What does a three-year-old AI start-up have in common with a family business that has survived for centuries? More than I would have expected. During Atlantik-Bruecke’s delegation trip to Milan, I had the opportunity to moderate the roundtable “Lombardy in Transition – Family Business, Innovation and the Future of German-Italian Cooperation.” My two guests represented very different worlds: Martina Domenicali, Co-Founder and CRO of the Milan-based AI company Lexroom, and Professor Josip Kotlar of Politecnico di Milano, whose research focuses on strategy, innovation, succession and family business.

We talked about venture capital and family capital, speed and patience, risk and responsibility – and about the difficult question of how companies manage change without losing what made them successful in the first place. When European start-ups begin to scale Martina’s story is remarkable. At 27, she has helped build Lexroom into one of Europe’s rapidly growing legal AI companies. The company has raised more than $75 million in funding. One part of our conversation stayed with me. In the early stages, capital can still be quite local. Entrepreneurs, investors and family offices in regions such as Lombardy are willing to back new ideas.

Transatlantic investment is an enormous asset

But once the amounts become larger and serious international scaling begins, US venture-capital funds become increasingly important. Lexroom itself is a good example: its $50 million Series B was led by Left Lane Capital, an investment firm headquartered in New York. There is nothing wrong with American capital. Transatlantic investment is an enormous asset. But it does raise an uncomfortable European question: Why are we still not better at mobilising our own capital when our most promising companies start to scale? Starting companies is one thing. Financing them all the way into global companies is another.

“A company does not survive for 400 or 500 years by doing the same thing forever.”

2 500 years – and still changing Professor Kotlar brought almost the opposite perspective. We discussed companies such as Acetaia Giusti, whose history reaches back to 1605, and Beretta, which celebrates 500 years of documented history in 2026. At first sight, they could hardly be further removed from a venture-backed AI company. But their longevity is not the result of avoiding change. A company does not survive for 400 or 500 years by doing the same thing forever. It survives by changing repeatedly without losing its identity. And this becomes particularly difficult during succession.

I know that tension from my own family business, Bornemann Gewindetechnik GmbH & Co. KG, a third-generation German manufacturer specialising in customised threaded spindles and power-transmission threads. Bornemann Gewindetechnik is not 400 years old – we have been around for just over 60. But the basic conflict is familiar. The generation that has spent decades building a company naturally wants to protect it. It knows what can go wrong and has a strong sense of responsibility for what has been created. The next generation sees something else: technologies not yet adopted, investments not yet made, markets not yet entered. I experienced this myself during our succession.

How to convince Karl-Heinz to digitalise his manufacturing company

Years ago, I described this conflict through a fictional German SME owner I called “Karl-Heinz“: a successful, experienced entrepreneur who simply did not see why he should digitalise a manufacturing company that was already working perfectly well. The point was not that Karl-Heinz was wrong. Quite the opposite. If you have spent decades building something successfully, caution is rational. The challenge is to combine that experience with the willingness of the next generation to question what already works. My original article, “So überzeugen wir jeden Karl-Heinz – Digitalisierung bei KMUs”, explores this tension in more detail.

Two forms of capital for change This led me to perhaps the most interesting thought from our discussion. We normally treat venture capital and business succession as completely separate subjects. Perhaps we should not. Venture capital puts money and responsibility into the hands of people who want to build something new. Successful succession puts ownership, capital and responsibility into the hands of a new generation that may need to transform something that already exists. Both are, in a sense, capital for change.

“Europe needs more capital for young companies that want to scale.But we also need to make it easier to finance succession.”

Europe needs more capital for young companies that want to scale. But we also need to make it easier to finance succession, ownership transitions and investment in established SMEs. Because there is enormous innovative potential inside companies that already have customers, employees, technology, production capabilities and access to global markets. Sometimes the missing ingredient is not another technology. It is the willingness – and the ownership structure – to use it.

Why Lombardy matters

Lombardy was a particularly interesting place for this discussion. Milan combines finance, technology and entrepreneurship with one of Europe’s strongest industrial regions and a dense network of specialised and family-owned companies. For German SMEs, Northern Italy is also not simply an export market. It is already part of our industrial value chains. At Bornemann Gewindetechnik, for example, we source some of our steel from suppliers in Northern Italy.

