With the re-election of Donald Trump as president, the role of the United States in the world — and with it the transatlantic relationship — is shifting at a pace few would have predicted. Under Donald Trump, the security of Europe is no longer an integral part of American interests in the way it was for decades after World War II. This change brings uncomfortable truths and consequential decisions for Europe. We want to continue working with the U.S., but at the same time we must recognize that we are now responsible for our own security.

[related]The truth is that even long before Trump, the U.S. had urged Europeans to do more for their own security and to shoulder a greater share of the burden within NATO. We Europeans often ignored these calls out of convenience. Now we must rapidly become capable of defending ourselves so that we never have to be defended. We must rise to this responsibility because the future of Europe and our free, democratic way of life depends on it.

The recently published U.S. National Security Strategy makes clear how the United States views its role abroad and how it sees Europe. Strategically, the U.S. is focused on maintaining dominance in the Western Hemisphere against external political and economic influence. In this framework, democratic rule-of-law states in Europe are at times seen as part of the problem, while reducing tensions with Russia is cast as a goal in order to achieve a type of strategic stability. In pursuit of that goal, pressure is being applied — especially on Ukraine.

For Europeans, these positions are not compatible with our own security interests. Europe’s security depends on the failure of Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Only by preventing Russia from achieving its aims can we stop military force from once again being seen as a legitimate tool of state policy — not just in Europe, but elsewhere, for example as a model for China regarding Taiwan. An end to the war that rewards aggression would not bring peace; it would destabilize Ukraine and further erode the foundations of the European security order.

The authority of international law is non-negotiable for us Europeans. It applies equally to both strong and weak states and is, for many, the most important protection against the predatory actions of militarily stronger neighbors. That is why, in full solidarity, we must also insist that the U.S. uphold international law and must not let it be relativized.

Europe missed the opportunity to put itself in a position where it has the capability to act independently in world affairs. We must make up for that now. This includes continuing to invest in transatlantic relations, which are more than government-to-government ties. They encompass politics, economics, and — above all — the connections between people in the U.S. and Europe that often go back generations and tell the shared and fateful history of our continents. Despite all difficulties, that story is not yet finished.

Norbert Röttgen, Member of the German Bundestag (CDU/CSU), is the deputy parliamentary leader of the Christian Democrats in the German Bundestag. He is also the deputy chairman of Atlantik-Brücke.

To read more on the question of whether the United States is still Europe’s partner, also see the pro comment by Metin Hakverdi, Member of the German Bundestag (SPD), Coordinator for Transatlantic Civil Society, Cultural, and Information Policy Cooperation of the Federal Government at the Federal Foreign Office and board member of Atlantik-Brücke here: “Strategic Decoupling would be damaging for Europe”

Der Beitrag “The U.S. positions on Russia Are Not Compatible With Our Own Security Interests” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Interview with Düzen Tekkal

Der Beitrag “Democracy is fighting for survival” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Our speakers– Melinda Haring, Senior Advisor at Razom for Ukraine and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Dr. Tobias Lindner, former Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office; and Angela Stent, Professor Emerita and Senior Advisor at the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University — tackled pressing questions such as: What could a peaceful settlement look like? And can we clarify the often ambiguous position of the U.S. administration in this process? The discussion was moderated by Mareike Müller, Foreign Correspondent for Ukraine, Russia, Eastern Europe, Handelsblatt. One of the key takeaways was that much will depend on the willingness of both the United States and the European Union to increase political pressure on Russia — not only through enhanced sanctions, but also by stepping up military support if the Kremlin fails to pursue a genuine ceasefire.

Click through the picture gallery to see highlight quotes from our speakers or watch the full webinar below.

Der Beitrag “Is the EU still important to Ukraine?” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Listen to the conversation:

Interview: David Deißner

Joshua Walker, on October 9th of this year Turkey launched a military offensive in northern Syria which is directed against the Kurdish YPG militia. This step was facilitated through the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. What does this mean for the credibility of the United States in the Middle East?

American credibility and foreign policy have suffered not just in the Middle East. Although you could shrug and say American credibility has been suffering for a long time, not just under the Trump presidency, but ever since the so-called red line that was set by the previous administration in Syria. Nobody should have been surprised. The U.S. has sold out the Kurds numerous times. This was inevitable in coming, but it is still tragic to watch all the human suffering. It was not a matter of if but a matter of when. The surprising nature of this is how quickly it escalated and became a global crisis. To see the way in which the power vacuum that the United States has left in Syria has been filled by Russia, Iran, and now Turkey which used to be on different sides is particularly interesting to watch. October 9th joked at our military officials who have been working so closely with our Kurdish allies.

Which role does NATO member Turkey play in this situation in northern Syria regarding the Kurdish forces?

[related]From the beginning, the Turks have been the main protagonist. Turkey is the second largest military power in NATO in terms of the number of forces, and it is a sophisticated fighting force. The fact that it is also the Muslim majority power has always led Turkey to have a larger seat at the table. Turkey shares one of the longest land borders with Syria. From the very beginning of the Syrian uprising, Turkey has been very clear about its position: It is against Assad, but it also believes that the YPG or the PKK is a terrorist organization that represents an existential threat to the republic of Turkey. Turkey has been waging a war against this group for a good thirty-year period from the eighties onward. Thousands of lives have been lost.

There is a domestic context here for Turkey as well. President Erdogan, who has been flagging with his popularity, needs to find a reason to continue his policy given on what happened with the Istanbul municipal election recently. There is no political party in Turkey, with the exception of the HDP, that does not believe that this is the right course of action. There has been a steady drumbeat of war. Erdogan seized the opportunity.

There has been a steady drumbeat of war. Erdogan seized the opportunity.

What happens if Turkey invokes Article 5 of its NATO membership if it is attacked by some Kurdish forces?

First of all, a lot of us thought that because Turkey is a NATO member, perhaps it would not take these actions in Syria. Invoking Article 5 could cause an internal crisis in NATO. The bigger discussion in Washington is the following: With allies like this, what should we be thinking of NATO as we know it is no longer a relevant force inside of Turkey because of Turkey’s behavior, not just in this particular case with Syria, but also with the Russian S-400 weapon systems that have been bought? We as transatlantic friends struggle with this question.

Will Russia and Iran, which both protect the regime of President Bashar al-Assad geopolitically, benefit from the new reality on the ground in Syria?

