For the 45th edition of Atlantik-Brücke’s flagship program, 18 Americans and 29 Germans from diverse
fields, including government, corporate, startups, and media, came together in Detroit to embrace varied
perspectives, forge new connections across disciplines, industries, and continents, discuss the pressing
issues of our time, and constructively challenge the status quo.

Considering implications of geopolitical shifts for Germany and the US

After an immersive get-together on the arrival day, the first days of the conference focused on developing
and discussing political, economic, and social scenarios for a world in 2029, considering potential
geopolitical shifts and their implications for Germany and the US in particular. Several breakout sessions
provided an in-depth analysis of potential futures for Germany and the US, emphasizing the importance of
strategic foresight in anticipating and navigating complex global challenges. Following this, eminent
leaders from academia, the economy, and state politics provided insights into political and economic trends
in Michigan and the broader Midwest, as well as Michigan’s significance as a swing state in the upcoming
presidential election.

[related] Further discussions centered on developing a transatlantic perspective on pressing political, economic, and social questions that are expected to gain importance in the coming years. Regarding technological disruption, managing AI and balancing innovation with regulation for business, security, and society was identified as a key issue. In discussions on how to strengthen democracy and social cohesion in Germany and the US, the group proposed various tangible measures, such as investing in local and balanced journalism, funding exchange programs, promoting media education, and incentivizing community-building activities or civil service for young people.

Another group focused on exploring Western security strategies against rising authoritarian powers, proposing periodic military-to-military engagements to encourage European and Indo-Pacific military observers to attend US and allied joint military exercises.

“Conversations touched on transatlantic cooperation on clean energy and sustainability”

From a diplomatic perspective, further approaches included encouraging more diplomatic engagement to
support Ukraine and Taiwan across both regions. On the economic front, the discussions advocated for
greater resistance against monopolistic behaviors and corruption. In terms of geo-economic statecraft in
21st-century innovation, key proposals included establishing a US-European semiconductor research
institute, enhancing partnerships with the Global South, such as through infrastructure investments, and
fostering digital cultural youth exchanges. Other deep conversations touched on transatlantic cooperation
on clean energy and sustainability, sharing lessons on migration, and investing for stability and prosperity
in the Global South.

Field trips to Detroit’s inner city

After these two days of intense and thought-provoking discussions, the group embarked on several field
trips to Detroit’s inner city. First-hand insights into the revitalization of Detroit’s urban core, its reinvention
as America’s automotive capital, and its ongoing transformation into a vibrant hub for startups and
technological innovation thoroughly reshaped our perspectives on the city that long stood as a symbol of
the decline of the US industrial heartland.

Another dimension was added with a closer look at Detroit’s cooperation with its Canadian neighbor, the city of Windsor. The diversity of the greater Detroit area and the critical role of its Arab-American communities in the upcoming presidential elections were discussed with the Arab-American mayors of Dearborn and Hamtramck. A visit to the world-renowned Ford Rouge Factory complex marked the beginning of the fifth conference day and provided the group with not only a glimpse into the complex’s century-spanning history but also a close-up observation of modern-day assembly line production.

“UAW president Shawn Fain delivered an impressive report on the association’s work”

As a counterpart and complement, the next appointment led the group to the United Auto Workers labor union, where UAW president Shawn Fain delivered an impressive report on the association’s work and the 2023 strike against the Big Three automakers, which gained national attention and resulted in record concessions for auto workers across America. A guided tour through a revitalized quarter of the city and a dinner hosted by a renowned couple of art collectors concluded the day, leaving the Young Leaders with a lasting impression of Detroit’s hands-on mentality as well as the diversity and richness of African-American art and culture in the city.

An expert panel on Detroit’s and Michigan’s role as a hub for life sciences opened the final day of the
conference, highlighting the importance of transatlantic cooperation, particularly in research. Following
this, two US Air Force generals shared their experiences on sustainability, resilience, and readiness,
providing valuable advice on leadership in an increasingly complex environment. Further expert
discussions on supply chain resilience, the use of AI in fintech, and Detroit’s outstanding role in music
completed three days of immersive field trips and gave us significant final impressions of a city we will
never see in the same light again.

The experience throughout one week of programming, discussions, and immersive activities was nothing
short of transformative. From on-site visits to engaging with local journalists, state senators, investors,
entrepreneurs, and artists, the program offered a deep dive into the remarkable urban renewal of Detroit’s
metropolitan area. The group witnessed firsthand how a courageous investment community, committed
business and policy representatives, fearless community leaders, and inspiring cultural thought leaders
came together to drive a profound transformation of the city’s economic and social ecosystem. At the same
time, we immersed ourselves in the political and societal landscape of a key swing state leading up to the
presidential election in November.

Key takeaway: Embracing diverse perspectives

The key takeaway of the conference was evident to all attendees: Embracing diverse perspectives and
engaging with peers who constructively challenge one’s thinking and offer fresh insights is among the most
rewarding and enriching experiences. As leaders in business ecosystems, societies, and democracies on
both sides of the Atlantic, we can achieve more when we understand each other, adopt each other’s
perspectives, and partner closely. At the heart of it all are shared values, joint ambitions, commitment, and
curiosity to lead through continuous change in an ever-evolving world, rather than just following the pack.
Here’s to the new friendships, broadened perspectives, and shared commitment to shaping a brighter future!

Der Beitrag Young Leaders Conference 2024: “Why follow when you can lead?” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Der Beitrag What the Young Leaders have to say! erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Thank you, Julia, for the kind introduction and thank you to Atlantik Brücke and TBI for hosting me here today. I have visited Germany more often than any other country during the Biden Administration. This speaks not only to the depth, but also the breadth of the U.S.-German partnership on economic, climate, and national security, issues. But as you all know, the foundation of our partnership is deeper than our shared interests. Our people share the same values, including a deep and abiding commitment to promoting democratic values at home and abroad.

I’ve come to Berlin on the back of a trip to Kyiv, where I had a chance to meet my counterparts and brave Ukrainians who have been resilient in the face of unyielding war. I was reminded that Ukraine remains a democratic country today because its people are willing to fight for freedom.

[related]Over two years ago, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin expected to be in control of Kyiv within days and the entire country within weeks. But Ukraine stood up, and our coalition stood beside them, denying the Kremlin the quick victory it expected. And as the Ukrainian people fought off advancing Russian troops, we put in place unprecedented sanctions that cut off Russia’s largest banks from our financial systems and shackled the Kremlin’s war chest by immobilizing its sovereign assets held abroad.

In response to its strategic failure, the Kremlin has now committed nearly half a million troops to this unprovoked invasion and imposed a set of draconian capital controls to prevent money from escaping from Russia. As Russia’s strategy evolved, so did our approach.

On one end, the United States, Germany, and our coalition provided Ukraine with weapons to defend against Russia’s aggression on the frontlines and economic support to bolster its resilience on the home front.

On the other, we took steps to isolate Russia from the global financial system and cut off the Kremlin’s access to the goods they need to build everything from tanks to bombs. Simultaneously, we went after Russia’s main revenue source through a price cap that reduced Russia’s oil profits. Putin’s own spokesmen openly acknowledged that our sanctions and enforcement actions are impeding Russia’s ability to get the goods they need, limiting their profits, and further restricting their remaining financial channels.

One of our objectives in taking these steps was to force the Kremlin to make the hard choice between preserving the potential of its economy and continuing to fund its war of choice. Well, the Kremlin has made its choice. It has chosen to wage its illegal war over investing in the Russian people.

The War Economy

Putin has decided to turn Russia into a war economy, where the entire industrial base is geared toward his war in Ukraine. Gone is a commitment to building a prosperous Russian middle class connected to the world and expanding opportunity. The Kremlin is instead creating an economy inspired by the Soviet era—prioritizing guns over butter and military ambition over the welfare of its citizens.

Within this economy, Russia allocated 29 percent of Russia’s total budget this year for defense spending, more than double its 2021 level. Production of military-industrial goods has risen by 35 percent.

To do this, Russia is depleting its economic buffers, draining foreign exchange reserves and driving up inflation. Over a million young workers have left the labor force because of conscription or emigration. The Russian economy is less diversified today than prior to the war and will continue to move backwards. Meanwhile, Russia is nationalizing a wave of companies, including the autotrader Rolf, the chemical company Metafrax, and the metals producer Kompaniya Etalon. And the international private sector exodus shows no sign of reversing as Russia has revealed itself to be an unreliable trade partner for investors.

Beyond the data, you can see the Russian economy transforming in small but illustrative ways. A Russian bakery stopped baking desserts and started producing drones. A company that made camping gear for hikers pivoted to making sleeping bags for soldiers.

Perhaps the clearest example of the fundamental change in how Putin views the importance of industry to his military ambitions is the fact that he named an economic advisor, Andrey Belousov, to lead the Russian Ministry of Defense. What this should signal to us all is that Putin is focused on making sure the Russian economy can power Russia’s war machine.

Throughout this war, our actions have forced Russia into making difficult economic choices. First, it was to accept geopolitical and financial isolation in order to wage its war. Now, it is to abandon its domestic economic priorities to prolong its war. Each time Russia has made one of these choices, we have adapted our own policies in response to further increase pressure. We must do so again.

We must recognize that while the reconfiguration of Russia’s economy has real costs for the Russian people, it has the potential to make the Russian military stronger than it was before this war started. Russia’s ambitions are not just to replenish its war equipment but to build a stronger, more powerful military that surpasses what it had before the invasion began. Putin’s goal is to subjugate Ukraine, with his troops stationed at the border of Poland, Finland, and the Baltics. Failure to stop Putin now risks a resurgent Russia directly threatening NATO.

That’s why this war is not just an existential threat to Ukraine, but to Europe and our national security. And that’s why this is not a moment for incrementalism, but a time for our coalition to take decisive steps to cut off Russia’s access to the goods it needs to build the weapons the Kremlin wants. This includes looking to expand our sanctions and export control regime to capture the fact that Russia’s entire economy is now on a war footing.

Russia’s Main Partner

To be successful, we have to be clear-eyed about how the Russian military-industrial complex works. Right now, we know the Kremlin does not have the ability to build its war economy without external support. Russia has always needed goods from abroad to support its industrial base. For many decades, companies in this room and across the G7 provided the electronics, engines, and other components that powered Russian machinery. Our decision to cut Russia off from these goods made it more difficult for the Kremlin to build the tanks and bombs it needs to sustain its war of choice.

Russia has now adapted by deepening ties with Iran, North Korea, and particularly, China. Last year, Russia imported $5.2 billion worth of sensitive, dual-use goods from China-based suppliers, an increase of over 40 percent in just one year. The Kremlin knows it can only meet its military goals with China’s assistance. This is why President Putin was in China two weeks ago. It’s why he toured the Harbin Institute of Technology, which is known for research of rockets, missiles, and UAVs, and which recently opened a joint campus with St. Petersburg State University.

No other country has the capacity to supply Russia with the quantity of machine tools, microelectronics, and other goods the Kremlin needs to build weapons. Beijing may not be sending tanks or missiles to Russia, but the Kremlin cannot produce these weapons at scale or continue its war without the assistance of companies and financial institutions in China.

In addition, many of the goods from our coalition’s countries that are still being found in Russian military equipment are largely being transshipped through China. There is more we can and must do in our countries to prevent transshipment through third countries, but we must recognize that Chinese firms today are Russia’s indispensable partner in building weapons.

I want to be clear: our goal is not to shut down all bilateral trade between Russia and China. Our goal is to convince China to stop sending Russia a set of dual-use goods that are actively being used to prosecute a war Beijing has told us they want to see end. We have provided China and other countries around the world with a list of these dual-use goods that are being used to make weapons for the battlefield. Many countries have stopped selling these dual-use goods to Russia, but the partnership between China and Russia has only deepened.

And this partnership may seem like a distant threat to our companies and our countries. But we should remember that before this war started, we often talked about our concerns with Europe’s dependence on Russian gas and the need to diversify supply chains. That too was once a distant threat. But the consequences of inaction became apparent when Russia weaponized its energy exports. Once again, there are warning signs flashing. This time because of Chinese support for the Russian military-industrial base. We should not be blind to the fact that a growing Russian military with material support from Chinese companies will only grow in ambition.

Our Response

That’s why we must be explicit with every individual, company, and country that providing the Russian military-industrial complex with support is unacceptable.

This needs to start at home, including with companies within our countries. As Ukrainians have directly raised with me, Russian weapons found on the battlefield have American- and European-branded components. The United States is engaging with our manufacturing, distribution, and freight forwarding firms to build out better compliance regimes to prevent our goods from ending up in Russia. We need our allies to do the same housekeeping with their private sectors, and we need companies around the world to take similar steps.

When the private sector doesn’t act, we are ready to. That includes taking action against companies in countries that are facilitating transactions to help the Russian military industrial complex get these goods. We must also strengthen our domestic customs and export control enforcement in order to make sure that unscrupulous companies in our countries cannot support the Russian war machine.

Every country in our coalition and every member of NATO must also consistently and clearly communicate to Beijing that it is unacceptable for Chinese to abet the Russian military-industrial base. President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and Secretary Yellen have joined with European leaders to raise this issue in varying degrees with PRC leadership.

And while our words matter, our actions matter more. The EU as a whole is China’s largest export market, and China remains the largest exporter in key sectors like chemicals and machinery to the EU. We recognize the EU’s economic relationship with China is mutually significant, and we must make the choice stark for China: Chinese firms can either do business in our economies or they can equip Russia’s war machine with dual-use goods. They cannot do both.

We must make clear to Chinese companies that we are all prepared to use our sanctions and export controls to hold them accountable. And the United States, Europe, and all of our allies have to act together in following through by using our economic tools so that there is no daylight between our policies.

Of course, our preference is to not have to use these tools. Our economies are intertwined with China’s. We do not seek to decouple from China. We want a healthy economic relationship with China that benefits both sides. But if China does not put a stop to the trade of dual-use goods to Russia, we will have to take action to hold them accountable.

I recognize that if we are forced to take these steps, many in this room may worry about the economic repercussions to our companies and our economies. But my view is that failure to convince China to stop selling dual-use goods to Russia poses a significant threat to Europe’s national security – to global security – which in turn will disrupt our economic futures. A resurgent, militarized, and mobilized Russia would mean greater geopolitical challenges to our economies. It would mean a greater threat of economic coercion. And it would mean tough trade-offs between defense spending and other priorities at home.

When he was in China, Putin said that cooperation between the PRC and Russia “serves as one of the main stabilizing factors in the international arena.” I am doubtful that many of you think that an emboldened Russia would be stabilizing for the German, European, or global economy—that a Russian victory in Ukraine would be an economically preferable outcome for your companies. That’s why we have to take concerted actions to scrutinize our supply chains, adapt our business models, and stop Putin’s military ambitions.

And we don’t have endless time to deliberate. The Russian military-industrial complex is growing in size because Putin has gone all in. He is confident that with a reconfigured economy he can overpower Ukraine and challenge NATO. His confidence stems from the fact that he thinks he can wait us out—that our support for Ukraine will wane and that we will grow complacent in our response to his aggression. Let us prove him wrong.

Der Beitrag The US and Europe have to further increase pressure on Russia – and China erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Sweden’s application for NATO membership and its accession is a historic paradigm shift. Since Sweden is leaving behind more than two centuries of military non-alignment – this is a Swedish “Zeitenwende”. After Russia´s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the then Social Democratic government under Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson immediately appointed an inter-parliamentary working group to analyze the new security policy consequences of the attack for Sweden and for Europe. The working group concluded that Russia would pose a serious threat to European and Swedish security also in the long term and that it was therefore in Sweden’s national interest to join NATO together with Finland.

Sweden and Finland will extend NATO’s operational depth in the Baltic Sea region and link the far north, the North Atlantic, more closely with the Baltic Sea region.

With Sweden as a member, our sea, airspace and territory can be used for reinforcements to be deployed quickly from Swedish soil to the Baltic states. In addition, Sweden’s geostrategic position will make a decisive contribution to being able to deploy also reinforcements from North America in Europe.

At the same time, this means also a greater responsibility for Sweden in protecting sea transports through the Baltic Sea, above all to secure supplies for Finland. We will assume this responsibility in our neighbourhood and contribute to the deterrence policy of the Alliance and all Allies.

Sweden also has some unique military capabilities. Our fighter planes will participate in NATO’s Baltic Air Policing and Sweden’s unique naval forces, which are particularly suited to the conditions of the Baltic Sea, will be able to jointly with the German navy control the Baltic Sea approaches.

The Swedish government recently decided to reinforce the Canadian-led Nato presence in Latvia with a battalion. All in all, our defence spending has been doubled between 2020 and 2024. This means that Sweden has already reached the NATO standard of 2% of GDP this year.

To conclude: NATO is making Sweden safer – and Sweden is making NATO stronger!

About the author: Veronika Wand-Danielsson is Sweden’s Ambassador to Germany since September 1st of 2023. Prior to this position she was Director of the department for Europe and North America and of the department for America in Sweden’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs. From 2014 until 2020 she was Sweden’s Ambassador to France and Monaco.

Der Beitrag Sweden has finally come home erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

On October 7^th, 2023, Hamas terrorists invaded Israel from the Gaza strip and committed the deadliest attack against Jews since the Holocaust. The degree of glee and barbarity with which the terrorists murdered and slaughtered that day even surprised Ambassador Deborah Lipstadt who has dedicated her entire career on the study of antisemitism. And as Secretary Clinton noted, the high degree of planning and organization behind the attack, all in order to kill and mutilate as many innocent civilians as possible, was particularly abhorrent.

“There is an invidious strain of antisemitism that has never gone away, but we had hopes it had been certainly submerged, that had been poking its head up for quite some time now.” Hillary Clinton

What happened in the days, weeks, and months after the attack up until today was similarly surprising, abhorrent, and organized. Both Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Lipstadt pointed out that antisemitic outbursts celebrating the Hamas massacres in demonstrations and the online world happened within days or even hours after the attack, long before Israel went into Gaza. This underscored, in Secretary Clinton’s view, that “this was not spontaneous, this was highly organized” by groups that “had been on alert before October 7^th”. In this sense, October 7^th put the spotlight on the fact that “there has been a growing movement of antisemitism in many places in the world.”

But besides the outright antisemitic clamor, there was also a horrifying silence in the aftermath of October 7^th: “More horrific, however, [than the gender-based violence against women on October 7^th itself] was the silence of the feminist organizations [and] the human rights organizations”, Ambassador Lipstadt said to call out the antisemitic hypocrisy of many organizations which deem themselves progressive. The only difference between the attacks against women of October 7^th and similar attacks in the past, where these organizations were highly outspoken, the Ambassador noted, was the perception that the victims of October 7^th were Jewish.

A Different Kind of Hatred

[related] The striking fact that antisemitism is virulent and rising in all parts of society, including those which are otherwise considered highly aware toward of racism and hatred, indicates that antisemitism is not merely another form of racism, but structurally a different kind of hatred. While antisemitic discrimination in many ways resembles racist discrimination – Secretary Clinton pointed to the similarities between the antisemitic legislation of Nazi Germany 1933-1939 and the Jim Crow laws enforcing racial segregation in the southern United States up until 1965 –, antisemitism functions in a specific way: The antisemite, Ambassador Lipstadt explained, “punches up” against the Jews imagined as superior, powerful, and deceitful; the racist “punches down” against black people imagined as inferior, not smart enough and incapable.

This insight helps a great deal in understanding why antisemitism is not only virulent in right-wing white supremacy circles, where racism and antisemitism come together in conspiracy myths like the “Great Replacement Theory” according to which Jews are staging behind the scenes the mass immigration of non-white people into western societies in order to destroy them, but also connecting with rather left-wing, liberal or progressive milieus. The idea of an all-too-powerful, deceitful force as an oppressor can be easily smoothed into a worldview that is largely based on the distinction of oppressor and oppressed. This is how age-old antisemitic tropes like the blood libel also found their way into the discourse about the Israeli-Palestinian context before and after October 7^th, often poorly disguised as mere criticism of the Israeli government.

“Antisemitism is a threat to democracy and national stability. If you buy into the conspiracy myth which is at the heart of antisemitism, that Jews control the banks or the electoral system, you have given up on democracy. Authoritarian governments love antisemitism because it becomes the spoon to stir up the pot.” Deborah Lipstadt

So, what can be done against the “invidious strain of antisemitism that has never gone away, [and] that had been poking its head up for quite some time now”, as Secretary Clinton described it? The first advise both Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Lipstadt offered is to recognize antisemitism as a threat to democracy, national stability, and security. This is insofar plausible as the idea that banks, the electoral system and many other institutions of modern democratic societies are somehow controlled and rigged by Jews is at the core of antisemitic belief systems. If this belief spreads, trust in democracy which is a necessary perquisite of democracy inevitably collapses.

Speak Out Against Antisemitism and Stand Up for Democracy

On a more practical level, Ambassador Lipstadt urged the audience to take antisemitism seriously, not to accept any “but” to antisemitism, to stand up and speak out against antisemitism. She highlighted that far too many Jews in all spheres of societal life – on the streets, in restaurants, or on college campuses – go undercover and hide their Jewishness. Wherever one encounters antisemitism, it is everyone’s responsibility to speak out against it. Because the alternative to speaking out would be silence, and as the U.S. Ambassador to Germany Amy Gutmann impressively stated in her opening remarks to the conversation: “Silence is injustice.”

Der Beitrag Clinton and Lipstadt: Combating Antisemitism erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

This fall, Atlantik-Brücke’s New Bridge alumni had the chance to come together for the second annual New Bridge Alumni Reunion in sunny Los Angeles. Almost 60 alumni from seven American as well as one German cohort joined in discussions on “Global Challenges and Local Solutions” and left the weekend with a renewed commitment to transatlantic relations and the New Bridge Program itself.

The program was kicked off with a welcome reception at the rooftop of a local brewery that set the stage for old friends and fellows to reconnect and building new connections across cohorts. The group was joined by transatlantic experts who provided another layer of insight and expertise to the gathering: Professor Abraham Lowenthal, President Emeritus of the Pacific Council on International Policy and Founding Director of Inter-American Dialogue, journalists from ARD Los Angeles, including Katharina Wilhelm and Andreas Hain, Dr. Oliver Hartmann, Director of the Thomas Mann House, and John Harpole, Consultant at Spencer Stuart and Atlantik-Brücke Young Leader alumnus from 1999.

[related]The second day started with further introductions. An icebreaker led by New Bridge alumni led the group through a series of activities that encouraged connection across cohorts. The group reflected on similarities and other unique ties to create cohesion and greater camaraderie within this big group of different people. Afterwards, Ambassador Nina Hachigian, Special Representative for City & State Diplomacy for the U.S. Department of State joined the group for a keynote on “Global Challenges and Local Solutions”, moderated by an alumnus. The conversation offered a thorough introduction to subnational diplomacy. Ambassador  Hachigian also shared reflections from a decades-long career in national security, diplomacy, and public service while also highlighting narratives about creating roadmaps in new positions in diplomacy and building international relationships amidst a challenging political climate. Additionally, alumni had an opportunity to ask about career advice and about how to create global ties at the municipal level.

A lunch discussion with Andrea Sasse, Consul General of the Federal Republic of Germany to Los Angeles, instead focused on “Local Decisions, Global Impact”, highlighting the upcoming U.S. general election and its implications for Germany and the transatlantic relationship. In the very lively discussion afterwards, Consul Sasse shared how deeply she cared about the individual upholding democratic principles: “You don’t have to fight for democracy on a global stage. It’s more about standing up when you know something is wrong.” Having taken part in a fellowship herself, Consul General Sasse emphasized the lifelong impact, friendships, and resources a participation like this can have on one’s life and urged the New Bridge alumni to stay connected and engaged.

Devon Adams #NBP5

“It’s always good to bring people together who can share different perspectives and experiences. I appreciate how civil the fellows are in sharing differing opinions. We may not always agree and sometimes our views are challenged, but we always learn from each other.”

During the afternoon programming, the group was honored to have local activists, community leaders, and change makers join to lead different roundtables on the topics of gender equity and LGBTQIA+ rights, migration, and climate justice and environmental action. The conference room buzzed with enthusiasm as everyone had the opportunity to share various viewpoints and ideas. Alumni from the field took the lead in preparing and moderating these different sessions. In the session on gender equity and LGBTQIA+ rights, alumni discussed disparities that stem from data collection challenges and potential solutions with Tony Hoang, Executive Director at Equity California, Matthew Inouye, Manager of Policy and Community Engagement at The TransLatin@ Coalition, and Holly Millburn-Smith, Co-Executive Director at City Hub and Network for Gender Equity. On migration a discussion was facilitated with Zack Mohamed, Deportation Defense Organizer at the Black LGBTQIA+ Migrant Project and Anthony Ng, Program Officer at the Weingart Foundation, who spoke about the services and resources their organizations provide to immigrants in Los Angeles, a “sanctuary city.” During the conversation on climate and environment, Molly Kawahata, Founder of Systemic Impact Strategies & Former White House Climate Advisor, Justin Marquez, Senior Partnerships Manager at Elemental Excelerator, and Alvaro Sanchez, Vice President of Policy at The Greenlining Institute conveyed the importance of partnerships and messaging to institute systemic solutions to the climate crisis.

Brianna Dimas #NBP7

“It was nice to get outside of our main industries and see how we can work together to solve big global problems. I therefore really enjoyed the three sessions on migration, LGBTQIA+, and climate issues.”

These in-depth conversations emphasized the need for great leaders who inspire change and help set the stage for innovative solutions. Thus, the reunion also provided a platform for the group to exchange ideas about leadership, one’s own journey, lessons learned, and ideas for the future as part of the next part of the programming. Alumni shared their definitions of leadership, identified leaders they admire, offered tips on setting boundaries, and discussed leadership development opportunities. They recognized the strength of being a part of the New Bridge network and how their participation has an everlasting impact on their journey.

The last part of the program on this day brought the Alumni a little bit closer to the stars – as a visit to Los Angeles would not be complete without experiencing a bit of Hollywood! Accompanied by excellent tour guides, the group explored the Warner Brothers Studios. The tour included a stroll down streets lined with building facades featured in countless movies and TV shows; a behind-the-scenes look into the making of CW’s “All American” and impromptu photo shoots on the sets of Friends, Gilmore Girls, and The Big Bang Theory. An overall fun experience even for alumni who had never heard of Stars Hollow before.

A new Alumni Council being elected in December 2023

The last day of the conference was concluded with discussions on ways for alumni to stay involved with the program and have a further impact on the transatlantic dialogue. Various ideas were brought forward as taking part in upcoming events, connecting with our partners, supporting New Bridge programming, taking up speaking engagements as well as facilitating industry-based networking. Last year’s elected Alumni Council proudly presented an overview of activities and accomplishments of 2023, such as the launch of the Alumni Spotlight Initiative or the New Bridge Buddy Program.  With a new council being elected in December 2023, the group is excited to see new ideas implemented and to further engage with each other.

After three days of forging new connections and reviving old ones, debating a range of topics, and engaging in meaningful conversations, alumni had a hard time to part their ways. However, they left with a renewed sense of inspiration and excitement for a new year of New Bridge.

The NEW BRIDGE PROGRAM is supported by the Transatlantic Program of the Federal Republic of Germany, funded by the European Recovery Program (ERP) of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK), and by the Federal Foreign Office (AA) and the Joachim Herz Foundation.

Der Beitrag Meet-Up in Los Angeles: New Bridge Alumni Reunion 2023 erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The German-Canadian Conference 2023, held in Ottawa, Canada from June 4-5, brought together 60 high-level participants from both countries – including State Secretary Susanne Baumann from the Federal Foreign Office and Simon Kennedy, Deputy Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development. The delegation discussed current issues in four thematic blocks: energy and the environment; innovation and artificial intelligence; industrial policy and supply chains; and defense, security and procurement.

The evening receptions hosted by Global Affairs Canada and at the Residency of the German Ambassador to Canada, Sabine Sparwasser, allowed participants to expand the dialogue on the German-Canadian partnership and shared challenges and goals together with the speakers and other guests.

Unpacking Canada-Germany Resource Security – Working together for a low carbon future

The conference’s first session dealt with the conditions required to create a Canada-Germany green hydrogen partnership and de-risking low-carbon project planning. The panel reflected on the newly released expert report commissioned by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Atlantik-Brücke Canada, which offered the following recommendations to support the advancement of a stronger partnership and achieve the energy transition: (1) prioritize critical minerals and green hydrogen; (2) increase infrastructure investments; (3) work together on regulations and standards; (4) develop a strategic plan for the partnership; and (5) conduct pilot projects to demonstrate the viability of green hydrogen to boost private investment.

[related]The panel emphasized the need for both vision and action to realize our net-zero commitments. While in Canada recently announced investment tax credits were welcomed, the conversation highlighted how the regulatory environment is not ready to enable the growth of Canada’s clean economy at speed and scale. The inadequacy of regulatory frameworks creates uncertainty, exacerbates risks, and hinders renewable energy and green hydrogen projects.

This issue points to a broader theme that permeated the conversation, which is the important role governments must play in creating policy stability and predictability.

Energy and Environment – Squaring the “energy trilemma”

The session focused on addressing the “energy trilemma”: securing long-term economic growth, achieving progress toward net-zero emissions, and ensuring energy security—all at the same time. Throughout the discussion, the trilemma was extended to a “quadrilemma,” adding Indigenous partnership and reconciliation as a critical, and equal, priority, as well as a potential competitive advantage if done right. The session concluded by proposing a comprehensive action plan (“The 5 Cs”) to solve the quadrilemma: (1) international collaboration between like-minded countries; (2) concentration of the supply chain (building out complete supply chains to improve resilience); (3) building community confidence through ongoing engagement and partnership with Indigenous Peoples; (4) building competitiveness through strategic government interventions; and (5) using smart climate policies to reduce carbon emissions.

Given the budding hydrogen partnership between Canada and Germany, much of the discussion was centered on the role of hydrogen as a solution. It was acknowledged that hydrogen still faces significant challenges which threaten its viability as a critical low-carbon energy source. There are still too few buyers of clean hydrogen, and the technology to produce low-carbon hydrogen has yet to be proven at scale—resulting in an illiquid market, especially when compared to electricity. Additionally, technological challenges in both the use and distribution of hydrogen, especially in shipping, were raised. Put together, these factors underscore the need for de-risking, especially in the initial phase of hydrogen projects, which can be achieved through government support.

A spirit of embracing innovation and adaptability was deemed necessary to tackle the many obstacles ahead as we soldier on into a low-carbon future.

Innovation and Artificial Intelligence – Time for a “pause”?

This session explored the transformative potential of artificial intelligence (AI) in various sectors and underscored the importance of responsible and ethical deployment. The session was augmented by a paper authored by Dominic Martin, Professor at the Université du Québec à Montréal, who joined the discussions. AI was recognized as a pivotal force driving transformation across industries, enabling accelerated innovation and problem-solving. Discussants emphasized that AI can streamline decision-making processes and enhance efficiency across sectors, presenting opportunities for growth and improvement.

