived in defense policy circles in Washington?

It’s mystifying at best. For 35 years of the Cold War, the members of the NATO alliance provided Germany a forwarddefense on which Germany insisted. It’s strange that Germany doesn’t help to provide this forward defense to the new entrants that have not had the fortune of being under the Western umbrella during the Cold War. This would be the same level of defense at a much lower level of commitment than during the Cold War. We are living in an era and world in which the US needs more help. For those of us, like myself, who want to preserve the transatlantic alliance we have to change to stay the same.

We are living in an era and world in which the US needs more help.

What steps can we expect the United States to take in the future when it comes to the asymmetric threats of cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare?

This is a form of competition that the American government is increasingly attuned to. In terms of our societal vulnerability we need to recognize that the world we expected in the 1990s is not the world that will materialize. The internet was designed as if the state was going to wither away, as if strategic competition belonged to the past. If you now look at what the Chinese are able to do with technology and Artificial Intelligence and how they intrude into people’s lives, that’s the future if we don’t have a better response. We have to accept that we are going to need more intelligence steps to protect our networks.

If you now look at what the Chinese are able to do with technology and Artificial Intelligence and how they intrude into people’s lives, that’s the future if we don’t have a better response.

Do we have to rethink NATO and our security architecture in order to guarantee safety?

If NATO didn’t exist, we would have to create it. NATO at its core is still a security alliance. Its fundamental purpose is a collective defense organization to protect its member states. It might do other things, but those are secondary functions. NATO is a very broad organization that has 29 members and lacks a clear threat in the way that the Soviet Union presented it. Will it be able to provide the degree of coherence? I don’t know. The international architecture is going to probably change most in Asia, because that’s where it’s less formed. The rise of China is a tectonic shift.

The rise of China is a tectonic shift.

An argument that you hear very often in Germany is that the transatlantic partnership should give a strong answer to the rise of China. Does this resonate in the current U.S. administration?

Absolutely, that is completely correct on the security front. If Europe can take a greater degree of responsibility vis-à-vis Russia, that would allow the United States to focus more on China and issues like 5G, especially not allowing Huawei to penetrate into a continent that’s in many ways very rightly focused on data privacy. Huawei is the route towards perdition. Europe and America have to integrate through trade and security in a way that still preserves our own autonomy and decision-making.

Europe and America have to integrate through trade and security in a way that still preserves our own autonomy and decision-making.

In your last conversation with Atlantik-Brücke in 2016, we were talking about President Obama’s track record in fighting international terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. How do you assess President Trump’s successes and failures in this policy field after more than two years in office?

He has done very well in the international security field. In 50 years, people will look back and say: “What really changed was the American position on China”. For the first time, the Trump administration has made clear: “China is a competitor. The best way to have a secure and stable relationship with them is to be clear and firm and strong and to negotiate from a position of strength to avoid them miscalculating our ability and our resolve.” That’s a major development. The President is also trying to do less in the Middle East. How you do that, is a very tricky problem.

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Ms. Taussig, is there a war between liberal and autocratic systems and ideas?

Great power competition today is not only a competition over security, economic and technological interests; it is also a struggle over the role and influence of democracy in the international order. Both Russia and China, using different means and with different strength, seek to weaken democratic institutions and norms that challenge their own internal power and legitimacy. This contest of ideas runs across states and also through them, as illiberal and authoritarian-leaning leaders and parties are consolidating control within democratic states. Current governments in Hungary, Poland and Turkey represent the forefront of the illiberal challenge in the EU and NATO. Their advancements are emblematic of the separation of liberal principles – individual liberties, and legislative and judicial checks on the executive – from democratic processes and elections. Even more than democratic setbacks, these developments highlight a crisis of liberalism in the West.

Current governments in Hungary, Poland and Turkey represent the forefront of the illiberal challenge in the EU and NATO.

Has the West lost its credibility due to its own internal political turmoil?

Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic must engage in a meaningful debate of democratic renewal in order to compete with increasingly confident and powerful authoritarian states such as China. First and foremost, to strengthen democracy internationally, it first must be shown to work. This means reinforcing basic democratic fundamentals on the rule of law, minority protections, free and fair elections and free media across western and non-western democracies. This also means developing policies of inclusive growth to tackle rising economic inequality and pro-growth policies to address societal and rural-urban imbalances across advanced democracies.

Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic must engage in a meaningful debate of democratic renewal in order to compete with increasingly confident and powerful authoritarian states such as China.

How can the transatlantic partners counter expanding military and economic influence by autocratic states?

[related]Militarily, burden sharing will remain a critical component of NATO’s ability to counter Russian aggression in Europe. In addition to higher European defense spending, strong and principled American leadership is needed, as well as stronger responses to democratic backsliding within NATO’s ranks, which hurts cohesion and trust in the alliance. In the Indo-Pacific, European partners should invest greater resources in upholding the rules-based order. Positive examples include Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) carried out by the British and French Navies in the South China Sea, while more is needed from Germany. Economically, corruption is a primary vehicle for authoritarian influence in democratic states. This is why strengthening the rule of law and shining a light on corrupt practices and networks can counter outside influence, as well as internal practices that weaken trust in democratic institutions and free market economies.

Are Western democracies well equipped to react to external interferences with their institutions?

Recent examples of Russian political influence have garnered significant attention. Examples include Moscow’s interference and disinformation efforts in the 2016 U.S presidential election, attempts to influence the Brexit referendum, and ongoing financing and tactical support for far-right political parties throughout Europe. Russia’s efforts are primarily opportunistic, as they exploit existing vulnerabilities within societies and political systems. Chinese influence is more strategic and subtle. How Chinese economic engagement across Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America may result in political influence that hinders good governance and transparency is still a little understood phenomenon that will require more focus in the years ahead – particularly as it becomes more technologically advanced.

Russia’s efforts are primarily opportunistic, as they exploit existing vulnerabilities within societies and political systems. Chinese influence is more strategic and subtle.