Absolutely. The Astana process by which Russia, Turkey, and Iran have been negotiating these issues, even when there was a more adversarial relationship between the three capitals, has picked up to be one of the main deciding factors. If I am Syrian today, unlike in the past when I would need to go to Switzerland or New York to try to figure out what my fate would be, increasingly this is beginning to flow through Moscow and Teheran and to a lesser extent through Ankara. Because Ankara is playing much more like a regional player. Turkey seems to be focusing its energies on its regional aspirations and particularly protecting its sovereign territory, versus Russia, who is playing the role of a spoiler. Wherever it can really stymie unity or international efforts, it is doing so in a powerful way. It is really breathtaking to watch how Russia, which is from a purely numbers point of view a very weak power, is punching well above its weight. The difference between Russia’s actions and Iranian actions is that Iran has a much larger regional game here that is playing out with Hezbollah, Lebanon, and its antagonism of Israel.

It is really breathtaking to watch how Russia, which is from a purely numbers point of view a very weak power, is punching well above its weight.

Syria that has been in a civil war for more than eight years becomes once again a site of further combat operations. These cause an ever-increasing number of deaths and force tens of thousands of people to flee. Which responsibility does the West bear for this tremendous humanitarian crisis?

It is easy to point fingers. The West did not inspire the movements that led out of the Arab spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. However, if the West had lifted a finger and put it on the scales in the Syrian War on one side or the other, we would have clearly made a difference and changed the outcome. If we had had even half or a third of the political will, that the Iranians or the Russians had in protecting Assad, in eliminating him, it would be over. Ultimately, we are all to blame for where we are. We are in the worst of both worlds.

Where do you see the qualitative difference between the Obama administration’s approach to this issue and the current administration’s policy?

There is an amazing amount of continuity with our policies. Even when Obama decided not to enforce the red line, there were still American forces there: State Department, U.S. Aid, intelligence, and defense. With the “New Beginning” speech in Cairo, the Obama administration put the rhetoric out ahead of its actions. When the actions did not meet up to the rhetoric, there was a real disappointment and cynicism that developed about America’s intentions in the region.

When Trump came in, there was an initial honeymoon period. Trump does not seem to have any appetite for foreign intervention and seems to want to get everybody out of the so-called endless wars. Yet many of the agencies I described continued to do business as usual in the region. Until last month, when Trump telegraphed Erdogan that he is not doing anything more and pulling American soldiers out. Now you see a real anger and backlash when you look at the Republican response to President Trump’s abandonment of the Kurds. Almost all foreign policy professionals were uniform in saying this is a pretty significant and bad move on Trump’s part. This is a lose-lose situation in a worst-case scenario.

Now you see a real anger and backlash when you look at the Republican response to President Trump’s abandonment of the Kurds.

German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer suggested to establish an internationally controlled security zone along the Syrian-Turkish border in cooperation with Turkey and Russia. What is your take on this?

I am disappointed about what I am seeing because it seems like it is too late. If there is one silver lining, it is to see that Germany is realizing it has to play a larger role. But while this proposal sounds really forceful and it is a great talking point and headline, the Europeans should have been more proactive and focused on Turkish concerns beforehand. That is not even to mention the EU membership, which we do not even talk about anymore. That used to be the biggest driver of Turkish foreign policy. I am concerned that clearly the EU does not seem to feel like a real foreign or security power when it comes to Turkey.

If there is one silver lining, it is to see that Germany is realizing it has to play a larger role.

Is the EU at least to some extent prepared for new high numbers of refugees seeking shelter in the European Union? Or is this rather not the case, and Europe is very much depending on the agreement it has completed with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan so that more than three million Syrian refugees living in Turkish camps do not enter the European Union?

The EU is clearly dependent on Turkey. The EU has simply made the short term negative case of saying: We will pay you to keep the refugees there. There is no long-term solution. Turks are now literally piling refugees into trucks and driving them into Syria. Generally speaking, it would be a mistake to give up on Turkey. The Europeans are in danger of losing their relationship with Turkey over their fears related to national security concerns.

What are the ramifications of the latest developments for a potential reinvigoration of ISIS in the Middle East?

First of all, the killing of Baghdadi was a real blow. The fact that other top ISIS deputies were being knocked out may be the one positive silver lining. The broader ramifications are that there is a power vacuum. Russia has no interest in stopping a reinvigoration of ISIS, and Assad doesn’t really control all of his territory yet. If the Kurdish forces, which were fighting ISIS do not see any incentive to continue doing this, extremist forces like ISIS and al-Qaida will come back. I just worry, that we are so reactive at this point in time that we are just one terrorist attack away from something major.

I just worry, that we are so reactive at this point in time that we are just one terrorist attack away from something major.

What kind of overall strategy would you recommend to the transatlantic partners with regard not only to Syria but to the whole region in the Middle East?

One of the challenges we have for an overall strategy is that all of us are very distracted at home. You have to start at home. We as transatlantic partners have to focus on our core interests that we still share as a community of nations. NATO as the largest and most powerful and historic military alliance still has a role to play in protecting us and also in terms of working together. We are stronger together than individually. Turkey is a perfect example for us to cooperate with. Nobody has an interest for Turkey and its economy to go off the ledge. We need to find a way to reorientate our relationship with Turkey in a realistic manner. There are bright spots that we should be looking at, particularly in the economic sphere, when it comes to the Turkish youth and education system.

Here you can find Joshua Walker’s profile site at Eurasia Group.

Der Beitrag “The U.S. has sold out the Kurds numerous times” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Interview: David Deißner and Robin Fehrenbach

Elbridge, in 2018, the U.S. government has fundamentally changed its National Defense Strategy. One could argue that it focuses more than before on the great power competition. What are the implications of this strategy for Europe and for NATO?

[related]As former Secretary of Defense James Mattis put it, the number one national security priority and particularly defense priority for the United States is no longer terrorism, it’s the great power competition. This means above all China because of the scale and sophistication of its military, but also Russia. From a military perspective in Europe it’s going to mean a greater focus on Russia. Over the last 15 years, the Russians have quite assiduously worked on developing a range of capabilities, particularly conventional forces to pursue a theory of victory against eastern NATO by using the fait accompli and coupling that with their nuclear forces to create new facts on the ground. NATO would be very loathe to try to reverse them.

You have recently co-authored an article with Walter Slocombe in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung regarding the collapse of the INF treaty. You wrote that “this is not a problem that will be solved by threatening targets deep into Russia.” Your advice is instead to blunt a Russian assault against NATO. Could you elaborate on this approach?

The real danger that Russia poses from a military perspective is that it might very rapidly seize territory in the Baltics or in eastern Poland and then create a hardened defensive position. After the long period of time it might take the alliance to build up the forces to eject Russia, people will be so accustomed and so loathe to risk what would be required to eject them that they will accept the new reality. That would fundamentally undermine NATO.

