This year (June 11, 2026), the Atlantik-Brücke hosted its traditional SACEUR talk at the ILA aerospace show in Berlin. The high-profile discussion brought together General Carsten Breuer, Chief of Defense of the Bundeswehr; General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); Airbus Defence and Space CEO Michael Schöllhorn; and OJ Sanchez of Lockheed Martin – to discuss Europe’s progress in defense, but also to lay bare its remaining gaps, as the continent works to restore its military credibility. The panel was moderated by Robert Wall (Aviation Week).

“This is the first time that the Atlantik-Brücke has held its traditional talk with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Chief of Defense of the Bundeswehr in public,” said Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke, in his welcome remarks. “It is also our premiere with General Alexus G. Grynkewich. And General Carsten Breuer is a steadfast partner in our security policy dialogue.”

“Even six to eight years ago, I couldn’t have imagined holding a discussion about the shift in attitude within the Bundeswehr and the defense industry,” Breuer affirmed.

“2029, this is where it counts. And this is the reason why I put a red line on all our timescales in the Ministry of Defense.”

[related] A recurring theme of the discussion was time. Breuer described how he has drawn a firm deadline in his ministry’s planning: “2029, this is where it counts. And this is the reason why I put a red line on all our timescales in the Ministry of Defense.” He repeatedly pressed for openness between politics, industry, and the armed forces, warning that timelines can no longer simply be pushed back. “We have to be honest to ourself,” he said, arguing that if a goal set for 2029 cannot be met, “then we have to discuss how to mitigate this, because there is no other chance.”

The panelists pushed back on the notion that Europe remains a “paper tiger.” “Most allies have increased their defense budgets. Last year, for the first time, all allies met the target set at NATO’s Wales summit,” said Grynkewich. He cautioned, however, that money alone does not create capability – it requires “delivery through an industrial base that’s healthy, that’s innovative.” “It would be wrong to say that Europe has no defense capability at all. The money is now being made available. We in the defense industry have to ramp up the innovation of our products,” Schöllhorn said, stressing: “The defense industry and the procurement system have to work even more closely together.”

The thorniest capability gap lies in long-range precision strike

The thorniest capability gap discussed on the panel lies in long-range precision strike. Breuer outlined a three-step approach – first relying on US capabilities, then procuring systems, and finally building a European solution – while acknowledging the uncertainty around the first two steps. His guiding criterion, he stressed, is availability by the 2029 horizon: systems must be procured “whenever they are available,” depending on what the market and development timelines allow. “We have to establish transparency about the red lines of our objectives. That means by 2029 we have to have been honest with ourselves. After that, we can no longer afford any delays. If a specific goal is at risk, we have to ask ourselves how to mitigate the resulting threat.”

“As for Europe’s capabilities in long-range precision strike, it’s clear that within NATO and from the US perspective we need certain air and maritime capabilities under certain conditions,” Grynkewich emphasized. And he analyzed: “Long-range weapons help the alliance establish deterrence in the short term. In the medium and long term, long-range precision strike has to be complemented by cyber and space capabilities. For that, research and development has to be adapted.”

“Lockheed Martin is rapidly ramping up its industrial manufacturing capacity. All our systems have to contribute to enabling long-range precision strikes,” Sanchez assured.

“Whoever is able to master the data, is gonna have a decision advantage.”

Both generals converged on a deeper point: networking matters more than individual platforms. “It is all about the data,” Grynkewich said. “Whoever is able to master the data, move it more quickly, apply more effective algorithms to it, is gonna have a decision advantage.” The two industry representatives reiterated the call for common standards, and Breuer warned against deferring standardization: “Don’t delay it because we don’t have the time.”

On the alliance’s future shape, Grynkewich framed a lighter American burden as a strength rather than a retreat. Asked what a transatlantic alliance looks like if the US carries less of the load, he answered: “It looks stronger. It looks more sustainable.” He situated this within a “NATO 3.0” concept that gives Europe a more balanced voice.