Is the liberal multilateral international order beyond saving?

The liberal international order developed in the wake of WWII has very much been a U.S.-led order. American withdrawal of its support for longstanding military alliances, political partnerships, democratic norms, and the rules-based trading system would weaken the order, regardless of whether other nations were willing to “pick up the slack.” That being said, critical progress must be made on burden sharing and institutional reform if this order is to withstand new and evolving transnational challenges and the rise of powerful authoritarian states that seek to make the order less liberal.

You can find Torrey Taussig’s detailed curriculum vitae here.

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General Philip Breedlove would welcome “Germany’s recapitalization and retraining of its military forces.” In our interview, the former Commander of the United States European Command and NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) calls for a higher readiness of the whole Western alliance to cope with massive and complex threats. You can read an edited version of our podcast “Atlantik-Brücke On The Record” with General Breedlove below. The podcast was produced on the occasion of a discussion on the future of NATO, hosted by Atlantik-Brücke.

General Breedlove, how would you describe NATO’s current situation?

Our alliance is strong and it continues to be an important and successful alliance. However, I would also note that we are facing challenges now that are tough and we haven’t really faced some of these challenges in a long time. They force us to take a look at ourselves and to say: Are we ready for the threats that we see out there today? That is the biggest challenge to NATO.

What are the most pressing internal challenges which the Alliance is facing at the moment?

[related]Our current challenges began when the Russians invaded Crimea and the Donbass. A lot of attention again began to be paid to this neighbor to the North and East that was threatening Ukraine. Many of the former Soviet Warsaw Pact nations felt threatened again. There was a very strong focus on the fact that Russia was not going to be a partner but might actually once again be an opponent. At the same time, we were seeing massive migration problems in the South emanating from Northern Africa and from the civil war in Syria where Bashar al-Assad was murdering his people. Large numbers of people began to flee Syria.

One of those really tough internal problems in NATO is that we had a division in worry, a division in concern in that we saw this belligerent Russia to the East and the North, and we saw this very tough societal problem of immigration being caused by problems in Syria and Northern Africa. NATO had to come to grips with it. At one point, we created the ‘Strategic Direction East’ and ‘Strategic Direction South’ to label these internal problems. One of the biggest internal concerns is that NATO has to be able to address all of the challenges to its nations.

One of those really tough internal problems in NATO is that we had a division in worry, a division in concern in that we saw this belligerent Russia to the East and the North, and we saw this very tough societal problem of immigration being caused by problems in Syria and Northern Africa.

What are other severe external threats which NATO has to cope with?

There are other threats that may emanate from the same places, but they are different kind of threats. Clearly, the cyber threat that we face today is different than two decades ago. Cyber is a tool that is being used in everyday conflicts. We are having issues in cyber with our opponent to the East every day. These sets of old tools that many label hybrid war – Mr. Gerasimov (the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia; remark of Atlantik-Brücke) calling it ‘indirect means and asymmetric methods’ – are being used in a new way.

What worries you most?

Our nations are under a lot of pressure to address societal challenges and the policy solutions battle for the same budget that must be used to ensure that the militaries of NATO are ready to carry out the missions that they must accomplish. As the SACEUR it was clear to me that the readiness of our militaries in NATO was not adequate. It was not appropriate to the task that we saw from a resurgent and recalcitrant Russia. We need to address the readiness and recapitalization of our militaries.

As the SACEUR it was clear to me that the readiness of our militaries in NATO was not adequate. It was not appropriate to the task that we saw from a resurgent and recalcitrant Russia.

Being the former SACEUR and being equipped with the knowledge of your 39 years lasting military career, how do you assess the military exercise “Vostok 18” that was carried out by roughly 300.000 Russian soldiers as to the security of the NATO area?

First and foremost we should not be alarmed that Russia is exercising. We exercise. It is every nation’s right to exercise. The issue is that we must exercise responsibly. It is important that we are transparent in what we are doing, how long we are doing it, where we are doing it, who we are doing it with. Things that NATO advertises every day about its exercises. Vostok is an exercise towards the East. What worried me more as the SACEUR were the Zapad exercises. Those were the exercises done in the West. They were rarely open and transparent.

First and foremost we should not be alarmed that Russia is exercising. We exercise. It is every nation’s right to exercise. The issue is that we must exercise responsibly.

Do we witness the entering into a Russian-Sino phase at least on a military level when analyzing the participation of 3.000 Chinese soldiers in “Vostok 18”?

We should not be surprised. We as the West have issues working with Russia. We also have issues working with China. Geostrategically, why would we not expect them to possibly message us by collaborating? We also need to sit back and understand that the Russians have issues with the Chinese and the Chinese have issues with the Russians. It is not appropriate to overdramatize and to draw any major geostrategic conclusions from them exercising together.

Would you recommend any adaptations to NATO regarding its general strategy for the European security architecture?

We have been through two decades of fighting counter-insurgency and we have lost our focus on large scale war fighting operations. We do not have a focus yet on the size of operations that article 5 would require. We need to regain our ability through training and exercises. We need to regain our ability to understand how to command and control large formations against a dedicated opponent.

We need to regain our ability through training and exercises. We need to regain our ability to understand how to command and control large formations against a dedicated opponent.

Do you show understanding for Germany’s foreign and security policy that has not reached NATO’s 2-percent-goal yet?

I am not going to pretend to criticize or advise Germany. But the young Captain Breedlove who served during the Cold War here in Europe eight times and in Germany five times experienced that the Bundeswehr and the Luftwaffe of the Cold War was an incredibly capable military force. It was a leader on the European landmass. It is important for Germany to lead in NATO on the European landmass. I am not saying this at the exclusion of other large countries. But I would like to see that Germany’s recapitalization and retraining of its military forces show that leadership in NATO.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

The same role it played for the last seventy years. NATO is not perfect and it hasn’t kept perfect peace here in Europe. We have had some issues that we had to work through. But what NATO has done, is to prevent the kind of wars that ravaged Europe multiple times. NATO will continue to do that. NATO is a very capable and very important alliance. The mission that it has had for the last seventy years will be important for the next seventy years.