The real danger that Russia poses from a military perspective is that it might very rapidly seize territory in the Baltics or in eastern Poland and then create a hardened defensive position.

Instead of waiting, our forces have to be better able to blunt a Russian assault from the beginning. European forces, along with American forces, can get forward very quickly and engage Russian forces that might be invading. That sounds aggressive, but actually it’s considerably less destabilizing than some of the alternatives. If Germany wants to avoid an arms race, it could put a bit more effort and resources into redeveloping at least a fraction of the Bundeswehr that existed in 1988. That would go a long way to solve this problem.

The US has repeatedly called upon NATO member states to commit themselves to the 2-percent-target. What is the US asking of Germany and other European NATO allies beyond spending 2 percent of their respective GDP on security and defense?

Two percent is a good marker. But what we really want is output. As an alliance we want forces that can defend our common territory. Europe must be able to contest Russian aggression from the get-go. Germany could put three divisions in the field. In 1988 Germany had 15 divisions available. So, this would be one fifth of what Germany could do in 1988. Today Germany is much richer and much more secure. Germany is really the crucial state: It’s the country that has the largest economy in Europe and it has a significantly latent military capability. Meeting some of these objectives would be well within Germany’s ability without imposing a strain on its society.

Germany could put three divisions in the field. In 1988 Germany had 15 divisions available.

How is the German reluctance to the 2-percent-target perceived in defense policy circles in Washington?

It’s mystifying at best. For 35 years of the Cold War, the members of the NATO alliance provided Germany a forwarddefense on which Germany insisted. It’s strange that Germany doesn’t help to provide this forward defense to the new entrants that have not had the fortune of being under the Western umbrella during the Cold War. This would be the same level of defense at a much lower level of commitment than during the Cold War. We are living in an era and world in which the US needs more help. For those of us, like myself, who want to preserve the transatlantic alliance we have to change to stay the same.

We are living in an era and world in which the US needs more help.

What steps can we expect the United States to take in the future when it comes to the asymmetric threats of cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare?

This is a form of competition that the American government is increasingly attuned to. In terms of our societal vulnerability we need to recognize that the world we expected in the 1990s is not the world that will materialize. The internet was designed as if the state was going to wither away, as if strategic competition belonged to the past. If you now look at what the Chinese are able to do with technology and Artificial Intelligence and how they intrude into people’s lives, that’s the future if we don’t have a better response. We have to accept that we are going to need more intelligence steps to protect our networks.

If you now look at what the Chinese are able to do with technology and Artificial Intelligence and how they intrude into people’s lives, that’s the future if we don’t have a better response.

Do we have to rethink NATO and our security architecture in order to guarantee safety?

If NATO didn’t exist, we would have to create it. NATO at its core is still a security alliance. Its fundamental purpose is a collective defense organization to protect its member states. It might do other things, but those are secondary functions. NATO is a very broad organization that has 29 members and lacks a clear threat in the way that the Soviet Union presented it. Will it be able to provide the degree of coherence? I don’t know. The international architecture is going to probably change most in Asia, because that’s where it’s less formed. The rise of China is a tectonic shift.

The rise of China is a tectonic shift.

An argument that you hear very often in Germany is that the transatlantic partnership should give a strong answer to the rise of China. Does this resonate in the current U.S. administration?

Absolutely, that is completely correct on the security front. If Europe can take a greater degree of responsibility vis-à-vis Russia, that would allow the United States to focus more on China and issues like 5G, especially not allowing Huawei to penetrate into a continent that’s in many ways very rightly focused on data privacy. Huawei is the route towards perdition. Europe and America have to integrate through trade and security in a way that still preserves our own autonomy and decision-making.

Europe and America have to integrate through trade and security in a way that still preserves our own autonomy and decision-making.

In your last conversation with Atlantik-Brücke in 2016, we were talking about President Obama’s track record in fighting international terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. How do you assess President Trump’s successes and failures in this policy field after more than two years in office?

He has done very well in the international security field. In 50 years, people will look back and say: “What really changed was the American position on China”. For the first time, the Trump administration has made clear: “China is a competitor. The best way to have a secure and stable relationship with them is to be clear and firm and strong and to negotiate from a position of strength to avoid them miscalculating our ability and our resolve.” That’s a major development. The President is also trying to do less in the Middle East. How you do that, is a very tricky problem.

Der Beitrag “The number one national security priority is great power competition” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

General Philip Breedlove would welcome “Germany’s recapitalization and retraining of its military forces.” In our interview, the former Commander of the United States European Command and NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) calls for a higher readiness of the whole Western alliance to cope with massive and complex threats. You can read an edited version of our podcast “Atlantik-Brücke On The Record” with General Breedlove below. The podcast was produced on the occasion of a discussion on the future of NATO, hosted by Atlantik-Brücke.

General Breedlove, how would you describe NATO’s current situation?

Our alliance is strong and it continues to be an important and successful alliance. However, I would also note that we are facing challenges now that are tough and we haven’t really faced some of these challenges in a long time. They force us to take a look at ourselves and to say: Are we ready for the threats that we see out there today? That is the biggest challenge to NATO.

What are the most pressing internal challenges which the Alliance is facing at the moment?

[related]Our current challenges began when the Russians invaded Crimea and the Donbass. A lot of attention again began to be paid to this neighbor to the North and East that was threatening Ukraine. Many of the former Soviet Warsaw Pact nations felt threatened again. There was a very strong focus on the fact that Russia was not going to be a partner but might actually once again be an opponent. At the same time, we were seeing massive migration problems in the South emanating from Northern Africa and from the civil war in Syria where Bashar al-Assad was murdering his people. Large numbers of people began to flee Syria.

One of those really tough internal problems in NATO is that we had a division in worry, a division in concern in that we saw this belligerent Russia to the East and the North, and we saw this very tough societal problem of immigration being caused by problems in Syria and Northern Africa. NATO had to come to grips with it. At one point, we created the ‘Strategic Direction East’ and ‘Strategic Direction South’ to label these internal problems. One of the biggest internal concerns is that NATO has to be able to address all of the challenges to its nations.

One of those really tough internal problems in NATO is that we had a division in worry, a division in concern in that we saw this belligerent Russia to the East and the North, and we saw this very tough societal problem of immigration being caused by problems in Syria and Northern Africa.

What are other severe external threats which NATO has to cope with?

There are other threats that may emanate from the same places, but they are different kind of threats. Clearly, the cyber threat that we face today is different than two decades ago. Cyber is a tool that is being used in everyday conflicts. We are having issues in cyber with our opponent to the East every day. These sets of old tools that many label hybrid war – Mr. Gerasimov (the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia; remark of Atlantik-Brücke) calling it ‘indirect means and asymmetric methods’ – are being used in a new way.