While recognizing the need for continued research, attendees discussed the significance of establishing guidelines and red lines that outline what AI should not do. By setting ethical boundaries, AI can be harnessed for the benefit of society while mitigating potential risks and ensuring accountability. One of the challenges that arose in the discussion was the alignment of human will with the actions of the machine, underscoring the complexity of integrating AI into societal norms and expectations.

Participants discussed the growing trend of technological nationalism and emphasized the necessity for international collaboration. Recognizing the global nature of AI’s impact, they advocated for the development of international regulations and standards. Collaborative efforts among nations can facilitate the sharing of best practices, harmonize ethical guidelines, and address common challenges such as bias, accountability, and the rapid pace of AI’s advancements. We should not over or underexaggerate the threat of autonomous AI, but think through the necessary guardrails in research and innovation, similar to those that exist with cloning, that can ensure we harness its benefits.

Discussion on State-to-State Diplomacy

Over lunch, participants debated State-to-State Diplomacy in the context of the current state of German-Canadian relations, as well as the current state of affairs in a global context.

One important distinction was made on the panel: it is not only a changing world, it is a changed world. After the Russian attack on Ukraine, the international stage has changed fundamentally. The conflict has changed the scene and it is unclear how we counter the imperialistic attack. Furthermore, threats like misinformation and disinformation are a big challenge and they got bigger in the last year. Climate change and all the challenges coming with it are very real. Mass migrations, not only between countries but also inside countries are happening more and more.

It remains important as ever to talk with each other and to listen to everyone, to keep friends close by and fostering good connections especially with like-minded partners is active de-risking. Cooperation with like-minded partners needs to be intensified. Whether it is on infrastructure, resources or cooperation on the international stage like the UN: to be active on all these fronts is important.

Industrial Policy and Supply Chains – The promises and pitfalls of a rapid pivot away from three decades of economic liberalism

The challenges and opportunities of state industrial policy and supply chain strategy were reviewed by some of the two country’s most senior officials. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the fragility of neglected or undervalued supply chain strategies, with many critical materials heavily relying on only a few countries, creating a ripple effect.

The passage of the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act and the recent investment by Volkswagen in Canada to establish an electric vehicle battery manufacturing facility were discussed as two examples of an increasing trend by governments to play a role in the promotion of a state’s industrial policy, particularly with respect to the transition to green energy.

Panelists acknowledged that the bureaucratic wheel often turns slowly when it comes to approving projects and spurring innovation, but that there was widespread need to future-proof domestic industries, while still delivering the benefits of open, global trading economies. Furthermore, there is still a strong argument for globalization and open trading, but perhaps less with a frame of mind of trading with friends – rather we trade with interests in mind. Countries like Canada and Germany don’t need to have every component for every industry, but we should play some role in critical supply chains.

Defense, Security and Procurement – Honoring commitments to transatlantic security

In the day’s final session, there was universal agreement that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought clarity on our shared main challenge ahead: provide a credible deterrence against Russia. In order to reach this goal, widespread reforms are necessary. First, it was emphasized that Germany needs to demonstrate its seriousness about its commitment to a Zeitenwende. Committing more funds for defense projects would not be enough if they did not go hand in hand with providing political leadership, procurement reform, and with an industrial policy providing defense companies with long-term security that their products will be sold.

There was overall agreement that both Canada and Europe cannot operate without US-American leadership. The session highlighted the urgent need for reform within defense procurement in Canada and Germany alike. One panelist remarked that the aim should be to buy off the shelf wherever possible and evolve more of a venture-capital understanding to procurement. It was also stressed that European nations should enhance co-operation on large defense projects.

Young Atlantiks 2023

On the occasion of the German-Canadian Conference, ten young professionals from Canada and Germany met in Ottawa as part of the Young Atlantiks Program. The program offers a small group of young Canadians and Germans the opportunity to exchange and engage on current and future challenges on both sides of the Atlantic and create lasting transatlantic connections. Over a period of six days, the Young Atlantiks exchanged ideas with representatives from politics, science and society and laid the foundation for the next generation of the transatlantic German-Canadian partnership. Highlights of this year’s program included meetings with Germany’s Ambassador to Canada, Sabine Sparwasser and Isabelle Poupart, Chargée d’affaires a.i. of Canada to Germany, working lunches with the Hon. Greg Fergus, MP, and the Hon. Ratna Omidvar, Independent Senator for Ontario, a speed mentoring session with Atlantik-Brücke affiliates and a fireside chat with the Deputy Ambassador of Ukraine to Canada.

The initiative is funded by the Canadian Embassy in Germany and the German Embassy in Canada and jointly realized by Atlantik-Brücke and Atlantik-Brücke Canada. Established in 2019, the program is now in its third year.

Der Beitrag An Abundance of Shared Challenges and Goals erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

At this critical juncture, the American Council on Germany and Atlantik-Brücke convened their annual transatlantic conference in Washington, D.C. to explore the recent economic impacts to the transatlantic partnership – and worldwide.

[related]Ambassador John B. Emerson, Chairman of the American Council on Germany, and Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, opened the conference by welcoming everyone back to Washington, D.C. since the last German-American Conference in the United States in 2018. Noting how much has changed since then – changes in government on both sides of the Atlantic, the COVID pandemic, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and so much more – both stressed the importance of face-to-face meetings to exchange views on shared issues. The war in Ukraine has made clear that the post-Cold War era is over, and the relative peace enjoyed by Germany has ended. In this context, the German-American partnership has regained relevance. “Germany and Europe must take on more responsibility, but a more sovereign Europe should mean more cooperation with the United States to provide greater burden-sharing,” said Mr. Gabriel. Ambassador Emerson added that strong economies are critical domestically and for foreign policy, stressing that economic stability is key to ensuring the health of our respective democracies.

Germany and Europe must take on more responsibility, but a more sovereign Europe should mean more cooperation with the United States to provide greater burden-sharing.[quoter]Sigmar Gabriel[/quoter]

In a conversation moderated by Ines Pohl, Washington Bureau Chief for Deutsche Welle, entitled “Setting the Stage: Geopolitics and the Global Economy,” Jacqueline Ramos, Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Dr. Norbert Röttgen, Member of the Bundestag (CDU), highlighted a range of issues confronting Germany and the United States. In the near term, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the rise of autocratic governments around the world must be a top priority – we must endure and stay together to effectively confront these challenges. Dr. Röttgen noted that the clock is ticking for Europe and stressed that Germany must show “leadership reliability” to strengthen its ability to act, not against the United States, but in cooperation as partners. Both speakers identified China as the long-term challenge, suggesting that Beijing’s ambitions are of a much larger order of magnitude than Moscow’s – President Xi wants to change the global order while Putin just wants to alter the post-Cold War European security order. China poses threats to Germany and the United States economically and in terms of security. IP theft, economic practices, and supply chain dependencies all are detrimental to Western economies and both countries are taking steps to address these issues.

Dr. Röttgen suggested German policy is changing slowly but cannot happen overnight. German industry argues that the Chinese market is so big that they cannot afford not to be there. However, changing course long-term is critical otherwise a Taiwan conflict will have a similar shock effect on the German economy as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While Germany and the United States have differing approaches to China, Ms. Ramos explained that concerted efforts are being made to build resiliency together. For example, soon after Chancellor Scholz spoke with President Biden, the German government announced new measures on 5G policy to address security concerns in telecommunications infrastructure. Overall, effective Chinese deterrence can be achieved by Germany, Europe, and the U.S. sending the clear message that Xi should not underestimate the unity of the West and should not repeat the mistakes of Putin. Unfortunately, said Dr. Röttgen, our mutual goals of peace, prosperity, and the protection of our planet are impeded by geopolitical struggles, such as that with China, but efforts must nonetheless continue to seek collaboration wherever possible.

To open the second day of the conference, German Ambassador to the United States Dr. Emily Haber shared her perspectives on the transatlantic relationship over the course of the last five years during her tenure as an ambassador, with its many ups and downs. In terms of what has not changed, Germany and Europe remain dependent on the U.S. for security, and there is no issue where the U.S. doesn’t matter or have influence on Germany. Additionally, there is an incredibly stable infrastructure of relationships in science and research, in the military, and between businesses which helps make the partnership relatively resistant to politics. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, was “a massive earthquake with tectonic aftershocks” which has ended the post-Cold War era, and the new one we have entered has not yet come into focus. In Germany, she explained there is a fear for the future world our children will live in, and long-held beliefs that peace was a constant in Europe, maintained by economic interdependency, have been shattered in a matter of months. Despite this massive shift, the war has fueled a renewed sense of Atlanticism, and German complacency of burden-sharing has been replaced by a recognition that the moral overtones which have driven German policy since the 1960s must now be based in greater realism. The challenge for Germany and Europe is to find a balance between Europeanism and Atlanticism now in which they are complementary to one another characterized by a shared rules-based order and pragmatic values to build coalitions against aggression. Following her remarks, Ambassador Emerson led a conversation with Ambassador Haber.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a massive earthquake with tectonic aftershocks.[quoter]Dr. Emily Haber[/quoter]

In a conversation entitled “Creating a Foreign Policy for the Middle Class,” Elizabeth Baltzan, Senior Advisor for the United States Trade Representative, and Sigmar Gabriel explored what exactly a foreign policy for the middle class means and how it impacts the transatlantic alliance. Ms. Baltzan explained that the root of this policy goes back to the Atlantic Charter in 1941, which states “a desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security.” In other words, international trade policy, a part of foreign policy, should provide economic security for working people. And going a step further, if you don’t provide economic security for working people, then you risk democracy. Citing National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s recent speech at the Brookings Institution on the Biden Administration’s international economic agenda, Ms. Baltzan noted that many U.S. initiatives, including the Inflation Reduction Act, aim to strengthen the U.S. economy to confront Chinese trade practices and domestic economic policies. Noting the criticism of the IRA in Europe, she urged people to understand the importance of the bill in creating U.S. jobs and in meeting the Paris climate commitments, elements that end up benefiting the EU-US alliance. Overall, both agreed that each side shares common goals, despite some disagreements, and that collaborative efforts to create multiple modes of production are needed to reduce dependencies and increase resiliency in global supply chains.

The Atlantic Charter states a desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security.[quoter]Elizabeth Baltzan[/quoter]

In a spirited discussion moderated by Julia Friedlander, CEO of Atlantik-Brücke, Dr. Emily Blanchard, Chief Economist for the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment at the U.S. Department of State, and Dr. Philipp Steinberg, Director General for Economic Stabilization and Energy Security at the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, examined the challenge of ensuring economic security while also promoting value-based trade goals and how governments and private sector can work together to provide both. The war in Ukraine posed significant immediate risks to economic security in Germany. Still, the crisis has served as a catalyst for structural change with accelerated reforms of laws and administrative procedures that are boosting Germany’s efforts to achieve climate goals while alleviating the immediate energy crisis. Dr. Blanchard explained that Putin’s invasion has sharpened the focus on the global economy and how the dependencies impact almost everything in our daily lives. Governments have a vital role to play in moderating where the market doesn’t get it right. Both speakers concurred that problems won’t get solved alone, and the government must give tools and incentives to help the private sector contribute to solutions. In terms of values-based trade, there will always be conflict with pure economic interests and needs which may at times, be a priority and more dominant. However, transparency and space for consumers, together with pragmatic standards from governments regarding fundamental worker rights or environmental standards, to influence companies’ values can be more effective than a fixed set of rules or trying to impose values on other countries.

The various crises of the last three years have had a significant impact on globalization and economic competitiveness which was analyzed by Heidi Crebo-Rediker, General Partner at America’s Frontier Fund, and Steffen Kampeter, CEO of the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (BDA), in conversation with Luiza Savage, Executive Editor of Growth at Politico. Noting that there has been a Zeitenwende in defense and security policy, Mr. Kampeter stressed the need for such a transition in economic and social affairs as well in Germany and at the EU level. Taxation, specifically payroll taxes, remains too high, and bureaucratic red tape on a range of issues remains much too complicated. The political debate in Europe criticizing the Investment Reduction Act really isn’t an economic debate, he said, because “governments cannot subsidize competitiveness.” Ms. Crebo-Rediker explained the conversation about IRA fairness issues really must be seen instead in the context of the climate change imperative. The Biden Administration has laid out a much more structured approach to address and identify challenges to economic competitiveness such as supply chain vulnerabilities. Turning to the auto industry’s shift to EV, both agreed that the EU and U.S. have a clear mutual interest in collaborating to confront the Chinese auto industry’s explosive growth. However, Mr. Kampeter stressed the issue isn’t the ability of the auto industry to produce more EVs, but rather the more complex infrastructure which is required, including batteries, the electrical grid, and storage capacity, which is lacking in both Germany and the United States. Ms. Crebo-Rediker suggested that a much greater focus on capital markets is needed in this regard because it is impossible to out-subsidize the Chinese. Another challenge to economic competitiveness is workforces – both in terms of quantity and quality. There is a lack of skilled workers both for current and future jobs and there are estimates that 50 percent of current workers will need retraining and upskilling to support the advanced manufacturing industry. A greater effort is required to maintain a robust social compact to mobilize labor forces and to avoid the conflict and recent unrest seen in France.

How business and governments can collaborate to support shared visions and common goals was at the core of a conversation with Elissa Alben, Vice President and Head of Global Trade Policy and International Government Relations at Pfizer; Jan Neutze, Vice President of EU Government Affairs at Illumina; and Hartfrid Wolff, Communications Department Head at the German Federal Ministry of Digital and Transport, which was moderated by Dr. Steven E. Sokol, President and CEO, American Council on Germany. Ms. Alben stressed how Pfizer’s core values and purpose drive what the company does, citing the company’s long-term commitment to providing better access which would not get the attention it deserves if not included in the value statement. In the case of COVID, the vision helped support the common cause of developing a vaccine together with public support. Mr. Neutze strongly argued that companies could promote welfare while striving to make a profit and that governments can play a role in this. The human genome project was originally government funded and created an entirely new sector in our economy. Numerous companies now utilize the DNA sequencing from that project for a range of biotech products, including the COVID vaccine, which saves lives but also creates jobs and profit for the companies. In many fields, but especially in biotech, governments can play a critical role in establishing data frameworks that enable innovation and ensure privacy. Digitalization and remote monitoring, supply chains, and digital therapeutics all are data-driven. Mr. Wolff concurred stating that government can provide tools to the private sector while also making the case to the public why these tools are essential. The key is to be transparent and make things tangible in people’s daily lives – show there is value to them and how they will benefit. All agreed that “government must make solutions possible and not create ways to control it” because companies want to be innovative and have the potential to improve people’s lives dramatically.

At the moment, the European Union and the United States are more aligned in terms of climate policy and goals to confront climate change than they have been in many years. However, the approaches are not always identical, and the sustainability costs in terms of finances and implementation of new technologies remain challenging to achieve this needed transformation. Dr. Monika Griefahn, Chair of the Board at eFuel Alliance, Oliver Hill, Chief Representative and Head of Corporate Development at VNG AG, and Emily Kreps, Managing Director and Head of ESG at Deutsche Bank, provided an overview of some of the climate and business strategies being pursued in a discussion moderated by Samantha Gross, Director of the Energy Security and Climate Initiative and a Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution. Mr. Hill described how VNG has had to immediately find alternative sources for the one-third of the natural gas the company received from Russia and now is acquiring and building biogas plants, researching hydrogen as a replacement for natural gas, and utilizing carbon capture and storage technologies. Dr. Griefahn explained the benefit of efuels which are produced with the help of electricity from renewable energy sources, water, and CO2 from the air and do not release additional CO2. However, efuels in some cases, require more energy, even if from renewables, to produce. Most important when trying to meet climate targets is not to put all your eggs in one basket. This transformation must happen quickly, and there is no time to wait for a magic silver bullet. Ms. Kreps explained that Deutsche Bank has sustainable finance goals to help clients with the capital they need for long-term goals. Even oil and gas receive financing, but only if there is a transition plan based on climate science. Recognizing the huge investment needed to meet climate goals, estimated as high as $2.5 trillion, governments need to make the case for climate projects in the context of other topics and priorities such as workforce development, education, and job creation.

In the final session of the conference, Dr. John Lipsky, Peter G. Peterson Distinguished Scholar at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs and a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Ludovic Subran, Chief Economist at Allianz SE, Friederike von Tiesenhausen, Global Head of Public Affairs at Bloomberg, together with moderator Sara Schonhardt, International Climate Reporter at E&E News, discussed the need for a new global economic policy for the transatlantic community after the turbulence of the last few years. Dr. Lipsky highlighted how treaty-based multilateral institutions like the IMF and WTO are not effectively addressing issues because of decisions by G20 leaders to create their own policies based on each crisis. The effect has been much less unanimity, like what had existed during the financial crisis, and more calls for reforms to the institutions. Reforms, however, have been difficult because advanced economies have diverging views from the recipients of aid on what the reform agenda should look like. Ms. von Tiesenhausen added that there is a desire to find the right transmission tool, but it has been difficult to get information on whether aid projects are sustainable, and the private sector has been more domestic focused and not interested in new foreign projects. Mr. Subran suggested that there is a disconnect between the political elite that sees the need for global aid and publics which focus more on domestic issues. All agreed that emerging economies were hit hard by the Covid pandemic, higher food and energy prices, and the impact of climate change, so there is pressure to find a solution, and many are suffering from debt distress, compounded by a drying up of Chinese lending. There were diverging views on what should be done to aid the Global South with Dr. Lipsky suggesting the best strategy to help emerging economies is for the advanced economies to avoid an economic downturn. Ms. von Tiesenhausen felt that regional development banks could play a larger role. All agreed on the need to reduce inflation to lower interest rates so that it is easier to service public debt.

Together, the transatlantic alliance needs to raise the economic floor for our citizens which in turn builds support for our international allies and the global economy.[quoter]Senator Chris Murphy[/quoter]

Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT), Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, concluded the conference with a keynote highlighting the necessity for a strong alliance between Germany and the United States. There are many reasons why our countries need to reduce friction between us, including unity against rising autocracies, an existential war in Ukraine to maintain the norms we believe should guide our societies for the next 70 years, and the rise of China. On all these issues and more, coordination of our policies, even if not always identical, is to the benefit of our communal interests. Senator Murphy stressed that the best foreign policy is an America with a strong democracy at home with values that can be promoted abroad. And regarding economic policy, each side of the Atlantic took things for granted and failed to recognize that the global economy we jointly promoted didn’t benefit average citizens enough. Together, the transatlantic alliance needs to “raise the economic floor for our citizens” which in turn builds support for our international allies and the global economy.

The 2023 German-American Conference was generously supported by Allianz and Deutsche Bank.

Der Beitrag Global Economic Disruptions and Transatlantic Alliances erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

by Robin Fehrenbach

The island of Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China have a tense relationship. China sees Taiwan as an integral part of its national territory, while the island strives for autonomy. Should these opposing goals develop into a conflict, this would also have far-reaching consequences for the transatlantic partners. On this occasion, a roundtable of high-ranking experts was organized by Atlantik-Brücke in cooperation with the Atlantic Council and the Rhodium Group in Berlin. The discussion took place under the Chatham House Rule.

The semiconductor industry as a silicon shield

Of outstanding strategic interest both for China and for the transatlantic partners is currently the position of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). Large parts of the global production of advanced technology are heavily dependent on the elaborate industrial production of semiconductors by TSMC. An attack of any kind on the Taiwanese company would hit this industrial sector very hard. However, since China would also be directly affected, TSMC’s strong position in the global market serves as a silicon shield for Taiwan, so to speak. One consequence, for both the United States and the EU, is to reduce existing dependencies in terms of supply chains and raw materials such as rare earths in particular. The U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), for example, offer an opportunity to make progress here.

The second important step in anticipating a Taiwan conflict is to consider possible sanctions by the G7, U.S. and EU in response to the crisis. To do this, it is important to keep in mind that the economic setbacks of economic and financial sanctions would be severe for the democratic West. After all, economic ties with China are extremely strong for most of the countries concerned – the German economy in particular is dependent on exports to China, on supply chains with the People’s Republic and on raw materials there.

It follows that punitive measures are always accompanied by costs and restrictions. Based on previous experience with sanctions, various approaches and objectives are conceivable, with each constellation having to be considered specifically in terms of the states, actors and resources involved. One objective could be to keep one’s own costs as low as possible. This can be achieved, for example, by imposing a price cap on a particular commodity from the penalized state, as can be observed in the case of Russia in response to its war of aggression against Ukraine in the case of oil. Furthermore, it is conceivable to target individuals, groups or organizations, but not the broad center of a society.

Tools and impact of “Economic Statecraft”

In addition to the sanctions already mentioned, other tools of so-called “economic statecraft” – i.e. foreign and security policy related to the economy – can also come into play. These include, above all, export controls and the screening of investments. Restricting and closing market access and imposing new or higher import tariffs on trade in goods and services are other important types of sanctions. The G7, U.S., and EU are attempting to bundle such measures into sanctions packages in the respective rounds to create both a targeted and effective impact. This also makes it clear that it is necessary to prepare and apply sanctions in a coordinated manner; it makes little sense for an individual state to push ahead with them on its own.

As far as the specific case of China is concerned, the People’s Republic is particularly vulnerable in the supply chains with lithium, and products of the chemical and pharmaceutical industry. These would be sectoral sanctions. Ultimately, sanctions should lead to a change in behavior on the part of the state subject to the sanctions. The fact that this does not always happen can currently be seen in the case of Russia. Even after eight rounds of sanctions by the EU alone, President Putin is still waging a war in Ukraine that violates international law. The logic of sanctions also includes the fact that the sanctioning states need patience and perseverance to achieve a change in the behavior of the sanctioned state. It is generally accepted in the West that China’s leaders are closely studying Russia’s reaction to the sanctions in order to draw conclusions for their own policy regarding Taiwan.

In summary, the key finding is that a deeper discussion among transatlantic partners on scenarios, risks of escalation, sanctions and planning on the Taiwan issue is of fundamental strategic importance. Transatlantic partners have a great need for scenario analysis in this context, and at the same time it is necessary for democratic industrialized countries to prepare for an acute crisis around the island and conceivable responses.

Der Beitrag A Taiwan Crisis Looms on the Transatlantic Horizon erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The armed conflict on European soil is shaking the world and causing immeasurable harm – in Ukraine and in its neighboring countries. Together with partners, CARE supports people in Ukraine and neighboring countries with hygiene packages, food and water. On the ground, CARE equips hospitals and other medical facilities with anesthesia and respiratory equipment, electric beds, and medicines. CARE workers continue to provide shelters and safe spaces for women and families and offer psychosocial support. To prepare people for the difficult winter conditions, aid workers are distributing warm clothing, blankets and heating facilities. In addition, destroyed houses are provided with makeshift insulation to make them work as shelters.

On our ➡️Camgaign site for CARE, you can find out more about the organization and make a contribution to help.

Der Beitrag Atlantik-Brücke for Ukraine erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Michael Hüther and Jürgen Matthes

In Europe, the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has caused a stir in the media and startled politicians. Many see it as an attack on Germany as an industrial location, and some observers see it as a continuation of Trump’s protectionism with other instruments. Upon closer inspection, however, the criticism and alarm appear to be both self-righteous and exaggerated – self-righteous because the U.S. is now taking climate protection seriously and wants to restructure the industrial sector using legitimate means and exaggerated because there is never just one factor that causes industrial locations to erode. Most importantly, we are the ones who are responsible for our local economic conditions. Similarly, we can try to improve transatlantic trade relations through the Trade and Technology Council and the G7’s Climate Club. Those who are now complaining about the IRA should also be complaining about the failure of TTIP.

[related]However, the climate policy subsidies developed by Joe Biden and his administration do have considerable leverage, especially since further programs have already been launched and individual U.S. states are not twiddling their thumbs either. With the Inflation Reduction Act, considerable efforts are being made to reduce the U.S.’s carbon footprint. The IRA includes $369 billion in funding over ten years for climate change mitigation and energy security (U.S. Senate, 2022). However, these figures, as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), are only a rough guide, primarily because the extensive tax credits for climate-friendly investments and projects included in the IRA are not capped. Thus, they could either not be met or exceeded. Moreover, the Biden administration has also made smaller amounts of climate-related funding from other fiscal packages available (Kunath et al., 2022).

The outcry in Germany over the IRA is due to the U.S. pursuing climate policy primarily through extensive subsidies and the fact that some of these subsidy programs are likely to be accessible to European companies only to a limited extent, due to the protectionist elements of the IRA. For example, so-called local content requirements are imposed, which stipulate that essential inputs must be manufactured in the U.S. and can thus not be imported from Europe. The discussion in Germany is primarily focused on perceived disadvantages for the German automotive industry. New electric vehicle tax credits for passenger cars (Mayer-Brown, 2022; RGIT, 2022; VDA, 2022) only apply to those vehicles with a final assembly in the U.S., i.e., not to German car exports. There are also other restrictions, such as price and income caps, and very strict regulations regarding the production and supply of electric car batteries. Most importantly, after 2027, at least 80 percent of critical minerals for such batteries must come from the U.S. or from countries that have a free trade agreement with the U.S., which the EU currently does not have. Even cars (and batteries) manufactured in the U.S. by U.S. subsidiaries of German parent companies are unlikely to be eligible for these tax credits due to the IRA’s critical minerals requirements, as well as the price and income limits.

At first glance, the U.S. approach seems problematic and downright protectionist. Moreover, a great deal of disappointment with the Biden administration’s approach to trade policy rings through in the heated media debate. But how should the IRA and the EU’s climate policy approach really be assessed? How problematic is the U.S. approach for the German economy? To what extent are German exporters discriminated against and is the IRA act really a game changer when it comes to dislocation of investments?

In any case, the effects of the IRA should be analyzed in more detail before the European side also turns to protectionism. Only then can we pose the question of how Europe should respond. And independently of this, Europe should consider what new trade policy perspectives it would like to open with the U.S. and what the EU itself needs to do to become a more attractive manufacturing location. On the other hand, opening the gates for industrial policy (counter)subsidies runs the risk of wasting taxpayer money in a subsidy race.

1. Subsidies Are a Legitimate Approach to Climate Policy

For global climate policy, the new U.S. approach is a big deal. The Biden administration is turning over a new leaf after the setbacks during the Trump administration. The fact that the U.S. is relying primarily on subsidies instead of carbon pricing has a lot to do with domestic politics. In the polarized political debate in the United States, placing a higher burden on consumers and businesses is unlikely to be enforceable, especially since parts of the Republican party are still questioning or denying the existence of man-made climate change.

From an environmental economics perspective, subsidies for climate protection are a legitimate approach because the environmental externalities of economic activities can be internalized through pricing, subsidies, or regulation. The aim is to bring the social costs of climate change into the calculations of private sector companies. The EU is approaching this mostly through pricing and regulation. Thus, the U.S. and EU approaches collide, and in some sectors, a subsidy race is emerging.

To the extent that U.S. subsidies roughly correspond to internalizing costs of climate-damaging negative externalities, they would be justifiable in environmental economic terms. To be sure, U.S. subsidies are not explicitly oriented on a one-to-one basis toward reducing carbon dioxide emissions, as would make sense in theory. However, the subsidies are clearly aimed at more climate protection. Only if it can be proven that the subsidy volume would significantly exceed the value of climate-damaging negative externalities could the U.S. be accused of an unfair approach with overly generous subsidies. If this is not the case, climate policy and competition policy collide in an unfortunate way.

2. Germany Benefits from Previous U.S. Fiscal Packages

The Biden administration has already launched several comprehensive fiscal packages in its first two years (Kunath et al., 2022): the short-term American Rescue Plan (ARP), $1.7 trillion spending bill intended to counter the negative effects of the COVID pandemic in March 2021, and the medium- to long-term Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), which provides $550 billion over the next ten years.

The U.S. economy has received a major boost, particularly from the ARP, which has also benefited the German economy. It is estimated that the ARP has boosted U.S. economic output by almost 7 percent in 2021 alone and, through a higher demand for German exports, has increased German economic output by more than 1 percent (vbw, 2022). This represents a significant positive spillover effect. The same applies to the IIJA, albeit to a lesser extent, however with a longer-term impact.

Partly due to these fiscal packages, German exports to the U.S. have been booming recently. As a result, the U.S. has been able to significantly expand its role as the most important export partner for Germany. In the first three quarters of 2022, German exports of goods to the U.S: grew by more than 29 percent, almost twice as fast as overall goods exports did, at around 15 percent. The share of German exports to the U.S. in total exports to the rest of the world subsequently increased to almost 10 percent. A similarly high ratio was last recorded 20 years ago.

3. The European Automotive Industry Is Only Partially Discriminated Against

At first glance, the IRA support for electric vehicles (i.e., regulations regarding the final assembly in the U.S., on battery production, and the supply chain) appears to strongly discriminate against the German automotive industry and German auto exporters especially. A closer look, however, shows that a differentiation must be made here. One has to bear in mind that the German automotive industry already produces some models locally in the U.S. and in North America. In addition, exports of electric vehicles are still quite low, although this is likely to change in the future.

Let’s put this into perspective: tax credits for electric vehicles, with an envisaged volume of around $7.5 billion, represent only a small part of IRA spending. In addition, price and income caps must be considered. This is because mainly higher-priced cars are exported from Germany to the U.S.: The German Association of the Automotive Industry assumes that many mid-range vehicles will be ineligible for U.S. subsidies for this very reason (VDA, 2022). Thus, while the tax credits do not apply in this case, there is also no trade discrimination since IRA funds are not available for similarly priced U.S. competitor models either. To be sure: the requirements to quickly ban mainly Chinese inputs from the battery supply chain, remain challenging and are unlikely to be met in the allocated timeframe. However, European automakers share this issue with their American counterparts.

The Biden administration is expected to respond to European concerns. After in-depth discussions in a dedicated task force and at the highest level, it appears that Washington is prepared to address European concerns regarding the IRA. According to media reports, EU cars (including exported ones) that are leased in the U.S. as company cars could be classified as commercial vehicles, to which the aforementioned requirements do not apply (Fasse et al., 2022). A significant proportion of German (exported) electric vehicles should be able to benefit from IRA funding through such a “leasing solution”. Experts estimate that about half of the German electric vehicles registered in the U.S. are leased.

Such exemptions would not apply to the probably moderate share of German electric vehicles on U.S. roads that are not leased but owned privately and that meet the price and income limits. To benefit from IRA funding, battery production and supply chain requirements remain relevant in these cases, and thus constitute discrimination against EU vehicles. However, here, too, relief might be coming. According to media reports (Fasse et al., 2022), the U.S. is said to be willing to prevent discrimination against the EU vis-à-vis free trade partners in the sourcing of critical minerals by concluding a commodity partnership between the U.S. and the EU and considering it equivalent. Because many questions and issues remain regarding the implementation of the IRA, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has postponed the publication of guidelines for battery production-related regulations until March 2023 (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2022).

4. The Economic Impact of Local Content Requirements Is Limited

Some subsidy programs are subject to local content requirements (which vary slightly from program to program), i.e., they stipulate that relevant inputs must be manufactured in the U.S., if the full subsidy is to be granted. To the extent that these rules apply, intermediate goods exports from Germany are excluded from IRA funding.

