“A whole-of-society effort”

We stand at the threshold of a new world order. For more than 30 years, we have lived in peace in Europe. That is over. If the West fails to defend our liberal values, we will become the plaything of autocrats.

By Carsten Breuer

International conflicts and their effects are increasingly coming into our consciousness with great force. They are becoming topics of conversation not only on news programs, talk shows, and in surveys, but also at the kitchen table at home. The defense of our security has long ceased to be an abstract task—it is a concrete necessity. This is especially apparent when looking at Ukraine. Russia’s illegal war of aggression has lasted nearly four years. Above all, it is a war of attrition. We see high-tech drones in trench warfare, archaic violence in war crimes in Bucha, and battles to the bitter end in Bakhmut. Putin’s neo-imperialist ambitions have already cost hundreds of thousands of lives. And there is no end in sight. Russia switched to a war economy some time ago.

Its military now receives more spending than all other policy areas combined. Weapons and ammunition are being produced at full speed or, in some cases, refurbished from old stockpiles. Not all of this goes directly to the front, but also to new military units currently being established along the entire NATO eastern flank. Personnel-wise, Putin is preparing for further confrontations: by the end of 2026, Russian armed forces are expected to grow significantly again, to around 1.5 million soldiers. That is twice as many as before the war began on February 24, 2022. According to military analysts, Russia could be capable of launching large-scale attacks on NATO territory within a few years.

Not necessarily as a campaign of conquest, but perhaps as intensified provocation right at the brink of open war, aiming to undermine the Western alliance system, weaken NATO’s security guarantees, and expand its own sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. This is not a prediction, but a plausible possibility. We must take seriously the intentions and goals behind this massive rearmament. Putin is not interested in expanding his massive empire by a few square kilometers. He wants a new world order, and he wants to achieve it through force. Analysts view 2029 as a potential “culmination point,” but the threat is already real today. Putin has long viewed himself as being engaged in a “(shadow) war” against the West. This is evidenced by the increasing number of hybrid attacks that Europe is exposed to.

Even in Germany, we observe a wide range of systematic attacks in the gray area between peace and war: cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, severed data cables in the Baltic Sea, sabotage planning, drone-assisted espionage, disinformation campaigns on social media, and even foiled attack plans. All these “pinpricks” are intended to shake confidence in our state. They aim to undermine the cohesion of our societies. Germany plays a particular role—as Ukraine’s main supporter in Europe and as a hub for the Allies in deploying to NATO’s eastern flank. These hybrid attacks strike us—deliberately scalable and capable of being scaled—at the boundary between internal and external security, specifically at the intersection of different responsibilities. It is essential to act in a coordinated fashion at this point of entry, both nationally and internationally.

“Russia’s quest for power remains, for the foreseeable future, the greatest and most immediate threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.”

Russia’s quest for power will remain, for the foreseeable future, the greatest and most immediate threat to the Euro-Atlantic area. But it is by no means the only one. Across the globe, other crisis hotspots demand our vigilance. The conflict in the Middle East—or rather, conflicts—continue to concern us and require action. Crises overlap, blend into one another, and reinforce each other. And every conflict has the potential to have global effects. This can be seen, for example, with North Korea, which is supporting Russia in the war against Ukraine with soldiers and weapons. Resources flow back—not only financial, but military expertise and, above all, weapons components, including those for carrier rockets that can be equipped with nuclear warheads. Thousands of North Korean soldiers are fighting against Ukraine—and dying for Russia.

“We must view all the seemingly separate crises and theaters of war in the world as a whole.”

The losses are immense, but this way North Korean soldiers gain combat experience. Their baptism of fire against Ukraine increases the combat effectiveness of all North Korean armed forces. What is already clear: this destabilization through such interactions is occurring not only in Europe but also in East Asia. These complex interconnections make it clear: we must view all these seemingly separate crises and theaters of war around the world holistically, from a 360-degree perspective. We must recognize and discuss dependencies, interactions, and connections at all levels of action. In military terms: we have to consolidate the strategic situation, draw the necessary conclusions—at the speed required. And right now, that speed is very high. We are at the threshold of a new world order. In this period of upheaval, the West—and we—bear the responsibility to defend our liberal values with resolve. If we do not engage, we risk becoming the plaything of autocrats. This is not only a moral duty, but a fundamental realpolitik self-interest.