What worries you most?

Our nations are under a lot of pressure to address societal challenges and the policy solutions battle for the same budget that must be used to ensure that the militaries of NATO are ready to carry out the missions that they must accomplish. As the SACEUR it was clear to me that the readiness of our militaries in NATO was not adequate. It was not appropriate to the task that we saw from a resurgent and recalcitrant Russia. We need to address the readiness and recapitalization of our militaries.

As the SACEUR it was clear to me that the readiness of our militaries in NATO was not adequate. It was not appropriate to the task that we saw from a resurgent and recalcitrant Russia.

Being the former SACEUR and being equipped with the knowledge of your 39 years lasting military career, how do you assess the military exercise “Vostok 18” that was carried out by roughly 300.000 Russian soldiers as to the security of the NATO area?

First and foremost we should not be alarmed that Russia is exercising. We exercise. It is every nation’s right to exercise. The issue is that we must exercise responsibly. It is important that we are transparent in what we are doing, how long we are doing it, where we are doing it, who we are doing it with. Things that NATO advertises every day about its exercises. Vostok is an exercise towards the East. What worried me more as the SACEUR were the Zapad exercises. Those were the exercises done in the West. They were rarely open and transparent.

First and foremost we should not be alarmed that Russia is exercising. We exercise. It is every nation’s right to exercise. The issue is that we must exercise responsibly.

Do we witness the entering into a Russian-Sino phase at least on a military level when analyzing the participation of 3.000 Chinese soldiers in “Vostok 18”?

We should not be surprised. We as the West have issues working with Russia. We also have issues working with China. Geostrategically, why would we not expect them to possibly message us by collaborating? We also need to sit back and understand that the Russians have issues with the Chinese and the Chinese have issues with the Russians. It is not appropriate to overdramatize and to draw any major geostrategic conclusions from them exercising together.

Would you recommend any adaptations to NATO regarding its general strategy for the European security architecture?

We have been through two decades of fighting counter-insurgency and we have lost our focus on large scale war fighting operations. We do not have a focus yet on the size of operations that article 5 would require. We need to regain our ability through training and exercises. We need to regain our ability to understand how to command and control large formations against a dedicated opponent.

We need to regain our ability through training and exercises. We need to regain our ability to understand how to command and control large formations against a dedicated opponent.

Do you show understanding for Germany’s foreign and security policy that has not reached NATO’s 2-percent-goal yet?

I am not going to pretend to criticize or advise Germany. But the young Captain Breedlove who served during the Cold War here in Europe eight times and in Germany five times experienced that the Bundeswehr and the Luftwaffe of the Cold War was an incredibly capable military force. It was a leader on the European landmass. It is important for Germany to lead in NATO on the European landmass. I am not saying this at the exclusion of other large countries. But I would like to see that Germany’s recapitalization and retraining of its military forces show that leadership in NATO.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

The same role it played for the last seventy years. NATO is not perfect and it hasn’t kept perfect peace here in Europe. We have had some issues that we had to work through. But what NATO has done, is to prevent the kind of wars that ravaged Europe multiple times. NATO will continue to do that. NATO is a very capable and very important alliance. The mission that it has had for the last seventy years will be important for the next seventy years.

Der Beitrag “It is important for Germany to lead in NATO on the European landmass” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Part XIII of our series: Rose Gottemoeller regards the Alliance’s security guarantee for the Baltics and Poland as reliable. NATO Deputy Secretary General demands that Russia complies with its commitments to transparency of its military exercises in this region. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke Gottemoeller also stresses that the Alliance’s new command structure will be “robust, agile and fully fit for purpose”.

Mrs. Gottemoeller, Russia is trying to expand its spheres of influence. Especially the Baltics and Poland feel threatened by Russia’s aggressive behaviour. How reliable is NATO’s security guarantee in this European region?

In recent years, Russia has threatened and used military force against its neighbours. NATO has responded in a defensive and proportionate way. The response includes the four multinational battlegroups that are operational in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Our measures are strictly defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments. They aim at preventing conflict and preserving the peace.

Our measures are strictly defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

This is a clear demonstration that we stand together, and is the essence of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. But our deterrence and defence does not rely on four battlegroups alone. They are part of a broader posture that involves national home defence and other NATO forces. We have, for example, tripled the size of our multinational NATO Response Force to 40,000 troops – with a 5,000-strong spearhead force ready to deploy within 72 hours. We have also enhanced air patrols over the Baltic and Black Seas. Our defences are now stronger than at any point since the Cold War. That sends a clear signal.

Our policy towards Russia is consistent: strong defence and openness to dialogue. We are delivering on both tracks. While our practical cooperation with Russia has been suspended, we remain open to a periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue. We held six meetings of the NATO-Russia Council over the past two years, and are continuing to look for further opportunities.

There are regular reports about a gap of exercises between NATO and Russia. How severe is this problem in the perception within the alliance’s Headquarters?

[related]All nations have the right to exercise their armed forces; it is essential that in doing so they respect their commitments to transparency and predictability. Transparency has also been a priority for NATO in its discussions with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council, and it will remain a priority as we continue our dialogue with Russia. Exercises such as ZAPAD last year – together with the overall increase in Russian military activities – underline the need for close dialogue between NATO and Russia to avoid incidents and miscalculations.

Russia has regularly under-reported the size of its exercises to avoid mandatory observations by the OSCE. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has never opened an exercise for the mandatory observation outlined in the Vienna Document. We continue to urge Russia to be fully transparent about the scope of its exercises and to comply with the requirements of the Vienna Document. Allies are also making efforts within the OSCE to modernise the Vienna Document in order to close loopholes and ensure transparency of military exercises.

Russia has regularly under-reported the size of its exercises to avoid mandatory observations by the OSCE.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

As for what NATO does in this area, we ensure that all we do is defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments – including those outlined in the Vienna Document. Exercising is important to test our capabilities and make certain that we are fit for purpose and ready for the challenges we might face.

In May and June, NATO Allies will conduct a range of exercises in the Baltic Sea region – testing the ability of Allied forces to operate together. In the bigger picture, our measures strike the right balance between a greater military deterrence in the east and the ability to quickly send reinforcements. So, our approach remains firm, defensive and proportionate.

We will do what we believe is necessary to ensure that we are capable of defending our territories and populations. But I want to make clear that we do not want a Cold War, and we will not let ourselves be dragged into a new arms race. NATO remains determined to defend all Allies against any threat. We will maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent, as well as strong conventional forces. And we will continue to engage in a meaningful dialogue with Russia, to increase predictability and reduce risk.