The Biden administration is using the discriminatory rules (including the rules on final assembly in North America and battery production) to strengthen the weakened industrial production base in the U.S., especially in the heavily politically contested Rust Belt, as part of its Made in America-initiative (Kunath et al., 2022). While this goal is certainly understandable, the discriminatory IRA rules are problematic since they might violate WTO law (European Commission, 2022). The EU does not use such restrictions. Germany, for example, makes its subsidy program for electric vehicles available to foreign manufacturers without any restrictions.

However, when considering the extent to which local content requirements actually act as an export barrier to inputs from Germany, various qualitative arguments suggest that the discriminatory effects are likely to be limited:

• Local content requirements do not apply to all IRA programs. For German U.S. subsidiaries, which usually have a high local value-added share (vbw, 2022), those requirements are much less relevant, if at all.

• If such requirements do apply, they relate only to a limited amount of potential subsidies, depending on the program. Other IRA-funding elements, some significantly more relevant in scope, are tied to other more easily implemented conditions, such as requirements for pay and training or for the establishing of firms in certain U.S. regions.

• If only a limited portion of IRA subsidies are accessible through compliance with local content requirements, it is questionable whether it is worthwhile for firms located in the U.S. to reorganize their supply chain so that inputs from Germany are no longer used. Supply chains are optimized and adjusting them is costly as well as time-consuming. It is therefore not a foregone conclusion that German exporters of intermediate goods will lose their customers because of the IRA.

• Local content regulations generally leave room for foreign supplies because they do not require 100 percent domestic inputs in most areas. Even if there is formally no room for European supplies within the set limits, there are possibilities for exceptions, so-called waivers, if no suitable inputs are available in the U.S., or if this results in significant cost increases (e.g., of more than 25 percent for some programs). Particularly in the case of capital goods, German exports are sometimes without serious U.S. competition, so these exceptions are likely to apply at a wider range. This would allow German intermediate exports to continue despite local content regulations.

5. IRA Overall Rather Positive for Sales in the U.S.

If the impact of the discriminatory elements of the IRA remains limited, there is much to suggest that the demand for climate protection-related goods boosted by IRA spending is likely to have positive effects on German sales opportunities and exports to the U.S. Figuratively speaking, the pie gets bigger. Even if some parts of it should not be accessible due to discriminatory elements, the share for Germany should get bigger in absolute terms. Overall, the German economy is thus likely to benefit. This is likely to apply particularly to capital goods manufacturers, which also benefit from the IIJA infrastructure package.

However, there are fears that the high IRA subsidy and the protectionist elements in it could be a strong incentive for European companies to relocate production and investment to the U.S. in order to benefit from the generous subsidies there. Such investment diversion may occur in individual cases. In fact, there are media reports of a few company decisions in which investments planned in Germany were cancelled or postponed, for example regarding battery plants. Moreover, IRA funding interacts with tax incentives in the U.S. at the state level as well (i.e., with elements of international tax competition.) Nevertheless, caution is warranted in generalizing from individual examples and anecdotal evidence.

The following arguments call into question whether the IRA is indeed a crucial factor when it comes to relocation decisions:

• It is not out of the question that a possible Republican president after 2024 would significantly cut IRA funding. This is because parts of the Republican party are skeptical about climate change and oppose extensive subsidies and government control. Much will depend on whether the constituents of (potential) Republican or Democratic members of Congress benefit from such funding. Since U.S. Democrats have an interest in channeling funding to their own constituents, a cut to IRA funding might therefore be not very likely to hurt Republicans too much.

• Companies generally do not make location decisions based on limited (and possibly non-permanent) subsidy programmes, but rather, they consider a variety of indicators (or they should, at least.)

• Energy price differentials are a much more important factor for energy-intensive companies. Relocation considerations by German firms in these industries, which have been reported in the media, are therefore unlikely to be caused by the IRA. After all, around 8 percent of the industrial companies surveyed by the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2022) in the fall of 2022 are considering relocating production due to high energy costs. In addition, the European Union’s increasingly strict climate policies represent additional incentives to relocate production that is harmful to the climate.

• For some products, factors such as transport costs play an important and sometimes even decisive role in the site selection decision. For example, the production and assembly of wind turbines and their essential parts usually takes place in the country of installation because the transportation of towers and blades is very complex and expensive. However, this is not true for other major components. If the construction of wind turbines in the U.S. is strongly supported with the IRA, the export of more easily transportable components from Germany should continue to be possible even with local content rules in place.

• The EU could ultimately benefit from a strong promotion of hydrogen production in the U.S. because Germany and Europe will be dependent on imports of cheap hydrogen in the future. German companies are also likely to benefit from the construction and maintenance of hydrogen production plants in the U.S:. Besides, this also applies to the construction of battery factories.

• The attractiveness of the U.S: as an investment location could be better. Persistent infrastructure deficits and a grave shortage of skilled workers are likely to be more important – especially for less energy-intensive companies – than energy price advantages. Moreover, given low unemployment levels and a tight labor market, U.S: labor costs have risen significantly in recent years and will likely continue to do so.

• German direct investment flows to the U.S., which are an indicator of attractiveness as an investment location, have been uneven in recent years. After reaching a high of more than EUR 30 billion in 2019, according to Deutsche Bundesbank data, in 2021, just under EUR 13 billion in additional investments by German parent companies in the U.S. were recorded. The first three quarters 2022 saw a similar level of investments. Greenfield investments in the U.S. from foreign investors have also declined recently (Evenett, 2022).

6. The Biden Administration Is Cooperative in Many Areas

Compared with the previous administration, the Biden administration has managed to return the U.S. to transatlantic cooperation. Under the current administration, several trade conflicts with the EU have been substantially defused, albeit not finally resolved (Matthes, 2022). This is true of the conflict over U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, as well as on the subsidies for Boeing and Airbus, where reciprocal tariffs have been cut or not imposed. Working groups are moving to resolve these conflicts – a difficult task since both fields are impacted by China’s distortion of competition.

There can be no doubt that the Biden administration is aiming to foster transatlantic cooperation. In the geopolitical conflict with China, Democrats are seeking joint action with like-minded partners. The Trade and Technology Council exemplifies this as well, even if no major breakthroughs have been reached so far.

However, the resulting channels of discussion have helped to partially smooth over concerns about the IRA from the point of view of European and German automakers. Washington apparently underestimated the potentially negative effects on the EU as a transatlantic partner and is looking to implement remedial measures. The U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, whose department is responsible for IRA implementation, has clearly signaled that they are aware of European concerns and are interested in a Europe with a strong manufacturing base (Brüggmann/Heide, 2022).

All in all, the criticism of the Biden administration on the IRA issue seems to be overblown. Critics seem to suggest that the U.S. is in general no longer a reliable partner. Despite all the uncertainties concerning Washington’s future geopolitical focus, the global power competition requires the strengthening of transatlantic relations wherever possible. Anything else would be geopolitically highly counterproductive, especially since the EU and the U.S. share many common interests, for example when it comes to shaping and stabilizing the world order so that China and other autocracies can undermine it as little as possible.

7. Beware of a Trade War and Excessive Sectoral Industrial Policy

In the heated debate over the IRA, there have been repeated calls for trade retaliation against this supposedly egregious U.S. protectionism and demands that the EU should raise its own trade barriers against the United States. However, we strongly advise against such steps. First, such an escalation does not seem justified in light of the arguments presented here. Second, such steps are likely to be counterproductive for transatlantic cooperation and could even provoke a trade war. Third, this debate distracts from what Europe itself can do regarding trade and industrial location policy.

A more nuanced question is whether the EU should initiate WTO proceedings regarding the local content requirements in the IRA. In principle, this step would be understandable because the U.S. is, at least in spirit and possibly de jure, disregarding fundamental WTO trade rules. This could be emulated by other countries, eroding WTO rules across the board. However, a WTO lawsuit would be counterproductive from a geostrategic perspective. This is because such a step would put a strain on cooperation in the Trade and Technology Council and make the already very domestically focused U.S. Congress more skeptical of the EU. China, on the other hand, could exploit a trade dispute fought before the WTO for its own ends. In addition, it could be argued that a WTO lawsuit is a bargaining chip for negotiations with the U.S. on the flexible implementation of the IRA.

Channels of discussion with the U.S. administration should be used to their full extent in order to achieve effective facilitation in the implementation of the IRA. In addition, the Trade and Technology Council should focus also on creating common standards for climate-friendly products and technologies as soon as possible. That is because unequal standards would be non-tariff barriers to trade that act as important obstacles for exporters.

In addition to trade policy options, there are calls for greater use of industrial policy and subsidies. Behind this is a concern about relocation of production and the realization that the European Green Deal, with its pricing approach to reduce climate-damaging activities, conflicts with the U.S. subsidy approach. Competitive disadvantages for European companies, which are already imminent, are thus in danger of being further aggravated. A carbon border adjustment mechanism, which the EU recently agreed to in principle, can probably only partially offset these disadvantages for a few sectors.

France and Germany are calling for a softening of European state subsidy rules for climate-friendly projects – and the European Commission is moving forward on this issue. In addition, there are calls for so-called matching clauses – i.e., rules that make it possible to counter U.S: subsidies with equivalent European subsidies to prevent relocation. If such demands were implemented, a wave of industrial subsidies at the expense of European taxpayers would be imminent. Companies would engage in massive lobbying efforts to obtain subsidies for themselves. And on the political side, bureaucrats would get excited. Some business development departments of economic ministries have been waiting a long time for the European subsidy shackles to be loosened.

Isolated industrial policy interventions may be appropriate, but not across the board. A close examination is needed of where IRA subsidies (and not other causes) would be decisive for production relocations. In battery production, moreover, there are already new subsidy options and exemptions from EU state aid rules. Here, however, the problems lie more in the slow implementation of the European subsidy projects. In this respect, the EU has its own homework to do when it comes to safeguarding the quality of this location, particularly with a view to streamlining bureaucratic procedures.

The European Commission’s proposal to create a sovereignty fund with a further possibility for the EU to take on debt for industrial policy subsidies is problematic. Entering a subsidy race with other states that may be lost in the end, would be a bad investment of European debts.

There is also a link between a significant relaxation of state aid rules and a European fund for subsidy financing. This is because a relaxation of state aid rules would raise the argument that financially strong countries could outcompete financially weaker countries in the EU with high subsidies – and push the argument for a sovereignty fund. For this reason, too, the relaxation of state aid rules should be handled with caution. A relaxation with a view to a limited compensation of excessive electricity and gas prices for energy-intensive European companies would be more important than allowing counter-subsidies against the IRA on a broad scale.

Regarding the calls for an EU sovereignty fund, reference should also be made to the European Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which is of considerable size compared to the IRA. Italy, with a nominal GDP of EUR 1.7 trillion, receives around EUR 190 billion over a good five years. Relative to GDP, this is more than ten times as much per year as in the U.S. with the IRA volume of around $370 billion over a span of about ten years, as the US GDP amounts to more than $23 trillion. Even if one considers the fact that not all funding in Italy is used for climate protection (just under 40 percent), the RRF support is still five times as much as the U.S. has made available.

In addition, it is generally advisable for all EU countries to reallocate Recovery and Resilience Facility funds to make even more money available for renewable energy development, also to accelerate independence from Russian energy. The RePowerEU initiative is a step in the right direction. Reallocations of Recovery and Resilience Facility funds are also conceivable at the national level to address concrete risks of relocation that are clearly attributable to IRA subsidies, but only in a targeted and limited manner. Since substantial funds in the Recovery and Resilience Facility remain unused, especially when it comes to affordable credit opportunities, this source should be tapped first before calling for a new EU fund.

Above all, however, the debate surrounding the Inflation Reduction Act makes clear that policy makers in Europe and Germany should urgently do their homework. On the one hand, this means a clarification of trade policy perspectives, claims, and expectations. On the other hand, it involves a new and comprehensive supply-side program to strengthen economic locations in international competition with tax breaks, progress in digitization, infrastructure investment and, fundamentally, a consistent acceleration of permits and licensing procedures. Europe should remember its goal of being the most successful knowledge-based economy in the world and focus all its ambitions accordingly.

References

Brüggmann, Mathias / Heide, Dana, 2022, „Wir unterstützen überparteilich“ – USA wollen Ukraine weiter mit Milliarden helfen, Handelsblatt-Online, 19.12.2022, https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/ukraine-krieg-wir-unterstuetzen-ueberparteilich-usa-wollen-ukraine-weiter-mit-milliarden-helfen/28875300.html [5.1.2022]

DIHK – Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag, 2022, Konjunkturumfrage Herbst 2022, Berlin

European Commission, 2022, Submission by the European Union on the Inflation Reduction Act November 2022 https://downloads.regulations.gov/IRS-2022-0020-0774/attachment_1.pdf

Evenett, Simon J., 2022, Will the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act “Hoover up” European Investment?, Briefing, Nr. 4, Zeitgeist Series, St. Gallen

Fasse et al., 2022, Mit diesen Tricks wollen die EU und die USA ihren Subventionsstreit entschärfen, Handelsblatt online, 14.12.2022, https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/gruene-transformation-mit-diesen-tricks-wollen-die-eu-und-die-usa-ihren-subventionsstreit-entschaerfen/28866604.html [5.1.2022]

Matthes, Jürgen, 2022, Handelsbeziehungen zu den USA – Das Glas ist mehr als halbvoll, IW-Kurzbericht, Nr. 78, Köln

Mayer Brown, 2022, Tax Credits for Electric Vehicles: What’s Changed with the US IRA? | Perspectives & Events | Mayer Brown, September, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2022/09/tax-credits-for-electric-vehicles-whats-changed-with-the-us-ira [5.1.2022]

Kunath, Gero / Matthes, Jürgen / Obst, Thomas, 2022, Biden’s economic agenda risks mid-term elections, IW-Report, Nr. 59, Köln

RGIT, 2022, Analysis of the Inflation Reduction Act, Washington, D.C.

US Department of the Treasury, 2022, Treasury Announces Guidance on Inflation Reduction Act’s Strong Labor Protections, 29.11.2022,  Treasury Announces Information Timeline for Inflation Reduction Act Tax Implementation | U.S. Department of the Treasury  [5.1.2022]

US Senate, 2022, Inflation Reduction Act One Page Summary , Inflation Reduction Act One Page Summary (senate.gov) [5.1.2022]

vbw – Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft, 2022, Bidens Wirtschaftsagenda – Auswirkungen auf Bayern, München, https://www.vbw-bayern.de/vbw/Themen-und-Services/Au%C3%9Fenwirtschaft/Auslandsm%C3%A4rkte-Export/Bidens-Wirtschaftsagenda-Auswirkungen-auf-Bayern.jsp [5.1.2022]

VDA – Verband der Automobilindustrie, 2022, Stellungnahme des VDA zum Entwurf „Inflation Reduction Act“ und der Förderung der Elektromobilität in den USA, Berlin

Der Beitrag Is the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act Hurting the German Economy? erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Steinmeier also warned against taking the partnership between Europe and the United States for granted. He said it was essential, especially in light of demographic changes in the U.S., to convince a broader cross-section of the American society of the transatlantic project’s value. “Latino or Asian immigrants do not necessarily look across the Atlantic with the same natural feelings of affinity. Their biographical bridges lead not to Europe, but to Latin America and Asia.” This, he said, is precisely why Atlantik-Brücke’s New Bridge Program, which promotes diversity in transatlantic relations, is so important. “The transatlantic partnership needs new faces, new identities, and a shared vision of how our societies on both sides of the Atlantic should develop.”

The German President was welcomed by Atlantik-Brücke Chairman Sigmar Gabriel, who in his speech recalled the beginnings of Atlantik-Brücke after World War II and summarized: “Atlantik-Brücke’s founding in 1952 was a pioneering project […]. But the pioneering work does not stop. All of us gathered here today are called upon to work anew to strengthen the transatlantic partnership.”

Musicians from Yehudi Mehunin Live Music Now, under the direction of Prof. Dr. Stephan Frucht, provided musical accompaniment.

You can read the Federal President’s speech in its entirety here.

Der Beitrag „A Place Where One Can Sense the Appeal of the Transatlantic Project“ erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The quick and coordinated response to Russia’s war on Ukraine showed the importance of transatlantic cooperation. The Frankfurt Forum addressed the EU-US reaction to the war, but also sought to look at the key economic issues that will shape the US-Europe partnership over the coming years. The future of payments systems, international trade, the governance of currencies, and the use of economic tools in times of crisis were the topics of the conference’s expert panels and keynote discussions.

IHK Frankfurt am Main graciously hosted the event. Handelsblatt and CNBC were the media partners of the Frankfurt Forum.

You can watch the recording of the conference here:

[toggle title=”Keynote Fireside Chat with Christine Lagarde”]

Christine Lagarde, President, European Central Bank

In conversation with Maria Demertzis, Deputy Director, Bruegel

You can read the full transcript of Christine Lagarde’s keynote remarks and her conversation with Maria Demertzis here.

[/toggle]

[toggle title=”Keynote Remarks by Paolo Gentiloni”]

Paolo Gentiloni, Commissioner for Economy, EU Commission

In conversation with Annette Weisbach, Reporter, CNBC in Germany

You can read the full transcript of Paolo Gentiloni’s keynote remarks and his conversation with Annette Weisbach here.

[/toggle]

[toggle title=”Rethinking transatlantic trade in a changing global economy”]

Elizabeth Baltzan, Senior Advisor, United States Trade Representative
Kenneth Kang, Deputy Director, Strategy, Policy, and Review, International Monetary Fund
Rupert Schlegelmilch, Acting Deputy Director-General, DG Trade, European Commission
Anahita Thoms, Board Member, Atlantik-Bruecke and Partner, Baker & Mckenzie International

Moderated by Clete Willems, Senior Fellow, GeoEconomics Center, Atlantic Council; Former Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economics and Deputy Director of the National Economic Council, The White House

You can read the report titled “TTC, IPEF, and the road to an Indo-Pacific trade deal: A new model” by Clete R. Willems and Niels Graham here.

[/toggle]

[toggle title=”The international role of the euro and the dollar – Forever in the lead?”]

Maria Demertzis, Deputy Director, Bruegel
Andreas Dombret, Board Member, Atlantik-Bruecke; Former Member of the Executive Board, Deutsche Bundesbank
Geoffrey Okamoto, Managing Director, Goldman Sachs; Former First Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund
Philippa Sigl-Glöckner, Founder, Dezernat Zukunft

Moderated by Martin Mühleisen, Senior Fellow, GeoEconomics Center, Atlantic Council; Former Chief of Staff, International Monetary Fund

You can read the report titled “The international role of the euro and the dollar: Forever in the lead?” by Martin Mühleisen here.

[/toggle]

[toggle title=”Coordination and compromise: How the US and EU can set international standards on digital assets”]

Candace Kelly, Chief Legal Officer, Stellar Development Foundation
Brent Neiman, Counselor to the Secretary, US Treasury
Hyun Song Shin, Economic Adviser and Head of Research, Bank for International Settlements
Evelien Witlox, Program Director, Digital Euro Project, European Central Bank

Moderated by Annette Weisbach, Reporter, CNBC in Germany

You can read the report titled “Privacy in cross-border digital currency: A transatlantic approach” by Giulia Fanti and Nadia Pocher here.

[/toggle]

[toggle title=”A new era in the use of sanctions and tools of statecraft”]

Julia Friedlander, CEO, Atlantik-Bruecke
Carla Norrlöf, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto
Daleep Singh, Former Deputy National Security Advisor, National Security Council

Moderated by Frank Wiebe, Correspondent, Handelsblatt

You can read the report titled “Will economic statecraft threaten western currency dominance? Sanctions, geopolitics, and the global monetary order” by Dr. Carla Norrlöf here.

[/toggle]

[toggle title=”Trade, sanctions, and energy: New public opinion research from Morning Consult”]

Presentation by Sonnet Frisbie, Managing Director, Geopolitical Risk, EMEA, Morning Consult

[/toggle]

You can read the speech of Deutsche Bundesbank President Joachim Nagel on how to prepare for the world’s next economic shock here.

Press Coverage

You can find a selection of the press coverage of the event here:

t-online: “EZB-Präsidentin Christine Lagarde bekräftigt Entschlossenheit gegen die hohe Inflation”

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: “Amerikas Inflation ist anders”

Handelsblatt: “‘Haben keine wirkliche Kapitalmarktunion’ – Lagarde erklärt Schwäche des Euros”

The Pioneer: “Investment Briefing mit Annette Weisbach”

Bloomberg: “Lagarde Says ECB Will Lift Rates at Next ‘Several’ Meetings”

Reuters: “ECB policymakers put 75 bps hike on table for October”

Der Beitrag Frankfurt Forum erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

A major land war is being waged in Europe. Against this backdrop, nearly 50 up-and-coming decision makers convened outside Atlanta, Georgia, to engage in dialogue about the transatlantic alliance in times of crisis, to deepen understanding, and strengthen ties between the rising generation of Germans and Americans.

As Albert Einstein said in 1955, “The important thing is to not stop questioning.” Indeed, questions defined the Atlantik-Brücke’s 2022 Young Leaders Conference — tough questions, searching questions, light-hearted questions, two-in-one questions, and follow-up questions. And the conference provided the ideal platform to ask these questions and engage in lively debate, both amongst the participants and also to panelists and guest speakers.

There were questions about environmental sustainability, about consumer health and supply chain resilience.

Young Leaders also posed questions to one another. These ranged from the factors necessary to start a business to the forces kindling extremism in the military and law enforcement, from the manifold definitions of diversity to the meaning of victory in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Some questions were more light-hearted: Does it rain every day in Georgia? Who can drive this golf cart faster?

We arrived at some answers. No one left Foxhall Resort without knowing that lithium is an important component of EV batteries. The problems of polarization and distrust — whether in Germany or the United States, in politics or business — ran through the crises that occupied our discussions. It does seem to rain every day in Georgia, at least in August.

But these conclusions were preliminary, at best. Most of all, the conference afforded us the opportunity to step out of the hustle and bustle of our everyday lives and to consider how new, enlarged perspectives might offer solutions to some of society’s most vexing problems.

WORKING GROUPS

Some of these problems were addressed by the conference’s four working groups.

These working groups were: lessons learned from Covid-19, supply chain resiliency, diversity, equity, and inclusion and the implications of the war in Ukraine on energy security.

1. Lessons learned from Covid-19: future direction for public policy, investment opportunities, and digital transformation

The working group identified numerous problems exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic, including the fragmentation of funding for scientific innovation and failed communication. One possible solution would be the creation of a transatlantic entity tentatively named the North Atlantic Science Organization. It would be governed by a transatlantic executive board and help ensure equitable access to vaccines and therapeutics. Questions posed to the working group included whether such a body might not better be instituted within an existing organization, such as NATO or the WHO.

2. Future-proofing supply chains: balancing prosperity and social responsibility

The working group used EV (Electronic Vehicle) batteries as a case study and identified three supply chain pressure points. The first was accountability, illustrated by the example of cobalt sourced in countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, that use forced labor. The second was environmental trade-offs, such as the reliance on lithium processing, which involves transportation to China and use of vast sums of water and electricity. The third was complexity, captured by a web of reporting requirements to satisfy Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria. Some common threads emerged from the many solutions proposed by the working group, including blacklisting and whitelisting certain materials and countries; developing corporate consortiums to create power in numbers when weighing tradeoffs and avoiding a race to the bottom; public loan or utility loan schemes to assist companies with financing constraints; blended finance or public-private partnerships; enhanced digitalization and international standardization.

3. Advancing diversity, equity, and inclusion in political and business leadership:

The working group emphasized data, implicit bias, and mentorship. It argued that not simply data collection but also disclosure is essential to identifying problems and maintaining high standards. In that vein, it posed a challenge to Atlantik-Brücke to assemble a more diverse slate of Young Leaders — and to this year’s participants to put forward a more diverse slate of nominees. Among the solutions to implicit bias that were put forward was removing certain identifying details from job applications, such as headshots. In addition to these more structural factors, the working group stressed the importance of mentorship because it means having allies on the inside. The use of quotas was debated, with one point of contention being which identity categories are subject to such parameters, and questions focused on the need for multiple axes of diversity, including diversity of thought and educational background.

4. The war in Ukraine and its implications for energy security: tackling climate change in times of global instability

The working group focused on the central aim of reducing energy dependence on Russia, ideally with renewable sources of energy. In the short term, this might mean alternative supplies such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) or biomass, as well as reducing consumption. It could also involve the development of energy efficiency technology. More long term, the working group discussed blue hydrogen and green hydrogen, as well as battery supply and storage. These methods allow greater reliance on European partners and less on American-made products. A framework suggested by the working group would be an energy supply steering group — an alliance that would allow the European Union to negotiate gas purchases as one body.

GUEST SPEAKERS & OFF-SITE VISITS

Beyond participant-led working groups and panels, the conference also included outside speakers and off-site visits in and around Atlanta.

Georgia State Rep. Angelika Kausche, a German-American lawmaker, shared her pathway into politics as an immigrant to the United States. We learned how Melanie Moltmann, the German Consul General in Atlanta, Ga., sees effective civil rights education throughout the South. Docent-guided tours of the National Center for Civil and Human Rights in downtown Atlanta showcased how far the United States has come but also how human rights continue to be threatened around the world. Matthias Hoffman, President & CEO of the German-American Chamber of Commerce of the Southern U.S., highlighted the strong business relations that underpin the U.S.-German relationship — over $500 billion in German businesses investment in the U.S., which employ nearly a million people in all 50 states. An example of this business activity was shared by the Regional Vice President of the S.E. Region for Kuehne + Nagel, Jürgen Gentzke, who also explained challenges facing the global supply chain. Dennis Wagner, CEO of BESTAR Steel Group, shared insights about bringing a German company to the US.

At the Coca Cola headquarters, Rocky Rief, the Senior Director for Economic and Fiscal Policy, fielded a wide range of questions. At the Emory University Global Health Institute, an official from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the institute’s researchers and staff described challenges and lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. Eike Jordan, the President of the Halle Foundation, graciously hosted our group at the Halle Estate, where we heard from Pat Wilson, Commissioner for the Georgia Department of Economic Development. At Porsche’s North American headquarters, Kjell Gruner discussed the power of a brand, as we watched Porsches zoom through the experience center track in the background.

CONCLUSION

After extolling the virtue of questions, Einstein, in his 1955 comments, advised, “never lose a holy curiosity.”

In preparing to write this report, we asked conference participants to share recollections about the experience. What came through in the reactions was how shared curiosity made the week’s events such a success.

One participant wrote of finding “new thoughts, ideas, and possibilities.” Another remarked on the speed with which “intimate relationships formed,” in part because of the wide-ranging discussions, “from science communication to diversity and inclusion, to military leadership (and the number one song on the German charts right now…).”

One comment noted the need to “accept uncertainty and engage deeply in discourse whether we dissent or agree.” A reflection that seemed to sum up these observations noted: “Although a running joke of the conference was the doom and gloom of the worst-case scenarios for the U.S. and Germany, there was still a lot to be hopeful for in this group. There were routinely optimistic outlooks shared in even the worst contexts.”

Through questions and curiosity, the conference allowed us to arrive at something that feels unusual these days: hope.

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

© Dustin Chambers

Der Beitrag “A lot to be hopeful for” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Mr. Gabriel, are you concerned that Russia’s war against Ukraine could trigger a Third World War?

Sigmar Gabriel: I’m not a fan of panic-mongering, so I don’t like using the term ‘Third World War’. What we really should be concerned about is the possibility of Russia being willing to deploy nuclear weapons. That would have catastrophic consequences – at least for Europe. In fact, it would be no less devastating than a Third World War. Unfortunately, a Russian nuclear strike is a real and present danger.

In the oath he took when assuming office, Chancellor Olaf Scholz swore to protect the German people from harm. So his main priority should be to prevent the escalation of the war and the use of nuclear weapons. Do you agree?

Gabriel: There’s definitely some disagreement on whether the federal government’s communication strategy has been ideal. From my perspective, the federal chancellor quite rightly said two things: On the one hand, Germany will give Ukraine the support it needs to not lose this war against Russia. On the other hand, we have to be cautious that the war doesn’t escalate and possibly even result in the deployment of nuclear weapons. Providing support while exercising caution is a difficult undertaking, and it involves walking a fine line. NATO, the United States, and the United Kingdom are all concerned about the same issue: What can we do to prevent Putin from winning the war and to help Ukraine defend itself effectively? But we also have to be careful not to give Putin a reason to escalate the war because, if that happened, we would all be on the losing side, not just Ukraine.

Does supplying certain weapons to Ukraine implicate the West’s direct involvement in the war, or would that only be the case, as certain international law experts suggest, if NATO troops were deployed?

Gabriel: What constitutes our involvement in the war won’t be decided by human rights activists or legislators: it will be decided by Vladimir Putin. World history isn’t negotiated in court. Also, if international laws were being observed, there would be no war in Ukraine.

Isn’t the West already involved in the war? After all, Ukraine isn’t just defending itself, it’s also defending peace, freedom, and democracy in Europe.

Gabriel: As Europeans, we shouldn’t only condemn attacks on the peace order that are happening on our doorstep and then simply shrug our shoulders when they affect countries further away. This behavior has prompted several countries to accuse us of operating on a double standard. But, of course, Ukraine isn’t only fighting for itself, it’s fighting to uphold the minimum standards of international law. And that means not simply driving tanks into a neighboring country and declaring war. I think, for that alone, Ukraine deserves our support.

Of course, Ukraine isn’t only fighting for itself, it’s fighting to uphold the minimum standards of international law.

We should avoid calling the war a conflict between ‘the West and Russia’ because there are a lot of people around the world who would then see it as a ‘proxy war’ between two former empires that they want nothing to do with. Russia’s war concerns us all. If this breach of international law is successful, it could soon be copied in other parts of the world. In other words, Ukraine isn’t only fighting for its freedom, but also to uphold the international order.

Is Germany too hesitant and waiting too long before offering assistance? It seems as if Chancellor Scholz only responds to pressure.

Gabriel: I think the German chancellor is taking careful and considered action. And that’s important in this kind of a situation. Of course, the federal government could have acted faster and communicated some issues more clearly. Germany hasn’t been showing its best side in recent weeks, to put it mildly. Better coordination and communication within NATO and with the US, as a leading power, would have made a lot of things easier. Still, I prefer a government that considers an issue from all angles to a hot-headed government that reacts without thinking the issue through. After all, we’re talking about a war and, unfortunately, also the risk of a nuclear escalation.

Many politicians have looked Vladimir Putin in the eye. US President George W. Bush said Putin was straightforward and trustworthy, and that he got a sense of his soul. Joe Biden informed him to his face that he had no soul. Former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder described Putin as a ‘flawless democrat’. When you met Putin as Minister for Economic Affairs, State Secretary, Vice-Chancellor and leader of the Social Democratic Party, what did you see?

Gabriel: I definitely can’t reconcile the person I see today, and his actions, with the person I met five or six years ago. But that could be my mistake, perhaps I simply didn’t see through him. Some believe that he has undergone a process of radicalization in recent years.