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When I wonder how the Russian claim to power affects the everyday life in Lithuania in concrete terms, I immediately have two incidents in mind. One can recall the story of Russian supplies of oil via the pipeline “Druzhba”. Back in 2006 Lithuanian Government went for privatization of a major oil refinery that was and still is a major supplier of oil products to the region. Russia was pressing to sell the refinery to a Russian company for a low price. Lithuanian Government went for an open and transparent international privatization tender. The Polish company “Orlen” won. A few months later oil supplies via the “Druzhba” pipeline stopped, and the pipeline branch coming to Lithuania has been dry until this day. Official Russian explanation was that the pipeline needed repair. It still needs …

In Lithuanian efforts to develop alternative energy sources or to establish alternative routes of supply, there were various obstacles generated by Russia related actors. They ranged from financing, or, in fact, bribing local people to wage a campaign against extraction of shale gas up to engaging Lithuanian LNG terminal developers into lengthy litigation in courts. We also witnessed Russian efforts to question Lithuanian Government’s ability to meet its international commitments. For example, Russian representatives in UNESCO waged a campaign of allegations on, as if, environmental harm done by the construction of Lithuanian LNG terminal.

The same pattern in any maritime area considered by Russia as its zone of influence

[related]There is another case deserving serious attention. In 2014 and 2015, the power cable connecting the Lithuanian and Swedish electricity grids, called NordBalt, was being laid on the Baltic seabed. Russia launched a series of naval exercises in the vicinity of NordBalt power cable itinerary. Under an excuse of caring for safety, Russian navy chased away all the ships from the area. The area, de facto closed by Russian navy, encompassed a big sector of the Lithuanian exclusive economic zone. And, surprise, surprise, that was the area in which NordBalt cable had to be laid down. Russian navy exercises lasted more than half a year. In extreme case, in April 2015, the area was closed for 26 days. Completion of NordBalt was delayed and costs of the project increased significantly. This pattern could be applied in any maritime area considered by Russia as its zone of influence or interest. It has also to be noted that the Baltic Sea is quite shallow, and it is not so simple to change the established sea routes. Therefore, the approaches to the seaports on the Eastern Baltic coast could be severely hindered.

The examples that I have mentioned refer to several challenges posed by Russia. It is about Russian effort to take over the assets of our major companies. It is about using those companies as a major lobbying or corrupting instrument in politics. It is about steps to preserve and abuse a dominant role in the energy supply and about using it to achieve a major policy change of the country. It is about testing ways and means to disrupt major supplies and thus to tire out our population. It is about testing ways to hinder deployments of NATO reinforcements in the Baltics when the time comes.

Hostile activities against the IT systems are on the rise

Russian cyber attacks on our country pose another very dangerous threat. Russian hostile activities against the IT systems of the Lithuanian state sector and critical infrastructure are on the rise. Last year almost 55,000 cyber incidents were dealt with by Lithuanian National Cyber Security Centre. One fourth of them occured in our energy sector. Government institutions are also frequent targets. For example, features of a cyber and information operation were identified after the news portal of Lithuanian TV channel had been hacked and fake information about the Defense Minister had been placed on it. Subsequently an email containing a malicious document was distributed to the media and government institutions. The email contained a link to the fake article, in order to attract the recipients’ attention and increase the spread of the malware. The main goal of the hacker group associated with the Russian intelligence services was not an information operation but spreading the malware in the networks of state institutions.

The National Cyber Security Center now operates as the main national computer emergency response unit for management of cyber incidents. It also operates as the main Accreditation Authority of all types of IT systems and networks in Lithuania. The Centre has an R&D division for creating tools, necessary for managing cyber incidents and executes cyber exercises. A secure network of main state institutions, which could be capable of exploiting the benefits of peacetime systems and ensuring their viability in case of possible military action, is being developed. It is expected that approximately 550 most important state and municipal authorities will be interlinked by this network. It will be capable of operating separately from the public internet and remain resilient to the cyber threats. Lithuania initiated and leads the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defense policy (PESCO) project called “Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security”. The first outcome of the project is expected at the beginning of 2019 and should assist the participating nations to counter a cyber attack or an incident. This project will help participating EU member states to mobilize collective expertise in order to jointly strengthen their cyber security resilience and facilitate cooperation in combating cyber threats through mutual assistance. This year, NATO exercise Steadfast Cobalt will again take place in Lithuania. Thus, we try to contribute to the development of practical cyber security capabilities of the Alliance.

Contributions by our European allies, and, first of all, those by Germany, to increase our security are very much appreciated. However, the transatlantic factor is crucial. Russia must know that even in case of a limited incursion, it would immediately enter a military conflict with the whole Alliance including the nuclear powers and particularly the United States. Russians try to avoid namely that, and this is a major deterrence factor.

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Part XIV of our series: Magnus Nordenman calms the inhabitants of Guam and Hawaii: After initial irritations, the U.S. government under President Trump adheres firmly to Article 5. The Director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council points out however that the United States’ counter-terrorism strategy for NATO is hardly developed. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke in Washington, D.C. Nordenman also explains that the special quality of the Alliance’s new command structure rests on the better reinforcement build-up.

Mr. Nordenman, how steadfast is the U.S. government’s commitment to Article 5 under President Trump?

We’re in a better place than we were at the beginning of this administration. As a presidential candidate, Trump called NATO and America’s commitment into question. And the first summit in Brussels with President Trump was not a good day for NATO. But since then a lot has happened. The vice president has relayed America’s commitments, as have Secretary Mattis, Secretary Tillerson and the president himself. In that sense, the worst is over. We’ve removed most of the doubts about America’s commitment to Article 5 and European security. That’s not to say there won’t be turbulent times ahead. But at least, on that basic level, we are in a better place than we were in early January of 2017.