We do not want a Cold War, and we will not let ourselves be dragged into a new arms race.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

NATO’s new command structure with additional headquarters aims to accomplish a better capability of deploying troops. Do you think the potential deterrence towards Russia deriving from this step goes far enough?

Our ability to deploy troops wherever they are needed is key to deterrence in peacetime and to our collective defence in times of crisis. This must go hand in hand with a NATO command structure that is robust, agile and fully fit for purpose. Last November, NATO Ministers agreed in principle on the outline for such an adapted NATO Command Structure, and in February of this year, Allies agreed the proposed design for the adapted command structure. We will discuss resources, timelines and locations at the next Meeting of Defence Ministers in June.

The new command structure will include a number of new elements. A Command for the Atlantic will help protect the sea lines of communication between Europe and North America. There will be a new Command to ensure the mobility of our forces within Europe. We also agreed on the need for a renewed focus throughout the command structure on logistics and movement, situational awareness, resilience and on cyber defence. I expect we will finalise all aspects of the adapted structure ahead of the Brussels Summit in July.

Since 2014 there has also been good progress in improving national legislation, removing many bureaucratic hurdles to allow us to move forces across Allied territory. This is important, but we still have work to do. We need to have enough transport capacity at our disposal, and we need to improve infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, railways, runways and ports.

This is not a job for NATO alone – it requires close coordination across national governments and with the private sector. The EU has an important role to play as well, so NATO and the EU will continue to work very closely on this vital issue.

Russia has supposedly violated the INF Treaty by having developed the ballistic missile SSC-8 that is expected to have a range of more than 500 kilometres. What role does this threat play in NATO’s strategic considerations?

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons that threatened Europe, and which were associated with the ability to launch attacks with little warning. We remain fully committed to the preservation of this historic arms control treaty. The INF Treaty is a crucial element of Euro-Atlantic security. Full compliance with the INF Treaty is essential.

The United States has determined that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty. US Defence Secretary Mattis updated Allies on this issue in November of last year. In December, Allies issued a statement calling on Russia to address these serious concerns in a substantial, transparent and verifiable way.

The United States has determined that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

Allies welcome the continued efforts by the United States to engage Russia to resolve concerns about Russia’s compliance with the Treaty.

The relationship between NATO and Russia is very strained since the annexation of Crimea. Which approach should NATO take in order to accomplish a convergence with the Kremlin?

We have seen a broad pattern of reckless behaviour by Russia over many years. This includes the illegal annexation of Crimea, the military support to separatists in Eastern Ukraine, and its military build-up from the North of Europe to the Middle East. Russia’s military presence in Moldova and Georgia is against the will of either of these countries’ governments. There have also been attempts to subvert democratic processes and institutions, and we have seen an increase in cyber attacks. In March, Allies expressed their deep concern about the nerve agent incident in Salisbury in the United Kingdom, the first use of a nerve agent on Alliance territory. Subsequently over two dozen countries expelled people who had been accredited as Russian diplomats from their countries. NATO’s Secretary General withdrew agreement for the appointment of seven individuals accredited to the Russian Mission to NATO and denied the pending accreditation of three others.

This is certainly a challenging time, but NATO’s policy remains unchanged. We have strengthened our deterrence and defence in response to Russia’s actions, while we remain open for a meaningful dialogue with Russia. We held six meetings of the NATO-Russia Council since 2016, and we are working to hold another. This dialogue is difficult – but it is vital to increase transparency and reduce risk. So, NATO’s approach to Russia combines strength and dialogue. And we are delivering on both fronts.

Michael O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, supports the hypothesis that the end of NATO’s eastward expansion and the implementation of a zone of neutral nations would reduce tensions with Russia. How do you assess this proposal?

Russia’s western borders have never been safer. NATO enlargement poses no threat to Russia. NATO’s Open Door policy is enshrined in the Washington Treaty and has helped spread stability and prosperity, just like the European Union’s enlargement. And Russia has benefitted from this stability and prosperity as well. Our door remains open to European nations able to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Russia’s western borders have never been safer. NATO enlargement poses no threat to Russia.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

Every country has the right ”to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance.” These principles are enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. All OSCE member states have signed up to these principles, including Russia.

NATO membership is not imposed on countries. All countries that have joined NATO have done so freely, and in accordance with their domestic democratic processes. To join NATO, countries are expected to adhere to the values of NATO, and to meet strict political, economic and military criteria. NATO Allies are keeping the progress of aspirant countries under close review. In any event, accession to NATO is for individual candidate countries and the Alliance to decide. No third country has the right to interfere in this process.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

NATO has kept the peace in Europe for almost seventy years. It is the most successful military Alliance in the world because we have been able to adapt. In an unpredictable world, we will continue to adapt to new challenges and continue to keep our nations and populations safe and secure.

Der Beitrag Gottemoeller: “A demonstration that we stand together” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Professor Nye, in your book “Is the American Century Over?”, written in 2015, you express the expectation that the United States will still be playing a leading geopolitical role in 2041. Have you changed your position after one year of the Trump presidency?

Certainly, Donald Trump has put some doubts in the back of my mind. It is possible that he could derail these predictions. The Americans will generally still have the capacity to play a leading geopolitical role, but I am not sure if they are going to have the will. In the 1930s Americans drew inward, even though they were the strongest country in the world. This led to a terrible decade.

Is it perhaps too early to say after one year?

Trump has drawn upon a strand of populist nationalism which is common now in all countries in the developed world. It is, however, not dominant. If you look at public opinion polls, the majority of Americans still want overseas involvement including cooperation with other countries. But the strand that Trump has called upon is there. Even if Trump goes away, which I hope he will after four years, Trumpism or populist nationalism will persist. So, there is a certain danger that we face. We have to be careful to not just pin it on Trump’s difficult personality.

Trump has drawn upon a strand of populist nationalism which is common now in all countries in the developed world.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

You invented the term “soft power” describing the ability to attract and persuade. Did the United States become less or more attractive under Trump’s presidency?

[related]The evidence is very clear. I wrote a column for Project Syndicate saying that Trump has definitely reduced American soft power. There is a Gallup poll that shows that American attractiveness has gone down in more than 130 countries. There is a similar poll that was taken by Pew with results that were very much like those of the Gallup poll. Finally, there is an index of the soft power called the Soft Power 30 which is published in London by Portland, the British consultancy. The Americans dropped from first place in the last year of Obama to third place in the first year of Trump. That is not just a political statement or bias. There is evidence to substantiate that view.

What can be done to alter this course?