I did ask Putin once how he could make common cause with a criminal like Bashar al-Assad in Syria. At the time, I thought his answer was a bit bizarre. He said, “If you want to win a war you have to do it by any means necessary.” He was referring to the war against the Islamic State, and in that war, he didn’t care who his allies were. Basically, he was saying that the end justifies the means. The idea that Putin is willing to use any means to enforce his political doctrine is a pretty chilling thought.

Didn’t Putin tell us who he really was early on? During a speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, he said he had not accepted and reconciled himself with the break-up of the Soviet Union and that he wished he could turn back time. Should we have heeded the warning back then?

Gabriel: That’s what Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, the former chairman of the Munich Security Conference, has said. Ischinger thinks we didn’t take Putin’s speech seriously enough at the time. I wasn’t there, so I can’t say. However, many things point to the fact that, in the years after 2007, we underestimated Putin’s ambitions. Or rather, you could say we overestimated our experience and knowledge of of how to deal with the Soviet Union and Russia.

That, I believe, is the problem at the core of German politics and German social democracy: We thought we had found the right formula for our policy of normalizing relations and openness towards the East, or ‘Ostpolitik’.

What formula was that?

Gabriel: How to deal successfully with an authoritarian Russian state.

What was that assumption based on?

Gabriel: Our ‘Ostpolitik’ strategy was very successful. We made our peace with the Soviet Union and Poland after the atrocities of the Second World War, Gorbachev came to power, German reunification happened, the Soviet Union broke up, and the Warsaw Pact was abolished. We thought: We Germans know how to deal with Moscow.

Germany’s general attitude towards Eastern Europeans was pretty arrogant.

That was presumptuous. In fact, Germany’s general attitude towards Eastern Europeans was pretty arrogant. When the Berlin Wall was demolished, we developed a very paternalistic relationship with them. It was as if we were saying: “We understand you see Russia with different eyes. After all, you suffered all those years of Kremlin rule. But we Germans know better”. We genuinely thought we had discovered a universal formula for a successful ‘Ostpolitik’. That was the main problem.

Has the ‘change through trade’ solution failed?

Gabriel: That wasn’t the first East-West détente policy slogan. In fact, ‘change through trade’ is actually a perversion of the original idea. It all started back in the 60s and 70s under former SPD chancellor Willy Brandt and his senior diplomatic advisor Egon Bahr. Their formula was ‘change through rapprochement’. Basically, West Germans accepted the outcome of the Second World War and recognized the new western borders of Poland, known as the Oder-Neisse Line, within the framework of a final peace settlement. In return, Eastern Europeans, particularly Russians, recognized the CSCE Helsinki Final Act and therefore agreed to respect human rights, the territorial integrity of states, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

It wasn’t until later that the slogan became ‘change through trade’. The idea was that stronger links between the German and the Soviet – or Russian – economy would help us more effectively maintain stability and peace in Europe. Then Vladimir Putin arrived, a man who had no interest in economic success and used a different currency, the currency of power. To be honest, we Germans never believed the war in Ukraine would happen, until it did. The success of Germany’s economy and society is founded on successful economic integration and the conviction that the closer the economic ties are, the safer the world will be. That was obviously a gross misjudgment.

After two cruel wars in Chechnya, the war with Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, the war with Eastern Ukraine, and Russia’s military intervention in Syria, how could we possibly continue to believe that Putin could be kept in check by economic ties?

Gabriel: Germans weren’t alone in that belief. The majority of western European nations and the US also believed we could develop some kind of stable relationship with Russia. When President Joe Biden met with Vladimir Putin in Geneva in mid-2021 he said he believed that the US and Russia could build a stable and reliable relationship and negotiate disarmament.

Germany always hoped, albeit mistakenly, that Russia needs us and would make concessions because its economic survival depends on it.

Germany always hoped, albeit mistakenly, that Russia needs us and would make concessions because its economic survival depends on it. Many years that seemed to be true. But, I must admit that my Polish friend Janusz Reiter, a former Polish ambassador in both Berlin and Washington, always warned that Putin follows an entirely different logic and that he doesn’t care about his country’s economic and social situation.

Shouldn’t we finally have heard the warning bells when the annexation of Crimea happened?

Gabriel: In 2014, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Angela Merkel – who was the German chancellor at the time – and French President François Hollande managed to prevent the war from spreading to the rest of Ukraine.

Ukraine’s President Poroshenko called Merkel and asked for her help with negotiations when Eastern Ukraine was nearing military defeat. Thanks to the successful European intervention it was at least possible to contain the conflict. Had it not been for these efforts, Russia would probably have started a full-blown war with Ukraine back then.

Why did the German government continue with the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline – a transit pipeline circumventing Eastern Europe and creating a direct link between Russia and Germany via the Baltic Sea – after the Crimea annexation? Why did you, as Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, support a decision that made us even more energy-dependent on Russia?

Gabriel: Nord Stream 2 was approved and construction started back in 2005. The German government didn’t stop the project after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 because we were in Minsk in the process of negotiating a ceasefire in Ukraine. Angela Merkel wanted to persuade Russia to end the war in the Donbass region. It wouldn’t have been a particularly clever negotiation tactic to tell Putin, “We want you to give up and agree to a ceasefire, but we’re still going to scrap your ambitious energy project, Nord Stream 2.”

Today we know that Nord Stream 2 was a mistake. Vladimir Putin didn’t care about the pipeline. I’m sure he was well aware that a war with Ukraine would mean the end of the project. Interestingly, one outcome of the negotiations back then in 2014/2015 is still in place. Back then Ukraine was also using Russian gas supplied via the trans-Ukrainian pipeline that goes to Europe. There was always a risk that Russia would stop the flow of gas to Ukraine, especially with the onset of winter. To prevent that from happening, we agreed with Russia that Ukraine wouldn’t buy the gas directly from Russia, but from the EU. So, when the gas arrives in the EU, the amount that Ukraine needs is piped back to them. That arrangement is still in place today, despite the war. Another part of the negotiation package with Russia was that gas would continue to be transported via Ukraine, even after the completion of Nord Stream 2. So the German government did impose certain conditions in connection with the construction of Nord Stream 2.

The Balts, the Poles, the Americans, and many Ukrainians believed that Nord Stream 2 was a tool Russia was using to extend its power. They warned of the geopolitical implications very early on. Why didn’t we listen?

Gabriel: Again, I can only say that we believed Russia would be just as dependable as the former Soviet Union regarding the energy supply. After all, the Soviet Union had been a reliable supplier throughout the entire Cold War. Even the US was buying Russian crude oil until the war in Ukraine broke out. We simply transferred our past experience with the Soviet Union to Russia and Putin. It was a misjudgment.

And we just didn’t listen to Eastern Europeans. First, because we thought we knew better and, second, because the liberalization of the European energy market meant that the state no longer felt responsible for energy security. That responsibility had been transferred to the private sector in 2002. When the EU decided to liberalize – or in other words privatize – the energy markets in 2002, the task of ensuring security of supply was transferred from the state to the ‘market,’ the assumption was that the market could do it more efficiently and at lower cost. And these ‘markets’ – privatized companies – obviously opted to buy cheap pipeline gas from Russia instead of expensive liquid gas. That’s why the LNG terminals in Europe are only partially in use.

Nevertheless, German ministers – yourself included –met with gas pipeline operators on many occasions and followed the progress of construction. So the project wasn’t entirely non-political?

Gabriel: No, of course not. The government obviously had to negotiate the issue of continuing the gas transit via Ukraine with Gazprom and the Russian government. The European Commission negotiated with Gazprom on the same issue, and Germany was always asked to be involved in these negotiations. Also, it wasn’t just about Ukraine, but also about the supply of gas to Slovakia, Bulgaria, and other countries.

How could leading German politicians, particularly Social Democrats, continue calling Nord Stream 2 a purely economic project with no geopolitical impacts until recently?

Gabriel: I, personally, never said that, and I have always believed that description of the project to be false. The fact that we attached political preconditions to the trans-Ukrainian pipeline shows that Nord Stream 2 was more than just an economic project.

The fact that we attached political preconditions to the trans-Ukrainian pipeline shows that Nord Stream 2 was more than just an economic project.

As Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy you approved the sale of Germany’s largest gas storage facility to the Russian Rosneft Group. Did you consider that the deal might go against German national interest?

Gabriel: No, I admit I didn’t consider it at the time. I also believed it was in Germany’s interest to give German companies the opportunity to acquire property rights in Russian gas fields. Those deals involved an exchange of German companies’ gas rights for Gazprom infrastructure. The German companies asked us for help.

But there were major concerns in Germany about that sale, and about the construction of Nord Stream 2.

Gabriel: Yes, particularly in the Green Party, also for environmental reasons. But there were opponents in the CDU, too, including Norbert Röttgen, who is now Vice-Chairman at Atlantik-Brücke. Nevertheless, the majority of Bundestag politicians and members of various German governments between 2005 and 2021 voted in favor of cheap Russian oil and gas.

Minister for Economic Affairs Robert Habeck believes that German gas storage facilities in Russian hands pose a security risk. Do you agree?

Gabriel: Yes, of course. But that can soon change. The most difficult challenge is to find an alternative supplier to replace Russian gas at short notice. That too, we will achieve, but the price will be higher. And we have to be willing to pay it.

Does the Social Democratic Party — your party — not bear special responsibility for its misjudgment of Russia?

Gabriel: I don’t think it’s a bad thing to have a discussion about the successes and failures of the SDP’s Russia policies. Take a closer look and you can see that the discussion is actually representative of what should generally be happening in Germany because the whole country has been shaped by the era of East-West détente policy. Germany’s firm belief in the integrative powers of economic cooperation shaped its own model of economic success and the way companies and civil society think.

I don’t think it’s a bad thing to have a discussion about the successes and failures of the SDP’s Russia policies.

Now we’re embarking on a new and probably very uncomfortable era. The old global order and Pax Americana are gone, but a new global order hasn’t yet emerged. The next decade will be shaped, not necessarily by war, but by uncertainty, unpredictable dynamics, and instability. Adjusting to this new status quo and separating what we did right in the past from our mistakes and learning from them, is probably the most important thing we can do, if we and our partners, such as the US, want to get things right in this chaotic world. The SPD will benefit as a party if it starts that process.

Why?

Gabriel: I’m pretty sure that others will follow suit because the Social Democrats have not led the majority of German governments in recent decades. Also, many people’s perceptions of Russia are generation-dependent. The younger generation’s criticism of Russia has become louder in recent years because of the country’s accelerating crackdown on liberal values. Many older people still judge Russia policy in terms of their memories of Nazi war crimes in Russia and the successful ‘Ostpolitik’ and East-West détente policy. And we often forget that people in Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic States or Belarus experienced the Nazi Holocaust to the same extent as the Russians. These different experiences of different generations are also an issue that we have to discuss. And it’s better if the SPD initiates the discussion.

There is one crucial thing, I think, that the SPD must do. It has to critically examine whether its own narrative about the ‘Ostpolitik’ and East-West détente policy is really true.

What narrative?

Gabriel: Within the SPD and perhaps even beyond the party, the perception is that they were one single policy. In truth, there were two very different phases.

The first phase under SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt was very successful. However, Brandt always made it very clear that West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany, must resolutely support NATO. Brandt’s East-West détente policy of the 70s was preceded by a major speech by SPD parliamentarian Herbert Wehner in 1960, in which he explained that the SPD’s negative stance on the Federal Republic’s alignment with the West was wrong. Many Social Democrats believed at the time that alignment with the West and NATO membership would permanently seal Germany’s fate as a divided nation. Wehner explained that an alignment with the West and NATO membership would be a mainstay of social democratic foreign policy. It was no coincidence that this historic turning point within the SPD happened right after the reform party convention in Bad Godesberg in 1959.

It was only because of West Germany’s strong ties with NATO that Brandt was later able to negotiate with the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, and announce the first phase of East-West détente policy. Otherwise, the chancellor and West Germany would have been left at the mercy of Brezhnev’s interests.

And the second phase?

Gabriel: That phase has long been criticized, especially in Eastern Europe. When I attempted to criticize this second phase as SPD party chairman on the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Warsaw Pact, many people saw it as an ‘act of treason’ against ‘Ostpolitik’. The second phase primarily focused on building stability in the East-West relationship, so much so, that SPD representatives were reluctant to meet with citizens’ rights groups that were springing up throughout Eastern Europe, including the Polish Solidarność trade union movement. They avoided any close contact with people who questioned the status quo in Eastern Europe, even though these citizens’ rights groups would probably never have existed without the positive outcome of the first phase of SPD ‘Ostpolitik’, namely the human rights package in the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975.

What were those social democrats afraid of?

Gabriel: They were afraid that the human rights activists would cause East Bloc instability and that the Communist regime would use military force to suppress them. Protests in East Berlin in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Prague in 1968 were proof that, if necessary, tanks would be deployed to stop protests. The leading social democrats at the time were united in their fear of military escalation, including a conflict with the West. Their objective was no longer ‘change through rapprochement’, it was only about ‘stability’. Policies were being imposed from the top down without any grassroots input. An underestimation of the power of civil society was the main problem in this second phase of East-West détente policy.

You should always negotiate, including with Russia, but it’s better to negotiate from a position of strength.

What lessons should the SPD have learned from that?

Gabriel: The take-away from the first phase of East-West détente policy is that military and political strength, not appeasement, were responsible for the success of negotiations. You should always negotiate, including with Russia, but it’s better to negotiate from a position of strength. Former chancellor Helmut Schmidt agreed: In the early 1980s he was keen to push through his rearmament program, the so-called NATO dual-track decision, because he was concerned about Russia’s nuclear armament. The SPD refused to support Schmidt at the time.

But Schmidt was also focused on stability and not particularly sympathetic to Solidarność.

Gabriel: To put stability in Europe above everything else was certainly a mistake. But you have to remember that, in those days, the entire world was afraid of a nuclear war between the West and the USSR. I’m not making excuses, I’m simply explaining the reasoning behind some of the decisions that were made at the time.

Aren’t the Gazprom deals that were orchestrated by former SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his defense of Putin excellent examples of getting Russia policy wrong? What did you think when you heard that he’d come to Putin’s defense, saying, “Mea culpa isn’t my thing” in a recent interview with the New York Times?

Gabriel: I thought that he shouldn’t have done the interview. But the problem isn’t what he said. The problem is his decision not to publicly distance himself from Vladimir Putin. For me, that’s both a human and a political tragedy.

But we have to be careful and not make Gerhard Schröder the scapegoat for everything that went wrong in order to escape criticism and exonerate ourselves. In the Bible, a scapegoat is, after all, the animal who is symbolically burdened with one’s own sins and which is then sent into the desert to get rid of the sins and reconcile with God. Schröder should certainly share the blame and responsibility, but we shouldn’t forget our own ‘sins’ or pretend that the rest of the country had nothing to do with the mismanagement of our policy on Russia.

It’s obvious that continuing the Nord Stream 2 project was a mistake.

Did you play a part in that mismanagement? And, if you did, do you regret it?

Gabriel: Yes, it’s obvious that continuing the Nord Stream 2 project was a mistake. I think it’s important for politicians to accept personal responsibility, and that involves talking publicly about the decisions we played a part in. That’s what I am trying to do, and I hope I’m succeeding. With the knowledge I have today, I would have acted differently back then. But it’s far more difficult to answer the question of why we didn’t or weren’t willing to see what others were telling us. That’s something I think about a lot, and it’s no use pointing out that the planning and construction of the pipeline started eight years before it became my responsibility in 2013. That would make it sound like I’m trying shirk responsiblity. I’m still processing it.

When the war in Ukraine is over at some point in the future, Russia will still be there, and Vladimir Putin may still be its leader. What could or should the new ‘Ostpolitik’ be when that time comes?

Gabriel: All the sanctions will probably remain in place as long as Putin is still in power. We will have a new iron curtain between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, and there will probably be armed military units on each side, which were not there previously.

I believe Russia will be a shadow of its former self after this war is over.

However, I believe Russia will be a shadow of its former self after this war is over and I hope that, with time, a different Russian leadership will emerge. It won’t be Putin’s direct successor, though, because anti-Western sentiment is still too ingrained in Russia – not just in Putin – for that to happen. Many people in Russia think that the West is the arch-enemy and associate it with decadence. Change will take time.

Will our future relationship with Russia be entirely based on security policy, because we will have decoupled our economic and energy policies?

Gabriel: Russia won’t be another North Korea after this war. The country is too big for that to happen. It has too many natural resources, it is too important from a military standpoint, and, for that reason, it will continue to be a partner to many countries around the world. Of the 141 nations that condemned Russia’s war with Ukraine at the UN General Assembly, only around 30 have actually imposed sanctions on Russia.

Nobody can predict whether the next US president in 2024 will continue to stand at Europe’s side, or whether they will say that our problems have nothing to do with them.

But, to a great extent, Russia will be technologically and economically decoupled from us. So it is true that, ultimately, the only thing remaining is the security policy issue. And the only answer to that will be to build up our defense capabilities as much as we can – and make a stronger Europe. This is important, because nobody can predict whether the next US president in 2024 will continue to stand at Europe’s side, or whether they will say that our problems have nothing to do with them.

Doesn’t this war underscore the importance of the transatlantic partnership?

Gabriel: You don’t have to convince me of its importance. In 2018 I wrote a book with the title: ‘Zeitenwende in der Weltpolitik’ (A Historic Turning Point in World Politics). ‘Zeitenwende‘ or turning point has become a popular term.. In the book, I consider the issue of our Western alliance. There have been calls to leave the nuclear shield of NATO. A French president declared NATO to be brain-dead. And an American president said he wasn’t sure that we really still need NATO. Now, with his war, Putin has made NATO more relevant than it has been in decades.

As I see it, the issue isn’t whether NATO and the transatlantic alliance are needed. That debate was silenced, at least for the time being, when Russia invaded Ukraine. But we cannot be sure whether the next American president won’t turn away from Europe once again.

This task of ensuring that Eastern Europe can defend itself has been shouldered by the US alone up until now. I believe it would benefit European cohesion and transatlantic relations if Germany took on this task.

How should Europe be preparing for that possibility?

Gabriel: The only way to prepare is to make the European pillar whitin the NATO framework – not the European framework outside the alliance – as strong as possible. In 2018, my Polish friend Janusz Reiter and I proposed the two percent defense investment should be divided up, with Germany investing 1.5 percent of its GDP in the federal armed forces and the other 0.5 percent in a NATO defense fund for Eastern Europe. This task of ensuring that Eastern Europe can defend itself has been shouldered by the US alone up until now. I believe it would benefit European cohesion and transatlantic relations if Germany took on this task – with our money and not with US tax dollars.

Der Beitrag “Nord Stream 2 was a mistake. We simply didn’t listen to the Eastern Europeans.” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The U.S. Secretary of State was welcomed by Atlantik-Brücke Chairman Sigmar Gabriel.

Der Beitrag Keynote by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony J. Blinken erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“Our transatlantic ties remain the strongest foundation we have for realizing a better future for ourselves and the world.” [quoter]U.S. Consul General Thatcher Scharpf[/quoter]

At the Atlantik-Brücke dinner, the Consul General gave his views on the transatlantic relationship: “Over the last 75 years, the United States and our European allies and partners have built a durable, democratic, and prosperous transatlantic community. Our alliance shaped the 20th century for the better. It delivered security and opportunity not only for our own people, but for people everywhere. However, the world looks very different than it did decades ago, when we forged many of our alliances. Threats have multiplied. Competition has stiffened. Power dynamics have shifted. Trust in our alliances has been shaken. Yet none of this changes the fact that we need alliances – now maybe even more than ever. The challenge we face is to adapt and renew those alliances so that they can meet today’s threats, and continue to deliver for our people, as they have in the past. The only way to meet these challenges is by working together. Our transatlantic ties remain the strongest foundation we have for realizing a better future for ourselves and the world.”

The Consul General does not only have diplomatic ties to Germany; it is also a big part of his family history: three of his four grandparents were the grandchildren of Germans who immigrated to the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Der Beitrag “We need alliances – now even more than ever” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Internationally, confidence in the U.S. president has increased significantly from Trump to Biden. At the end of Trump’s term, only 17% of polled publics in 16 different countries were confident in the U.S. president, whereas this year, 75% said they were. Similarly, confidence in the U.S. president’s ability to manage international affairs increased.

Jacob Poushter, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research, Pew Research Center, presented these and other insights from the latest Pew survey results.

Most of the polled international publics do not think that the U.S. is taking their country’s interest into account when making foreign policy decisions. In Germany, about half of respondents, 51%, thought so.

Domestically, President Biden’s approval rating had decreased significantly: 44% of Americans approved of the job Biden is doing, which is worse than presidents Bush and Obama fared during the same timeframe in their terms, and down from 54% at the beginning of his time in office. His approval rating is similar to that of President Clinton and higher than President Trump’s. According to Poushter, lower approval ratings for presidents have become more common: the deep polarization in American politics means that presidents now rarely get above 55%.

In Biden’s case, the 10% decline in approval since the beginning of his term is to a large degree due to foreign policy – a policy area that is “generally not the top priority for Americans,” says Poushter. Yet, 69% of Americans, both Democrats and Republicans, feel that the U.S. has failed in achieving its goals in Afghanistan and 42% say that the Biden administration has done a poor job handling the crisis in Afghanistan.

You can take a closer look at the survey findings in this Pew Research Center Slide Show.

Der Beitrag Changing Views of and in the United States erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Panel 1: The Pollster and the Policy Expert

Janina Mütze, Co-Founder and CEO, Civey

Julia Reuschenbach, Lecturer for Poltical Science,
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn

Moderator:
Sudha David-Wilp, Deputy Director Berlin Office, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States

Panel 2: The Politicians

Marieluise Beck, Director for East-Central and Eastern Europe, LibMod and Former Member of the German Bundestag (Alliance 90/The Greens)

Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman, Atlantik-Brücke and Former Member of the German Bundestag, Vice Chancellor and Secretary of State (Social Democrats)

Ruprecht Polenz, President, The German Association for East European Studies and Former Member of the German Bundestag (Christian Democrats)

Moderator:
Ambassador John B. Emerson, Chairman, American Council on Germany; Former Ambassador of the United States to Germany

Panel 3: The Pundits

Steven Erlanger, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent in Europe, The New York Times

Dr. Anna Sauerbrey, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Der Tagesspiegel

Moderator:
Dr. David Deißner, Executive Director, Atlantik-Brücke

Der Beitrag Election Readout 2021 erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Despite a strained transatlantic relationship in recent years, economic setbacks in the wake of the pandemic and the political and economic rise of China, the EU and the US remain each other’s most important economic partners. That’s according to a study conducted by the German Economic Institute for Atlantik-Brücke. The study was presented to the public at a press briefing with Prof. Dr. Galina Kolev, author of the study and trade expert at the German Economic Institute, and former Federal Minister Dr. Norbert Röttgen, MdB (CDU/CSU), vice Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke.

Trade in goods (more than 550 billion euros worth of goods were traded between the EU and the US in 2020) remains a strong pillar of economic relations. But investment and services, the exchange of ideas and technology, and digital-based collaboration are also important components of the economic bond across the Atlantic.

With a trade volume of nearly 420 billion euros, the US was by far the EU’s most important foreign trade partner in services trade in 2020. Although services trade between the EU and China has grown strongly, it is still far below the level of transatlantic services trade. The value of EU services exports in 2020 to the US was almost four times that to China. EU services imports from the US were as much as seven times higher than those from China.

The US is the top destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) for many EU countries. In 2019, the FDI stock of European companies in the US amounted to more than 2,100 billion euros. European companies invested about eleven times more capital in the form of FDI in the U.S. than in China. The U.S. is by far the largest foreign investor in the EU. U.S. FDI stocks in the EU totaled over 2,000 billion euros in 2019. That’s about 28 percent of total FDI from outside the EU. In comparison, Chinese investment in the EU amounted to less than 1 percent of total FDI in the European Union.

Foreign affiliates also play an important role in transatlantic economic relations. European foreign affiliates in the U.S. are among the largest exporters. A quarter of total US goods exports are attributable to them.

US investors in Europe are also known for their high spending on research and development (R&D). US companies account for nearly a quarter of R&D spending by foreign companies in Germany.

“The close transatlantic economic relationship underscores the solid foundation and future potential for cooperation between the EU and the US. However, the past four years have shown that this cooperation cannot be taken for granted, but needs active nurturing,” said Prof. Dr. Galina Kolev, Senior Economist and Head of the Macroeconomic Analysis and Business Cycle Research Group at the Institute of German Economics.

“Europe and the U.S. are strongest when we work together and pull our weight together. It is in our mutual interest to enter into a true partnership of equals. To achieve this, we Europeans must take on more responsibility. Particularly with regard to China, which represents the central political and economic challenge of the next ten years, we will only be in a position to assert our interests transatlantically,” commented former Federal Minister Dr. Norbert Röttgen, MdB (CDU/CSU), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the German Bundestag and Vice Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke.

“In view of the growing claim to power by authoritarian regimes, we must lose no time in advancing transatlantic cooperation in business and trade, but also in research, development and green technology. This is ultimately about protecting the resilience of our Western economies and free societies. The groundwork for closer transatlantic cooperation is in place, and it is now important to seize the opportunity,” added Dr. David Deißner, Executive Director of Atlantik-Brücke.

Der Beitrag USA and EU remain each other’s most important economic partners erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

With the pandemic still tearing across the globe, the 2020/2021 Young Leaders conference was in doubt until the very last minute. Yet the center held, and in the first week of August, nearly fifty Young Leaders convened at Schloss Neuhardenberg in Brandenburg to discuss the future of the transatlantic relationship and debate the most pressing issues affecting the U.S. and Germany. For many, it was the first large social gathering in more than eighteen months.

Coronavirus was at the center of conversations with German Federal Minister of Health Jens Spahn and Sigmar Gabriel, Atlantik-Brücke Chairman and former German Vice Chancellor. Rather than frame the pandemic as a Black Swan event, however, we discussed it as a challenge to, and reflection of, a rapidly reorganizing world; a catastrophe that exposed vulnerabilities and profoundly tested political systems. As scientists warn that the next pandemic is not a matter of “if” but “when,” we wondered what this new reality might mean for national and geopolitical dynamics. Will intense periods of instability continue to fuel misinformation and economic precarity, or will governments, banks, and independent institutions finally learn to work together and effectively care for their populations and solidify alliances? Moreover, how will all this be affected by other ongoing global developments, such as digitalization, rising temperatures, and autocratic challenges to democracy?

These are big questions, and over the course of the week we approached them via a series of off-the-record conversations and off-site visits at private residences and companies. The Chargé d’Affairs at the US Embassy in Berlin, Clark Price, graciously welcomed us at his residence; former Bild editor and Atlantik-Brücke board member Kai Diekmann met with us at the headquarters of his new media start-up, Storymachine, to discuss the evolving dynamics between traditional media and social platforms. We spoke with General James Mattis, former US Secretary of Defense, over Zoom about the meaning of leadership and the importance of alliances. Colonel Jill Long, Air Attaché at the US Embassy in Berlin, highlighted the importance of diversity at a dinner at the airport of Neuhardenberg. Michelle Müntefering, State Minister for International Cultural Policy met with us at the Federal Foreign Office. Jan Kallmorgen of Berlin Global Advisors welcomed us to his home, where Dr. Thomas Bagger, Director of Foreign Policy at the office of the Federal President, spoke about foreign and security policy. Professor Dr. Andreas Dombret, Senior Advisor at Oliver Wyman and member of the board of Atlantik-Brücke, spoke about global financial and economic development, particularly with a focus on the aftermath of the pandemic. At the very end of the week we met with Michael Werz, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and also a board member of Atlantik-Brücke, who shared with us his insights on the impact of changing demographics on both sides of the Atlantic.

[related]Finally, all of the Young Leaders were assigned to working groups centered on four themes: the evolving role of China, the impact of political polarization, Covid-19, and climate change. As Young Leaders came from a wide variety of different backgrounds — namely government, finance, journalism, lobbying, and the thinktank world — end-of-week presentations drew on these fields, and mixed concrete practical solutions with incisive top-level analysis. Characterizing China as both a rival and partner, for instance, the China working group devised a strategy for “competition, collaboration, and confrontation.” This approach asked the EU and the US to reimagine their strategies around international development aid to better compete with China in terms of soft and economic power. Inspired in part by Germany’s former policy regarding mandatory military service, the polarization group proposed the creation of a national civil service for Americans, which they believed would productively force citizens from different socioeconomic backgrounds to learn to live and work together. The Covid-19 group promoted developing a transnational pharmaceutical tracking system so that, when the next pandemic comes, vaccines and supply chains will be more transparent and effective.

Climate change was not only the primary topic for the final working group – which proposed implementing a stronger international system of carbon reduction targets – it was arguably the overarching theme of the conference. With wildfires ravaging Turkey, Greece, and California, and Germany still reeling from the devastating effects of recent flooding, global warming did not feel like an abstraction so much as an immediate existential threat. The urgency of this problem was echoed by many of the speakers, from thinkers as diverse as the CEO of a Swiss insurance company, Andrea Stürmer, to a young, riveting, representative of Fridays for Future, Helena Marschall. In demanding a solution based on political cooperation (something that has proven nearly impossible during the Covid-19 pandemic) climate change makes clear that the real challenge is human. As was affirmed by presenters and experts over the course of the week, we have the technology to stop the world from warming. The question is whether we can find enough common ground to use it. In this, strong leadership is more important than ever.

The Young Leaders also met Graf von Hardenberg, who presented the history of his family’s former estate and described its role as the site of resistance meetings during Hitler’s rule. The castle was expropriated after the assassination of resistance hero Claus Graf von Stauffenberg, transformed into a school in the GDR era, and later turned into a conference center and monument to anti-Nazism — a history of twentieth-century Germany, and its return from the brink of total calamity, in miniature.

There are many reasons to be disheartened by the state of the world in 2021, but as we were reminded at Neuhardenberg, there are also reasons to be hopeful. After nearly two years of fear and isolation, the conference reminded us how important it is to meet face-to-face, and reaffirmed that direct exchange is the best basis for trust and collaboration. As Young Leaders 2020/2021 — perhaps the longest cohort in the history of Atlantik-Brücke — we believe that social-ecological transformation is critical for our generation and future ones.

© field_5a0af26be6eb2

© field_5a0af26be6eb2

Der Beitrag German-American Young Leaders Conference 2020-2021 erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“Saving Democracy: Reinventing Institutions & Practices for the 21st Century”

On July 12, 2021, Dr. Jan-Werner Müller, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, discussed his new book, “Democracy Rules,” which suggests that we need to re-invigorate the intermediary institutions that have been deemed essential for democracy’s success: political parties and free media. World Affairs Councils of America President and CEO Bill Clifford moderated the conversation.

Democracy is under attack. Rising populism, waning trust, and a period of unprecedented uncertainty caused by the Covid-19 pandemic have strained democratic institutions. What can be done to reinvigorate the intermediary institutions that have been considered essential for democracy’s success since the nineteenth century: political parties and free media?