The first summit in Brussels with President Trump was not a good day for NATO.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

Russia is trying to extend its spheres of influence. The Baltics and Poland, in particular, feel threatened by Russia’s aggressive behavior. How reliable is NATO’s security guarantee in this European region?

[related]It’s getting better. The implementation of the Warsaw Summit decisions with an enhanced forward presence in the Baltic States and Poland is a first step. But now we need to do more in the maritime domain, in the air domain, and in reinforcement. NATO is on the right track, and it actually got there surprisingly quickly. One important point that isn’t discussed much in Europe is the fact that European nations are stepping up their efforts – with Germany having the lead in Lithuania, the UK in Estonia and Canada in Latvia. It’s crucial to understand that America is not alone in its commitment to security in the Baltic region.

That’s a contribution to transatlantic burden sharing.

Correct. It’s not enough, and more needs to be done. But the political point is important: this is not a scenario in which America has to shoulder the entire burden.

North Korea has threatened to attack the island of Guam, which is a territory of the United States. Would such an event invoke NATO’s Article 5 on collective defense?

It might. That’s an unknown factor that wasn’t considered when NATO was first established because the focus back then was obviously on Europe. But Guam is an alliance territory and the only time Article 5 has been invoked was actually in response to the attack on the U.S. Guam is obviously open to legal discussion. A more interesting case is probably Hawaii, which is actually a state in the Union. Hawaii is also within missile range, and North Korea has commenced nuclear missile drills again for the first time since the Cold War. In this new, globally interconnected security environment, both Canada and the U.S. – as Pacific countries and allies – have to be prepared for Pacific events that might also impact NATO.

In this new, globally interconnected security environment, both Canada and the U.S. – as Pacific countries and allies – have to be prepared for Pacific events that might also impact NATO.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

Would you recommend NATO to think through these legal issues surrounding Guam?

It makes a lot of sense for NATO to focus primarily on the East and South. That’s where we have intense security challenges. But it’s always good to give your mental muscles a work out and at least think things through to conclusion. It ensures that the decision makers are better equipped to cope with unexpected events. It’s also worthwhile thinking about worst case scenarios. This has been a longstanding challenge for the alliance. If you told someone that NATO would be engaged in central Asia in early 2000, people would have thought you were joking. But then 9/11 happened, and all of a sudden NATO was undertaking its largest expeditionary operation for almost 15 years. So it’s healthy for any alliance to regularly consider the impossible.

Which strategy for NATO does the United States under the Trump administration seek to develop?

This administration, at least at the senior level in the White House, really has two priorities: a better balance of burden sharing and a NATO role in counter-terrorism. A couple of rungs down things get a bit more detailed and granular. One example is the Department of Defense under Secretary Mattis, who has a very good understanding of  the Russian challenge and the importance of defense and deterrence. There’s a lot of good, practical work going on there.

This administration, at least at the senior level in the White House, really has two priorities: a better balance of burden sharing and a NATO role in counter-terrorism.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

How far developed is this strategy already?

There’s a growing sense in Washington that the burden sharing discussion is going in the right direction. Then we can move on to the reasons. Is this being driven by Putin or Trump? Europeans tend to argue that it is actually being driven by Putin rather than Trump. Trump supporters tend to argue that it is all being driven by Trump. I like to think the truth is somewhere in between. But whoever is driving it, and however long it takes to get there, this discussion is moving in the right direction.

The counter-terrorism strategy is much less developed. Both Washington and the alliance agree that NATO is not a counter-terrorism organization. There are also different opinions within the alliance on how counter-terrorism should be implemented and what institutions have to be worked through. This opens the door to European NATO members to come to Washington with their ideas and proposals on what NATO’s role in counter-terrorism could be.

President Trump’s ‘America First’ strategy seems to put American protectionism in a broad range of policy fields. To what extent does this impact NATO’s strength and the United States’ longstanding aspiration to shape the liberal world order?

You are seeing two separate directions in American foreign policy. I’m less worried about the defense and national security situation. As I said, we’re already past the worst in terms of America’s commitment to NATO. The burden sharing issue is also going in the right direction, and the U.S. is maintaining strong defense relationships with partners such as Australia, Japan and South Korea.

More damage is probably being done on the trade agenda, with President Trump’s proposal to withdraw from the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement and his pulling out of the TPP negotiations. TTIP also seems to have been abandoned for the moment. In that sense, multilateral trade agreements are more at risk than America’s military and security alliances. On a day to day basis these are unrelated. But they do say something about America’s commitment to multilateral solutions and rules-based institutions. At a philosophical level they certainly reinforce each other. So there is a danger of a divide opening up, and of American engagement in the world resting on the single pillar of defense, whereas before it rested on two – the other being multilateral trade.

Multilateral trade agreements are more at risk than America’s military and security alliances. On a day to day basis these are unrelated. But they do say something about America’s commitment to multilateral solutions and rules-based institutions. At a philosophical level they certainly reinforce each other.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

The Ukraine crisis remains unresolved. Would the revitalization of the NATO Russia Council help to improve both the situation in Ukraine and the American-Russian relationship?

Broadly speaking, the U.S.-Russia relationship is at its worst since the Cold War in spite of the hopes of the White House to try and restore it. We’ve arrived at this point for a number of different reasons – first and foremost as a result of Russian interference in the U.S. election and its continued aggression in Ukraine. The relationship has taken a turn for the worse since President Trump took up office. There is some consistency here, because the administration is saying the relationship cannot improve until we have a political solution for Ukraine, which puts this administration in line with the Obama administration’s position. The Ukraine remains a huge issue and the topic of supplying arms to Ukraine is back on the table. It was ultimately rejected by the Obama administration but is now being seriously discussed again in Washington.

What is your key takeaway from the NATO Russia Council?

We aren’t going to see any major breakthroughs. Talks are taking place for the eminently good reason that talking to each other is better than not talking to each other. On the one hand we are moving to deter Russia, and on the other we are attempting to engage in constructive cooperation. This isn’t just the European view. Secretary Mattis is also on the record talking about the importance of strong deterrence and dialogue.