It is going to be difficult for President Trump because he tends to a bullying and unilateralist style which antagonizes others. If you use a phrase like ‘America first’ all the time, by definition this means that everybody else is second. That is not exactly the way to attract others. With that being said, however, let us note that Trump is able to make changes in his policy. Before he was elected he said NATO was obsolete. After a few months in office he discovered NATO was not obsolete. There are a lot of areas where he has initially challenged the traditions of American foreign policy but has come around to embrace those traditions. If you combine that with a resurgence in the economy, which he expects to get through his fiscal stimulus, and if that does not go off the rails into inflation, Trump can recover some of the American soft power. But he has to change his style to be able to fully recover.

If you use a phrase like ‘America first’ all the time, by definition this means that everybody else is second. That is not exactly the way to attract others.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

Which role will the United States be playing especially within NATO in 20 years’ time?

Probably since the 1950s, since the Suez Crisis, there have been articles and predictions about the death of NATO. That is now obsolete. NATO has proven a far more resilient concept and structure because of two reasons: One is the relatively open organization for democratic societies which enables them to interact with each other, more than just at the top level. The second point is that geopolitically, Russia still is a problem or a puzzle. If Russia remains that sort of a puzzle then NATO will not be obsolete. I am leery of these views that say NATO is finished.

And what will the role of the Unites States within NATO look like?

The United States will continue to seek its interests as it has since 1945 in being closely tied to an open and democratic Europe. That requires NATO and American participation in NATO.

Trump’s “America first” strategy seems to foster American protectionism. Does this affect NATO’s strength and the United States’ long-known aspiration to shape the liberal world order?

It does. The attitude which Trump and some of his close advisors have taken, that a trade surplus is a measure of moral failure, is simply not good economics. The basic view of most regular economists is that your trade surplus and deficit has more to do with your savings and investing rates. As Trump has pressed this issue that trade surpluses are rogue and demanded renegotiation, it does spill over into other aspects of alliances. Look at the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement or at the problems that Trump has had with his visits with Chancellor Merkel. This is a real problem.

Trump urges the Europeans to invest more in their military abilities. Is he right?

Asking the Europeans to do more to contribute to common defense has a long, long history. The 2-percent-target goes back many years. But because of his bluster and style Trump may be more credible than Obama on that.

Does he have more credibility by being more forceful in that matter?

Sometimes nastiness as a hard power is more effective than soft power.

Do you think the United States would ultimately appreciate a stronger European commitment within NATO?

The US has been interested in a stronger European military for some time, well before Donald Trump. There was a period when I was in the Defense Department in the 1990s when there were certain fears that France was trying to lead Europe out of NATO or reduce the American role in the alliance. That is ancient history. The view for a decade and more has been that a stronger Europe inside NATO is better for the United States. That is actually a pretty widely shared view among those people in the United States who pay attention to foreign policy.

What are the main and most urgent strategic challenges for NATO?

The issue of the return of great power politics and the issue of how Russia will behave will require a combination both of deterrence and also a way to think about retaining the democratic processes in Eastern and Central Europe. Both challenges are going to be central to NATO. I don’t expect countries like Poland or Hungary to defect to Russia. That is not plausible. But the quality of democracy in some of these former Visegrád countries has been under challenge from this same type of right-wing populist nationalism which has affected the United States. In addition to having a strong deterrent posture to prevent Russia from using its strength to bully its neighbors and expand, both NATO and the European Union have to think about the internal quality of democracy.

The issue of the return of great power politics and the issue of how Russia will behave will require a combination both of deterrence and also a way to think about retaining the democratic processes in Eastern and Central Europe.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

Are you less optimistic than 20 years ago that there will ever be a world in which Russia does not see NATO, the United States and Europe as competitors or even enemies?

20 years ago, we believed there was a profound change going on in terms of democratization and liberalization of Russia. That has been reversed. Part of it may have been mistakes made by the West. The Bush administration’s efforts to expand NATO membership right to the borders of Russia in Georgia and so forth were not appropriate in terms of reassurance for the Russians. But it is also true that some of the changes that occurred inside Russia have to do with problems in Russian society and economy which were not caused by NATO expansion.

But this serves as a good explanation for Russia blaming NATO for its domestic difficulties …

That is right. If one looks back at Putin’s policies and especially his Munich Security Conference speech in 2007, you can see this kind of blaming. The views that we had in the 1990s, when Yeltsin was in power and we used the NATO-Russia Council as a way to integrate Russia into NATO were overly optimistic. But if you take a long-run view we certainly should be hoping that changes inside Russia will allow a Europe that includes Russia again. But I don’t expect that in the near term, unfortunately.

When Obama was president one could get the impression that the relationship with Russia was not at the top of his agenda. Could that change with Donald Trump?

Ironically, one of the things that Trump got right in foreign policy was to think of ways to try to reduce the tensions with Russia and to improve the relationship. It is not that one has to accept Russian behavior. But it is true that Russia is a great power. We have to do business with them. To sharpen antagonism is not healthy for Russia, for Europe and the United States. In that sense, Trump’s insight might have been better even if his motives were somewhat unclear. Putin and the Russian intelligence overachieved in their efforts to interfere in the 2016 election and they have made rapprochement with Russia so radioactive inside American politics that not even Trump can do anything about it.

Putin and the Russian intelligence overachieved in their efforts to interfere in the 2016 election and they have made rapprochement with Russia so radioactive inside American politics that not even Trump can do anything about it.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

The Munich Security Conference 2018 will focus in particular on the future role of the European Union as a global actor and its relations with Russia as well as the United States. What is your opinion on the EU’s future role?

The EU plays a very important role. I have always thought of the EU as a magnet which should draw others towards an open, rules-based society both domestically and internationally. On the other hand, there is a historical danger of Central Europeans like Germany being drawn too much into the Russian orbit. The effort is to build bridges – but sometimes in the effort to build bridges they may go too far. The key question for Europe is whether it is careful enough not to be played by Putin in order to divide the United States from Europe. It is interesting to me that the sanctions were applied to show that a country cannot steal its neighbor’s territory without paying a price. Those sanctions applied after the annexation of Crimea have maintained an important role and the West is not divided on that so far.

Do you think the sanctions should stay for the near future?

Yes. Until you see changes in Russian behavior. One could imagine steps that might be taken to reduce Russian interference in Luhansk and Donbass for example which could lead to some degree of relaxation of sanctions in a step-by-step process. A total removal of sanctions right now would be a mistake.