According to Dr. Müller, there is reason to be optimistic; the wide spread discontent with the current state of democracy, apparent from numerous surveys, is not necessarily dangerous or a rebuke of democratic ideals. Instead, it could be seen as a healthy sign of democracy in action and as a response to increasing polarization. Dr. Müller stressed that deep levels of polarization – as they can be currently observed in the US, for example – are not inevitable. Polarization, he argues, is an outcome of political processes, and can also be reversed by it.

Dr. Müller also stressed that rightwing populists are learning from each other, adapting successful strategies, and “refin(ing) right-wing populist authoritarian governance”.

“Democracies in Distress: Europe and the US”

On July 13, 2021, Anne Applebaum, Staff Writer at The Atlantic, spoke with Dr. David Deißner, Executive Director at Atlantik-Brücke, about the current state of democracy, both in the United States and in Europe.

In recent years, public opinion surveys have indicated a rising level of distrust in democratic institutions and practices on both sides of the Atlantic. Populist movements have gained support and political divisions have deepened in many countries, making political compromise and normal democratic governance increasingly difficult. The discussion tried to give answers as to what causes these trends and what can be done to address them.

Applebaum highlighted that there is no monocausal explanation for these trends. However, as she argues in her recently published book, a part of this change can be traced to intellectuals and journalists of the 1990s, who could be described as center right at the time, but have since transformed into populists or nationalists. Applebaum argued that the danger lies in their quest to undermine the institutions of democracy.

Among this movement, she noted, there seems to be a “unifying theme of disappointment” and a “strong element of nostalgia,” either for an imagined or real past, as well as a deep disappointment with the present and a dislike of rapid societal change. Many are disillusioned by social, demographic, and political change, they feel that something drastic needs to be done to get the country back to how it used to be. However, there is also often a component of personal disappointment and many saw a personal opportunity in the ascend of the far right.

„Understanding the Rise of lliberal Politics in Europe and the U.S. – And What to Do About It“

On July 13^th, 2021, Dr. Daniel Ziblatt, Eaton Professor of Government at Harvard University and Director of the Transformations of Democracy Group at the WZB Social Science Center Berlin, spoke with the moderator of the discussion, Paulina Fröhlich, Head of the Future Democracy Programme, Das Progressive Zentrum, about the rise of illiberal politics in the Western world and what can be done to reverse the trend.

The decline of established political parties, media, and interest groups has opened the door to anti-democratic forces, posing new challenges for our democracies. Europe’s establishment parties are faltering and the rise of social media poses new challenges on both sides of the Atlantic. What can be done to rebuild confidence and to increase citizen engagement to improve the effectiveness of our democracies?

According to Ziblatt, at the core of today’s issues lies the fact that “the establishment’s gatekeeping power has eroded dramatically.” Ziblatt’s main argument is that the crisis of democracy can be traced to the weakening of the political establishment – namely political parties, interest groups, and media outlets – in many countries. The establishment’s control over resources has been dwindling, which has made politicians more responsive to popular demands, but, at the same time, has also given rise to dangerous populists.

Der Beitrag Germany, the US, and the Future of Democracy erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Under Secretary Nuland highlighted some key points of President Biden’s trip to Europe, the G7, NATO and EU-US summits as well as Biden’s meeting with Putin:

• The goal of the trip was to create an architecture of the future; it was “a 1949 moment”.
• Democratic countries need to demonstrate unity in the face of challenge from autocracies like Russia and China.
• Democracy needs to show it will deliver for its own people as well as for people around the world.

These ideas, Nuland argued, became manifest in the outcomes of the various summits:

• The G7-pledge to donate a billion vaccines to countries in need with no political strings attached
• The Build Back Better World initiative of the G7 countries, in which they provide medium and lower income countries with an infrastructure fund as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road initiative and other autocratic measures
• The G7’s decision on a corporate minimum tax of 15% to emphasize fairness
• The G7-climate-pledge to transition away from coal
• The decision to make NATO stronger and more resilient, and to focus more strongly on China and cyber security
• The launch of the EU-US Technology Council to address challenges in tech and to demonstrate unity vis-à-vis autocracies

All of these initiatives provided the backdrop for President Biden’s meeting with President Putin. The United States offered Russia cooperation on a number of issues, including strategic stability, the fight agains ransomware attacks and Syria.

The Fireside Chat with Ambassador Nuland kicked off our German-American Conference in cooperation with the American Council on Germany.

Der Beitrag “A 1949 Moment” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

With the Privacy Shield framework overturned by European Courts in 2020, data transfer between the transatlantic partners has become increasingly controversial. Fueled by the worldwide pandemic and the accelerated need for digital communication, American technology companies are further expanding their market penetration. Oftentimes, the discourse within the E.U. is dominated by data protection as a fundamental right, and by pursuing an agenda of digital sovereignty. The future and trajectory of a transatlantic data policy is uncertain.

This, however, puts the transatlantic partners in a unique position to restart their technology relationship and the opportunity to readdress these challenges together. The new Biden administration promises a return to cooperation and multilateralism. A joint Trade and Technology Council put forward by E.U. leaders could be a first step to establish a framework for cooperation based on shared values and principles. In light of China’s advancements in data driven business and new technologies, joining forces will consolidate the transatlantic alliance as a global standard-setter and digital leader.

With:

Bruno Gencarelli, Head of Unit International Data Flows and Protection, European Commission

Christopher Hoff, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Services, U.S. Department of Commerce

Martin Jetter, Chairman Europe, Middle East & Africa, IBM; Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Deutsche Börse Group

Iris Plöger, Member of the Executive Board, Federation of German Industries (BDI)

Moderated by David Deißner, Executive Director, Atlantik-Brücke.

We thank our corporate member IBM for their support.

Der Beitrag Transatlantic Technology Cooperation: Where Are We Headed? erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The virtual event entitled “Conversation on Relations between China and the West: A Perspective from Beijing” was held in cooperation with the Munich Security Conference as part of the MSC’s “Road to Munich” campaign.

The speakers were H.E. Wang Yi, State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman, Atlantik-Brücke; Former Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany, and Federica Mogherini, Rector, College of Europe; Former Vice President of the European Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European Union.

The discussion was moderated by Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman, Munich Security Conference and Member of the Board of Atlantik-Brücke.

The discussion ranged from Europe’s relationship with China, the US’s role in that relationship, to the value of multilateralism.

Der Beitrag A Conversation on Relations between China and the West: A Perspective from Beijing erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The Word Trade Organization’s need for reform is often closely linked with challenging policies by China, says trade expert Daniel S. Hamilton. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke, the Distinguished Fellow at the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation analyzes the gridlock of the WTO’s Appellate Body and the organization’s handling of forced technology transfers and intellectual property theft.

By Robin Fehrenbach

Mr. Hamilton, the WTO urgently needs substantial reform to fulfill its purpose of defending principles for international trade. Let’s start with the most obvious task on the agenda of the new Director-General Okonjo-Iweala which is to restore the very important role of the Appellate Body. How could its gridlock be solved so that the trade dispute settlement among its 164 members can be managed again?

The Appellate Body stopped operating in December 2019 because the United States refused to agree to re-appoint incumbent members or to appoint new members. Much critique was leveled at the Trump Administration, but the Biden Administration has underscored that U.S. concerns are bipartisan. The core U.S. complaint is that the Appellate Body has engaged in judicial overreach, interpreting its mandate beyond what WTO members agreed with when the Body was established in 1995. Moreover, the United States is not the only WTO member with this concern.

[related]Any solution to either re-constituting the Appellate Body, or a possible successor, must be grounded in the original 1995 expectations – that such a body would play a limited role in dispute settlement, looking only at the case in front of it with a view to legal errors, not revisiting the facts or trying to establish legal precedents for future cases via its findings. Some member states have additionally argued that the Appellate Body should be supported directly by the WTO Secretariat rather than by its own staff, which have been accused of paying insufficient attention to WTO member states rights. Jeffrey J. Schott and Euijin Jung of the Peterson Institute for International Economics have analyzed the WTO cases brought against the United States and find that the problem of judicial overreach seems to surface primarily in a subset of U.S. losses in antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) cases that target specific methods of calculating dumping margins. They suggest to exempt AD/CVD cases from appellate review (while still subjecting them to dispute panel rulings) as a way to address U.S. concerns.

Modernization of the WTO set of rules also needs to take place with regard to industrial subsidies, forced technology transfers as well as digitization – just to mention the most pressing issues. Could you elaborate on these topics?

In order to move forward on modernizing WTO rules, we must first address the China problem, because many of these issues turn on Chinese policies.

Twenty years ago, we made a bet: admitting China into the WTO would induce it to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the rules-based trading order. We must have the courage to admit we lost this bet. China’s forced technology transfers, its unprecedented intellectual property theft, and its enormous government subsidies, among other policies, threaten to undermine trust in the WTO and its mechanisms. The United States, the EU and Japan have had an ongoing dialogue on how to address their concerns about China and the WTO. As Jennifer Hillman and others have argued, they should now bring those concerns forward by gathering a broad coalition of countries to file a common, comprehensive case at the WTO. A broad-based coalition would have leverage over China, whereas individual entreaties would not. It would signal faith in the WTO’s ability to address challenges to the rules of the global trading system. A case of this type would also be a means to identify more clearly where current rules fall short, and how they could be changed. China would face a choice: either to adjust to the WTO system, or to leave it. The best case result would be common agreement that both China and the global trading system benefit from China’s WTO membership, including meeting the responsibilities associated with it, and that some WTO rules need adjusting going forward.

Twenty years ago, we made a bet: admitting China into the WTO would induce it to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the rules-based trading order. We must have the courage to admit we lost this bet.

How is it possible to collectively make the WTO as a multilateral institution stronger, more agile and better adapted to the realities of today just as the newly elected Director-General pointed out in her first official statement?

The WTO could be stronger and made more fit for purpose in a number of areas. One would be to strengthen the role of the Secretariat by modifying the consensus rule on administrative issues, and to complement member-state reporting on their policies and compliance with WTO agreements by giving the Secretariat its own independent analytic capabilities. Reforms should build on innovations adopted in several WTO bodies to open and encourage greater participation by stakeholders in committee meetings, including business, regulators, and other international organizations.

The WTO should also be open to plurilateral initiatives by subsets of member states, provided that any agreements that result from such initiatives be open to other WTO members who agree to abide by their conditions. Further, there should be more independent criteria for determining countries eligible for “special and differentiated treatment.” At the moment countries simply declare whether they qualify or not. The dispute settlement system must be reformed, as mentioned earlier. And we must address China’s failure to follow through on the commitments it made when it joined the WTO.

Dr. Daniel S. Hamilton is the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Distinguished Fellow and Director of the Global Europe Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is also Senior Fellow and directs the Foreign Policy Institute’s “The United States, Europe, and World Order” Program at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. Here you can read his full biography.

Der Beitrag “To move forward on modernizing the WTO rules, we must first address China” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Former U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA, 1993-2017), Senate predecessor of now Vice President Kamala Harris and  Co-Chair of the political advisory firm Mercury, spoke with Marie-Astrid Langer, U.S. Correspondent, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), about the high levels of polarization in the U.S., the future of the Republican Party, and the state of the transatlantic partnership.

Amid the Covid-19 pandemic, a national reckoning for racial justice and the fallout from the violent storming of the U.S. Capitol in early January, tension and political polarization in the United States grew. While running for president, Joe Biden pledged to work towards healing a deeply divided nation. However, the question remains how the new president will deliver on his promise in today’s highly polarized political climate.

Bryan Lanza and Morris Reed, partners at Mercury and colleagues of Senator Boxer also participated in the debate. David Deißner, Atlantik-Brücke’s Executive Director, moderated the discussion.

Der Beitrag “Maybe We’ll See a Realignment” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline has strained transatlantic relations. In our panel discussion, our guests examined what concrete measures can be undertaken to overcome the deep-seated differences between the U.S. and Europe on this matter and whether the U.S.’ recommitment to fight global climate change can serve as a foundation for a new transatlantic energy partnership. They also discussed what new challenges we might be facing regarding transatlantic energy policy in the future.

Our speakers were:

Ambassador Richard Burt, Former U.S. Ambassador to Germany; McLarty Associates Ambassador

Ambassador Daniel Fried, Former U.S. Ambassador to Poland; Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council

Mario Mehren, CEO, Wintershall Dea GmbH

Ambassador Janusz Reiter, Former Polish Ambassador to the U.S. and Germany; Founder, Center for International Relations, Warsaw

Dr. Kirsten Westphal, Global Issues Senior Associate, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)

Prof. Dr. Friedbert Pflüger, CASSIS, University of Bonn; Managing Partner, Bingmann Pflüger International GmbH, moderated the discussion.

This event was held in cooperation with Energiespräch am Reichstag.

Der Beitrag Reforging the Transatlantic Energy Alliance: From Sanctions towards Cooperation erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

While the pictures from D.C. are not representative of the US as a whole, the current social divide in the US runs deep and stems from economic and social inequality and the emergence of parallel media spheres. Outgoing President Donald Trump actively furthered this divide during his time in office, and also bears responsibility for the escalation that took place on January 6, which he spurred on by spreading misinformation regarding the election, discrediting the media, and aggressively showing sympathy for extreme-right groups and conspiracy theories. Trump’s violation of democratic norms should be spelled out clearly and should have consequences.

Even though the inauguration of the new administration will be overshadowed by the attack on the capitol and the continuing division in the country, we are hopeful that the wake-up call will be heard.

As close partners of the US, we as Europeans should refrain from finger-wagging – the commitment to a democratic order is not self-evident in Europe either. It has to be fought for and defended decisively, time and time again. Even if it may take a long time to heal the wounds – 2021 offers the opportunity for a new beginning and a clear commitment to democracy and unity. We reach out to and support our American friends in this endeavor.

The Atlantik-Brücke board of directors

Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman

Professor Dr. Michael Hüther, Vice-Chairman

Dr. Norbert Röttgen, Vice-Chairman

Ute Wolf, Treasurer

Dr. David Deißner, Executive Director

Der Beitrag A Wake-Up Call erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

In this exceptional year there was little opportunity for personal encounters. But transatlantic exchange has not diminished as a result. In 2020, Atlantik-Brücke was able to bring together absolutely outstanding speakers from both sides of the Atlantic. In this short film, we will showcase some of their voices. Our speakers included Francis Fukuyama, Emily Haber, Nicholas Burns, Clarissa Ward, John Allen, Tom Friedman, Victoria Nuland, Robert Zoellick, John Emerson, Heidi Heitkamp, Joseph Nye, Garlin Gilchrist, Cathryn Clüver, John Lipski, Imani Perry and many, many more. If you would like to see the conversations we held this year in their entirety, you have the opportunity to do so here.

Der Beitrag Atlantik-Brücke Highlights 2020 erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed-columnist at The New York Times, discusses the US’s and Europe’s relationship with China at the invitation of Atlantik-Brücke. Friedman advocates for a transatlantic strategy. According to Friedman, until recently, American companies turned a blind eye to Chinese misbehavior because both sides were benefitting. However, this has changed.

Friedman argues that negotiating successfully with a country of China’s scale and economic power is only possible by using leverage, something Trump failed to do. Instead of building a united front with Europe, Trump made negotiations with China a bilateral affair.

While China and especially the renminbi might be considered stable today, this could change, since China is more closed off than it was in recent years, which is unlikely to make them thrive in an ever-more connected world.

Der Beitrag The Need for a Transatlantic China Strategy erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Four leading American pollsters give us their take on the upcoming election.

[related]Glen Bolger, Public Opinion Strategies, Celinda Lake, Lake Research Partners, Fred Yang, Hart Research and Amy Walter, Cook Political Report speak about how the pandemic is affecting the election, which groups of voters the presidential candidates can each win, and how the Senate election differs from the presidential election. In addition, the four experts talk about why pollsters did not predict the election of Donald Trump in 2016. Former Congresswoman Elizabeth Esty moderated the discussion. Atlantik-Brücke’s five-part “Virtual Battleground Tour” is being held in cooperation with the Association of Former Members of Congress (FMC).

Der Beitrag A Pollster’s Analysis on the U.S. Election erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Interview: David Deißner

Mr. Röttgen, the US Senate is continuing to intensify sanctions against Nord Stream 2, and the Nawalny case also casts the project in a new light. Do you share the critical view of the Americans and what is the state of affairs regarding Nord Stream 2?

I share the American criticism from a European perspective. I believe that this project contradicts everything we have decided on in terms of energy policy, namely diversification instead of increasing unilateral sources of supply. It contradicts the assessment of our eastern neighbors like the Poles and the Balts that this projects affects their national security. Moreover, it contradicts our policy towards Ukraine. This has been my criticism for a long time, and it is shared in the United States.

[related]The brutal and inhumane poison attack on the opposition member Nawalny is a further argument against Nord Stream 2. If the gas pipeline were completed despite these developments, it would be the ultimate confirmation for Putin to stick to his course of action. The EU should jointly decide to stop Nord Stream 2. This has to be our own decision. It must not be a resonse to pressure from the US. My opinion on this point is clear: We in Germany and Europe have to determine our decisions on energy policy independently. Sanctions are an instrument that can be considered against opponents but must never be used against partners and friends.

The sanctions could also be directed against German officials. The German government has condemned this measure as a violation of international law. Which measures should Germany take to counter these sanctions?

First of all, one point must be clarified: The port in Sassnitz, which is currently under debate, is not subject to American sanctions. There is currently only a letter from three American senators on this issue. That should be noted.

It would change things significantly if US sanctions were directed against the German state, even if only in the form of regional authorites. Up to now, the focus has been on sanctions directed at companies. But these kinds of sanctions cannot be the basis for our transatlantic cooperation either.

How will things proceed from here, which scenario do you think is realistic? Will the whole project be abandoned with billions in losses, will there still be a political compromise or even a resolution to the conflict?

I do not expect a compromise, not even if  there was a new president in the US. The American position will not change. That is why there will be no resolution of this issue.  The question remains as to whether Gazprom is technically capable of laying the final pipeline section itself without foreign companies. I have my doubts about that. This will certainly cause a delay; I don’t know whether it is impossible.

The debate about Huawei’s role in the development of the 5G network is another big strain on transatlantic relations. Western democracies fear that Huawei could use its technology to carry out espionage and sabotage on behalf of the Communist Party. It is well known that you are a strong opponent of Huawei’s participation in Germany on the grounds of political principles. Could you elaborate on that?

My first message is a positive one. It is in our interest to find a European solution for creating a digital nervous system in Europe. We can do it. With Ericsson and Nokia, there are European companies that have an international market share comparable to Huawei.

The network providers in Germany counter that this will lose a lot of time in expanding the network.

There are countries that are already expanding 5G without Huawei and yet are more advanced than we are. So, it can be done. In addition, it is in our economic interest to apply this strategic technology industrially in our large and attractive single market. Foreign companies must only be allowed to participate in our market under a general set of rules. Such companies must not be allowed to use the influence they would gain in our country at the service of a foreign government. Especially not at the service of a non-democratic, authoritarian regime. This contradicts our national security interests.

In “Hart aber fair” (note: a German talk show), you repeated an argument by the German legal scholar Böckenförde, namely that liberal democracy is based on foundations it cannot create. You said that these foundations of democracy and democracy’s ability to function are currently under threat in the United States, as division and polarization have become such a big part of politics. With regard to both the United States and Germany, are you concerned that the moral basis of democracy is eroding and in jeopardy?

In Germany I do not see this tendency at all. In the United States, the democratic foundations of life are already under attack, and are slowly approaching this Böckenfördian threshold, so to speak. One must realize that democracy is not just the execution of procedures but has social and discursive premises. If hatred becomes part of the constitution of a society, so to speak, the democracratic way of life of that society is undermined. The division and antagonism, even the hatred in the American political system did not begin with Trump. This had already started a few years earlier, and I really consider this to be life-threatening. Moreover, such polarization also undermines any possibility of assuming international leadership.

Der Beitrag Röttgen: “Sanctions must never be used against partners” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

President Trump has affirmed a plan to cut the number of U.S. troops deployed in Germany by 9,500, and a reduction of the U.S. military footprint in Germany seems increasingly likely. This is regrettable in many respects. Germany welcomes the U.S. troops stationed in its country. Part of the reason why we are happy to have them here is because they contribute to the security of our nation, though only a small proportion of the U.S. armed forces in Germany perform a security function. The majority are stationed here for strategic or logistic reasons relating to the coordination of the United States’ military presence in the Middle East and in Africa. Whatever their function, members of the U.S. armed forces are welcomed members of society because they are the human face of the transatlantic alliance. The resulting interpersonal relationships are the bedrock of our partnership and no less important than the security aspect of the American presence.

Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Germany further erodes the foundations of trust

Even though a reduction in the number of U.S. troops deployed in Germany does not pose a direct threat to German or European security, the President’s plan nevertheless sends out an alarming signal. Washington’s decision damages the relationship of trust that has been built up over the decades between the transatlantic partners, undermining the cohesion of the Western alliance and its global political power. Authoritarian regimes and illiberal movements will be delighted at this development because many of them will profit from a weakened liberal order.

So what can we do? It will be impossible to change President Trump’s mind because he will be pursuing a foreign policy that reflects his campaign pledges until the November election. We have to accept this and deal with it as best we can by focusing on damage limitation and making preparations for the time beyond the election campaign, which will eventually be wound up.

Are we a credible partner?

We know that there have been contentious issues with the USA in the past, even before Trump won the presidential election, and that there will be other contentious issues extending across party lines in the future – such as the 5G roll-out, the Nord Stream 2 project and Germany’s trade surplus. We have to address all these issues with the USA. Whatever the outcome of the U.S. election, which we have to respect, we must ask ourselves whether we are acting as a credible partner to the USA, one that takes its obligations as a member of the alliance seriously. Germany’s comparatively low defense spending in terms of NATO’s 2 percent target has been criticized by both Democrats and Republicans in the USA.

We want to continue collaborating with the USA

We have to remember that our security is guaranteed by the USA. Even if we decided to change that, it would take Europe many years to replace U.S. military strength with its own resources. That’s why the transatlantic relationship is essential. We aren’t merely interested in collaborating with the USA as a foreign and security policy partner, but also in cultivating a close economic and cultural relationship. The coronavirus pandemic has shown us the importance of effective international cooperation and strong partnerships. Without cooperation none of us will be able to put the current economic crisis to bed or deal with the major repercussions of that crisis that lie ahead of us.

Europe has to steer the transatlantic alliance rather than simply going with the flow

In the past we have tended to make matters easy for ourselves by sailing in the USA’s wake. Europe has to play a bigger role in shaping the transatlantic alliance, also with a view to geopolitically relevant relationships with countries such as China. It is more important than ever before for us to actively maintain the transatlantic partnership while assuming greater responsibility for the task of safeguarding our own security and interests.

We have to bear in mind that the geopolitical map has fundamentally changed since the Cold War era and the United States’ interest in the Pacific region will continue to grow. Vice-versa, we also know that many people on the other side of the Atlantic, like us, believe in the importance of maintaining a close and trusting relationship for more than mere nostalgic reasons. The USA is not President Trump. The protests that are currently sweeping across the country make it clear that America is a divided nation. However, they also express one of the strongest public commitments to diversity and positive change anywhere in the world.

We will overcome the transatlantic alliance crisis

Conflicts can be resolved in any partnership that is based on shared values and interests. We are closer in that respect to Canada and the United States than to any other country outside Europe. The German-American relationship has been shaken by a number of crises over recent decades, yet we have managed to overcome them all as a result of our deep-rooted connections. We are therefore confident that this crisis also can and will be overcome.

This article was published in Tagesspiegel Online on June 19, 2020.

Der Beitrag The ball is in Europe’s court erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

With:

• Dr. Jan Philipp Burgard, Correspondent and Deputy Bureau Chief, ARD German Television; Young Leader Alumnus (2016)
• LaSean Knox-Brown, Young Leader Alumnus (2016),
• Dr. Imani Perry, Hughes-Rogers Professor, Department of African American Studies, Princeton University,
• Kirsten West Savali, Executive Producer, Essence Magazine
• Moderation: Léa Steinacker, Chief Strategy Officer, ada; Young Leader Alumna (2016)

The death of George Floyd, a 46-year-old African-American, who died while being pinned to the ground by a white Minneapolis police officer, has sparked outrage in the United States. Over the last weeks, protests have occurred nationwide demanding an end to systemic racism and police brutality. It has been argued that George Floyd’s death, as well as the protests, show fundamental flaws of law enforcement in America: militarization, the lack of real accountability and transparency, and misplaced incentives. In this call, our speakers discussed these topics and talked about whether they anticipate any fundamental changes as a result of the protests.

Der Beitrag A Conversation on Racism and Police Brutality in the U.S. erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

With the spread of COVID-19, an unprecedented public health crisis has brought global travel to a halt and slowed international commerce. Should we have seen this coming? Ambassador Boris Ruge, Vice-Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, and Professor Gregory F. Treverton, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, discuss whether we could have anticipated this pandemic and how the definition of security threats is evolving. The panel is moderated by Dr. Constanze Stelzenmüller, Senior Fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institution.

The conversation is part of Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany’s German American Conference, which, due to the pandemic, is held as a series of Zoom Calls.

Der Beitrag “Did We Miss the Warning Signals?“ erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Ambassador Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard University, discussed the effect the current pandemic has on the relationship between Europe and the United States with Atlantik-Brücke-Chairman Sigmar Gabriel.

Both Sigmar Gabriel and Nicholas Burns agreed that it is natural for governments to turn inwards during a crisis and to care for the health and well-being of their respective population. However, this should not distract from the fact that this is a global health crisis, which will be followed by a global economic crisis. Hence a global effort is not just desirable, but necessary. Ambassador Burns emphasized the need for cooperation within the G20. Meanwhile, Mr. Gabriel pointed out that the developing world now sees China as its main partner in fighting the corona virus, a role that the emerging superpower is happy to assume.

Although it is not too late for the transatlantic partners to lead the global effort in overcoming this pandemic and the economic shock, the current US administration gives little reason for hope that it will change its course, and on the other side of the Atlantic, Europe seems to be struggling to come to terms with its own internal divisions and export bans that prevented medical equipment from reaching Italy when the pandemic.

The discussion was moderated by Atlantik-Brücke’s Executive Director David Deissner.

Der Beitrag Covid-19 and its implications for transatlantic relations erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Listen to the conversation:

Interview: Michael Werz

Congresswoman Escobar, you are one of two Latinas from Texas who for the first time in American history have been elected to serve in the U.S. Congress. Tell us a little bit about how the reactions were in El Paso and also in Washington, D.C.

[related]About 85 percent of the El Paso community is Hispanic, specifically of Mexican descent. It did take a long time for us to get as many Hispanics elected in El Paso. It’s a recent phenomenon. I have the tremendous privilege of having served in local government for over a decade, and I have been very privileged to have such strong support from the community throughout my political carrier.

What is especially important to me is that young Latinas get to see women that look and sound like them and have the same roots and heritage in positions of authority. It allows them to understand that they too can be at the leadership table and that they can also accomplish whatever they set their minds out to do.

The 116th Congress is historically the most diverse Congress ever. It is long overdue. Washington and Congress badly need the diversity of voices, thoughts, and backgrounds. This diversity makes a democracy strong and healthy. We need more women and women of color until we adequately reflect the percentages in the country.

Washington and Congress badly need the diversity of voices, thoughts, and backgrounds. This diversity makes a democracy strong and healthy.

This is your first term in Congress. However, Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House of Representatives, has recently elevated you to a democratic leadership position. How did you manage to become a senior politician in your first two years in Congress?

I was elected by my freshman colleagues to the freshman leadership position. I have been so incredibly fortunate to have received tremendous support from the speaker and my colleagues from the moment that I walked in. One of my goals early on was to build relationships. I have been long enough in politics and government to understand the obvious: You don’t get anything done without bringing people along with you. You can’t pass bills, and you can’t create change unless you have strong relationships with your colleagues.

The other component that created a path for me was what was happening in El Paso in 2019. El Paso was at the epicenter of really horrific and abhorrent anti-immigrant policies coming from the Trump administration. It was important to me that my colleagues could see what was happening, that they bore witness to it, that they talked to people on the ground affected by it. We brought over a dozen of congressional delegations, almost 70 percent of Congress, to El Paso in 2019. Almost every other weekend we had a group of members of Congress coming to El Paso. We took some of them over the border to Mexico so that they could meet with the refugees being denied entry into the United States. We took them to hospitality centers in our community where we were caring for the refugees. We also took them to the sites where the children who died in American custody were apprehended. My colleagues saw how hard I work for my community, for the caucuses, and for the values that America was founded on.

El Paso was at the epicenter of really horrific and abhorrent anti-immigrant policies coming from the Trump administration.

A horrible mass shooting occurred at a Walmart Supercenter in the city of El Paso on August 3rd of 2019. The attacker killed 22 people and injured 26 others; this was the deadliest anti-Latino attack in recent U.S. history. You had a town hall meeting during the shooting. Can you share with us what your immediate thoughts were when you heard the news?

The massacre happened after months of trauma where we had to face up against the anti-immigrant policies that were being executed in our community. As the year progressed, all our leaders were working day and night trying to help the very vulnerable migrants coming to our community. In many ways we were showing the country exactly how we should be treating vulnerable refugees.

In the midst of all of this, on a day when I was having my town hall meeting and speaking to my constituents in a wonderful discussion, my staff approached me and told me that there had been a shooting. It was shocking. At first, there was a moment of disbelief. I didn’t know how bad it could be. I urged my constituents to go home, to stay at home and to be safe. Then I rushed backed to my district office. Almost within the hour we found out that a number of people had been killed. I intuitively felt in my gut and in my heart that the shooting was driven by hatred and racism.

I intuitively felt in my gut and in my heart that the shooting was driven by hatred and racism.

When the gunman’s pamphlet was made public and he confessed to the police that he drove to El Paso in order to slaughter Mexican immigrants, the shock didn’t wear off for a long time. We had a press conference that afternoon with the governor of the state of Texas. He pointed to mental illness regarding what was fueling the gunman. We know statistically that the mentally ill are more likely to be victims of crime and not perpetrators of crime. To be honest with you, I felt tremendous anger and frustration. The weight of the president’s words and of his horrific immigration policies had come to bear down on the community in the most violent and most nightmarish way through the slaughter of innocent people.

As I learned the stories of the victims’ families and just struggled to come to grips with the injustice, it made me realize that El Paso was a very important community in this country because of what we had to bear. But even in that really awful and painful period one thing absolutely stands out more than anything and makes me proud of my community: Our generosity, kindness, good will, love, and the way how we treat one another remind me that in our most challenging moments we make a choice about how we treat people. El Paso has emerged as a shining example of the goodness that comes with choosing to care for people.

Taking a step back, did we underestimate the potential of white nationalism in Texas and in the United States at large? How did we get to this point that a place like El Paso becomes ground zero for such a horrific and complicated policy conversation?

I am still struggling with understanding how our country has allowed this and for this point to emerge in our history. We are at the very low point and at a very dark place in American history right now. What we’ve seen in America unfortunately over the last few years is not just some of our most significant leaders, including the president and led by the president of the United States, be derelict in their responsibility to lead us out of this darkness, but we have actually seen them pull us deeper into that darkness. And we are going to have to take a long look at ourselves in the mirror as a country and ask ourselves if this is acceptable and if this is who we want to be. Everyone in America has a very important role to play in ensuring that we move out of this darkness.