NATO’s new command structure and additional headquarters will enhance its troop deployment capabilities. Do you think these changes go far enough to be an effective deterrent against Russia?

This is another very important building block of our deterrence construct, which relies on reinforcements. We’re never going to have enough troops from day one in Poland, or in the Baltic States, or in Romania. It will always be a reinforcement build-up. By the way, it was also a reinforcement build-up during the Cold War. The U.S. certainly has fewer troops in Europe than it had during the Cold War, but even back then a key objective was to channel reinforcements into Europe. It is easy to forget. People like to talk about fighter jets, artillery, and tanks. But these structures, logistics, supplies and reinforcements all keep NATO going. I’m glad we’re finally getting to it because this has been underappreciated for a long time.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

That’s a great question! NATO will continue to play a central role supporting America’s national security. The EU has an incredibly important set of European institutions. In that respect we will always be an outsider, but this doesn’t mean there won’t be close cooperation or a close U.S.-EU partnership. We were a founding member of NATO and we’re also one of the leading members of the alliance. NATO will always be important. I remain optimistic about NATO and the transatlantic relationship. We’ve been through bad times and crises in our relationship before. It’s particularly striking how many aspects of the situation today remind me of 2002, 2003 and 2004, another period in which many Europeans believed that America was a rogue country that wasn’t respecting its allies and international institutions.

NATO will always be important. I remain optimistic about NATO and the transatlantic relationship.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

You’re talking about the war in Iraq.

Correct. There was talk in Berlin and Paris back then about it being time for Europe to go its own way and reduce its dependence on the United States. But we overcame that relationship crisis. I’m not saying that the situation then is comparable to the situation today. Very different factors are involved. But I’ve heard talk like this before. Domestically, in the U.S., I’m beginning to see a pretty healthy counter-reaction – especially if you look at congressional interest in NATO, congressional delegations traveling to Europe, members of the Senate and the House talking about the importance of NATO and American commitments to Europe, and more funding for the European Deterrence Initiative. The U.S. is definitely going through a turbulent and challenging time, and there is a lot of uncertainty. But I am beginning to see the outlines of a counter-reaction. People here in Washington are waking up and realizing that we can’t take the transatlantic relationship for granted. It is something that we have to nurture as well.

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Professor Nye, in your book “Is the American Century Over?”, written in 2015, you express the expectation that the United States will still be playing a leading geopolitical role in 2041. Have you changed your position after one year of the Trump presidency?

Certainly, Donald Trump has put some doubts in the back of my mind. It is possible that he could derail these predictions. The Americans will generally still have the capacity to play a leading geopolitical role, but I am not sure if they are going to have the will. In the 1930s Americans drew inward, even though they were the strongest country in the world. This led to a terrible decade.

Is it perhaps too early to say after one year?

Trump has drawn upon a strand of populist nationalism which is common now in all countries in the developed world. It is, however, not dominant. If you look at public opinion polls, the majority of Americans still want overseas involvement including cooperation with other countries. But the strand that Trump has called upon is there. Even if Trump goes away, which I hope he will after four years, Trumpism or populist nationalism will persist. So, there is a certain danger that we face. We have to be careful to not just pin it on Trump’s difficult personality.

Trump has drawn upon a strand of populist nationalism which is common now in all countries in the developed world.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

You invented the term “soft power” describing the ability to attract and persuade. Did the United States become less or more attractive under Trump’s presidency?

[related]The evidence is very clear. I wrote a column for Project Syndicate saying that Trump has definitely reduced American soft power. There is a Gallup poll that shows that American attractiveness has gone down in more than 130 countries. There is a similar poll that was taken by Pew with results that were very much like those of the Gallup poll. Finally, there is an index of the soft power called the Soft Power 30 which is published in London by Portland, the British consultancy. The Americans dropped from first place in the last year of Obama to third place in the first year of Trump. That is not just a political statement or bias. There is evidence to substantiate that view.

What can be done to alter this course?

It is going to be difficult for President Trump because he tends to a bullying and unilateralist style which antagonizes others. If you use a phrase like ‘America first’ all the time, by definition this means that everybody else is second. That is not exactly the way to attract others. With that being said, however, let us note that Trump is able to make changes in his policy. Before he was elected he said NATO was obsolete. After a few months in office he discovered NATO was not obsolete. There are a lot of areas where he has initially challenged the traditions of American foreign policy but has come around to embrace those traditions. If you combine that with a resurgence in the economy, which he expects to get through his fiscal stimulus, and if that does not go off the rails into inflation, Trump can recover some of the American soft power. But he has to change his style to be able to fully recover.

If you use a phrase like ‘America first’ all the time, by definition this means that everybody else is second. That is not exactly the way to attract others.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

Which role will the United States be playing especially within NATO in 20 years’ time?

Probably since the 1950s, since the Suez Crisis, there have been articles and predictions about the death of NATO. That is now obsolete. NATO has proven a far more resilient concept and structure because of two reasons: One is the relatively open organization for democratic societies which enables them to interact with each other, more than just at the top level. The second point is that geopolitically, Russia still is a problem or a puzzle. If Russia remains that sort of a puzzle then NATO will not be obsolete. I am leery of these views that say NATO is finished.

And what will the role of the Unites States within NATO look like?

The United States will continue to seek its interests as it has since 1945 in being closely tied to an open and democratic Europe. That requires NATO and American participation in NATO.

Trump’s “America first” strategy seems to foster American protectionism. Does this affect NATO’s strength and the United States’ long-known aspiration to shape the liberal world order?

It does. The attitude which Trump and some of his close advisors have taken, that a trade surplus is a measure of moral failure, is simply not good economics. The basic view of most regular economists is that your trade surplus and deficit has more to do with your savings and investing rates. As Trump has pressed this issue that trade surpluses are rogue and demanded renegotiation, it does spill over into other aspects of alliances. Look at the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement or at the problems that Trump has had with his visits with Chancellor Merkel. This is a real problem.