The wider Atlantik-Bruecke programme in Milan therefore went well beyond family business and start-ups. Discussions with business and political leaders, including at Generali, addressed financial markets, industrial competitiveness, supply chains and the question of how Germany and Italy can strengthen Europe’s economic position in a changing transatlantic environment.

For me, the trip left one central question: Are we creating the conditions for the next generation of European entrepreneurs – whether they are founding a company or taking over a 60-, 100- or 500-year-old one – to move fast enough? Europe has no shortage of ideas. Nor does it lack remarkable companies. But we can become much better at getting capital and responsibility into the hands of people prepared to change them. That would be a good place to start.

About the author:
Moritz von Soden is Managing Director and third-generation owner of Bornemann Gewindetechnik GmbH & Co. KG, a German family business specialising in custom precision lead screws, including trapezoidal and ACME threads, for demanding applications in offshore, energy, medical technology and defence. He is also a member of the SME Advisory Council of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs.

Disclaimer: This article was written with the help of AI.

Der Beitrag Milan taught us a lot about entrepreneurship erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

For much of the Cold War, the transatlantic alliance was an quasi-theological in importance. NATO was an article of faith: a united and free West standing against Soviet communism, with America serving as Europe’s permanent guardian. Conservatives from Eisenhower to Reagan were among its most devoted believers, and rightly so. But after the Cold War, this unexamined faith bred complacency. By the 2010s most European allies spent well under the 2 percent of GDP they had pledged to defense, while summit communiqués celebrated “shared values.”

Donald Trump broke the spell. He treated the alliance not as a creed but as a partnership that must serve concrete interests on both sides of the Atlantic. For all the turbulence, the result is a stronger alliance. At The Hague in 2025, allies pledged 5 percent of GDP for defense and security by 2035. European allies and Canada raised core defense spending by nearly 20 percent in 2025. Germany loosened its debt brake to rearm and is emerging as a serious defense provider. Europe is building real military power for the first time in a generation.

American conservatism contains at least three foreign policy strands

This shift will outlast Trump because it reflects a broad conservative consensus, well beyond one man’s temperament. American conservatism contains at least three foreign policy strands, and they disagree on much.

The restrainers, rooted in the populist and national-conservative wing, distrust open-ended commitments and believe Washington has subsidized wealthy allies at the expense of American workers. The prioritizers see China as the defining challenge of the century and want Europe to bear the burden conventional defense against Russia so American power can shift to the Indo-Pacific. The Reaganite internationalists still prize NATO as history’s most successful alliance and see American leadership in Europe as indispensable.

“And none expects a return to the Atlantic world of a Ronald Reagan or George H.W. Bush.”

What is striking is where these strands converge. All three want a Europe that defends itself. All three judge alliances by what they deliver, rather than what they proclaim. And none expects a return to the Atlantic world of a Ronald Reagan or George H.W. Bush. The GOP’s center of gravity has moved to working-class voters wary of distant entanglements. Even Democrats, under Jake Sullivan’s “foreign policy for the middle class,” absorbed much of the same logic. Europeans hoping to wait out Trump for a restoration are deluding themselves.

The conservative vision is not retreat. It is partnership among capable nations, each clear about its own interests, reinforcing the alliance through enhanced capabilities. Many European conservatives share that vision, understanding that sovereignty begins with the ability to defend oneself.

But partnership cuts both ways, and here Europe risks making a serious mistake. Having accepted responsibility for its own defense, Brussels seems to be trying to wall out American industry. The EU’s €150 billion SAFE defense loan program requires roughly 65 percent European content, and a “tech sovereignty” push would steer public cloud and AI contracts toward European providers. Washington has already warned it will review the waivers that let European firms sell into the American defense market.

Co-production and joint ventures, not protectionism

This is self-defeating. Europe’s new money should buy the most capability in the shortest time, and in missile defense, advanced aircraft, space and secure cloud and AI, American firms often deliver what no one else can. Shutting them out hands ammunition to those in Washington who say Europe wants American protection without American partnership; every strand of conservatism would read a “Fortress Europe” the same way. And the real beneficiary of a fragmented Western defense and technology base is Beijing. The answer is co-production and joint ventures, not protectionism.