We are at the very low point and at a very dark place in American history right now.

There is obviously the urgent matter of coming up with policy solutions and legislation to make sure that future mass shootings are hopefully prevented. What is your thinking with regard to the legislative deadlock related to gun control?

The House of Representatives has bipartisan commonsense gun violence prevention legislation. We even came back from our August recess early in order to pass more legislation. We have been having these debates on the House floor. We have been passing bills through committees and they have all landed on the Senate’s side. One person, the Senate majority leader, Mitch McConnell, prevents those pieces of legislation from being debated and being sent to the president to be signed into law. It is deeply frustrating that one person is able to hold up all of that legislation. To see our legislation essentially just pile up on the desk of one person is disheartening. But we have to keep pushing, we have to keep educating the American public, we cannot allow the public to be complacent or to lose heart.

You have a Republican mayor in El Paso, and you have a Republican colleague in Congress from the district next door, Will Hurd, in Texas-23. How are your Republican colleagues reacting and what are they saying about the stalemate that they are seeing, which is mainly, as you described, due to the leadership of their own party?

That has been additionally frustrating to me. My neighbor to the east, Will Hurd, who has recently announced that he is retiring from Congress, used to be someone that Democrats could count on to be a moderate voice and someone who was willing to cross the aisle and work together. But now he has set his sights on what is going to happen to him after retirement, and he has been pretty much in lockstep with the president. So, we can’t count on him to be bipartisan on many of these issues anymore because he has a different career path ahead of him.

And the mayor of my community, who is Republican, has signed on to the U.S. Conference of Mayors’ call to Congress to pass commonsense gun violence prevention legislation. Now, he also has a very good relationship with our Republican governor, who has yet to do anything legislatively on gun violence prevention.

You are a member of the Armed Services Committee which is allocating the use of military funds and personnel. It was highly controversial that the president decided to mobilize U.S. troops to the U.S.-Mexican border because it was not clear to many that this was a national emergency that warranted such action. What was your take on this situation and what is the status quo right now along the border?

One of the biggest challenges that I have with my Republican colleagues and their constituents who believe that sending troops or building a wall is good public policy is that they have bought into the myth that asylum seekers or undocumented immigrants are a national security threat. As leaders in Congress, we need to recognize that a mother with a baby who is fleeing violence in Central America and coming to our doorstep, knocking on our door and seeking asylum, is not a national security threat. We have to think about the movement of people and the laws that govern that movement in a different way. We need to have secure borders. But there is a smart way to do it. A wall is not going to fundamentally change the fact that Central American refugees and Mexican refugees and Cuban refugees are arriving at out front door.

We need to recognize that a mother with a baby who is fleeing violence in Central America and coming to our doorstep, knocking on our door and seeking asylum, is not a national security threat.

Traditionally, the Latino community in the United States and also Latino Representatives have not been overly engaged in national security policy, international affairs, and even less in the transatlantic arena. But you are scheduled to visit Germany in over a month to visit the Munich Security Conference. And, very interestingly, you have invited the co-chair of the German Green Party, Robert Habeck, to visit you in El Paso. What are you hoping will be his main takeaways when he visits El Paso for a day and a half and then flies back to Berlin and relays his experiences at the U.S.-Mexican border?

I am very excited about the Munich Security Conference and also very excited about the visit next week. These are shared experiences. I have a lot to learn from my German counterpart, and you all have a lot to learn from us as well. We grow as leaders, as policymakers, as people on this planet, when we share those experiences and we look to one another for support and for solutions. What is important to me about the visit for next week is that I believe we are going to continue to see migration occurring across the globe at unprecedented levels and we have to come together to address the root causes, obviously climate change and poverty. At the same time, we have to educate our communities because cynical politicians will use migration as a tool for fear. We have to combat that cynicism and that division and build a bridge of greater understanding, a bridge of solutions and ideas. I hope that this is the beginning of a more meaningful conversation.

Michael Werz is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress in Washington, D.C.

The television network PBS has produced a documentation about El Paso worth watching which you can find here.

Der Beitrag “El Paso is a shining example of the goodness that comes with choosing to care” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

What are Western vlaues, and do they still connect Germany and the United States today? German Ambassador to the United States Emily Haber says: “We want the same things, we want to defend our way of life.” We spoke to a diverse group of Germans and Americans to hear their views. Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Omid Nouripour, Foreign Policy Spokesperson for the Green Party, former Congressmen Jeff Miller and Jim Moran, State Secretary Sawsan Chebli and R.R. Reno, editor of the religious magazine “First Things”and serial entrepreneur Sebastian Funke talk about their take on the subject. The film is part of Deutschlandjahr USA/Wunderbar together.

Der Beitrag “We want to defend our way of life” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

What are we talking about when we talk about equality? In our interview series about Western values, Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, calls it a “Rorschach test”. We also spoke to Ambassador Christoph Heusgen, former Atlantik-Brücke Chairman Friedrich Merz, photographer Herlinde Koelbl, Omid Nouripour, Foreign Policy Spokesperson for the Green Party, former Congressmen Jeff Miller and Jim Moran, Lantinx activist Paola Ramos and serial entrepreneur Sebastian Funke about their take on equality. This film is Atlantik-Bruecke’s second of four films about Western values. The series is part of the Deutschlandjahr / WunderbarTogether.

Der Beitrag “Emphasis should be on real equality of opportunity” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

What do people from both sides of the Atlantic associate with the term freedom? How important is freedom for each and every individual, what does it mean for our societies? Are we ready to stand up for our own freedom and that of others? We have asked politicians, artists and entrepreneurs from both sides of the Atlantic to talk to us about this important social achievement. We also want to take a closer look at the often cited Western values. In these often challenging times for transatlantic relations, we want to know: how strong is the common foundation of values on which our partnership was built?

The conversations showed that freedom is not just a philosophical and political issue, but a very personal one for many of our interviewees.

Photographer Herlinde Koelbl, Ambassador Emily Haber, Richard Haass, Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, former Atlantik-Brücke Chairman Friedrich Merz, Omid Nouripour, Foreign Policy Spokesperson for the Green Party, former Congressmen Jeff Miller and Jim Moran, Lantinx activist Paola Ramos, State Secretary Sawsan Chebli and R.R. Reno, editor of the religious magazine “First Things” talk about their personal experiences and views on the subject.

The film is the first part of a four-part series in which we want to get to the bottom of Western values and inspire discussion. The films are part of the “Deutschlandjahr”-campaign “Wunderbar Together”.

Der Beitrag “Our freedoms have not come out of nowhere” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Listen to the conversation:

Interview: Robin Fehrenbach

Mr. Nuñez-Neto, the U.S.-Mexican border is roughly 2000 miles long. Can you give us an update: What distance has been newly covered with steel fences, walls or border installations since President Donald Trump took office?

The government has not constructed any kind of significant new stretches of fencing. There are some demonstration projects that it has constructed on the border to test different kinds of technology. Some of this relates to some disputes and some funding issues between the Congress and the administration and even within the administration.

Near San Diego is a site where a lot of prototypes are being shown. Is the president creating a showcase regarding the wall?

[related]Yes. In San Diego and in a couple of other parts of the border the government has constructed some demonstration projects to test different designs. That is important because the border is 2000 miles long, and it’s not all the same. There are parts where there are floods regularly and where it’s mountainous and rugged. One design isn’t going to work everywhere.

Can you estimate how much of the distance will be covered by the time the next presidential election takes place?

That’s a pressing question for the administration. The president would like to construct up to 500 miles of walls or fencing before the election. According to news media reports that just came out there has been a little bit of a dispute internally of what the cost of that might be. The U.S. Department of Defense apparently concluded that the cost was substantially higher than what it had thought. At least to date, the Pentagon has moved very slowly in transferring the funds that the president would like shifted for construction.

The president would like to construct up to 500 miles of walls or fencing before the election.

How did President Trump succeed in materializing at least a partial financing of his plans to build a wall, although the positions in Congress between Republicans and Democrats are totally divided?

The administration was unable to get Congress to approve funding for new barriers on the border. It’s probably worth pointing out that we already have roughly 700 miles of physical barriers which include both pedestrian fencing – that is fencing that is intended to keep people from crossing – and what they call vehicle barriers. These are intended to stop vehicles from crossing illegally. There was a dispute between the administration and Congress over how much additional barriers were needed and how much they were going to cost. Congress declined to appropriate funding for that purpose. In response, the president declared a national emergency on the border.

Under U.S. law, in times of national emergencies the president has fairly broad latitude to take emergency actions, including to move funds from accounts to pay for measures that address the emergency. There have been some law suits surrounding this issue. So far Congress has not succeeded in stopping the transfer of funding, despite that it appears that the process is moving pretty slowly, probably more slowly than the administration would like.

It appears that the process is moving pretty slowly, probably more slowly than the administration would like.

The president’s plans have also resulted in the longest shutdown in U.S. history with a duration of 35 days. Regarding the understanding of such measures by the public: How much is this kind of extreme policy accepted by American citizens?

The public has unfortunately grown a little bit used to government shutdowns. They used to be extremely rare and over the last seven to eight years they have become fairly regular. It’s a symptom of a broader issue with our politics in the United States today which is characterized by polarization – an unfortunate and shortsighted one when it ends up shutting the government down in order to achieve tactical results by wielding a very blunt object.

In this last shutdown substantial parts of the government stopped running. The public gets upset when it starts to feel the effects. For example, air traffic controllers started being unable to keep up the operational speed that they normally have. Some airports had substantial delays. That’s what broke the camel’s back with regard to the shutdown.

As you already mentioned, Donald Trump also imposed a national state of emergency while speaking of a national crisis on the Southern border. How severe is the problem of drug trafficking and crimes committed by illegal immigrants?

Drug trafficking has obviously been a large historical issue across the physical land border. I am most concerned about hard drugs like cocaine and heroin. More than 90 percent of those drugs generally come through our ports of entry because they are easy to conceal. You can smuggle them in small quantities and still make a lot of money. This issue has been fueled by the opioid epidemic in the United States which is a real problem and policy challenge. But the policy solutions should focus more on what we can do to better detect and interdict these drugs at our actual ports of entry.

As far as the violence committed by migrants is concerned, there is no evidence that illegal or legal immigrants in the United States commit crimes at a higher rate than the average U.S. citizen. That is not a huge concern. There has been a dramatic surge in migration over the last year and a half from Central America to the United States and it has predominantly been fueled by families and children. There is no doubt that there is a crisis on the border but it’s more of a humanitarian crisis than any other crisis.

There is no evidence that illegal or legal immigrants in the United States commit crimes at a higher rate than the average U.S. citizen.

Is president Trump trying to build a narrative working with fear?

The president has taken some incidents committed by bad actors and has often portrayed them as if that happens all the time. I am not convinced that’s exactly the case. Our border security agencies have been stretched to their breaking point. The issue is that we have frontline law enforcement officers and border patrol agents trying to handle a humanitarian crisis: They are being overwhelmed with young children and families.

The way the system works in the United States is that our frontline border agencies before the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are the border patrols between the ports of entry and the Office of Field Operations (OFO) at the ports of entry. Their facilities are only intended to hold people for a very short amount of time. We are talking of twelve to twenty-four hours. Other parts of the government are supposed to take those populations that need to be detained and put them in detention facilities that are geared to hold people for an extended period of time. Because the rest of the system has been completely overwhelmed by this surge in migration, we’re seeing people kind of stack up at our border facilities for many days at a time. This is unsanitary, and it’s unfair to our frontline law enforcement on the border.

Our border security agencies have been stretched to their breaking point. We have frontline law enforcement officers and border patrol agents trying to handle a humanitarian crisis: They are being overwhelmed with young children and families.

Will the deals with Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras that have been negotiated under high pressure by the U.S. government in 2019 really limit illegal immigration into the USA on a permanent basis?

They might. We are already seeing the numbers decrease a little bit over the last couple of months. Some of that could be seasonal. This is traditionally the time of a year when migration starts to slow down a little bit. It could also be happening due to the policies taking effect.

The bigger question is whether these policies will stand up in court. We have already seen competing rulings by different courts around this question. In the Immigration and Nationality Act, the law that governs the migration to the United States, there are provisions that would allow asylum seekers to remain in a safe third country. In some respect the administration has implemented something that looks a lot like a safe third country process without going through the actual loops you need to go through to designate a country like Mexico as safe third country. That will probably be litigated over the next year.

The administration has implemented something that looks a lot like a safe third country process without going through the actual loops you need to go through to designate a country like Mexico as safe third country.

Why are children still being separated from their parents on American soil?

There are legitimate reasons why children can sometimes be separated from their parents if their parents have committed a crime and if the government believes that the children will be endangered if they were to remain with their parents. Even in the Obama administration, when I was at CBP, we would have some incidents in which children were removed from their parents when it was deemed that their parents were criminals. The family separation policy that was put in place last year was substantially broader than that. It’s unclear to me why this is still happening.

It seems as if no long-term solution for this problem on the horizon.

I have been frustrated for years that the debate has been focused on what happens on the border, which is a symptom of the problem and not the actual challenge. The problem is that our system and our laws in the United States are antiquated and haven’t been updated in almost 40 years. We need to reform our system. We also need to recognize that these countries in Central America are essentially functioning as failed states where you have lawlessness and criminal elements including gangs like MS-13 taking over wide swaths of the country and making life basically unlivable for large parts of the population. As an American I think we need to take some responsibility for the fact that these gangs actually originated in the United States and were exported to Central America in the 1980s.

It’s sometimes very dangerous for immigrants to be sent back to the Mexican side of the border because they are exposed to robbery or violence. Could you elaborate on that?

One of the issues that doesn’t get talked about enough is that families and children are making the trip from Central America to the United States. This journey is incredibly dangerous for them and involves putting themselves in the hands of smugglers and criminals. There are horrible stories about the numbers of women who make this kind of journey that end up being violated in some way or other.

This is a deep concern, and this is probably one of the reasons why it’ll be difficult to designate Mexico as a safe third country. Mexico has taken enormous strides over the last twenty to thirty years and has become a middle-income country and has improved its security situation notwithstanding the wars with the cartels. But it’s still a pretty dangerous place, and migrants get routinely taken advantage of and have crimes committed against them.

You have extensively analyzed U.S. migration policy and worked on legislation in the Senate. What policy would you recommend to guarantee an effective immigration system with secure borders while simultaneously allowing for humane procedures in the process of seeking asylum?

Frankly speaking, it’s not rocket science. When I was working in Congress, there were multiple efforts both under the Republican president George Bush and the Democratic president Barack Obama to pass comprehensive immigration reform. It’s interesting that in both cases the broad contours of a possible reform were fairly similar. They generally involved accepting that we have between ten and thirteen million people living without legal status in the United States. We’ll never be able to find and remove them all. In many cases these people have been here for decades and have built lives in the United States and have U.S. citizen offspring. We need to provide these people with some avenue for having a kind of legal status whether it’s citizenship or something on a path towards citizenship.

It also involves making smart investments in our border that are targeting the problems we see on the border and not just building a wall or fences to make us feel better. It involves acknowledging that we need immigration and guest workers as Europe does as well. Our population is aging and has become accustomed to benefits like Social Security and Medicare. Without robust immigration numbers it’s going to be very difficult to continue that in the future.

We have between ten and thirteen million people living without legal status in the United States. We’ll never be able to find and remove them all.

How important will this issue be in the 2020 presidential election?

It’s clear that the administration wants to make it a primary issue during the election. What you hear from Democrats is more of a focus on economic topics and health care than immigration. That will probably be some sign of where the election is headed depending on what you hear more in the debates.

What is the Democrats’ strategy to counter the narrative and policy of the president?

Unfortunately, the Democrats are fairly divided on this issue. You have politicians on the far left who want to abolish immigration and customs enforcement. I personally think – and this is not a RAND position right now – that this is shortsighted. There are points that Democrats ought to be speaking about. One of them is that this administration has used a lot of a tough rhetoric on immigration but that it has overseen the most rapid increase in illegal immigration in quite some time. We are on track for a million apprehensions at the border this fiscal year. This would be the largest number since the early 2000s and almost three times more than what we saw in the last years of the Obama administration.

The USA has always been a country of immigration. Will it lose its status of an almost mythical land where you can fulfill your personal dreams if you just try hard enough?

I truly hope not. I myself am an immigrant from Argentina and a naturalized citizen. Yet, having not been born in the United States, I had the privilege to work as a senior advisor to multiple senators on an important committee in Congress. I have been a presidential appointee. Those are the kinds of opportunities that still exist in the United States for immigrants. Immigrants can make a difference. But immigration has also always been a polarizing debate in the United States going back hundreds of years. Both holds true.

Here you can find Blas Nuñez-Neto’s profile at the RAND Corporation.

Der Beitrag “The government hasn’t constructed new stretches of fencing” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Caroline Naumann and Selma Stern

Forty-five Young Leaders from the United States and Germany came together for a week of deep engagement on transatlantic issues in August 2019 in Queenstown, Maryland. On a political level, this year’s cross-sectoral group of experts and young decision-makers observed a more volatile transatlantic relationship than previous classes. In times of rising nationalism and populism in both countries, the issues at stake were emotional, debates heated. Nonetheless, the bonds forged in less than a week show just how strong our transatlantic connection is on a fundamental level.

Seventy years after the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), many areas of debate between the U.S. and Germany are not new, but the domestic and global context is. At home, both countries are seeing a rise in right wing populism, which is driven by perceived injustices, national identity, and an inability to fully understand international interdependencies. Globally, the maelstrom created by the simultaneous rise of China, Russia’s geopolitical shift, President Trump, technological progress, increased global mobility, and climate change produces a complex new reality. In this piece, we focus on two overarching topics of the conference: global security policy and communication with domestic audiences.

Sustaining security cooperation in the face of mutual threats

Global security was a salient theme throughout this year’s conference. Julie Fisher, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State gave an overview of the U.S. perspective, experts from the Hudson Institute, the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Center for American Progress provided deep insight into the variety of viewpoints in Washington. The conversation with Emily Haber, German Ambassador to the United States, was a highlight of the conference and illustrated the German approach to foreign policy.

Virtually all discussions with experts from policy, business and the media touched on one point of contention between Berlin and Washington: German spending on its military. All NATO members committed to spending 2% of their GDP on defense. Germany’s budget, albeit growing, is not as significant as the U.S. and other NATO partners want it to be. Although this debate predates the Trump administration, the tone between Washington and Berlin has become harsher in recent years. Many of the conference’s interlocutors share the impression that the current U.S. style is counterproductive, although there is broad agreement that Germany is not yet complying with the Wales Pledge.

The Young Leaders conference showed that “the 2% debate” is as much if not more of a discourse problem than a substantial policy problem. At the core, foreign policy interests are, arguably, even more aligned than in previous years. There is broad agreement among policy makers that both countries are facing similar threats from outside the NATO alliance, especially in cyberspace, but also in conventional terms. Working-level relations between the foreign policy and defense bureaucracies on both sides are strong, as Colonel Terry Anderson, Associate Professor at the Naval War College, explained in detail. Germany has upped its defense spending significantly and is committed to further increases by 2024. Threat assessments vary due to geographical and historical differences, but there is significant common ground given the rise of China, Russia and various non-state actors challenging our free way of life in “the West”.

Facing the facts – and the perceptions

On a political level and in the wider public arena, mutual perceptions of Germany and the US are focused on the negative. The Trump administration’s retreat from several international regimes coupled with its insistence on more defense spending in the NATO context is seen as erratic and inconsistent in Germany. The confrontational tone from Washington and President Trump’s “America first” rhetoric feeds into a German perception of the United States as a global bully. This is echoed in public perception polls. While 72% of Americans perceive the relationship to be positive, only 24% of Germans believe the same (Pew, 2019). An Atlantik-Brücke study finds that 84.6% of Germans view German-American relations negatively (Atlantik-Brücke / Civey, 2019).

On the other hand, Germany is seen as tight-fisted, somewhat naive vis-à-vis Russia, and unreliable in terms of defense commitments in Washington. Within Germany, there is no domestic consensus about the depth and level of threat actually posed by Russia, leading to somewhat cautious and unassertive policy. These behaviors can in part be explained by history and geography but are often misread as a mere lack of German engagement.

Debating social media “debates”

The Young Leaders and most conference speakers came to a common conclusion: It is extremely important to “argue out” the emotional aspects of the discussion in order to get to the core of the policy issues, especially in such politically charged times. The natural forum for such debate is social media, though it has both positive and negative impacts on public discourse. It is well established that the algorithms behind Facebook, Twitter and others aim to reach users likely to agree with the stated views, not bring together varied perspectives for lively discussion. While social media is successfully being used to galvanize devoted followers, it is failing to spark the true political debate society needs.

Complicating matters further is the global trend of deliberately misleading information and manipulation of public discourse. Deep fakes (videos whose images and sound are realistically altered to send a different message) are on the rise and studies have found that there is a 70% higher likelihood that people retweet falsehoods than facts (MIT, 2018).

Breaking out of the echo chamber

Think tanks and the media indicated that the public’s perception of the U.S.-German relationship – and knowledge and understanding of foreign policy – can be tangibly strengthened by facilitating communication at the city- and state-level. Hometown heroes and local politicians can reach their communities through social and traditional media, and good old-fashioned ‘coffee and cake’ events. One Young Leader noted that this may be especially powerful if the leader is a reliable local figure who does not usually discuss foreign policy issues, because it would reach non-traditional audiences from a base of trust.

This is also true for policy areas other than international security. In various formats, the Young Leaders also worked on a range of other issues, including but not limited to migration, gender and identity, the rise of populism and the future of the media industry in an age of rapid digitization. Experts such as Elmar Theveßen, Washington Bureau Chief of ZDF and Jan Philipp Burgard, U.S. Correspondent & Deputy Bureau Chief of ARD, Germany’s national public broadcasting services, helped the group understand the key challenges transatlantic media professionals are navigating today. The group’s visit to Lockheed Martin shed light on controversial aspects of international trade and security.

Conclusion

Despite the current public perception and strained diplomatic rhetoric, nearly every discussion highlighted the common values, trends, and threats shared by both the U.S. and Germany. Across the board, speakers noted that the “working level” interaction between governments, civil societies, and economic institutions is quite strong and not as impacted by recent tensions as feared. This enforces the belief that the stronger the ties between individual actors in business, media, the public sector and civil society, the less lasting harm short term political tensions can do to our transatlantic alliance. This year’s Atlantik-Brücke Young Leaders are hopeful that this transatlantic storm will pass.

Citations

• MIT Fake News study, Mach 2018 http://news.mit.edu/2018/study-twitter-false-news-travels-faster-true-stories-0308
• Pew research study, March 2019 https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/03/04/americans-and-germans-disagree-on-the-state-of-bilateral-relations-but-largely-align-on-key-international-issues/
• Atlantik-Brücke study (in cooperation with Civey), February 2019
  https://www.atlantik-bruecke.org/app/uploads/AtlantikBrueckeUmfrage2019.pdf

Der Beitrag Passing storm or tectonic shift? erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Further elected members of the executive board of directors are Treasurer Professor Dr. Andreas Dombret, former member of the executive Board of Deutsche Bundesbank and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, New York and Atlantik-Brücke’s Executive Director Dr. David Deißner.

Sigmar Gabriel succeeds Friedrich Merz as chairman who held the position for ten years.

Friedrich Merz thanked Atlantik-Brücke members and the board of directors for the good working relationship. „It was a great pleasure and honor to be chairman of Atlantik-Brücke for 10 years. One thing became clear repeatedly: The transatlantic relationship is more than trade policy, more than a security alliance. It is a value-based community, in which we also have to represent our interests. Taking a stance is not an easy, but an important task. I wish every success to my successor Sigmar Gabriel and his board of directors.”

Sigmar Gabriel expressed his gratitude for the trust placed in him by the members. He said: „The relationship to the U.S. is neither better nor worse compared to how we knew it since the 50’s, but simply different. To set new impulses in this relationship, Atlantik-Brücke is just the right starting point. If Atlantik-Brücke didn’t exist, it would have to be invented.”

The Annual Members’ Meeting furthermore elected the extended board. Confirmed in their position were the following board members:

• Kai Diekmann, Storymachine GmbH, Berlin
• Angelika Gifford, Technology Executive and Member of Corporate Boards, TUI AG, ProSiebenSat1 Media SE and Rothschild & Co., Munich
• Reiner Hoffmann, Chairman, German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB), Berlin
• Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman, Munich Security Conference (MSC), Munich
• Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, MdB (FDP) and Deputy Chairman of the FDP Parliamentary Group, German Bundestag, Berlin
• Parliamentary State Secretary Christian Lange, MdB (SPD), Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, Berlin
• Omid Nouripour, MdB (Alliance 90/The Greens), Foreign Policy Spokesperson of the Green Parliamentary Group, German Bundestag, Berlin
• Karsten Uhlmann, Managing Partner, Frankfurter Brauhaus GmbH, Frankfurt (Oder)
• Michael Werz, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress, Washington, DC
• Ute Wolf, Chief Financial Officer, Evonik Industries AG, Essen

Newly appointed to the extended board were the following members:

• Eveline Metzen, General Manager, American Chamber of Commerce in Germany e.V., Frankfurt am Main
• James von Moltke, Member of the Management Board, CFO, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt am Main
• Julie Linn Teigland, Managing Partner for Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Ernst & Young GmbH, Mannheim
• Anahita Thoms, Partner, Head of Germany’s International Trade Practice, Baker & McKenzie, Düsseldorf
• Frederike von Tiesenhausen Cave, Global Head of Public Affairs, Bloomberg L.P., London
• Nagila Warburg, Entrepreneur and Board, Warburg Archive Foundation, Hamburg

Atlantik-Brücke Auditors Dr. h.c.  Klaus-Peter Müller, Honorary Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Commerzbank AG, Frankfurt am Main and Dr. Lutz R. Raettig, Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Morgan Stanley Bank AG, Frankfurt am Main were confirmed by the Annual Members’ Meeting.

Der Beitrag Sigmar Gabriel new chairman of Atlantik-Brücke erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Interview: David Deißner and Robin Fehrenbach

Elbridge, in 2018, the U.S. government has fundamentally changed its National Defense Strategy. One could argue that it focuses more than before on the great power competition. What are the implications of this strategy for Europe and for NATO?

[related]As former Secretary of Defense James Mattis put it, the number one national security priority and particularly defense priority for the United States is no longer terrorism, it’s the great power competition. This means above all China because of the scale and sophistication of its military, but also Russia. From a military perspective in Europe it’s going to mean a greater focus on Russia. Over the last 15 years, the Russians have quite assiduously worked on developing a range of capabilities, particularly conventional forces to pursue a theory of victory against eastern NATO by using the fait accompli and coupling that with their nuclear forces to create new facts on the ground. NATO would be very loathe to try to reverse them.

You have recently co-authored an article with Walter Slocombe in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung regarding the collapse of the INF treaty. You wrote that “this is not a problem that will be solved by threatening targets deep into Russia.” Your advice is instead to blunt a Russian assault against NATO. Could you elaborate on this approach?

The real danger that Russia poses from a military perspective is that it might very rapidly seize territory in the Baltics or in eastern Poland and then create a hardened defensive position. After the long period of time it might take the alliance to build up the forces to eject Russia, people will be so accustomed and so loathe to risk what would be required to eject them that they will accept the new reality. That would fundamentally undermine NATO.

The real danger that Russia poses from a military perspective is that it might very rapidly seize territory in the Baltics or in eastern Poland and then create a hardened defensive position.

Instead of waiting, our forces have to be better able to blunt a Russian assault from the beginning. European forces, along with American forces, can get forward very quickly and engage Russian forces that might be invading. That sounds aggressive, but actually it’s considerably less destabilizing than some of the alternatives. If Germany wants to avoid an arms race, it could put a bit more effort and resources into redeveloping at least a fraction of the Bundeswehr that existed in 1988. That would go a long way to solve this problem.

The US has repeatedly called upon NATO member states to commit themselves to the 2-percent-target. What is the US asking of Germany and other European NATO allies beyond spending 2 percent of their respective GDP on security and defense?

Two percent is a good marker. But what we really want is output. As an alliance we want forces that can defend our common territory. Europe must be able to contest Russian aggression from the get-go. Germany could put three divisions in the field. In 1988 Germany had 15 divisions available. So, this would be one fifth of what Germany could do in 1988. Today Germany is much richer and much more secure. Germany is really the crucial state: It’s the country that has the largest economy in Europe and it has a significantly latent military capability. Meeting some of these objectives would be well within Germany’s ability without imposing a strain on its society.

Germany could put three divisions in the field. In 1988 Germany had 15 divisions available.

How is the German reluctance to the 2-percent-target perceived in defense policy circles in Washington?

It’s mystifying at best. For 35 years of the Cold War, the members of the NATO alliance provided Germany a forwarddefense on which Germany insisted. It’s strange that Germany doesn’t help to provide this forward defense to the new entrants that have not had the fortune of being under the Western umbrella during the Cold War. This would be the same level of defense at a much lower level of commitment than during the Cold War. We are living in an era and world in which the US needs more help. For those of us, like myself, who want to preserve the transatlantic alliance we have to change to stay the same.

We are living in an era and world in which the US needs more help.

What steps can we expect the United States to take in the future when it comes to the asymmetric threats of cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare?

This is a form of competition that the American government is increasingly attuned to. In terms of our societal vulnerability we need to recognize that the world we expected in the 1990s is not the world that will materialize. The internet was designed as if the state was going to wither away, as if strategic competition belonged to the past. If you now look at what the Chinese are able to do with technology and Artificial Intelligence and how they intrude into people’s lives, that’s the future if we don’t have a better response. We have to accept that we are going to need more intelligence steps to protect our networks.

If you now look at what the Chinese are able to do with technology and Artificial Intelligence and how they intrude into people’s lives, that’s the future if we don’t have a better response.

Do we have to rethink NATO and our security architecture in order to guarantee safety?

If NATO didn’t exist, we would have to create it. NATO at its core is still a security alliance. Its fundamental purpose is a collective defense organization to protect its member states. It might do other things, but those are secondary functions. NATO is a very broad organization that has 29 members and lacks a clear threat in the way that the Soviet Union presented it. Will it be able to provide the degree of coherence? I don’t know. The international architecture is going to probably change most in Asia, because that’s where it’s less formed. The rise of China is a tectonic shift.

The rise of China is a tectonic shift.

An argument that you hear very often in Germany is that the transatlantic partnership should give a strong answer to the rise of China. Does this resonate in the current U.S. administration?

Absolutely, that is completely correct on the security front. If Europe can take a greater degree of responsibility vis-à-vis Russia, that would allow the United States to focus more on China and issues like 5G, especially not allowing Huawei to penetrate into a continent that’s in many ways very rightly focused on data privacy. Huawei is the route towards perdition. Europe and America have to integrate through trade and security in a way that still preserves our own autonomy and decision-making.

Europe and America have to integrate through trade and security in a way that still preserves our own autonomy and decision-making.