Trump urges the Europeans to invest more in their military abilities. Is he right?

Asking the Europeans to do more to contribute to common defense has a long, long history. The 2-percent-target goes back many years. But because of his bluster and style Trump may be more credible than Obama on that.

Does he have more credibility by being more forceful in that matter?

Sometimes nastiness as a hard power is more effective than soft power.

Do you think the United States would ultimately appreciate a stronger European commitment within NATO?

The US has been interested in a stronger European military for some time, well before Donald Trump. There was a period when I was in the Defense Department in the 1990s when there were certain fears that France was trying to lead Europe out of NATO or reduce the American role in the alliance. That is ancient history. The view for a decade and more has been that a stronger Europe inside NATO is better for the United States. That is actually a pretty widely shared view among those people in the United States who pay attention to foreign policy.

What are the main and most urgent strategic challenges for NATO?

The issue of the return of great power politics and the issue of how Russia will behave will require a combination both of deterrence and also a way to think about retaining the democratic processes in Eastern and Central Europe. Both challenges are going to be central to NATO. I don’t expect countries like Poland or Hungary to defect to Russia. That is not plausible. But the quality of democracy in some of these former Visegrád countries has been under challenge from this same type of right-wing populist nationalism which has affected the United States. In addition to having a strong deterrent posture to prevent Russia from using its strength to bully its neighbors and expand, both NATO and the European Union have to think about the internal quality of democracy.

The issue of the return of great power politics and the issue of how Russia will behave will require a combination both of deterrence and also a way to think about retaining the democratic processes in Eastern and Central Europe.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

Are you less optimistic than 20 years ago that there will ever be a world in which Russia does not see NATO, the United States and Europe as competitors or even enemies?

20 years ago, we believed there was a profound change going on in terms of democratization and liberalization of Russia. That has been reversed. Part of it may have been mistakes made by the West. The Bush administration’s efforts to expand NATO membership right to the borders of Russia in Georgia and so forth were not appropriate in terms of reassurance for the Russians. But it is also true that some of the changes that occurred inside Russia have to do with problems in Russian society and economy which were not caused by NATO expansion.

But this serves as a good explanation for Russia blaming NATO for its domestic difficulties …

That is right. If one looks back at Putin’s policies and especially his Munich Security Conference speech in 2007, you can see this kind of blaming. The views that we had in the 1990s, when Yeltsin was in power and we used the NATO-Russia Council as a way to integrate Russia into NATO were overly optimistic. But if you take a long-run view we certainly should be hoping that changes inside Russia will allow a Europe that includes Russia again. But I don’t expect that in the near term, unfortunately.

When Obama was president one could get the impression that the relationship with Russia was not at the top of his agenda. Could that change with Donald Trump?

Ironically, one of the things that Trump got right in foreign policy was to think of ways to try to reduce the tensions with Russia and to improve the relationship. It is not that one has to accept Russian behavior. But it is true that Russia is a great power. We have to do business with them. To sharpen antagonism is not healthy for Russia, for Europe and the United States. In that sense, Trump’s insight might have been better even if his motives were somewhat unclear. Putin and the Russian intelligence overachieved in their efforts to interfere in the 2016 election and they have made rapprochement with Russia so radioactive inside American politics that not even Trump can do anything about it.

Putin and the Russian intelligence overachieved in their efforts to interfere in the 2016 election and they have made rapprochement with Russia so radioactive inside American politics that not even Trump can do anything about it.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

The Munich Security Conference 2018 will focus in particular on the future role of the European Union as a global actor and its relations with Russia as well as the United States. What is your opinion on the EU’s future role?

The EU plays a very important role. I have always thought of the EU as a magnet which should draw others towards an open, rules-based society both domestically and internationally. On the other hand, there is a historical danger of Central Europeans like Germany being drawn too much into the Russian orbit. The effort is to build bridges – but sometimes in the effort to build bridges they may go too far. The key question for Europe is whether it is careful enough not to be played by Putin in order to divide the United States from Europe. It is interesting to me that the sanctions were applied to show that a country cannot steal its neighbor’s territory without paying a price. Those sanctions applied after the annexation of Crimea have maintained an important role and the West is not divided on that so far.

Do you think the sanctions should stay for the near future?

Yes. Until you see changes in Russian behavior. One could imagine steps that might be taken to reduce Russian interference in Luhansk and Donbass for example which could lead to some degree of relaxation of sanctions in a step-by-step process. A total removal of sanctions right now would be a mistake.

There is much more movement within the European Union than in the United States. Some countries are in favor of lifting the sanctions …

Correct. Italy and other countries like the former Visegrád countries would like to see more rapid progress than is healthy. What is interesting to see is that the transatlantic relationship has survived these temptations.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

NATO provides a security blanket in the sense of reassurance. Despite of different national interests and different political pressures which tend to pull states in different directions there is an overarching security framework which helps states to avoid rash or desperate types of actions. NATO in that sense is a complement to the EU. But the heart of the future of Europe is obviously to find ways to continue the process that has begun under the rubric of the European Union. That does not mean a federation. The political and public opinion do not back this kind of system right now.

NATO and the EU are complementary, like hard and soft power.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

NATO and the EU are complementary, like hard and soft power. The danger is that the Trump administration disrupts this larger picture. So far – and it is only a little over a year into his presidency – he has adapted more than I expected and has not broken that basic consensus in the Atlantic area. I don’t want to sound like somebody who is a Trump supporter because it is very clear that I am not. But it is important that we keep what he is doing in some degree of perspective. So far he has not broken the basic hard power framework which underlies a smart power policy.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. was interviewed by Juliane Schäuble, head of the politics department at the Berlin daily paper Der Tagesspiegel.

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Part IX of our series: Michael O’Hanlon demands that NATO’s eastward expansion must come to an end. The Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and author of the book “Beyond NATO” suggests an alternative security architecture in Europe. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke he insists that neutral countries should have every option to join any other organization.