There is much more movement within the European Union than in the United States. Some countries are in favor of lifting the sanctions …

Correct. Italy and other countries like the former Visegrád countries would like to see more rapid progress than is healthy. What is interesting to see is that the transatlantic relationship has survived these temptations.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

NATO provides a security blanket in the sense of reassurance. Despite of different national interests and different political pressures which tend to pull states in different directions there is an overarching security framework which helps states to avoid rash or desperate types of actions. NATO in that sense is a complement to the EU. But the heart of the future of Europe is obviously to find ways to continue the process that has begun under the rubric of the European Union. That does not mean a federation. The political and public opinion do not back this kind of system right now.

NATO and the EU are complementary, like hard and soft power.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

NATO and the EU are complementary, like hard and soft power. The danger is that the Trump administration disrupts this larger picture. So far – and it is only a little over a year into his presidency – he has adapted more than I expected and has not broken that basic consensus in the Atlantic area. I don’t want to sound like somebody who is a Trump supporter because it is very clear that I am not. But it is important that we keep what he is doing in some degree of perspective. So far he has not broken the basic hard power framework which underlies a smart power policy.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. was interviewed by Juliane Schäuble, head of the politics department at the Berlin daily paper Der Tagesspiegel.

Listen to the Transatlantic Call:

Der Beitrag Nye: “Nastiness can be more effective than soft power” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Part IX of our series: Michael O’Hanlon demands that NATO’s eastward expansion must come to an end. The Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and author of the book “Beyond NATO” suggests an alternative security architecture in Europe. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke he insists that neutral countries should have every option to join any other organization.

O’Hanlon’s main assumptions at a glance:

1. NATO’s eastward expansion has gone far enough
2. Negotiations of Western nations with potentially neutral countries in eastern Europe would reduce the risk of war with Russia
3. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova
4. The neutral countries could join the European Union in the future
5. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination

Dr. O’Hanlon, in your book “Beyond NATO” you outline the hypothesis that the end of NATO’s eastward expansion and the implementation of a “zone of neutral nations” would reduce tensions with Russia. Do you see any signs in the actual political landscape for this approach to be seriously considered?

I am not going to be so audacious as to say that this strategy is being followed now. But it has a chance. Let me add two points. First, I am not the original proponent of this kind of thinking. This architecture is mine. But the basic notion that we have to think differently about the East than we would think about other parts of Europe has a number of other adherents. Henry Kissinger is one, the late Zbigniew Brzezinski another, perhaps even chancellor Merkel. We know that going back to the 2008 NATO summit, president Bush and secretary Condoleezza Rice wanted to expand NATO and give both the Ukraine and Georgia membership action plans to join within a short time. Many Europeans held them back. We already saw foreshadowing of this thinking with European reluctance to go that far.

What is your second point?

I would not propose this architecture simply as a gift to Russia or as a unilateral concession on our part not to expand NATO further. Because for one thing we would be leaving Ukraine and Georgia in the lurch, since we did promise them eventual membership. Secondly, if we conceded this Eastern area as a non NATO zone without making any other efforts to define a new architecture this could almost seem like Jalta II where we are giving Russia its own sphere of influence suggesting, that it should have domineering powers over other countries. I don’t want to propose that.

If we conceded this Eastern area as a non NATO zone without making any other efforts to define a new architecture this could almost seem like Jalta II where we are giving Russia its own sphere of influence suggesting, that it should have domineering powers over other countries.[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

What is at the core of your proposed new security architecture?

[related]The concept combines neutrality with an insistence that these countries have every option to join any other organization that might be open to them. Obviously they are not yet candidates for EU membership. If the European Union ever wanted to include Ukraine and Georgia, Russia would have to say: ‘That is okay.’ Russia also needs to solve Donbass, South Ossetia, and Abchasia, in other words the territorial disputes with Ukraine and Georgia. All these things need to be wrapped together. Or you can’t call it an architecture. If we agree on all of this, here is the additional sweetener for Russia: EU sanctions can be lifted as well, because the idea is that we will actually have created a new path forward. The goal is to normalize the relations with Russia.

In order to call it a strategy something has to happen in return, correct?

Exactly right. It has to be seen as an agreement that requires Moscow to do some things, too. That is fair and even favorable to the neutral countries themselves. I will acknowledge that most of the emails that I have received from the neutral countries since I have published this work have not been that favorable. They see this as an abandonment. I try to argue that this is not an abandonment. Because in fact right now they are being promised something that they will probably never get. I don’t see any realistic movement towards NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia or other former Soviet republics. We have left them out on a limb, exposed and with no protection. My plan is better for those neutral countries. But it will only be better for them if every other prerogative of normal sovereignty is protected.

I don’t see any realistic movement towards NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia or other former Soviet republics. We have left them out on a limb, exposed and with no protection.[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

You believe that NATO’s expansion has gone far enough. Do you thereby call into question that several countries in eastern Europe have decided independently and in a self-determined way to join NATO after the end of the cold war?

This is a very difficult and delicate question. I admit I walk a very fine line. I do not believe the West can go into a negotiation for a new security architecture without any kind of apology to Moscow. I do not try to relitigate previous rounds of NATO expansion except to try to understand how Putin and Russia have gotten to where they are mentally and strategically.

NATO expansion was offered to independent countries that had often been under the Soviet yoke for a long time. Countries that the West helped consolidate their democracies, for example with civilian control of the military, and stability of borders. That was good. That all expanded the zone of peace in Europe and helped a number of these countries make remarkable progress. If you compare Poland to Ukraine today for example, they started out in the post cold war era more or less identical in size, population and GDP. Today, Poland despite its recent problems with governance is three times as wealthy as Ukraine.

Also, NATO worked very hard to reach out to Russia throughout this period creating the NATO-Russia Council and the partnership for peace. Moreover, NATO promised not to station major combat forces east of where they had been located previously. We generally kept to that promise. Now we are slightly modifying that approach but Russia gave us no choice because of the threat they have been posing to the East.

What does your analysis mean for potential future NATO member states?

People sometimes quote the Helsinki final act of 1975 which says that any state should be able to join any organization it wishes. They will say: ‘Doesn’t that mean that Moldova should be able to join NATO if it wants?’ I have three replies to that. First, the 1975 Helsinki final act was a long time ago. It did not really envision the cold war ending with one of the alliances resolving and the other going strong and expanding.

Second, the 1949 Washington Treaty that created NATO explicitly said in Article 10 that membership could be offered to other countries provided that it was seen to be in the interest of the security and strategic stability of the existing members and of Europe in general. It was not an open-ended blank check that anybody who wants in can be immediately assumed to be eligible.