In your last conversation with Atlantik-Brücke in 2016, we were talking about President Obama’s track record in fighting international terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. How do you assess President Trump’s successes and failures in this policy field after more than two years in office?

He has done very well in the international security field. In 50 years, people will look back and say: “What really changed was the American position on China”. For the first time, the Trump administration has made clear: “China is a competitor. The best way to have a secure and stable relationship with them is to be clear and firm and strong and to negotiate from a position of strength to avoid them miscalculating our ability and our resolve.” That’s a major development. The President is also trying to do less in the Middle East. How you do that, is a very tricky problem.

Der Beitrag “The number one national security priority is great power competition” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Mark, what are Facebook’s plans to counter possible attempts of electoral manipulation on the platform – especially with regard to the European election in May of this year and the U.S. Presidential elections next year?

At Facebook, we’re focused on protecting elections while also making sure people have a voice in the political process. Over the last two years, we’ve learned from elections around the world to create a robust approach to safeguard our platform. This includes removing fake accounts, reducing false news, disrupting bad actors and increasing ads transparency. And we’re doing this while also supporting an informed and engaged electorate.

We’ve learned from elections around the world to create a robust approach to safeguard our platform.

[related]In the run up to the European Parliamentary Elections in May, we are making big changes to the way ads with political content work on Facebook. We are introducing some new tools to help us deliver on two key goals: preventing online advertising from being used for foreign interference, and increasing transparency around all forms of political and issue advertising.

These steps will include ensuring that advertisers are authorized in their country to run ads related to the European Parliamentary elections. In addition, to increase transparency, all ads related to politics and issues on Facebook and Instagram in the EU must be clearly labeled. This includes a “Paid for by” disclosure, allowing you to see who is paying for the ad. We have also built a new tool called Ad Library to make it easy for everyone to find out about political or issue ads on Facebook, including information on the number of times the ad was viewed, and demographics about the audience reached including age range, location, and gender.

These changes will not prevent abuse entirely. We’re up against smart, creative and well-funded adversaries who change their tactics as we spot abuse. But we believe that they will help prevent future interference in elections on Facebook. And that is why they are so important.

You have talked about your endeavor to offer a digital equivalent of the living room. What do you mean by that?

Over the last 15 years, Facebook and Instagram have helped people connect with friends, communities, and interests in the digital equivalent of a town square. But people increasingly also want to connect privately in the digital equivalent of the living room. As I think about the future of the internet, I believe a privacy-focused communications platform will become even more important than today’s open platforms. Privacy gives people the freedom to be themselves and connect more naturally, which is why we build social networks.

As I think about the future of the internet, I believe a privacy-focused communications platform will become even more important than today’s open platforms.

I believe the future of communication will increasingly shift to private, encrypted services where people can be confident what they say to each other stays secure and their messages and content won’t stick around forever. This is the future I hope we will help bring about.

Public social networks will continue to be very important in people’s lives – for connecting with everyone you know, discovering new people, ideas and content, and giving people a voice more broadly. People find these valuable every day, and there are still a lot of useful services to build on top of them. But now, with all the ways people also want to interact privately, there’s also an opportunity to build a simpler platform that’s focused on privacy first.

You have recently called for more regulation of the digital space. This is unusual for the CEO of a major tech company. How come?

Technology is a major part of our lives, and companies such as Facebook have immense responsibilities. Every day we make decisions about what speech is harmful, what constitutes political advertising, and how to prevent sophisticated cyberattacks. These are important for keeping our community safe. But if we were starting from scratch, we wouldn’t ask companies to make these judgments alone.

I believe we need a more active role for governments and regulators. By updating the rules for the internet, we can preserve what’s best about it — the freedom for people to express themselves and for entrepreneurs to build new things — while also protecting society from broader harms.

By updating the rules for the internet, we can preserve what’s best about it — the freedom for people to express themselves and for entrepreneurs to build new things.

The areas I identified are harmful content, election integrity, privacy and data portability. I believe Facebook has a responsibility to help address these issues, and I’m looking forward to discussing them with lawmakers around the world. We should have a broader debate about what we want as a society and how regulation can help. These four areas are important, but, of course, there’s more to discuss.

Der Beitrag Zuckerberg: “We need a more active role for governments and regulators” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Robin Fehrenbach

Jamie Fly was used to harsh criticism whenever he landed in Berlin. That’s what happened to him in 2003, when he worked for the George W. Bush administration and was asked tough questions about the war in Iraq. Ten years later – working for President Barack Obama – he experienced the outrage of the German partners over the NSA affair. Today, Fly’s situation is completely different, as the Senior Fellow of the GMF and Atlantik-Brücke Young Leader Alumnus conveyed at a dinner discussion in Berlin. For two years, Germans have been asking him to explain President Trump’s policies. What used to be irritation has turned into helplessness.

[related]Fly, who also acted as a foreign and security policy advisor for Republican Senator Marco Rubio, began his domestic policy analysis with the recent congressional elections. “After the Midterms, it looked as if Trump would emerge relatively unscathed. Although the majority in the House of Representatives was lost, the Republicans were pleased with winning seats in the Senate.” But the government shutdown, which became the longest in US history, shattered trust. The economic impact, Fly predicted, would be enormous. “The shutdown was a tactical misstep by the President. What has he achieved? He didn’t get the money to build a wall at the Mexican border,” Fly noted. He said he expected the new Congress to use more of its oversight authority to keep the executive branch in check, but this would likely aggravate the deadlock in US politics.

Fly was worried about the American people. The continuing domestic political squabbles and the negative experiences with military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were increasingly tiring the population of US foreign policy. Before the Midterms, polls showed that only 6% of US citizens considered foreign policy to be an important issue. Fly regretted that the current administration continued to act erratically in this field. The high turnover of key foreign policy officials was also related to this. There is a long list of common challenges facing the United States and Europe, such as the search for solutions to social problems or the handling of Artificial Intelligence. However, there is no impetus on the part of the United States to push this transatlantic agenda forward. “The will to play a leading role in world politics is disappearing. This break with decades of continuity will bring fundamental changes for Europe, but also for the Middle East,” said Fly. As a consequence, Europe must work out what it wants to achieve internationally and, above all, how it wants to succeed. Germany in particular should become much more involved in Asia, especially Japan.

In the subsequent discussion, Fly addressed “a general crisis of confidence in our societies,” noting that the fear of globalization, immigration and digitization is real. “This is where real transatlantic cooperation should become the driving force for countering populism and nationalism,” Fly noted. At the end of the event, Fly and the members and Young Leaders of Atlantik-Brücke discussed the state crisis in Venezuela and the trade conflict with China.

Der Beitrag “The shutdown was a tactical misstep by the President” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

[related]Explaining the choice of award winner, Friedrich Merz, Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke said: “With CETA, Canada and Europe are setting an example for transatlantic cooperation and multilateralism. Without the outstanding commitment of Chrystia Freeland, this landmark agreement would not have been concluded.” Max Warburg, member of the Atlantik-Brücke board and son of Eric Warburg (after whom the award is named), praised not only Freeland’s political achievements, but also her personal integrity: “Chrystia Freeland is unwavering in her moral principles. She demonstrates courage in confronting even powerful opponents and stands up for her values.”

In her acceptance speech, Minister Chrystia Freeland said: “Germany, the European Union, and the transatlantic alliance have been at the heart of the rules-based international order for more than 70 years. Together with its European allies, Canada continues to defend the values we hold dear, including human rights and democracy, and to promote free and fair trade as essential for maintaining peace among nations. In the case of CETA, the agreement is delivering economic opportunities on both sides of the Atlantic while also pushing back against emerging threats of protectionism that we are seeing around the world.”

“Together with its European allies, Canada continues to defend the values we hold dear.”[quoter]Chrystia Freeland[/quoter]

Federal Foreign Minister Heiko Maas pointed out in his laudation:”Chrystia Freeland has turned Canadian foreign policy into a “brand” that stands out clearly and recognizably from the rest of the diplomatic chorus. She has focused foreign policy – particularly during the G7 presidency – on clear priorities and at the same time anchored it even more strongly in multilateralism. She has taken a courageous stand against the trend towards isolationism and protectionism: For more international cooperation, not less. She is more than worthy of the Eric M. Warburg Award.”

Der Beitrag Minister Freeland honored with Warburg Award erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

“We know what works: Freedom works. We know what’s right: Freedom is right”, said George H. W. Bush in his inaugural speech as US President in 1989. Shortly after, his words were to be followed by deeds: The perspective of a reunited Germany was controversial among the European Allies, but George H. W. Bush resolutely fought for it.

Atlantik-Brücke Chairman Friedrich Merz said: “George Bush will be remembered forever as a prudent, courageous and far-sighted President. At a time of historic upheaval, he stood by our country. He was a champion of a multilateral and liberal order, who placed his trust in his political partners and treated them with respect. This made him a truly great statesman who wrote history and is still a model for us today.”

The former president valued and trusted Germany as a partner in Europe and was convinced that a reunited free Germany would be even better able to fulfil the role of “partner in leadership” – a concept he had already devised in 1989.

For his services to German reunification and the friendship between Germany, Europe and the United States, Atlantik-Brücke presented the former president with the George H. W. Bush Award, named after him, on August 28, 2015. “With great personal commitment, George Bush made it clear that the USA considered Germany as a friend and partner,” Friedrich Merz said at the award ceremony.

You can read an obituary on George H. W. Bush by our board member Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger here (in German).

Der Beitrag Atlantik-Brücke mourns George H. W. Bush erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

For more than 21 years Steve Russell served in the U.S. Army. He has fought in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Since 2015 he represents the 5th district of Oklahoma in the Congress of the United States. Russell regards the transatlantic alliance as stable and culturally ingrained. The Congressman explains in conversation with Atlantik-Brücke where Americans and Europeans should encounter each other, why Eastern Europe must concern us and why he doesn’t trust Iran. An on-site visit in Oklahoma City.

Interview: David Deißner

Der Beitrag On The Record erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

In our first episode of “On The Record”, we talk to Julianne (“Julie”) Smith, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, who is currently serving as a Weizsäcker Fellow at the Bosch Academy in Berlin. She served as the Deputy National Security Advisor to the Vice President of the United States, Joe Biden, from 2012-2013. Shortly before the Midterm elections, she speaks about the discontent of many Americans with the elites in Washington, about President Trump’s foreign policy and the future of NATO.

Interview: David Deißner

Der Beitrag On The Record erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Dr. Ailish Campbell is Canada’s Chief Trade Commissioner and assesses the outcomes one year after CETA’s implementation: 99 percent of the Canadian-European Free Trade Agreement have already come into force, and the exchange of goods has already been stimulated noticeably. Campbell also explains in the conversation what is at stake in the final phase of the NAFTA renegotiations with the United States. Read in the following a shortened version of our Transatlantic Call with Dr. Campbell.

Dr. Campbell, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union is generally regarded as one of the most progressive, fair, and ambitious Free Trade Agreements at least of the last few years. CETA has provisionally entered into force on September 21 of 2017. Since then one year has passed. Can you tell us how the ratification process is making progress?

I am very pleased to say that 99 per cent of CETA on a trade-weighted value perspective have come into force. These are the elements that are under Commission authority on your side and which here in Canada are clearly under federal jurisdiction. The agreement now also requires ratification in member states.

Which economic successes in trade and investments can already be seen from CETA?

I would note that exports from both the EU and more specifically from Germany to Canada are up to 7.8 percent. This is only merchandise export of goods. We are also awaiting annual services data. Here in Canada trade is also up overall to the European Union including up 7 percent to Germany. The idea, though, that we should only look at what we are exporting to one another as if that is the measure of the agreement, does not provide a full picture. You may recall that there is someone else who is very focused only on the trade balance.

You are referring to U.S. President Donald Trump.

[related]Correct. We have to look at our two-way foreign direct investments, our innovation collaboration, our collaboration on the environment including the implementation of the Paris agreement. Student exchanges and a very rich history between Canada and Europe are also included in the full picture not only in the sense that a good portion of Canadians are of European descent. But also in the sense of continuing to do fantastic innovation together including clean cities and mobility. CETA is just one element of our long and enduring relation and collaboration. We should also take a more holistic view of our economic and social linkages.

The agreement is particularly progressive in terms of labor rights and environmental protection. Quite frankly, it is a masterpiece of negotiation led by Chrystia Freeland, now Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and the former Minister of International Trade. Does CETA have a positive impact on other negotiations of free trade agreements?

We hope so. Certainly, we have used aspects of the CETA negotiations in our work on the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) specifically looking at issues related to the environment as well as labor. As you are seeing NAFTA being renegotiated we long had labor and environmental chapters there. We would like to see those become more robust. We also proposed a chapter on gender and on indigenous first nations’ trade in NAFTA as well. We will only see as these negotiations conclude what is in the final agreement. You have hit on a really important point. It is very simply this that our values are very well aligned between Germany and Canada, in particular the high protection of labor.

Our values are very well aligned between Germany and Canada, in particular the high protection of labor.

In the Mexico-U.S. negotiations on NAFTA our general position was: Please negotiate whatever you want into the highest standard. Because Canada continues to have the highest all-in wage compensation for workers. We continue to have the most robust public health care system. We are far more like Europe and various models particularly France and the UK than the US on health care.

The original North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA which was ratified in 1994 is being renegotiated between the USA, Canada and Mexico. Can you tell us in which phase the negotiation is at the moment?

Today my Minister, Chrystia Freeland, is flying into Washington. The negotiations continue. We have modernized NAFTA twelve times before. New issues come to the forefront, some of those are in CETA: Everything from e-commerce to improved services standards to trade in data and digital as well as improved environmental protection. All of these things are certainly on the agenda for us. We have an offer to the US that is under ongoing negotiations right now. Prime Minister Trudeau has been quite clear publicly about where some of the tougher areas are. Those include access to our dairy industry and issues around our cultural exemption which we maintain to particularly guard French language rights in Quebec and the ability to produce our own national content. A third issue would be chapter 19 which concerns the settlement of disputes. Minister Freeland has been very active with her counterpart Robert Lighthizer. In fact, the CETA negotiator Steve Verheul is our chief negotiator for NAFTA as well, and Steve is excellent. So, we are very well prepared. Certainly, we want to see a deal that works for all three parties, Canada, Mexico and the United States.

Certainly, we want to see a deal that works for all three parties, Canada, Mexico and the United States.

Do you think the deadline that has been communicated, October 1^st, is realistic?

We are working hard. I certainly hope that our American friends will see the value in what we have tabled as our proposals.

After the U.S. government decided to pull out of the completed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) between the United States and eleven further nations in the Pacific Rim, the agreement was ratified as the now so-called CPTPP by the remaining group of states including Canada. How does CETA combined with CPTPP place Canada in a strategic position for Canadian companies and foreign direct investment?

It is very clear: Canada is not the United States of America right now, it never has been, and it never will be. One of the key factors for us right now that makes us very different from the United States is our openness to the rest of the world. Our position is that we want to be the gateway on our east coast and across the country of course to CETA, to NAFTA and an effective agreement with the Americas. We are also negotiating with the Pacific Alliance in South America as well as Mercosur. We concluded the CPTPP because we find it very important to set high standards and rules including the engagement of our state and enterprises in the market economies with Asian partners.

We concluded the CPTPP because we find it very important to set high standards and rules including the engagement of our state and enterprises in the market economies with Asian partners.

Having a deal with Japan, we felt has tremendous value. It is an incredibly wealthy and important G7 country but also one that shares our values in protecting the environment and consumers. So, locking in that deal, it is very important to set standards that influence supply chains. This is the kind of deal which we hope will be open over time after ratification of the initial group of members to other countries. We will also continue to watch what goes on with the UK and Brexit depending on their decisions. We just had Liam Fox, the UK Minister for International Trade, here. We have said that if and when those exit negotiations conclude, we would also conclude a free trade agreement with the UK.

In general, as a country of 37 million people, this gives us access to over 1.2 billion consumers in the world’s richest markets: the EU, the US, Mexico, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the other TPP members.

Would you recommend CETA as a role model for the United Kingdom and its future relationship to the EU?

Maybe you have seen this illustration from the European Commission trying to tell the United Kingdom how much it would lose in terms of influence by leaving the European Union. For example, it showed AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) and other relationships including CETA. The Canada-EU deal was portrayed as a series of many steps. It is not a membership with the EU, we don’t have a fiscal arrangement, the Common Agricultural Policy, and Schengen. The fact that the UK never joined the Monetary Union is another important aspect. CETA is absolutely a model for the UK. But that will be up to the UK government to decide what it is pursuing. I was joking with my UK counterparts who were here: That if they copy the agreement, we should probably charge them a license fee.

CETA is absolutely a model for the UK. But that will be up to the UK government to decide what it is pursuing. I was joking with my UK counterparts who were here: That if they copy the agreement, we should probably charge them a license fee.

Free trade agreements are complicated treaties full of technical details. The bigger picture of it however symbolizes openness and cooperation in a globalized world. Does free trade have the potential to offer opposition to the trend of protectionism and isolationism around the world?

I definitively subscribe to the trade theory of peace which is that it is harder for countries that are more open and integrated to go to war with one another, that they instead see what they have in common. That has to be joined, though, with ongoing dialogue on a host of other issues. We are not just our economies, we are societies. It requires conversations on human rights. There is so much we have in common with the European Union and Germany. Having lived in the European Union and being also a EU citizen – I have an Irish passport –, I know the importance of the European Union to Germany from a social perspective and also the concerns of Germany from a financial fiscal perspective. Canada has worked very collaboratively with Germany at the G7 and G20 on fiscal consolidation. An important part of this is the very clear reporting of overall deficit and debt levels between municipal, state, federal and supranational levels. We continue to be a fiscally very responsible partner.

We are not just our economies, we are societies.

There is such a rich set of dialogues going on. It is important that we don’t put all of this on trade. I personally don’t think that trade agreements can deliver everything, like integration. If globalization is only about trade, it will fail. If globalization is also about how we take care of each other and how we take care of the environment, including elements like development aid and helping other countries to develop a rule of law and an independent judiciary, to train police and military police, then it will work.

If globalization is only about trade, it will fail.

There are different styles of interaction with the current U.S. administration on the international level. We have seen the German chancellor Merkel dealing with President Trump in a typically sober manner, and the French President Macron being very charming at first. In comparison, the Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau used more direct and maybe strict words after the unpleasant sequel of this year’s G7 summit in Quebec. To what extent has this approach altered Canada’s way of negotiating with the Trump administration?

Canada has a very simple philosophy which is that the United States first of all continues to be very important to Canada and always will be. It is our largest neighbor. Millions of Canadians share if not passports then family and business connections. The United States is of course the office of the President, it is also Congress, it is also Governors of states. They are incredibly powerful in the US system. For example, in ratifying the Paris Climate Change Agreement and supporting the members of that agreement we have reached out to the very active state and city level: In New York with both Governor Cuomo and the Mayor, in California with both the Governor and the Mayor of San Francisco. Canada will continue to pursue a multi-level strategy when it comes to engage the United States. Our British traditions in one sense will keep us very focused. There is an old British saying: Keep calm and carry on. We know who we are. We know what our values are. We are a multilingual, multiracial society that is very open to the world. That is challenging and requires constant dialogue with our citizens. It doesn’t mean we are immune to any of the problems with racism that exist in the world. The Prime Minister’s commitment to inclusion of women and of LGBTQ citizens and to the environment has been very well presented and will be continued by Prime Minister Trudeau whom I have the pleasure of serving.

There is an old British saying: Keep calm and carry on. We know who we are. We know what our values are. We are a multilingual, multiracial society that is very open to the world.

Der Beitrag “One of the key factors is our openness to the world” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Der Beitrag Young Leaders’ Voices erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

By Julia von Cube and Emily Wang

At Schloss Neuhardenberg in Brandenburg, close enough to the German capital but at the same time far enough to focus on the group itself, forty-eight young professionals from government, diplomacy, academia, security, military, business, art, and sports on both sides of the Atlantic met for the 40th German-American Young Leaders Conference. The discussions were shaped by one overarching topic: In the face of both external and internal pressures, what is the future of the transatlantic partnership? What are the values that we should hold onto, and how do we adapt to new challenges like digitalization, demographic change, and a shifting world order?

Program

As the ties between the United States of America and Germany might be loosening, the debate at the U.S. Embassy Berlin with Robin S. Quinville, Deputy Chief of Mission, and moreover the talks at the Federal Foreign Office with State Minister Michelle Münterfering and Ambassador Antje Leendertse encouraged the group to take the current situation as a chance to reflect where we stand concerning our common values and standards in the transatlantic partnership. Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, MdB (Young Leader 1997) inspired this year’s cohort to look at the interests and issues that currently unite the transatlantic partners, rather than reminiscing about the past.

[related]During the week, the group of young professionals visited Axel Springer SE for a discussion with Julian Reichelt, Chairman of the BILD Editorial Offices & Editor-in-Chief of BILD and BILD Digital, followed by a tour of the publishing house’s newsrooms. In addition, a talk with Roland Jahn, Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic, offered a wider understanding of the German past – not only for the American participants of the program. Exchanges with Stefan Winners, Member of Burda Digital’s Board, Hans Raffauf, co-founder and Chairman of Clue and Till Behnke, founder of nebenan.de and betterplace.org , provided insights into digital transformation in Germany. A panel discussion on migration with Professor Dr. Naika Foroutan, Director of the Berlin Institute on Integration and Migration Research (BIM), and Farhad Dilmaghani, Former State Secretary, gave an outline of the questions of social stability Germany has to tackle.

The different tone in the transatlantic partnership was the subject of several discussions and meetings. The talk with Dr. Andreas Dombret, former Member of the Board of Deutsche Bundesbank & Member of the Board of Atlantik-Brücke e.V., focused on economic stability and changes in economic transatlantic decisions. German defense priorities and transatlantic security cooperation within NATO were the topics of Major General Michael Hochwart’s visit. The keynote of Federal Minister Jens Spahn (Young Leader 2014) addressed the future of the transatlantic partnership, but also the challenges Germany faces domestically, such as immigration and integration. Spahn’s speech was part of a summer reception with Atlantik-Brücke Members and Young Leaders Alumni bridging the generations of the program.

Discussion Points

Underpinning the entire week was an informal and interpersonal exchange about the shared and differing values between the U.S. and Germany. Despite deceptively similar cultures on the surface and cultural affinity, we discussed the differing concepts and expectations of leadership. Some of the speakers encouraged the group to think carefully about what our shared values are, as large parts of both the German and the American public find the transatlantic partnership and NATO increasingly less relevant.

Security and stability were of great concern, especially in light of Trump’s heightened rhetoric against Germany and other NATO partners.

Security and stability were of great concern, especially in light of Trump’s heightened rhetoric against Germany and other NATO partners. Despite the provocative language, working level relationships appear to be strong; some even claimed stronger than before. Furthermore, there was a general consensus from speakers and participants alike that Germany should invest more heavily in its military readiness. This discussion also highlighted the diverging public opinion on the two sides of the Atlantic. Many speakers pointed to a complacency of the German public, as a generation of young people has grown up in peacetime and sees less relevance in organizations like NATO. On the American side, pithy messaging about “fairness” in defense spending has mobilized public sentiment. In either case, these trends demonstrate the need for better and more digestible messaging around the relevance of the transatlantic partnership and NATO in particular.

Many felt that China’s growing power is encroaching on American hegemony.

Another important foreign policy and security factor that was discussed was the shifting world order, especially with regards to Russia and China. In the case of Russia, speakers and participants from different industries expressed concern at its influence throughout the ex-Soviet bloc, desire to weaken the EU, skillful use of media outside of its borders, and the need for a strong NATO to deter further disruption. Many felt that China’s growing economic power and influence through One Belt, One Road and other initiatives are encroaching on American hegemony. While we debated the exact nature of China’s ascent and Russia’s ultimate intent, it became clear that the U.S. and Germany should articulate a clearer vision and strategy concerning these two countries for the future.

Both the United States and Germany face significant internal pressures including digitalization and demographic change.

In addition to a changing world order, both the United States and Germany face significant internal pressures including digitalization and demographic change. The potential influence on societies and workforces of AI and digitalization is vast. Our discussions centered on the implementation of redistributive policies, universal basic income, the role of education and, even more challenging, how to define purpose in a world with drastically fewer jobs. Demographic change calls to mind migration, but in fact includes issues like an aging and shrinking population and changing ethnic majorities. Another important point that came up was social inclusion: While our societies become more pluralistic, many still struggle to access equal opportunities.

The media’s ability to knit a society together or tear it apart was constant throughout the week. Speakers highlighted their concern at Russian propaganda in Germany and the lack of fact checking or investigation on social media.

“Privilege comes with responsibility”, one of the Young Leaders pointed out.

In response to this slew of challenges, conference participants were also focused on concrete solutions to strengthen the transatlantic relationship. Suggested projects ranged from engagement through educational institutions to using entertainment and news channels as means to educate different segments of the public on the strength of our existing bonds and the continued necessity for them. Proposals also included more formal partnerships between sister-cities and other demonstrations of the two countries’ synergies across business, science, and various industries. Lastly, we discussed the need for more civic engagement to restore trust in and excitement about the political process and democracy.

“Privilege comes with responsibility”, as one of the Young Leaders pointed out as a summary of the intensive week of debate and discussions. This is driven by the firm belief that turning the back on the transatlantic partnership is not an option.

Der Beitrag “A wake-up call” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

For more than seventy years, Germany, Europe and the United States of America have enjoyed a steadfast and mutually supportive partnership based on shared values. This partnership helped to establish the international post-war order. It has ensured peace, freedom and prosperity in our countries throughout the decades, and to many people around the world, it has been the paragon of a multilateral order safeguarding freedom and respecting the international rights of the Community of Nations.

We are greatly concerned that this framework is being called into question, and that the government of the United States of America is increasingly putting its national interests first – with little regard for those of its transatlantic partners. Allowing a divide to form between the U.S. and Europe would not only undermine the transatlantic achievements of recent decades, it could well encourage a negative development similar to that of the interwar period. There is no question that the primary responsibility of every government is to protect its country and its citizens. But the nations of the Western world have always assumed additional responsibility for each other, and collective responsibility for the people elsewhere in the world. The unwillingness of the U.S. government to support this concept of collective responsibility and to participate in the community will inflict serious political and economic damage in the long term, not least on the United States of America itself.

As members of one of the longest-established and most traditional transatlantic institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, we therefore reaffirm with great urgency our view that

• Europe and the United States of America bear a shared responsibility for world peace, particularly in the 21st Century;
• “‘the West’ is more than just a cardinal direction” (German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier). We are united by the idea of striving for equity and fairness on the foundation of freedom, democracy, equality and international understanding in a world that is increasingly threatened by inequality, hunger, poverty, civil war, the impacts of climate change, violations of human rights, and authoritarian political regimes;
• if we isolate ourselves as nations by introducing protectionist policies, we will be unable to solve a single national or global problem;
• only a rule-based, multilateral world order can create a framework within which the world will be capable of successfully overcoming the global challenges of the 21^st Century;
• Europe and the United States share responsibility for ensuring humanitarian policies on global migration and social diversity;
• the United States will continue to be our closest and most important ally when it comes to finding geopolitical and strategic solutions that reflect our shared experience, values and interests.

We are aware that the current situation makes it necessary for us to do more than simply look to the United States. The European Union must also make progress in developing stronger foreign, defense and economic policies. In light of the continuing involvement of the U.S. armed forces in NATO, European  members must make a contribution to the stability of the defense alliance. In the long term, the transatlantic community of values can only be successful if both sides are strong and capable of acting on the international stage.

Atlantik-Brücke and its members stand by their convictions and responsibilities for upholding the transatlantic community of values. Our work will focus to an even greater extent on promoting this community in the U.S. and in Germany. We are engaging in an exchange of views with American citizens and their government. We will intensify our dialog on all levels of society. We are sharing ideas with representatives of the administration and members of both political parties, as well as representatives of civil society in the federal states. We are talking to governors, mayors and business owners, academics and people in the creative professions. In this phase of transatlantic relations, we are also stepping up the dialog with the Canadian government, which is working constructively with its European partners, particularly in the areas of trade and commerce.  We are also seeking to intensify our dialog with the younger generation to cement and achieve long-term improvements in our transatlantic relationship.

Der Beitrag Uphold the transatlantic community of values! erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

When I wonder how the Russian claim to power affects the everyday life in Lithuania in concrete terms, I immediately have two incidents in mind. One can recall the story of Russian supplies of oil via the pipeline “Druzhba”. Back in 2006 Lithuanian Government went for privatization of a major oil refinery that was and still is a major supplier of oil products to the region. Russia was pressing to sell the refinery to a Russian company for a low price. Lithuanian Government went for an open and transparent international privatization tender. The Polish company “Orlen” won. A few months later oil supplies via the “Druzhba” pipeline stopped, and the pipeline branch coming to Lithuania has been dry until this day. Official Russian explanation was that the pipeline needed repair. It still needs …

In Lithuanian efforts to develop alternative energy sources or to establish alternative routes of supply, there were various obstacles generated by Russia related actors. They ranged from financing, or, in fact, bribing local people to wage a campaign against extraction of shale gas up to engaging Lithuanian LNG terminal developers into lengthy litigation in courts. We also witnessed Russian efforts to question Lithuanian Government’s ability to meet its international commitments. For example, Russian representatives in UNESCO waged a campaign of allegations on, as if, environmental harm done by the construction of Lithuanian LNG terminal.

The same pattern in any maritime area considered by Russia as its zone of influence

[related]There is another case deserving serious attention. In 2014 and 2015, the power cable connecting the Lithuanian and Swedish electricity grids, called NordBalt, was being laid on the Baltic seabed. Russia launched a series of naval exercises in the vicinity of NordBalt power cable itinerary. Under an excuse of caring for safety, Russian navy chased away all the ships from the area. The area, de facto closed by Russian navy, encompassed a big sector of the Lithuanian exclusive economic zone. And, surprise, surprise, that was the area in which NordBalt cable had to be laid down. Russian navy exercises lasted more than half a year. In extreme case, in April 2015, the area was closed for 26 days. Completion of NordBalt was delayed and costs of the project increased significantly. This pattern could be applied in any maritime area considered by Russia as its zone of influence or interest. It has also to be noted that the Baltic Sea is quite shallow, and it is not so simple to change the established sea routes. Therefore, the approaches to the seaports on the Eastern Baltic coast could be severely hindered.

The examples that I have mentioned refer to several challenges posed by Russia. It is about Russian effort to take over the assets of our major companies. It is about using those companies as a major lobbying or corrupting instrument in politics. It is about steps to preserve and abuse a dominant role in the energy supply and about using it to achieve a major policy change of the country. It is about testing ways and means to disrupt major supplies and thus to tire out our population. It is about testing ways to hinder deployments of NATO reinforcements in the Baltics when the time comes.