O’Hanlon’s main assumptions at a glance:

1. NATO’s eastward expansion has gone far enough
2. Negotiations of Western nations with potentially neutral countries in eastern Europe would reduce the risk of war with Russia
3. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova
4. The neutral countries could join the European Union in the future
5. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination

Dr. O’Hanlon, in your book “Beyond NATO” you outline the hypothesis that the end of NATO’s eastward expansion and the implementation of a “zone of neutral nations” would reduce tensions with Russia. Do you see any signs in the actual political landscape for this approach to be seriously considered?

I am not going to be so audacious as to say that this strategy is being followed now. But it has a chance. Let me add two points. First, I am not the original proponent of this kind of thinking. This architecture is mine. But the basic notion that we have to think differently about the East than we would think about other parts of Europe has a number of other adherents. Henry Kissinger is one, the late Zbigniew Brzezinski another, perhaps even chancellor Merkel. We know that going back to the 2008 NATO summit, president Bush and secretary Condoleezza Rice wanted to expand NATO and give both the Ukraine and Georgia membership action plans to join within a short time. Many Europeans held them back. We already saw foreshadowing of this thinking with European reluctance to go that far.

What is your second point?

I would not propose this architecture simply as a gift to Russia or as a unilateral concession on our part not to expand NATO further. Because for one thing we would be leaving Ukraine and Georgia in the lurch, since we did promise them eventual membership. Secondly, if we conceded this Eastern area as a non NATO zone without making any other efforts to define a new architecture this could almost seem like Jalta II where we are giving Russia its own sphere of influence suggesting, that it should have domineering powers over other countries. I don’t want to propose that.

If we conceded this Eastern area as a non NATO zone without making any other efforts to define a new architecture this could almost seem like Jalta II where we are giving Russia its own sphere of influence suggesting, that it should have domineering powers over other countries.[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

What is at the core of your proposed new security architecture?

[related]The concept combines neutrality with an insistence that these countries have every option to join any other organization that might be open to them. Obviously they are not yet candidates for EU membership. If the European Union ever wanted to include Ukraine and Georgia, Russia would have to say: ‘That is okay.’ Russia also needs to solve Donbass, South Ossetia, and Abchasia, in other words the territorial disputes with Ukraine and Georgia. All these things need to be wrapped together. Or you can’t call it an architecture. If we agree on all of this, here is the additional sweetener for Russia: EU sanctions can be lifted as well, because the idea is that we will actually have created a new path forward. The goal is to normalize the relations with Russia.

In order to call it a strategy something has to happen in return, correct?

Exactly right. It has to be seen as an agreement that requires Moscow to do some things, too. That is fair and even favorable to the neutral countries themselves. I will acknowledge that most of the emails that I have received from the neutral countries since I have published this work have not been that favorable. They see this as an abandonment. I try to argue that this is not an abandonment. Because in fact right now they are being promised something that they will probably never get. I don’t see any realistic movement towards NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia or other former Soviet republics. We have left them out on a limb, exposed and with no protection. My plan is better for those neutral countries. But it will only be better for them if every other prerogative of normal sovereignty is protected.

I don’t see any realistic movement towards NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia or other former Soviet republics. We have left them out on a limb, exposed and with no protection.[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

You believe that NATO’s expansion has gone far enough. Do you thereby call into question that several countries in eastern Europe have decided independently and in a self-determined way to join NATO after the end of the cold war?

This is a very difficult and delicate question. I admit I walk a very fine line. I do not believe the West can go into a negotiation for a new security architecture without any kind of apology to Moscow. I do not try to relitigate previous rounds of NATO expansion except to try to understand how Putin and Russia have gotten to where they are mentally and strategically.

NATO expansion was offered to independent countries that had often been under the Soviet yoke for a long time. Countries that the West helped consolidate their democracies, for example with civilian control of the military, and stability of borders. That was good. That all expanded the zone of peace in Europe and helped a number of these countries make remarkable progress. If you compare Poland to Ukraine today for example, they started out in the post cold war era more or less identical in size, population and GDP. Today, Poland despite its recent problems with governance is three times as wealthy as Ukraine.

Also, NATO worked very hard to reach out to Russia throughout this period creating the NATO-Russia Council and the partnership for peace. Moreover, NATO promised not to station major combat forces east of where they had been located previously. We generally kept to that promise. Now we are slightly modifying that approach but Russia gave us no choice because of the threat they have been posing to the East.

What does your analysis mean for potential future NATO member states?

People sometimes quote the Helsinki final act of 1975 which says that any state should be able to join any organization it wishes. They will say: ‘Doesn’t that mean that Moldova should be able to join NATO if it wants?’ I have three replies to that. First, the 1975 Helsinki final act was a long time ago. It did not really envision the cold war ending with one of the alliances resolving and the other going strong and expanding.

Second, the 1949 Washington Treaty that created NATO explicitly said in Article 10 that membership could be offered to other countries provided that it was seen to be in the interest of the security and strategic stability of the existing members and of Europe in general. It was not an open-ended blank check that anybody who wants in can be immediately assumed to be eligible.

My third argument is a little bit more crass. This almost sounds like Donald Trump. From our perspective one could ask: ‘Why are you assuming that I want to send my daughters to fight and die in the defense of your country?’ If I were an American diplomat I would not say that. But frankly, it reminds people of the stakes. NATO is a mutual defense organization in which the member states are sworn to each other’s protection. The United States has always taken that very seriously. We are the country that would probably bear the largest burden in terms of deployable combat forces apart from any country that has been attacked. We are entitled to ask: ‘Would it be good for us?’

Your core concept centres around a security architecture of permanent neutrality. In the best case, it would include from north to south Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus and Serbia. Are these states willing to stay neutral forever?