The alliance has lost its theology. It has gained something sturdier: a hard-headed partnership grounded in shared interests. Conservatives of every stripe can champion that alliance, provided Europe stops mourning the past and stops building its future by shutting out its most important partner.

About the author: Dr. Kenneth R. Weinstein is the Japan Chair at Hudson Institute, where he served as CEO from 2005-2020.

Der Beitrag Why U.S. Conservatives Want Europe to Buy American Arms erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Diese Delegationsreise war nur der erste Schritt in den Bemühungen der Atlantik-Brücke, den europäischen Austausch in dringlichen geopolitischen und geoökonomischen Fragen zu erleichtern. Die Kernidee der Initiative ist eine Abkehr von den rein bilateralen transatlantischen Beziehungen – denn eine gleichberechtigte transatlantische Partnerschaft erfordert ein starkes, geschlossenes Europa. Daher wird die Atlantik-Brücke ihre Mission zur Förderung des europäischen Dialogs fortsetzen: Auf die Reise nach Paris folgt im März 2026 ein Besuch Warschaus.

Zufälligerweise verabschiedete der Deutsche Bundestag nur wenige Tage vor der Reise der Pariser Delegation am 5. Dezember nach wochenlanger Unsicherheit und der ständigen Gefahr einer schweren Regierungskrise das Rentenreformgesetz der Regierungskoalition. Kein Zufall war jedoch, dass die Rentenreform in Paris ein wiederkehrendes Thema war. Sowohl Deutschland als auch Frankreich stehen vor den Herausforderungen einer alternden Gesellschaft, eines zunehmend untragbaren und schuldenfinanzierten Rentensystems und einer politischen Pattsituation, die eine bahnbrechende Rentenreform verhindert.

Nicolas Dufourcq, Generaldirektor der französischen öffentlichen Investitionsbank Bpifrance, hob die übermäßigen öffentlichen Ausgaben Frankreichs für Renten (14 % seines BIP) hervor und skizzierte, wie in einem kürzlich erzielten Kompromiss zur Abwendung eines Regierungssturzes die Rentenreform vorübergehend ausgesetzt und das Rentenalter effektiv unter 63 Jahren eingefroren wurde.

Auch wenn die jüngste Debatte über die Rentenreform in Deutschland weniger dramatisch verlief, kann sich Deutschland den grundlegenden Problemen des demografischen Wandels und der untragbaren öffentlichen Finanzen nicht entziehen – ebenso wenig wie alle anderen Länder in Europa, wenn sie den oft zitierten Draghi-Bericht umsetzen, die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Europas wiederherstellen und eine robuste industrielle Verteidigungsbasis aufbauen wollen.

Europa kann sich Pessimismus nicht leisten

Im Bereich der Außenpolitik unterstrich der Besuch in Paris das gemeinsame Bewusstsein für die Notlage, in der sich Europa derzeit befindet, wie unsere Gastrednerin Frau Romatet-Espagne hervorhob. Dieses Gefühl der Dringlichkeit prägte die Diskussionen der gemeinsamen Konferenz bei ODDO. Die zentrale Frage war nicht mehr, ob Europa aufrüsten muss, sondern vielmehr, wie es dies tun kann und ob gemeinsame Beschaffungen endlich zum Erfolg führen können.

In diesem Zusammenhang wurde kein Stichwort in der Debatte häufiger genannt als FCAS (Future Combat Air System). Das einst als Vorbild für die europäische Zusammenarbeit gepriesene 100-Milliarden-Euro-Projekt für einen deutsch-französisch-spanischen Kampfjet droht nun zu scheitern. Dennoch war die Schlussfolgerung nicht Resignation. Wie Bertrand de Cordoue in unserem Interview mit ihm zu Recht feststellte, kann sich Europa keinen Pessimismus leisten. Auch wenn die fragmentierte Landschaft der Verteidigungsindustrie nicht über Nacht verschwinden wird, bleibt eine effektive gemeinsame Beschaffung der vielversprechendste Weg zu schnelleren, effizienteren und glaubwürdigeren europäischen Fähigkeiten. Es ist schwierig, die Gesellschaft davon zu überzeugen, trotz finanzieller Zwänge in die Verteidigung zu investieren, und die militärischen Anforderungen der verschiedenen Nationen aufeinander abzustimmen.