Asked about a hypothetical scenario in which Russia were to attack the Baltic states, the SACEUR was unequivocal: “Absolutely we’re ready to fight tonight. We’re ready to fight tonight across all 32 nations.” Breuer added: “Our problem is not within the alliance. Our problem sits in Moscow, and therefore we have to do something against this.”

“Absolutely we’re ready to fight tonight. We’re ready to fight tonight across all 32 nations.”

Breuer closed the discussion with praise for the transatlantic partnership: “I’m absolutely glad to have an American SACEUR here, because this provides – apart from General Grynkewich himself – that transatlantic link, which is also what the Atlantik-Brücke is all about. I think it’s good, and we should keep it this way as long as that’s possible.”

Der Beitrag “2029 is the Red Line”: SACEUR-Talk on Europe’s Defense Buildup erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“How many of you were surprised that the United States attacked Iran? And how many were surprised that they did this exclusively on Israel’s side? I would argue that any American president, under these circumstances, would have seriously considered military action against Iran — a weakened regime, diminished proxies, concrete intelligence — a tempting golden moment after half a century of containment and countless rounds of sanctions.

[related] The Obama administration, too, considered military options. In 2014, Iran was — according to some intelligence assessments — only months away from a so-called breakout. Yet diplomacy still had a chance at that time, not least because Russia and China were equally interested in a multilateral agreement and in curbing Iran’s uranium enrichment. The negotiations, backed by a United Nations Security Council resolution, lasted eighteen months. They were hard-fought, though far from airtight.

Unable to secure a treaty due to Republican opposition in Congress and pressure from Israel, the United States was forced to negotiate a legally non-binding „agreement“. That agreement was time-limited and did not cover Iran’s support for regional proxies or its ballistic missile activities, but most critically, it was not a treaty. After several attempts to persuade the European signatories to expand sanctions and push Iran to extend the terms of the deal (a task I was involved in at the time), Trump ultimately took pleasure in tearing it apart in 2018.

In the years that followed, sanctions were imposed wherever possible — not only on Iran, but also on Venezuela and Russia — essentially maximum pressure against what felt like every oil-producing nation. The more Trump and later Biden rhetorically escalated sanctions, the more the entire concept lost its effectiveness. Switzerland, acting as the U.S. protecting power in Iran, carefully noted the steady flow along long-established smuggling routes into Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan. And the first shadow fleets began to emerge — much like those operating today in the North Sea. From sanctioned Iran across the Atlantic to sanctioned Venezuela, oil tankers continued to move through international waters.

„’Kinetic’ sanctions are a rather striking way to prevent the financing of terrorism.”

The next step, then, could only consist of bombs. The United States already had some experience in this regard. When the Islamic State expanded across the Middle East in 2014 and captured Mosul, it seized a branch of the Iraqi Central Bank that, thanks to continued U.S. payments, was filled with cash reserves in dollars. Physical money, after all, cannot be frozen by sanctions once you march in. So we bombed it — the first „kinetic sanctions“, ladies and gentlemen, in early 2016. An interesting method of preventing the financing of terrorism, wouldn’t you say? And notice the terminology: Ukraine now refers to its strikes on Russian energy infrastructure as kinetic sanctions. And when sanctions failed to bring down Maduro, the United States ultimately resorted to his abduction. The illusion of a quick and clean sanctions regime was replaced by the illusion of a quick and clean military operation. But of course, it is not that simple.

Our New Alliance

The era in which the United States could act unilaterally is over. So too is the time when it could make such decisions and only ask its allies in hindsight: are you with us or against us? Trump’s belated appeals for support once it became clear that the war would quickly grow more complicated than planned are relics of a hegemonic world order that both the United States and Europe assumed would last forever. That is how America operates. That is how thinking in the Situation Room works. One commands instruments of power that others can hardly even imagine, and becomes blind to their limits. The United States can no longer afford to act in this way. Building alliances is slow and demanding — in the past, avoiding that effort was considered bad form. Today, it is a fatal mistake.