First of all, we can’t prevent them nor should we try to prevent them from joining other security organizations or creating new ones. If the Caucasus countries wanted to create a Caucasus security organization that would help them feel like they were part of a common body, prepare for peace keeping missions overseas, handle counter-terrorism locally through coordination, and resolve their own territorial disputes, that might be good. I do not try to rule that out. But NATO should not offer membership to these countries.

If the Caucasus countries wanted to create a Caucasus security organization that would help them feel like they were part of a common body, prepare for peace keeping missions overseas, handle counter-terrorism locally through coordination, and resolve their own territorial disputes, that might be good.[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

How could the neutral countries be integrated into the EU security architecture?

If these countries do join the EU there needs to be some care about the mutual defense provisions of the European Union Treaty which sound almost like the Article 5 provisions of the NATO Treaty. Maybe, those EU security provisions need to be either deleted or clarified for a new member. This would not mean that the entire EU would deploy forces as an entity to the defense of Moldova for example. Because that would violate the spirit of what I am proposing. The main idea is that NATO countries are no longer going to extend their Article 5 protections further east.

It would take huge diplomatic efforts to establish such a neutral zone in eastern Europe. You suggest the following steps: first, setting a new framework within NATO. Second, deliberation with the potentially neutral countries and, third, formal negotiations with Russia. How big is the risk that the Kremlin would perceive this kind of procedure as Western dominance once again?

Since we have the honor of sitting at Atlantik-Brücke’s office right next to the chancellor’s apartment: If someone like her with a greater diplomatic skill and experience than myself liked the main idea, but wanted to pursue it in a somewhat different way, I would be okay with that. I am not insisting that the exact sequence of what I am proposing is imperative. But the NATO members are sworn to each other’s defense. We have agreed that in security terms there is no daylight between us. Therefore, it makes sense to begin any discussion about NATO’s future within the alliance.

Then you have the question: Do we go over the heads of the neutral countries and talk to Moscow or do we involve these countries first? I am not in favor of NATO membership for Ukraine. Period. However, I am sensitive to the fact that Ukrainians are a proud and sovereign people. They deserve protection and safety. They gave up nuclear weapons after the cold war as we asked them to do. We had a promise that we would watch over their security. Arguably, we have failed in that. Rather than just go over Ukraine’s head and start talking to Vladimir Putin about how to divide up the world which is how this would be portrayed if we didn’t allow the neutral states to discuss this with us first, we have to go to them. This cannot be seen as Jalta II. It does not mean we have to keep Putin in the dark. I will send him a copy of my book, and maybe Donald Trump and chancellor Merkel could inscribe it and say: ‘Vladimir, we are trying to do something like this. We look forward to your reactions once we are a little more organized internally.’

It does not mean we have to keep Putin in the dark. I will send him a copy of my book, and maybe Donald Trump and chancellor Merkel could inscribe it and say: ‘Vladimir, we are trying to do something like this. We look forward to your reactions once we are a little more organized internally.’[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

You argue that it is required that Russia commits to help uphold the security of especially Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. This means, Russia would have to withdraw its troops. For years now there is no indication at all that Russia would agree to such a step. How realistic is this option?

Let me start with the hardest problem: Crimea. Russia will not give Crimea back. And we should not make the entire idea for a new security architecture contingent on Russia giving Crimea back. The way I would finesse that is that we should tell Russia we are not going to recognize the annexation of Crimea but otherwise put the issue aside.

Secondly, in regard to Moldova and the Transnistria region I don’t have a strong view on that question. The Moldovans there may welcome or be willing to tolerate the presence of Russian troops. This issue should be solved through a legitimate mutual agreement between Moldova and Russia that is ratified by the Moldovan parliament.

What does your assessment for eastern Ukraine and Georgia look like?

I know for a fact that Ukraine and Georgia don’t accept Russian troops. Russia is going to have to withdraw its troops. Maybe there could be international peacekeepers or a creation of a temporary buffer zone. We need to establish a credible monitoring body like the OSCE which is already in the Ukraine. Then at some point, maybe give a six month grace period, Russia will have had the opportunity to make enough adjustments to its presence in eastern Ukraine that the OSCE can certify that there is no longer a Russian military presence.

Certainly, in northern Georgia you could argue that there is a Russian speaking population so that autonomy in some kind of concept could be explored. We know that the Minsk II process for Ukraine would envision political autonomy for eastern Ukraine. There are ways for Russia to get an agreement where it can say that it is partially protecting the Russian speakers in those two countries. What is hardest to describe is the resolution of the territorial problems with eastern Ukraine and northern Georgia. Those would take some negotiation. However, we already know the geographic contours of the disputed areas and we know the kinds of autonomy that could realistically be provided.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years‘ time?

NATO is a fantastic organization. I want NATO to stay strong and the European Reassurance Initiative and Operation Atlantic Resolve to continue. We need to clarify to Vladimir Putin that the alliance is fully committed to all 29 member states and that there are no degrees of seriousness, no different categories of which member is truly worthy of Article 5 protection. Everybody is! Any other position would be an invitation to Russian mischief, even more than we are seeing already. I very much want NATO to continue as an Article 5 based, territorial and mutual defense organization for Europe and North America. It has accomplished that goal remarkably. That is by far and away its most important purpose. Even though I am a supporter of the mission in Afghanistan, NATO’s ability to do something like that is far less important than NATO’s ability to vouch for the security of its member states.

We need to clarify to Vladimir Putin that the alliance is fully committed to all 29 member states and that there are no degrees of seriousness, no different categories of which member is truly worthy of Article 5 protection. Everybody is![quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

Let me also add that I admire the European Union. Right now, the deterrence of Russia that we are accomplishing by making sure the Russians don’t come even further into Ukraine for example is largely because of EU sanctions and their ability to deprive Russia of the richest market on earth. This economic power is just as influential in shaping Vladimir Putin’s decision making as anything we are doing within the alliance. Hence, NATO needs to stay closely coupled with the EU. We need the EU to be strong to complement NATO and work together to create this overall western foreign policy of military and economic deterrence which is keeping Putin from doing any more damage than he has already done.

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