Diese Debatten zu vermeiden, würde jedoch die Verwundbarkeit Europas nur noch verstärken. Wie der litauische Botschafter Arnoldas Pranckevičius in seiner Grundsatzrede deutlich machte, ist die Zeit für endlose Strategieplanung vorbei. Die Sicherheit Europas hängt nun davon ab, dass Strategien ohne weiteres Zögern in konkrete Maßnahmen umgesetzt werden.

Das europäische Momentum stärken

In einer Welt, die von Rivalität und Disruption geprägt ist, muss Europa seine transatlantischen Beziehungen festigen und seine anderen strategischen Beziehungen und Freundschaften stärken. Die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit ist unerlässlich, um Europa als strategischen Akteur voranzubringen und seine neu gewonnene Stärke zu festigen. Da Bundeskanzler Merz Berlin als europäischen Knotenpunkt für wichtige Friedensverhandlungen etabliert, hat Europa die Möglichkeit, Ergebnisse mitzugestalten, anstatt nur zu reagieren.

Wir bei der Atlantik-Brücke sind entschlossen, unseren Teil zur Stärkung dieser europäischen Dynamik beizutragen. Unsere erste Reise einer europäischen Delegation nach Paris war ein Meilenstein in unserer erneuerten Europa-Strategie. Wir werden weiterhin die Beziehungen auf dem gesamten Kontinent stärken und ein Netzwerk von Partnern und Verbündeten aufbauen, die bereit sind, sich den Herausforderungen unserer Zeit zu stellen. Es ist jetzt an der Zeit, die transatlantischen Beziehungen neu zu interpretieren und mit unseren Verbündeten auf Augenhöhe zusammenzuarbeiten.

Der Beitrag „Die zentrale Frage ist nicht mehr, ob Europa aufrüsten muss, sondern vielmehr, wie es dies tun kann.“ erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Mrs. Flach, after a series of tariff announcements and countermeasures, the United States and China appear to be engaged in a trade war. This will lead to a drastic reduction in Chinese exports to the US. You warn of the risk of Chinese overproduction entering European markets, which could lead to lower prices for German consumers, but also increase competition. Which effect will outweigh the other? And how should Germany respond to this development?

Our simulation exercises show that German imports from China could increase significantly in some sectors in response to the US tariffs imposed on Chinese products, as Chinese firms now search for alternative markets for their products. While this could present an opportunity for some German firms to gain access to cheaper inputs for production, it may also lead to a significant rise in competition that could threaten firms in direct competition with Chinese producers. Therefore, it is important to address potential trade diversion caused by tariffs, not only but especially from China and particularly in products affected by global overcapacity.

[related]

Trump’s position on tariffs is permanently shifting. For now, he has proposed a temporary suspension of certain tariffs on European exports and is hitting China with even higher tariffs. What’s next? What should Europe prepare for?

Europe should prepare to negotiate. While it is important to consider and threaten ways to retaliate, it is equally important to explore opportunities for negotiating tariff reductions, which could lower uncertainty for firms and benefit both sides of the Atlantic. The greatest risk for Europe is currently an escalation of the conflict to the multilateral level, potentially triggering protectionism and fragmentation with unpredictable consequences.

How strong is the EU’s position in all this? What countermeasures do you consider appropriate to restore a functioning system of free trade?

The EU is in a strong position and has tools to act in response to the tariffs. It is important to threaten credible retaliatory measures, even if they come at a cost to European consumers. More importantly, it is crucial to negotiate and to keep unity within the EU, as the market power of the EU plays an important role in the negotiations. I welcome the European Commission’s proposal to eliminate tariffs on industrial products between the US and the EU. We have also simulated a scenario in which both the EU and the US lower their tariffs to match those imposed by the trade partner. In this case, both sides would benefit. This result highlights the crucial role that negotiations play in de-escalating trade conflicts.

Prof. Dr. Lisandra Flach is the Director of the ifo Center for International Economics and Professor of Economics at LMU Munich.

Der Beitrag „The EU is in a strong position” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The first edition of Atlantik-Brücke’s virtual event series on foreign and security policy, “Better Be Prepared”, on Germany’s snap election brought together four parliamentarians of the parties from the democratic center. In this conversation they discuss what they have planned for Germany’s role in Europe vis-à-vis the new U.S. administration, its commitment to NATO and engagement in geopolitics. This is a slightly edited and shortened version of the full transcript of the discussion.