A world in which the rule of law is replaced by the law of the strong is something we cannot and must not accept. And in terms of global challenges, the world is shrinking: crises, and possible solutions, are moving closer together. This challenges us as never before. And it won’t get easier. That is why readiness is today not only our own currency, but that of the entire NATO. For more than 30 years, we have lived in peace in Europe. That is over, and it is hard to get used to. But we have no choice. Credible deterrence is our “best-case scenario.” At the NATO Summit in The Hague in June 2025, all 32 Allies agreed on how and with what military means they will position themselves in the future. They set out, in binding terms, who will take responsibility in which areas.

After the United States, Germany provides the second-largest so-called capability package. We are on the way to becoming the engine of European defense. This means, for example, that we will establish new combat troop units, broaden our industrial base, and strengthen multinational cooperation. Ultimately, it also means that in the future we will spend 3.5 percent of GDP on defense and 1.5 percent on military infrastructure. With the help of the special fund, we have already set many things in motion: we have ordered tanks, ships, aircraft, drones. We expect key deliveries this and next year; unfortunately, armaments are not available off the shelf like at the hardware store around the corner. With the constitutional amendment that exempts defense spending above 1 percent of GDP from the debt brake, we have made another major step to cope with the expanded range of orders.

We have put security first. We now no longer have a time-limited special fund, but an uncapped budget. Uncapped, however, does not mean unlimited. More than ever before, we must justify every cent to the parliament. We can do that. And we will do so. We have already prioritized which capabilities the Bundeswehr needs most urgently. These include systems for air defense, as well as ammunition and means for electronic warfare, among others. It is important that not only the Bundeswehr now has planning certainty, but also industry and startups that must first ramp up their capacities. Equally important is looking well beyond 2029 at the future of warfare. That is why we must think and plan in at least two categories: In the short term, until 2029, the priority is readiness. In the long term, far beyond 2029, it is anticipation, flexibility, and keeping pace with disruptive developments.

Because we now have new technological possibilities that are changing the established paths of technology development and military strategy. In the past, the military was the driver of technological development—today, it is the reverse: technological progress generates strategic challenges. Long term, this will also influence the development of our doctrine and lead us to rethink war—even down to the battlefield. The innovation cycle for drones in Ukraine, for example, is about two weeks. We need to be similarly agile in peacetime—even without war dictating it. Threats on the battlefield force armed forces to constant adaptation. Therefore, we must also become more flexible, agile, and consequently faster in procurement. Wherever necessary, we must also break new ground. We must ask: Where are we not looking today—what do we not yet know, what can we not yet grasp?

But also: How do we ensure the Bundeswehr becomes both a driver of technology and can quickly and reliably incorporate new technologies? There are cooperation opportunities, for example, in the digitization and flexibilization of defense systems through software-based control, in Software Defined Defence. The use of artificial intelligence to analyze data or to support military decision-making is another field where armed forces depend on research and development in business and industry. Therefore, there must be close coordination between business and military strategy development.

“The responsibility for our security and freedom cannot rest solely on uniformed shoulders. It is a task for society as a whole.”

Clearly, the current threat situation can only be met with a comprehensive societal effort, with united forces—state and private. The armed forces are only as strong as the defense industry that stands behind them. It is not only about the ability to innovate, but also about the willingness to take risks—for a higher good.

Soldiers are trained to take risks. They must be able to fight and win. Because they have to win. This does not only apply to soldiers. NATO currently has around 500,000 men and women in high readiness. But for me it is equally clear: responsibility for our security and freedom cannot rest solely on uniformed shoulders. It is a task for society as a whole. Only together can we defend our country; only together can we deter. We must think and act holistically, even now in peacetime. We must become more closely and strongly interlinked. That lays the foundation for resilience. A combat-ready Bundeswehr is only one side of the coin. On the other side, we need equally resilient civil structures—in other words: a society capable of defense.

Both together create the prerequisites for credible deterrence. We soldiers may be the ones who win battles—but modern wars must be confronted by and with a society. The economy plays a major part. The better and faster we can equip our armed forces, the better we will be able to deter. And we must deter. The more credible our deterrence, the greater our chances of protecting the freedom so dear to us. The better our prospects of living in the future as we do now—and of preventing war in Europe. We will only succeed with this effort together—carried by the certainty that a life in freedom and security is worth it.

About the author: Carsten Breuer is a general in the German Army and, since March 17, 2023, the 17th Inspector General of the German Armed Forces.

[Disclaimer: This text was originally written in German. The English translation was produced with the help of AI.]