I respect that Chancellor Merz, in his first statement, refrained from judging the decisions of Germany’s partners. For it is one thing to comment from the outside and quite another to be in a position where decisions must actually be made. In the end, there are only two options: to press the button or not. And let us be honest: it is not a tenable position for a country like Germany, which seeks to have a voice on the global stage, to say: We are glad the Ayatollah is gone and we support the elimination of Iran’s missile capabilities, but the war itself is illegal. Of course, I also respect the decision of all European governments, under these circumstances and given the two protagonists, Trump and Netanyahu, not to take an active role in the conflict. Even if one were willing to subject oneself to the shifting moods of the U.S. president, what role would Europe have been expected to play in any case — assuming it was not merely a symbolic gesture of deference to the „Big Daddy“ of NATO, but a tactically meaningful contribution? Ideally, Europe would have been involved, but under different conditions.

“The United States wants partners on equal footing, not dependencies”

Believe me: the National Defense Strategy published earlier this year is not a second Clausewitz. But there is one passage that will stay with me and with my generation of security experts in the United States for a long time: „With rare exceptions, allies have too often been content to rely on the United States for their defense while reducing their own defense spending and instead investing in social welfare and other domestic programs. However, the blame does not rest solely with them. It was, of course, their sovereign decision to underinvest in defense. But that decision was often encouraged by earlier U.S. policymakers who mistakenly believed that the United States benefited from allies who were dependencies rather than partners.“  It reads: dependencies, not allies. What does that mean? It means that the United States wants partners on equal footing, not dependents. Trump is a relic — the final incarnation of a hegemony that no longer exists.

I fear that this war will produce no winners, only losers — in economic terms: a net deadweight loss. Iran will need years to recover, regardless of whether sanctions are eased and the country complies with Western demands to limit uranium enrichment. Israel will have neither eliminated an existential threat posed by a theocratic regime nor regained international support — the images from Lebanon and Gaza are still too fresh. And the United States has once again demonstrated its unparalleled military and intelligence capabilities. But it has lost the political game.I am convinced that had Washington taken the time to build genuine alliances with Europe and the Gulf states, the process would have been slower, but it would also have strengthened its own position and likely avoided this outcome. In the end, Iran was never as close to the bomb as many assumed.

„The United States took a shortcut — and the bill is now coming due.“

The United States took a shortcut — and the bill is now coming due. Meanwhile, Russia and China are operating in the background, providing Tehran with intelligence and material support. This is a far cry from 2015, when they still sat together with the West at the negotiating table. Yet wars in a world in transition are like immersion blenders. For that reason, not everything is negative. Ukraine is emerging as a global leader in drone defense and is concluding agreements with Gulf states. These countries — particularly the Emirates, which long flirted with Iran — are now taking action against illegal Iranian financial flows. Lebanon and Israel are discovering a shared adversary in Hezbollah. And, most importantly for this region, Europe is making further progress in defining itself in security policy.

Step by step, information is emerging about an allied mission to secure shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz. These are good news — first, for European security structures: a coherent military response by European actors in the European interest, without U.S. leadership. Second, for Europe’s relations with the Gulf states and other trading partners. Gradually, we are moving toward a European NATO capable of territorial defense — not without the United States, but alongside it, on equal footing. Not a dependency, but an ally.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are currently witnessing a global conflict in fragments. Imagine, for a moment, we were still living in Europe’s colonial world — it would be incomparably worse. What Europe does with the fragments now will be decisive: new alliances with Gulf states, missions to secure sea lanes, support for Ukraine. This is the beginning of a return to global politics for Europe. And that is why this war is also Europe’s war.”

Der Beitrag What the Iran war teaches about partnerships erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

We were honoured to welcome Phil Murphy, former Governor of New Jersey and former US Ambassador to Germany, and Tammy Murphy, former First Lady of New Jersey and political activist, for a fireside chat during their visit to Berlin. Emily Haber, former German Ambassador to the United States, moderated the engaging discussion on current domestic policy developments in the US as well as its foreign policy.

In a short interview with Atlantik-Brücke, Phil Murphy talked about his long-standing relationship with Atlantik-Brücke, the importance of sub-national cooperation between Europe and the US, and his view on German and US competitiveness. And he found clear words for the violence caused by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents in Minneapolis and beyond – and on how to push back.

Der Beitrag “I have enormous regard for Atlantik-Brücke” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..