Moderated by Friederike von Tiesenhausen

Atlantik-Brücke: With me today to talk about Trump, trade and defense are four distinguished speakers from the German Parliament. To start us off, I’d like to turn to Jürgen Hardt, who was one of the very few Germans in Washington for the inauguration. What did you take away from that day?

Jürgen Hardt: I’m sure that President Trump has the full support, not only from the two houses of the Congress, but also from the party members on the street. The second point I saw, and this is what we expected to see, is that Trump will be much better prepared for the second term than for his first term in office.

Atlantik-Brücke: What does this mean for German foreign policy?

Hardt: There are two big challenges in foreign and security issues as well as trade issues. President Trump didn’t mention Germany or Europe in his inauguration speech, but he mentioned the automobile industry. He does not know about the fact that the biggest exporter of cars from the United States to the world is not General Motors and not Ford. It’s BMW. In trade generally I expect a big confrontation. We will see concrete actions towards Europe.

In foreign and security issues, Trump has asked Germany to do much more in NATO and Europe as a whole and on Ukraine. Maybe not on the military side, because I think that he will stay with the commitment to the military support for Ukraine, but on the financial support for the state structures, civil and economic development.

Atlantik-Brücke: Nils Schmid, how do you see German foreign policy having to respond to Trump 2.0?

Nils Schmid: There’s a broad consensus on the transatlantic relationship among democratic parties in Germany. Jürgen is maybe a little bit too optimistic about Trump and about the possibilities to deal with him. When it comes to trade and tariffs, for example, you can count on Trump to be very aggressive. The European Union needs to take a unified stand and needs to be prepared for countermeasures. The Trump administration must know that there are consequences to this kind of unilateral measures when it comes to security.

The European Union needs to take a unified stand and needs to be prepared for countermeasures.[quoter]Nils Schmid[/quoter]

 

Let me very briefly just mention the three biggest challenges we have in Europe and the three answers we have to give. The first is the question of security and I fully agree with you that we have to do much more as Europe. This is a question of integration of military and skills in Europe. And of course, it’s about Ukraine. If Ukraine is falling, there’s going to be a huge war around us and within our countries. I fully agree that the second challenge is the question of tariffs and trade.And the third one is technology.

The worst case for Europe is that there are technology battles between China and the US. This is about us just being part of that as part of the American phalanx. This is about our sovereignty, to have our own stakes there. We’ve been not good enough. For all three challenges, we have to come together and find common solutions and there is a huge awareness for that in Europe.

The worst case for Europe is that there are technology battles between China and the US. This is about us just being part of that as part of the American phalanx. This is about our sovereignty, to have our own stakes there.[quoter]Omid Nouripour[/quoter]

And of course, we need a global strategy. China is a rogue state when it comes to the values and when it comes to systemic risk. But we have to cooperate with all of the other countries all across the globe. Especially in the fields, which are not that easy to cooperate with the new U.S. administration.

Atlantik-Brücke: Before we dive more deeply into the issue of trade and how to keep Europe together on this, I’d like to give Gyde a chance to outline what a liberal foreign policy for Germany would look like.

Gyde Jensen: We encourage the ties between the United States and the German Government not only in Washington, D.C., but also in the states in the whole country. This is not only about bringing policies and politicians together, but rather leading by example towards the very strong ties that our societies have. There is a pond between us, but we are democracies, and we breathe the same air.

This is not only about bringing policies and politicians together, but rather leading by example towards the very strong ties that our societies have.[quoter]Gyde Jensen[/quoter]

Germany and Europe should be self-confident when we face negotiations with the Trump administration. There is no need for being timid. We should rather focus on our trade and export driven economy. This is a very good circumstance to actually fly over to the United States and have these talks. This is very much overdue, whenever we have a new set of parliamentarians in the next German Bundestag.

Germany and Europe should be self-confident when we face negotiations with the Trump administration. There is no need for being timid.[quoter]Gyde Jensen[/quoter]

Generally spoken, our foreign policy will have to deal with the prospect in the upcoming years to fight for our freedom. Not only Ukraine is doing that, we also need to step up.

Atlantik-Brücke: Nils, Germany was not exactly able to lead and synthesize a common position in the EU in recent years – for example, on tariffs for Chinese electric cars. What would you do differently in the future so that Europe speaks with this united voice?

