Generally spoken, our foreign policy will have to deal with the prospect in the upcoming years to fight for our freedom. Not only Ukraine is doing that, we also need to step up.

Atlantik-Brücke: Nils, Germany was not exactly able to lead and synthesize a common position in the EU in recent years – for example, on tariffs for Chinese electric cars. What would you do differently in the future so that Europe speaks with this united voice?

Schmid: When it comes to Chinese electric vehicles, you have to admit that the way the EU Commission devised the special tariffs was really ill advised because they punished European importers more than other EU member states.

However, what we need to do, is to stand up against these very narrow-minded ideas about tariffs and trade coming out of the Trump administration. At the same time, especially when it comes to counter growing Chinese influence in world trade, we should offer opportunities of cooperation to the new administration in Washington. And we’ve come to a point where we need to explain to our American friends that if they want to take on China, they need allies in East Asia, countries like South Korea and Japan and others.

Atlantik-Brücke: The US has asked of Europe for a while, not just under this administration, to pivot away from its dependence on China. Gyde, how should the next German government walk this thin line between de-risking and depriving Germany of this vital export market?

Jensen: If Germany wants to take a strong stance vis-à-vis China, also with regard to the US, we should try to be more one-voiced from a European perspective. It would help if Europe could agree more on one direction towards China. Nobody else can help us to do this.

If Germany wants to take a strong stance vis-à-vis China, also with regard to the US, we should try to be more one-voiced from a European perspective.[quoter]Gyde Jensen[/quoter]

We should focus more on diversifying also with other Asian countries. Diversification would also help towards restraining China’s influence in our European partner countries. On the other hand, the German and European companies still need the Chinese market.

Atlantik-Brücke: Let’s move on to defense and NATO. Germany has in recent years finally reached the 2% goal of spending of GDP for defense matters. Omid, wouldn’t it be honest to say to the population in Germany that security has a price tag, and we now have to prioritize security over social spending?

Nouripour: This is not about playing these two issues against each other. More security needs more investment. We have a huge lack of investments for the last decade in the German armed forces. It’s about more than 2% that we have to spend if you want to modernize the armed forces in a sufficient way. This is why my party is talking about 3.5%.

But you know, at the end of the day, it’s not about figures, it’s about what is needed and the war in Ukraine. Every single penny we are spending in these days for defense is preventing the next war in Europe. And we have to also fulfill our obligations within NATO.

Atlantik-Brücke: Jürgen, do you feel there’s enough honesty about this trade-off in the German election campaign between spending for security in contrast to other policy areas?

Hardt: A better performance of Germany’s economy would first lead to more income on the state side. We as CDU also plan to take some areas out of the federal budget, for example special investment in infrastructure.

Even if we increase our defense expenditure significantly, it will not be done tomorrow to reach new capabilities. Investments in the German Bundeswehr will take some years to fully materialize. Germany, and this is my proposal probably for the NATO Summit, should also do more on the qualitative side. The Bundeswehr should become the main pillar of NATO in Europe. This should be an offer that also might impress Trump and Republicans in Washington. But this needs to be well prepared.

Atlantik-Brücke: I’d like to give Nils the chance to comment on this. What is the single most effective step Germany can take to strengthen the European pillar in NATO?

Schmid: First of all, let me say that I emphatically disagree with my two colleagues. We need an honest debate about how to finance bigger spending on defense. This has been a blind spot for many years and there are only three ways you can increase spending for armed forces. The first is to raise taxes. The second is to cut other expenditures, and the third is to raise the public deficit. Most probably we will need all three ways.

But with the current debt brake in place, we will not be able to fulfill the obligations of a decent state for our citizens, be it external or domestic security, be it social security, be it infrastructure spending. So, we need to fix this on the national level by reforming the debt brake, our constitutional balanced budget rule. Or as an alternative, we need to flexibilize European rules on public debt, the so-called Maastricht rules of the Stability Pact. This needs to be implemented as soon as possible, because we are now in a situation where we urgently need to do more for defense.

We should also streamline spending of European governments, first of all by harmonizing technical standards and reducing the diversity of weapons programs run by European governments, but also secondly by investing into common projects. This is also some news for our American partners. We will buy more European military equipment in the future, otherwise we cannot develop a strong European defense industry.

For a transitional period, we will need to purchase a modern weaponry from our American friends, as the German government under Chancellor Scholz did by acquiring F-35 fighter planes for nuclear sharing and for European air defense. But in the long-term perspective, this will be very much about procuring European weapon systems from European producers.

Atlantik-Brücke: Jürgen and Gyde, don’t you think, given the changed geopolitical circumstances, there is a case for doing all those three things that Nils has mentioned?

Hardt: A discussion on the debt brake might be misunderstood in other European Union member states, especially in member states of the eurozone. I fear that in case that Germany is losing its restrictions on spending, others will follow. And I fear that we will have a second euro crisis on the horizon, if Germany is losing its strong measures.

But on the other hand, we have this 100 billion Euro extra budget agreed on for the German Bundeswehr by changing the constitution, without harming the debt brake. So, we have the concept.

Jensen: There should be enough money in our budget currently, even within the debt brake, for us to ensure a quality of procurement and of capacity building for our armed forces.

We should not discuss so much about numbers, whether it be now 2% or 3.5%, but rather on having a strong economy which allows us to focus on better defense spending. I wouldn’t focus on the sheer numbers, but rather on the quality of the spending.

We should not discuss so much about numbers, whether it be now 2% or 3.5%, but rather on having a strong economy which allows us to focus on better defense spending.[quoter]Gyde Jensen[/quoter]

Atlantik-Brücke: I’d like to touch on two geographical issues. One is Ukraine, quite obvious, and the other is the Arctic. Omid, what do you see as Germany’s contribution to bringing about and possibly maintaining a peace in Ukraine?

Nouripour: The core of the conflict in Ukraine is about the right of self-determination of the Ukrainian people. If the Ukrainian people at the end tell us that they want to come to the table of negotiations and they are ready to freeze this line or that line of the front and they are ready to not give up, but understand that for the next couple of years, maybe they will not achieve the entire recovery of their territorial sovereignty, this is what we have to respect.

The core of the conflict in Ukraine is about the right of self-determination of the Ukrainian people.[quoter]Omid Nouripour[/quoter]