My third argument is a little bit more crass. This almost sounds like Donald Trump. From our perspective one could ask: ‘Why are you assuming that I want to send my daughters to fight and die in the defense of your country?’ If I were an American diplomat I would not say that. But frankly, it reminds people of the stakes. NATO is a mutual defense organization in which the member states are sworn to each other’s protection. The United States has always taken that very seriously. We are the country that would probably bear the largest burden in terms of deployable combat forces apart from any country that has been attacked. We are entitled to ask: ‘Would it be good for us?’

Your core concept centres around a security architecture of permanent neutrality. In the best case, it would include from north to south Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus and Serbia. Are these states willing to stay neutral forever?

First of all, we can’t prevent them nor should we try to prevent them from joining other security organizations or creating new ones. If the Caucasus countries wanted to create a Caucasus security organization that would help them feel like they were part of a common body, prepare for peace keeping missions overseas, handle counter-terrorism locally through coordination, and resolve their own territorial disputes, that might be good. I do not try to rule that out. But NATO should not offer membership to these countries.

If the Caucasus countries wanted to create a Caucasus security organization that would help them feel like they were part of a common body, prepare for peace keeping missions overseas, handle counter-terrorism locally through coordination, and resolve their own territorial disputes, that might be good.[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

How could the neutral countries be integrated into the EU security architecture?

If these countries do join the EU there needs to be some care about the mutual defense provisions of the European Union Treaty which sound almost like the Article 5 provisions of the NATO Treaty. Maybe, those EU security provisions need to be either deleted or clarified for a new member. This would not mean that the entire EU would deploy forces as an entity to the defense of Moldova for example. Because that would violate the spirit of what I am proposing. The main idea is that NATO countries are no longer going to extend their Article 5 protections further east.

It would take huge diplomatic efforts to establish such a neutral zone in eastern Europe. You suggest the following steps: first, setting a new framework within NATO. Second, deliberation with the potentially neutral countries and, third, formal negotiations with Russia. How big is the risk that the Kremlin would perceive this kind of procedure as Western dominance once again?

Since we have the honor of sitting at Atlantik-Brücke’s office right next to the chancellor’s apartment: If someone like her with a greater diplomatic skill and experience than myself liked the main idea, but wanted to pursue it in a somewhat different way, I would be okay with that. I am not insisting that the exact sequence of what I am proposing is imperative. But the NATO members are sworn to each other’s defense. We have agreed that in security terms there is no daylight between us. Therefore, it makes sense to begin any discussion about NATO’s future within the alliance.

Then you have the question: Do we go over the heads of the neutral countries and talk to Moscow or do we involve these countries first? I am not in favor of NATO membership for Ukraine. Period. However, I am sensitive to the fact that Ukrainians are a proud and sovereign people. They deserve protection and safety. They gave up nuclear weapons after the cold war as we asked them to do. We had a promise that we would watch over their security. Arguably, we have failed in that. Rather than just go over Ukraine’s head and start talking to Vladimir Putin about how to divide up the world which is how this would be portrayed if we didn’t allow the neutral states to discuss this with us first, we have to go to them. This cannot be seen as Jalta II. It does not mean we have to keep Putin in the dark. I will send him a copy of my book, and maybe Donald Trump and chancellor Merkel could inscribe it and say: ‘Vladimir, we are trying to do something like this. We look forward to your reactions once we are a little more organized internally.’

It does not mean we have to keep Putin in the dark. I will send him a copy of my book, and maybe Donald Trump and chancellor Merkel could inscribe it and say: ‘Vladimir, we are trying to do something like this. We look forward to your reactions once we are a little more organized internally.’[quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

You argue that it is required that Russia commits to help uphold the security of especially Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. This means, Russia would have to withdraw its troops. For years now there is no indication at all that Russia would agree to such a step. How realistic is this option?

Let me start with the hardest problem: Crimea. Russia will not give Crimea back. And we should not make the entire idea for a new security architecture contingent on Russia giving Crimea back. The way I would finesse that is that we should tell Russia we are not going to recognize the annexation of Crimea but otherwise put the issue aside.

Secondly, in regard to Moldova and the Transnistria region I don’t have a strong view on that question. The Moldovans there may welcome or be willing to tolerate the presence of Russian troops. This issue should be solved through a legitimate mutual agreement between Moldova and Russia that is ratified by the Moldovan parliament.

What does your assessment for eastern Ukraine and Georgia look like?

I know for a fact that Ukraine and Georgia don’t accept Russian troops. Russia is going to have to withdraw its troops. Maybe there could be international peacekeepers or a creation of a temporary buffer zone. We need to establish a credible monitoring body like the OSCE which is already in the Ukraine. Then at some point, maybe give a six month grace period, Russia will have had the opportunity to make enough adjustments to its presence in eastern Ukraine that the OSCE can certify that there is no longer a Russian military presence.

Certainly, in northern Georgia you could argue that there is a Russian speaking population so that autonomy in some kind of concept could be explored. We know that the Minsk II process for Ukraine would envision political autonomy for eastern Ukraine. There are ways for Russia to get an agreement where it can say that it is partially protecting the Russian speakers in those two countries. What is hardest to describe is the resolution of the territorial problems with eastern Ukraine and northern Georgia. Those would take some negotiation. However, we already know the geographic contours of the disputed areas and we know the kinds of autonomy that could realistically be provided.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years‘ time?

NATO is a fantastic organization. I want NATO to stay strong and the European Reassurance Initiative and Operation Atlantic Resolve to continue. We need to clarify to Vladimir Putin that the alliance is fully committed to all 29 member states and that there are no degrees of seriousness, no different categories of which member is truly worthy of Article 5 protection. Everybody is! Any other position would be an invitation to Russian mischief, even more than we are seeing already. I very much want NATO to continue as an Article 5 based, territorial and mutual defense organization for Europe and North America. It has accomplished that goal remarkably. That is by far and away its most important purpose. Even though I am a supporter of the mission in Afghanistan, NATO’s ability to do something like that is far less important than NATO’s ability to vouch for the security of its member states.

We need to clarify to Vladimir Putin that the alliance is fully committed to all 29 member states and that there are no degrees of seriousness, no different categories of which member is truly worthy of Article 5 protection. Everybody is![quoter]Michael O’Hanlon[/quoter]

Let me also add that I admire the European Union. Right now, the deterrence of Russia that we are accomplishing by making sure the Russians don’t come even further into Ukraine for example is largely because of EU sanctions and their ability to deprive Russia of the richest market on earth. This economic power is just as influential in shaping Vladimir Putin’s decision making as anything we are doing within the alliance. Hence, NATO needs to stay closely coupled with the EU. We need the EU to be strong to complement NATO and work together to create this overall western foreign policy of military and economic deterrence which is keeping Putin from doing any more damage than he has already done.

Der Beitrag O’Hanlon: “The goal is to normalize relations with Russia” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..