Schmid: When it comes to Chinese electric vehicles, you have to admit that the way the EU Commission devised the special tariffs was really ill advised because they punished European importers more than other EU member states.

However, what we need to do, is to stand up against these very narrow-minded ideas about tariffs and trade coming out of the Trump administration. At the same time, especially when it comes to counter growing Chinese influence in world trade, we should offer opportunities of cooperation to the new administration in Washington. And we’ve come to a point where we need to explain to our American friends that if they want to take on China, they need allies in East Asia, countries like South Korea and Japan and others.

We need to explain to our American friends that if they want to take on China, they need allies in East Asia, countries like South Korea and Japan and others.[quoter]Nils Schmid[/quoter]

Atlantik-Brücke: The CDU/CSU election program explicitly mentions the will to push for a new transatlantic trade agreement. Jürgen, people might say, given everything that comes out of Washington at the moment, that seems a bit naive. In what goods and services do you see scope for a new TTIP?

Hardt: Punctually, probably it’s possible to work together, maybe also together with the concept of becoming more independent from Asian markets and special technologies as semiconductors.

But I think, the biggest challenge with the trade policy of President Trump is that he is promoting a way which is harming the United States more than others. There’s a big misunderstanding in national economics, and also with Donald Trump, that the negative trade balance of the United States is a result of a weakness of the US. However, it’s the result of the fact that the US is much richer than the rest of the world, and therefore U.S. citizens have not to do all the work they need to in order to keep their level of welfare. And due to the fact that the U.S. dollar is the world’s reserve currency, the United States is able to compensate that. Therefore, every tariff increase by Donald Trump is mostly paid by American citizens or companies in the United States. Therefore, we need to have an intense dialogue with our colleagues in the Congress.

The biggest challenge with the trade policy of President Trump is that he is promoting a way which is harming the United States more than others.[quoter]Jürgen Hardt[/quoter]

Donald Trump has two imperatives. The first imperative is growth, which is a contradiction to tariffs, and the second imperative is China. From the European side we should tell President Trump that we also have some concerns with the trade policy of China and with the political development in China and that we therefore ask for a common approach, which is not overwhelming China, but limiting its negative impact on trade. We should do that together.

We have a new government in Germany maybe around Easter in the second half of April. In June, we have the European Union summit. Then, we have the NATO summit, probably with Donald Trump, and we have the G7 summit in Canada. For all three events, the new chancellor has to bring a strong position of Germany to the table.

In June, we have the European Union summit. Then, we have the NATO summit, probably with Donald Trump, and we have the G7 summit in Canada. For all three events, the new chancellor has to bring a strong position of Germany to the table.[quoter]Jürgen Hardt[/quoter]

Atlantik-Brücke: The US has asked of Europe for a while, not just under this administration, to pivot away from its dependence on China. Gyde, how should the next German government walk this thin line between de-risking and depriving Germany of this vital export market?

Jensen: If Germany wants to take a strong stance vis-à-vis China, also with regard to the US, we should try to be more one-voiced from a European perspective. It would help if Europe could agree more on one direction towards China. Nobody else can help us to do this.

If Germany wants to take a strong stance vis-à-vis China, also with regard to the US, we should try to be more one-voiced from a European perspective.[quoter]Gyde Jensen[/quoter]

We should focus more on diversifying also with other Asian countries. Diversification would also help towards restraining China’s influence in our European partner countries. On the other hand, the German and European companies still need the Chinese market.

Atlantik-Brücke: Let’s move on to defense and NATO. Germany has in recent years finally reached the 2% goal of spending of GDP for defense matters. Omid, wouldn’t it be honest to say to the population in Germany that security has a price tag, and we now have to prioritize security over social spending?

Nouripour: This is not about playing these two issues against each other. More security needs more investment. We have a huge lack of investments for the last decade in the German armed forces. It’s about more than 2% that we have to spend if you want to modernize the armed forces in a sufficient way. This is why my party is talking about 3.5%.

But you know, at the end of the day, it’s not about figures, it’s about what is needed and the war in Ukraine. Every single penny we are spending in these days for defense is preventing the next war in Europe. And we have to also fulfill our obligations within NATO.

Every single penny we are spending in these days for defense is preventing the next war in Europe.[quoter]Omid Nouripour[/quoter]

Atlantik-Brücke: Jürgen, do you feel there’s enough honesty about this trade-off in the German election campaign between spending for security in contrast to other policy areas?

Hardt: A better performance of Germany’s economy would first lead to more income on the state side. We as CDU also plan to take some areas out of the federal budget, for example special investment in infrastructure.

Even if we increase our defense expenditure significantly, it will not be done tomorrow to reach new capabilities. Investments in the German Bundeswehr will take some years to fully materialize. Germany, and this is my proposal probably for the NATO Summit, should also do more on the qualitative side. The Bundeswehr should become the main pillar of NATO in Europe. This should be an offer that also might impress Trump and Republicans in Washington. But this needs to be well prepared.

Atlantik-Brücke: I’d like to give Nils the chance to comment on this. What is the single most effective step Germany can take to strengthen the European pillar in NATO?

Schmid: First of all, let me say that I emphatically disagree with my two colleagues. We need an honest debate about how to finance bigger spending on defense. This has been a blind spot for many years and there are only three ways you can increase spending for armed forces. The first is to raise taxes. The second is to cut other expenditures, and the third is to raise the public deficit. Most probably we will need all three ways.

But with the current debt brake in place, we will not be able to fulfill the obligations of a decent state for our citizens, be it external or domestic security, be it social security, be it infrastructure spending. So, we need to fix this on the national level by reforming the debt brake, our constitutional balanced budget rule. Or as an alternative, we need to flexibilize European rules on public debt, the so-called Maastricht rules of the Stability Pact. This needs to be implemented as soon as possible, because we are now in a situation where we urgently need to do more for defense.

We should also streamline spending of European governments, first of all by harmonizing technical standards and reducing the diversity of weapons programs run by European governments, but also secondly by investing into common projects. This is also some news for our American partners. We will buy more European military equipment in the future, otherwise we cannot develop a strong European defense industry.

For a transitional period, we will need to purchase a modern weaponry from our American friends, as the German government under Chancellor Scholz did by acquiring F-35 fighter planes for nuclear sharing and for European air defense. But in the long-term perspective, this will be very much about procuring European weapon systems from European producers.

Atlantik-Brücke: Jürgen and Gyde, don’t you think, given the changed geopolitical circumstances, there is a case for doing all those three things that Nils has mentioned?

Hardt: A discussion on the debt brake might be misunderstood in other European Union member states, especially in member states of the eurozone. I fear that in case that Germany is losing its restrictions on spending, others will follow. And I fear that we will have a second euro crisis on the horizon, if Germany is losing its strong measures.

But on the other hand, we have this 100 billion Euro extra budget agreed on for the German Bundeswehr by changing the constitution, without harming the debt brake. So, we have the concept.

Jensen: There should be enough money in our budget currently, even within the debt brake, for us to ensure a quality of procurement and of capacity building for our armed forces.

We should not discuss so much about numbers, whether it be now 2% or 3.5%, but rather on having a strong economy which allows us to focus on better defense spending. I wouldn’t focus on the sheer numbers, but rather on the quality of the spending.

We should not discuss so much about numbers, whether it be now 2% or 3.5%, but rather on having a strong economy which allows us to focus on better defense spending.[quoter]Gyde Jensen[/quoter]

Atlantik-Brücke: I’d like to touch on two geographical issues. One is Ukraine, quite obvious, and the other is the Arctic. Omid, what do you see as Germany’s contribution to bringing about and possibly maintaining a peace in Ukraine?

Nouripour: The core of the conflict in Ukraine is about the right of self-determination of the Ukrainian people. If the Ukrainian people at the end tell us that they want to come to the table of negotiations and they are ready to freeze this line or that line of the front and they are ready to not give up, but understand that for the next couple of years, maybe they will not achieve the entire recovery of their territorial sovereignty, this is what we have to respect.

The core of the conflict in Ukraine is about the right of self-determination of the Ukrainian people.[quoter]Omid Nouripour[/quoter]

But this is not about Washington, Moscow, Brussels, Berlin or whomever to tell the Ukraine people what the solution for their country is. If you do not understand this as the core of the conflict, we all are going to lose. And then Moscow is going to win.

This is why we support back channel talks in these days and I’m very happy that the timeline of the new U.S. administration is not 24 hours of a solution. It’s rather six months or more.

This is all about the countries in Europe, especially our closest partners in Eastern and Central Europe, in Poland and the Baltics. We have to understand that the entire calculation of Putin is to divide Europe through his full-scale escalation in Ukraine.

Atlantik-Brücke: I’d like to turn to the Arctic. The floated idea that Trump would like to buy Greenland is very much on the agenda again. Nils, what are the German and European interests in this region now that the ice around the North Pole is melting and shipping routes and routes for military vessels are opening up?

Schmid: Certainly, we do have a strategic interest in the future of the Arctic. We have a very strong position as Europeans and Americans, especially when it comes to Greenland, because this is all NATO area, and we should respect that. Americans and Europeans should try to fend off opponents, especially China and Russia from interfering in these areas.

You may only count on hard power in some circles of Washington, but I would presume that soft power is still part of foreign policy, and the Trump team should not underestimate the value of soft power.[quoter]Nils Schmid[/quoter]

What I sense is a terrible drop in American soft power in the last two weeks since Trump took over. You may only count on hard power in some circles of Washington, but I would presume that soft power is still part of foreign policy, and the Trump team should not underestimate the value of soft power.

Nouripour: If one U.S. soldier enters Greenland, this will be the end of NATO, and it would encourage Russia to invade the Baltics. The U.S. administration has to understand that the consequences would be huge and that it would be their responsibility.

Atlantik-Brücke: I’d like to synthesize a couple of questions that have come in on the chat function. One of our audience members phrases that Trump appears poised to make disruptions. Jürgen, what are areas where you see the US and Germany and Europe being able to positively disrupt something together?

Hardt: In the field of technology, we have to make sure that not only China occupies special modern technologies and creates a monopoly. We need to have a diversification in this area. We are much stronger if we match capabilities of Europe and North America by building two big pillars of development that are in competition and therefore better than all the others. We should definitively enhance our joint activities in the Trade and Technology Council (TTC).

 

Atlantik-Brücke: One last question: Nils, which countries do you think will lead a European foreign policy?

Schmid: Within the European Union, it certainly will be the Weimar Triangle, and we had to wait for a very right-wing government in Poland to be vanquished by a more modern government to revitalize this format, and I think now is the time to recharge this initiative.

And we should not forget about Great Britain. I believe that when it comes to foreign and security policy, as we’ve seen over the last three years in Ukraine, the contribution of the United Kingdom can be crucial, and we should consider closer ties between the European Union and Great Britain in the future.

Jürgen Hardt is the Foreign Policy Spokesman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group. Gyde Jensen is the Deputy Chairwoman of the FDP Parliamentary Group. Omid Nouripour until recently was the Chairman of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and is a Member of the Board of Atlantik-Brücke. Nils Schmid is the Foreign Policy Spokesman of the SPD Parliamentary Group.

Friederike von Tiesenhausen is Global Head of Public Affairs at Bloomberg LP and a Member of the Board of Atlantik-Brücke.

Der Beitrag “We are much better prepared for Trump than in 2017” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

[related]During the discussion, Rudd and Gabriel touched upon a whole range of issues: Ideologically, Rudd described the shift which has taken place under President Xi, as well as China’s efforts to rebuild its status as a globally leading nation, both economically and militarily. Rudd and Gabriel reflected on China’s experience with European colonialism and how this still impacts political decision-making today. In addition, our guest speakers exchanged views on the role of the private sector whose economic growth has declined in recent years, as well as the consequences associated with those developments on a global and domestic level. Rudd pointed to Xi Jinping increasingly taking a harder line against private companies whom he perceived as a threat to his power.

Finally, Rudd gave some recommendations as to how the West, which he suggested to refer to with the more inclusive phrase “Democratic World”, could respond to China’s policies. He pleaded for the definition of “guardrails for strategic competition”. Rudd also expressed the need for clear red lines between the U.S. and China to reduce the risk of escalation in the future, be it in the economic sphere or in a geopolitical context –  as in the case of Taiwan.

Atlantik-Brücke would like to thank the Australian Embassy in Berlin as well as Allianz SE for making this event possible.

Der Beitrag The State of the Chinese Economy and Implications for Western Alliances erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..