Hostile activities against the IT systems are on the rise

Russian cyber attacks on our country pose another very dangerous threat. Russian hostile activities against the IT systems of the Lithuanian state sector and critical infrastructure are on the rise. Last year almost 55,000 cyber incidents were dealt with by Lithuanian National Cyber Security Centre. One fourth of them occured in our energy sector. Government institutions are also frequent targets. For example, features of a cyber and information operation were identified after the news portal of Lithuanian TV channel had been hacked and fake information about the Defense Minister had been placed on it. Subsequently an email containing a malicious document was distributed to the media and government institutions. The email contained a link to the fake article, in order to attract the recipients’ attention and increase the spread of the malware. The main goal of the hacker group associated with the Russian intelligence services was not an information operation but spreading the malware in the networks of state institutions.

The National Cyber Security Center now operates as the main national computer emergency response unit for management of cyber incidents. It also operates as the main Accreditation Authority of all types of IT systems and networks in Lithuania. The Centre has an R&D division for creating tools, necessary for managing cyber incidents and executes cyber exercises. A secure network of main state institutions, which could be capable of exploiting the benefits of peacetime systems and ensuring their viability in case of possible military action, is being developed. It is expected that approximately 550 most important state and municipal authorities will be interlinked by this network. It will be capable of operating separately from the public internet and remain resilient to the cyber threats. Lithuania initiated and leads the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defense policy (PESCO) project called “Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security”. The first outcome of the project is expected at the beginning of 2019 and should assist the participating nations to counter a cyber attack or an incident. This project will help participating EU member states to mobilize collective expertise in order to jointly strengthen their cyber security resilience and facilitate cooperation in combating cyber threats through mutual assistance. This year, NATO exercise Steadfast Cobalt will again take place in Lithuania. Thus, we try to contribute to the development of practical cyber security capabilities of the Alliance.

Contributions by our European allies, and, first of all, those by Germany, to increase our security are very much appreciated. However, the transatlantic factor is crucial. Russia must know that even in case of a limited incursion, it would immediately enter a military conflict with the whole Alliance including the nuclear powers and particularly the United States. Russians try to avoid namely that, and this is a major deterrence factor.

Der Beitrag Russian challenges tire out our population erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Part XIV of our series: Magnus Nordenman calms the inhabitants of Guam and Hawaii: After initial irritations, the U.S. government under President Trump adheres firmly to Article 5. The Director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council points out however that the United States’ counter-terrorism strategy for NATO is hardly developed. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke in Washington, D.C. Nordenman also explains that the special quality of the Alliance’s new command structure rests on the better reinforcement build-up.

Mr. Nordenman, how steadfast is the U.S. government’s commitment to Article 5 under President Trump?

We’re in a better place than we were at the beginning of this administration. As a presidential candidate, Trump called NATO and America’s commitment into question. And the first summit in Brussels with President Trump was not a good day for NATO. But since then a lot has happened. The vice president has relayed America’s commitments, as have Secretary Mattis, Secretary Tillerson and the president himself. In that sense, the worst is over. We’ve removed most of the doubts about America’s commitment to Article 5 and European security. That’s not to say there won’t be turbulent times ahead. But at least, on that basic level, we are in a better place than we were in early January of 2017.

The first summit in Brussels with President Trump was not a good day for NATO.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

Russia is trying to extend its spheres of influence. The Baltics and Poland, in particular, feel threatened by Russia’s aggressive behavior. How reliable is NATO’s security guarantee in this European region?

[related]It’s getting better. The implementation of the Warsaw Summit decisions with an enhanced forward presence in the Baltic States and Poland is a first step. But now we need to do more in the maritime domain, in the air domain, and in reinforcement. NATO is on the right track, and it actually got there surprisingly quickly. One important point that isn’t discussed much in Europe is the fact that European nations are stepping up their efforts – with Germany having the lead in Lithuania, the UK in Estonia and Canada in Latvia. It’s crucial to understand that America is not alone in its commitment to security in the Baltic region.

That’s a contribution to transatlantic burden sharing.

Correct. It’s not enough, and more needs to be done. But the political point is important: this is not a scenario in which America has to shoulder the entire burden.

North Korea has threatened to attack the island of Guam, which is a territory of the United States. Would such an event invoke NATO’s Article 5 on collective defense?

It might. That’s an unknown factor that wasn’t considered when NATO was first established because the focus back then was obviously on Europe. But Guam is an alliance territory and the only time Article 5 has been invoked was actually in response to the attack on the U.S. Guam is obviously open to legal discussion. A more interesting case is probably Hawaii, which is actually a state in the Union. Hawaii is also within missile range, and North Korea has commenced nuclear missile drills again for the first time since the Cold War. In this new, globally interconnected security environment, both Canada and the U.S. – as Pacific countries and allies – have to be prepared for Pacific events that might also impact NATO.

In this new, globally interconnected security environment, both Canada and the U.S. – as Pacific countries and allies – have to be prepared for Pacific events that might also impact NATO.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

Would you recommend NATO to think through these legal issues surrounding Guam?

It makes a lot of sense for NATO to focus primarily on the East and South. That’s where we have intense security challenges. But it’s always good to give your mental muscles a work out and at least think things through to conclusion. It ensures that the decision makers are better equipped to cope with unexpected events. It’s also worthwhile thinking about worst case scenarios. This has been a longstanding challenge for the alliance. If you told someone that NATO would be engaged in central Asia in early 2000, people would have thought you were joking. But then 9/11 happened, and all of a sudden NATO was undertaking its largest expeditionary operation for almost 15 years. So it’s healthy for any alliance to regularly consider the impossible.

Which strategy for NATO does the United States under the Trump administration seek to develop?

This administration, at least at the senior level in the White House, really has two priorities: a better balance of burden sharing and a NATO role in counter-terrorism. A couple of rungs down things get a bit more detailed and granular. One example is the Department of Defense under Secretary Mattis, who has a very good understanding of  the Russian challenge and the importance of defense and deterrence. There’s a lot of good, practical work going on there.

This administration, at least at the senior level in the White House, really has two priorities: a better balance of burden sharing and a NATO role in counter-terrorism.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

How far developed is this strategy already?

There’s a growing sense in Washington that the burden sharing discussion is going in the right direction. Then we can move on to the reasons. Is this being driven by Putin or Trump? Europeans tend to argue that it is actually being driven by Putin rather than Trump. Trump supporters tend to argue that it is all being driven by Trump. I like to think the truth is somewhere in between. But whoever is driving it, and however long it takes to get there, this discussion is moving in the right direction.

The counter-terrorism strategy is much less developed. Both Washington and the alliance agree that NATO is not a counter-terrorism organization. There are also different opinions within the alliance on how counter-terrorism should be implemented and what institutions have to be worked through. This opens the door to European NATO members to come to Washington with their ideas and proposals on what NATO’s role in counter-terrorism could be.

President Trump’s ‘America First’ strategy seems to put American protectionism in a broad range of policy fields. To what extent does this impact NATO’s strength and the United States’ longstanding aspiration to shape the liberal world order?

You are seeing two separate directions in American foreign policy. I’m less worried about the defense and national security situation. As I said, we’re already past the worst in terms of America’s commitment to NATO. The burden sharing issue is also going in the right direction, and the U.S. is maintaining strong defense relationships with partners such as Australia, Japan and South Korea.

More damage is probably being done on the trade agenda, with President Trump’s proposal to withdraw from the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement and his pulling out of the TPP negotiations. TTIP also seems to have been abandoned for the moment. In that sense, multilateral trade agreements are more at risk than America’s military and security alliances. On a day to day basis these are unrelated. But they do say something about America’s commitment to multilateral solutions and rules-based institutions. At a philosophical level they certainly reinforce each other. So there is a danger of a divide opening up, and of American engagement in the world resting on the single pillar of defense, whereas before it rested on two – the other being multilateral trade.

Multilateral trade agreements are more at risk than America’s military and security alliances. On a day to day basis these are unrelated. But they do say something about America’s commitment to multilateral solutions and rules-based institutions. At a philosophical level they certainly reinforce each other.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

The Ukraine crisis remains unresolved. Would the revitalization of the NATO Russia Council help to improve both the situation in Ukraine and the American-Russian relationship?

Broadly speaking, the U.S.-Russia relationship is at its worst since the Cold War in spite of the hopes of the White House to try and restore it. We’ve arrived at this point for a number of different reasons – first and foremost as a result of Russian interference in the U.S. election and its continued aggression in Ukraine. The relationship has taken a turn for the worse since President Trump took up office. There is some consistency here, because the administration is saying the relationship cannot improve until we have a political solution for Ukraine, which puts this administration in line with the Obama administration’s position. The Ukraine remains a huge issue and the topic of supplying arms to Ukraine is back on the table. It was ultimately rejected by the Obama administration but is now being seriously discussed again in Washington.

What is your key takeaway from the NATO Russia Council?

We aren’t going to see any major breakthroughs. Talks are taking place for the eminently good reason that talking to each other is better than not talking to each other. On the one hand we are moving to deter Russia, and on the other we are attempting to engage in constructive cooperation. This isn’t just the European view. Secretary Mattis is also on the record talking about the importance of strong deterrence and dialogue.

NATO’s new command structure and additional headquarters will enhance its troop deployment capabilities. Do you think these changes go far enough to be an effective deterrent against Russia?

This is another very important building block of our deterrence construct, which relies on reinforcements. We’re never going to have enough troops from day one in Poland, or in the Baltic States, or in Romania. It will always be a reinforcement build-up. By the way, it was also a reinforcement build-up during the Cold War. The U.S. certainly has fewer troops in Europe than it had during the Cold War, but even back then a key objective was to channel reinforcements into Europe. It is easy to forget. People like to talk about fighter jets, artillery, and tanks. But these structures, logistics, supplies and reinforcements all keep NATO going. I’m glad we’re finally getting to it because this has been underappreciated for a long time.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

That’s a great question! NATO will continue to play a central role supporting America’s national security. The EU has an incredibly important set of European institutions. In that respect we will always be an outsider, but this doesn’t mean there won’t be close cooperation or a close U.S.-EU partnership. We were a founding member of NATO and we’re also one of the leading members of the alliance. NATO will always be important. I remain optimistic about NATO and the transatlantic relationship. We’ve been through bad times and crises in our relationship before. It’s particularly striking how many aspects of the situation today remind me of 2002, 2003 and 2004, another period in which many Europeans believed that America was a rogue country that wasn’t respecting its allies and international institutions.

NATO will always be important. I remain optimistic about NATO and the transatlantic relationship.[quoter]Magnus Nordenman[/quoter]

You’re talking about the war in Iraq.

Correct. There was talk in Berlin and Paris back then about it being time for Europe to go its own way and reduce its dependence on the United States. But we overcame that relationship crisis. I’m not saying that the situation then is comparable to the situation today. Very different factors are involved. But I’ve heard talk like this before. Domestically, in the U.S., I’m beginning to see a pretty healthy counter-reaction – especially if you look at congressional interest in NATO, congressional delegations traveling to Europe, members of the Senate and the House talking about the importance of NATO and American commitments to Europe, and more funding for the European Deterrence Initiative. The U.S. is definitely going through a turbulent and challenging time, and there is a lot of uncertainty. But I am beginning to see the outlines of a counter-reaction. People here in Washington are waking up and realizing that we can’t take the transatlantic relationship for granted. It is something that we have to nurture as well.

Der Beitrag Nordenman: “Doubts about America’s commitment to Article 5 are removed” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Part XIII of our series: Rose Gottemoeller regards the Alliance’s security guarantee for the Baltics and Poland as reliable. NATO Deputy Secretary General demands that Russia complies with its commitments to transparency of its military exercises in this region. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke Gottemoeller also stresses that the Alliance’s new command structure will be “robust, agile and fully fit for purpose”.

Mrs. Gottemoeller, Russia is trying to expand its spheres of influence. Especially the Baltics and Poland feel threatened by Russia’s aggressive behaviour. How reliable is NATO’s security guarantee in this European region?

In recent years, Russia has threatened and used military force against its neighbours. NATO has responded in a defensive and proportionate way. The response includes the four multinational battlegroups that are operational in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Our measures are strictly defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments. They aim at preventing conflict and preserving the peace.

Our measures are strictly defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

This is a clear demonstration that we stand together, and is the essence of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. But our deterrence and defence does not rely on four battlegroups alone. They are part of a broader posture that involves national home defence and other NATO forces. We have, for example, tripled the size of our multinational NATO Response Force to 40,000 troops – with a 5,000-strong spearhead force ready to deploy within 72 hours. We have also enhanced air patrols over the Baltic and Black Seas. Our defences are now stronger than at any point since the Cold War. That sends a clear signal.

Our policy towards Russia is consistent: strong defence and openness to dialogue. We are delivering on both tracks. While our practical cooperation with Russia has been suspended, we remain open to a periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue. We held six meetings of the NATO-Russia Council over the past two years, and are continuing to look for further opportunities.

There are regular reports about a gap of exercises between NATO and Russia. How severe is this problem in the perception within the alliance’s Headquarters?

[related]All nations have the right to exercise their armed forces; it is essential that in doing so they respect their commitments to transparency and predictability. Transparency has also been a priority for NATO in its discussions with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council, and it will remain a priority as we continue our dialogue with Russia. Exercises such as ZAPAD last year – together with the overall increase in Russian military activities – underline the need for close dialogue between NATO and Russia to avoid incidents and miscalculations.

Russia has regularly under-reported the size of its exercises to avoid mandatory observations by the OSCE. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has never opened an exercise for the mandatory observation outlined in the Vienna Document. We continue to urge Russia to be fully transparent about the scope of its exercises and to comply with the requirements of the Vienna Document. Allies are also making efforts within the OSCE to modernise the Vienna Document in order to close loopholes and ensure transparency of military exercises.

Russia has regularly under-reported the size of its exercises to avoid mandatory observations by the OSCE.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

As for what NATO does in this area, we ensure that all we do is defensive, proportionate, and in line with our international commitments – including those outlined in the Vienna Document. Exercising is important to test our capabilities and make certain that we are fit for purpose and ready for the challenges we might face.

In May and June, NATO Allies will conduct a range of exercises in the Baltic Sea region – testing the ability of Allied forces to operate together. In the bigger picture, our measures strike the right balance between a greater military deterrence in the east and the ability to quickly send reinforcements. So, our approach remains firm, defensive and proportionate.

We will do what we believe is necessary to ensure that we are capable of defending our territories and populations. But I want to make clear that we do not want a Cold War, and we will not let ourselves be dragged into a new arms race. NATO remains determined to defend all Allies against any threat. We will maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent, as well as strong conventional forces. And we will continue to engage in a meaningful dialogue with Russia, to increase predictability and reduce risk.

We do not want a Cold War, and we will not let ourselves be dragged into a new arms race.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

NATO’s new command structure with additional headquarters aims to accomplish a better capability of deploying troops. Do you think the potential deterrence towards Russia deriving from this step goes far enough?

Our ability to deploy troops wherever they are needed is key to deterrence in peacetime and to our collective defence in times of crisis. This must go hand in hand with a NATO command structure that is robust, agile and fully fit for purpose. Last November, NATO Ministers agreed in principle on the outline for such an adapted NATO Command Structure, and in February of this year, Allies agreed the proposed design for the adapted command structure. We will discuss resources, timelines and locations at the next Meeting of Defence Ministers in June.

The new command structure will include a number of new elements. A Command for the Atlantic will help protect the sea lines of communication between Europe and North America. There will be a new Command to ensure the mobility of our forces within Europe. We also agreed on the need for a renewed focus throughout the command structure on logistics and movement, situational awareness, resilience and on cyber defence. I expect we will finalise all aspects of the adapted structure ahead of the Brussels Summit in July.

Since 2014 there has also been good progress in improving national legislation, removing many bureaucratic hurdles to allow us to move forces across Allied territory. This is important, but we still have work to do. We need to have enough transport capacity at our disposal, and we need to improve infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, railways, runways and ports.

This is not a job for NATO alone – it requires close coordination across national governments and with the private sector. The EU has an important role to play as well, so NATO and the EU will continue to work very closely on this vital issue.

Russia has supposedly violated the INF Treaty by having developed the ballistic missile SSC-8 that is expected to have a range of more than 500 kilometres. What role does this threat play in NATO’s strategic considerations?

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons that threatened Europe, and which were associated with the ability to launch attacks with little warning. We remain fully committed to the preservation of this historic arms control treaty. The INF Treaty is a crucial element of Euro-Atlantic security. Full compliance with the INF Treaty is essential.

The United States has determined that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty. US Defence Secretary Mattis updated Allies on this issue in November of last year. In December, Allies issued a statement calling on Russia to address these serious concerns in a substantial, transparent and verifiable way.

The United States has determined that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

Allies welcome the continued efforts by the United States to engage Russia to resolve concerns about Russia’s compliance with the Treaty.

The relationship between NATO and Russia is very strained since the annexation of Crimea. Which approach should NATO take in order to accomplish a convergence with the Kremlin?

We have seen a broad pattern of reckless behaviour by Russia over many years. This includes the illegal annexation of Crimea, the military support to separatists in Eastern Ukraine, and its military build-up from the North of Europe to the Middle East. Russia’s military presence in Moldova and Georgia is against the will of either of these countries’ governments. There have also been attempts to subvert democratic processes and institutions, and we have seen an increase in cyber attacks. In March, Allies expressed their deep concern about the nerve agent incident in Salisbury in the United Kingdom, the first use of a nerve agent on Alliance territory. Subsequently over two dozen countries expelled people who had been accredited as Russian diplomats from their countries. NATO’s Secretary General withdrew agreement for the appointment of seven individuals accredited to the Russian Mission to NATO and denied the pending accreditation of three others.

This is certainly a challenging time, but NATO’s policy remains unchanged. We have strengthened our deterrence and defence in response to Russia’s actions, while we remain open for a meaningful dialogue with Russia. We held six meetings of the NATO-Russia Council since 2016, and we are working to hold another. This dialogue is difficult – but it is vital to increase transparency and reduce risk. So, NATO’s approach to Russia combines strength and dialogue. And we are delivering on both fronts.

Michael O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, supports the hypothesis that the end of NATO’s eastward expansion and the implementation of a zone of neutral nations would reduce tensions with Russia. How do you assess this proposal?

Russia’s western borders have never been safer. NATO enlargement poses no threat to Russia. NATO’s Open Door policy is enshrined in the Washington Treaty and has helped spread stability and prosperity, just like the European Union’s enlargement. And Russia has benefitted from this stability and prosperity as well. Our door remains open to European nations able to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Russia’s western borders have never been safer. NATO enlargement poses no threat to Russia.[quoter]Rose Gottemoeller[/quoter]

Every country has the right ”to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance.” These principles are enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. All OSCE member states have signed up to these principles, including Russia.

NATO membership is not imposed on countries. All countries that have joined NATO have done so freely, and in accordance with their domestic democratic processes. To join NATO, countries are expected to adhere to the values of NATO, and to meet strict political, economic and military criteria. NATO Allies are keeping the progress of aspirant countries under close review. In any event, accession to NATO is for individual candidate countries and the Alliance to decide. No third country has the right to interfere in this process.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

NATO has kept the peace in Europe for almost seventy years. It is the most successful military Alliance in the world because we have been able to adapt. In an unpredictable world, we will continue to adapt to new challenges and continue to keep our nations and populations safe and secure.

Der Beitrag Gottemoeller: “A demonstration that we stand together” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Ms. Smith, there is an ongoing discussion whether the planned European Defense Union will compete with or complement the NATO alliance. How do you assess the developments in increased sovereignty in European security policy?

Personally, it is something that I support. America has had a very schizophrenic attitude towards European defense as it has been developing inside the European Union. When the idea first came forward in the late 1990s during the Clinton administration, the response from Washington was fairly negative because Americans were generally worried about two things: That it would succeed and serve as a counter to the NATO alliance and to US interests; or it would fail and ultimately weaken Europe’s position in the area of defense and military affairs, causing us to have a weaker partner consumed with process and institutions without building capacity.

[related]Since that time and since the chocolate summit, over the last 20 years Americans through the Bush administration, Obama administration and now Trump administration are coming to terms with the fact that this may at long last build real capacity on the other side of the Atlantic. If efforts inside the European Union succeed, among European militaries in particular, then that benefits the NATO alliance.

Can you find people in this town who don’t want to see the EU do this?

Yes, you can. But they are fewer in number. And you can even find people in uniform who understand that for some countries it is politically easier to pursue defense initiatives inside an EU framework versus a NATO framework. The EU is now motivated to take real action and that could lead to a European Union that is doing more in the world in the area of foreign and defense policy. The path on this side of the Atlantic has been positive in terms of us appreciating what the EU is trying to do and understanding that these initiatives may ultimately benefit the transatlantic alliance.

Are the EU member states acting in a smart way as they build up the Defense Union and decrease independence on the US, for example through PESCO, rather than fully concentrating on NATO’s European pillar?

We are talking about one set of forces. Take any country in Europe and think about its military and the work that needs to be done to ensure that those militaries are capable, equipped, well trained, and exercising with US allies. Anything that can help strengthen the capacity of these military forces is a good thing. You will find some people who are skeptical that this is going to lead to anything significant based on the history of the last 20 years. But the majority of folks here in Washington is willing to sit back and see what actually transpires. What we see right now is that real resources are being poured into these initiatives and European capabilities.

Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, stated that the European Defense Union should be fully established by 2025. Is this realistic?

No. Based on what we have witnessed in the past regarding European attempts to strengthen their defense capabilities and strategy, I find that to be a very ambitious target. I hope I am wrong. I would love to see changes take place in less than ten years but in my experience in observing developments inside Brussels, it is going to take longer than that. But again, ultimately this is a good thing, and something that Europe should pursue. I hope it will make our partnership stronger, not weaker.

For the officials in the Trump administration, they may have some wrinkled brows trying to understand what is happening here and what the motivation is. But if Europe can make the case that this will make us stronger as partners and help Europe take on more of the burden of managing the global security environment, certainly that is something that the Trump administration would applaud.

There is remarkable cooperation between NATO and the EU in progress: for example, the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. Are the two organizations on a successful path in rising to this complex challenge?

The EU-NATO relationship is something that many of us have been watching for a long time. All of us have been collectively frustrated by the lack of progress in enhancing it. But what has transpired now is really interesting and shows progress for the first time in a long time, though we should not overstate that. Right now, there is a lot of sharing in an unclassified environment. I would like to see more of it in a classified setting. That appears to be a bridge too far at the moment. But it is an important first step.

Regarding military spending efficiency, EU states are performing poorly in both NATO and the EU. How would you improve the situation?

Americans tend to get fixated on the goal that European militaries should spend two per cent of their GDP on defense. That is the line that you have heard coming from Washington for the better part of three or four decades through past administrations. What we talk less about is the way in which countries allocate that spending across several different priority areas. It is not enough for a country to spend two or three per cent. We have allies who are doing that. For example, the Greeks and the Turks spend a lot of money on defense.

It is not enough for a country to spend two to three percent of its GDP on defense. [quoter]Julianne Smith[/quoter]

But you have to look at how they are actually allocating and spending those resources. If you look at the numbers closely you don’t see the allocation required to make those countries be the most effective contributors to NATO security. We have countries that spend an enormous amount of money on defense, maybe a little under two per cent. But they spend about 70 per cent of those resources on personnel costs. That is not what you want to see. I understand this is due to pensions. But over time you want to see countries spending a much larger percentage on research and development and acquisition. NATO has set some modest targets in that regard. But it needs to do more particularly now that countries are going to start spending more. The needle is moving. What the Trump administration has been able to get passed is the message that you need to spend more. The next question is how should we spend these resources collectively and individually. We need an overarching strategy on where we want to prioritize, particularly R&D and acquisition.

Can you give an example?

Denmark has been told over the last 20 years that the focus is on expeditionary forces. You need to get your air and ground forces to far away places. That was true when we were deep in the Afghanistan mission and looking at expeditionary operations as the future of the alliance. But now that we are also tracking Russian activities in places like the Baltic sea or the North Atlantic or even the Black Sea, a country like Denmark is asking itself: ‘Should we now allocate more resources towards ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare), should we be doing mine clearance in the waters off of Denmark, should we develop another expeditionary brigade?’ Where are they expected to get guidance like that? Should they turn to NATO defense planners? Should they ask the European Union? I am sure the Danes would say no to that. Should they look for a signal from Washington where the priorities are? These are the questions we face now.

We don’t have a broader strategy about the priorities for this alliance. [quoter]Julianne Smith[/quoter]

What do you suggest?

It is not just enough to spend more. It is about spending wisely, contributing to a broader strategy. We don’t have a broader strategy about the priorities for this alliance. We seem to be signaling that every NATO member should do everything. So, we say
‘28 for 28’ or ‘360 NATO’. Those are nice slogans, but the reality is we might need more of a regional strategy. For a country like Denmark maybe its priority really is just the North Alliance at this point and less expeditionary forces.

The Framework Nation Concept implements European clusters of capabilities into NATO’s processes of planning, procurement and operations. Should NATO focus more on this concept in the future?

Yes, this is exactly what the alliance needs at this point. The Framework Nation Concept is a good model. It is not applicable in all cases but it allows groups of countries to advance a regional set of priorities together, to lift each other up in their neighborhood and to work more closely together. It forces them to talk about their strategic goals and threat receptions. Then they pool resources, train and exercise together. It is a very pragmatic approach to today’s security environment. Clearly, a country like Portugal can’t do it all. Putting Portugal inside the Framework Nation Concept works nicely for a small country that has a set pool of assets and needs to talk to its neighbors about how to best apply those assets. It is wise and has already proven to be effective and could help us more in the future.

What will be Great Britain’s contribution to European security policy after Brexit?

This is the 64,000 dollar question. We are all asking ourselves this. Many people on this side of the Atlantic are curious about where our bilateral relationship with the United Kingdom will go. We are also very curious about the role the UK will play inside the EU on security and defense. Our friends from London come over regularly and talk to us about enhancing the UK-US relationship, playing a stronger role inside the NATO alliance and continuing to be a contributor to European security.

One could imagine a situation where a Brexit leads to a real financial strain on London. The first place to look for savings is often in the area of defense.[quoter]Julianne Smith[/quoter]

What are your concerns?

Those announcements and speeches are met with some skepticism on this side of the Atlantic. One could imagine a situation where a Brexit leads to a real financial strain on London. The first place to look for savings is often in the area of defense. And while all of the decisions being taken right now, the policies that are being pursued, the new initiatives that are being launched seem very wise and are welcome here in Washington, we are just wondering if this will be the same picture that we will be seeing in three to five years. We really won’t have the answer to some of the questions until we push through Brexit and understand what the UK’s relationship with the EU is going to look like. There are still so many ongoing debates in London about a hard exit versus a soft exit. There are people inside Theresa May’s administration who have different views on the future of their country’s relationship with the European Union.

What role will NATO play in transatlantic security policy a decade from now?

I hope it will continue to play the same role it has played for seventy plus years. NATO has been first and foremost an important political forum where the top leaders from Europe, the United States and Canada come together to talk about today’s security environment. It is an important symbolic alliance in practice. It is a very effective military alliance. It has not had to invoke article 5 more than once in its history. It has shown the ability to reform itself. We have been through several iterations of NATO’s lifespan with the Cold War mission, the Balkans mission, the post 9/11 mission and now returning to the core mission of collective security in the face of Russian aggression. I don’t know what future chapters will hold for the alliance but if nothing else, NATO has shown the ability to innovate, reform, change, make new investments and carry on irrespective of any challenges it might face including public skepticism and a US administration that at best has mixed views about the alliance.

Julianne (“Julie”) Smith is Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.
»Link to Julianne Smith’s full biography at CNAS

Interview: Robin Fehrenbach

Der Beitrag “The EU is now motivated to take real action” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Professor Nye, in your book “Is the American Century Over?”, written in 2015, you express the expectation that the United States will still be playing a leading geopolitical role in 2041. Have you changed your position after one year of the Trump presidency?

Certainly, Donald Trump has put some doubts in the back of my mind. It is possible that he could derail these predictions. The Americans will generally still have the capacity to play a leading geopolitical role, but I am not sure if they are going to have the will. In the 1930s Americans drew inward, even though they were the strongest country in the world. This led to a terrible decade.

Is it perhaps too early to say after one year?

Trump has drawn upon a strand of populist nationalism which is common now in all countries in the developed world. It is, however, not dominant. If you look at public opinion polls, the majority of Americans still want overseas involvement including cooperation with other countries. But the strand that Trump has called upon is there. Even if Trump goes away, which I hope he will after four years, Trumpism or populist nationalism will persist. So, there is a certain danger that we face. We have to be careful to not just pin it on Trump’s difficult personality.

Trump has drawn upon a strand of populist nationalism which is common now in all countries in the developed world.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

You invented the term “soft power” describing the ability to attract and persuade. Did the United States become less or more attractive under Trump’s presidency?

[related]The evidence is very clear. I wrote a column for Project Syndicate saying that Trump has definitely reduced American soft power. There is a Gallup poll that shows that American attractiveness has gone down in more than 130 countries. There is a similar poll that was taken by Pew with results that were very much like those of the Gallup poll. Finally, there is an index of the soft power called the Soft Power 30 which is published in London by Portland, the British consultancy. The Americans dropped from first place in the last year of Obama to third place in the first year of Trump. That is not just a political statement or bias. There is evidence to substantiate that view.

What can be done to alter this course?

It is going to be difficult for President Trump because he tends to a bullying and unilateralist style which antagonizes others. If you use a phrase like ‘America first’ all the time, by definition this means that everybody else is second. That is not exactly the way to attract others. With that being said, however, let us note that Trump is able to make changes in his policy. Before he was elected he said NATO was obsolete. After a few months in office he discovered NATO was not obsolete. There are a lot of areas where he has initially challenged the traditions of American foreign policy but has come around to embrace those traditions. If you combine that with a resurgence in the economy, which he expects to get through his fiscal stimulus, and if that does not go off the rails into inflation, Trump can recover some of the American soft power. But he has to change his style to be able to fully recover.

If you use a phrase like ‘America first’ all the time, by definition this means that everybody else is second. That is not exactly the way to attract others.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

Which role will the United States be playing especially within NATO in 20 years’ time?

Probably since the 1950s, since the Suez Crisis, there have been articles and predictions about the death of NATO. That is now obsolete. NATO has proven a far more resilient concept and structure because of two reasons: One is the relatively open organization for democratic societies which enables them to interact with each other, more than just at the top level. The second point is that geopolitically, Russia still is a problem or a puzzle. If Russia remains that sort of a puzzle then NATO will not be obsolete. I am leery of these views that say NATO is finished.

And what will the role of the Unites States within NATO look like?

The United States will continue to seek its interests as it has since 1945 in being closely tied to an open and democratic Europe. That requires NATO and American participation in NATO.

Trump’s “America first” strategy seems to foster American protectionism. Does this affect NATO’s strength and the United States’ long-known aspiration to shape the liberal world order?

It does. The attitude which Trump and some of his close advisors have taken, that a trade surplus is a measure of moral failure, is simply not good economics. The basic view of most regular economists is that your trade surplus and deficit has more to do with your savings and investing rates. As Trump has pressed this issue that trade surpluses are rogue and demanded renegotiation, it does spill over into other aspects of alliances. Look at the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement or at the problems that Trump has had with his visits with Chancellor Merkel. This is a real problem.

Trump urges the Europeans to invest more in their military abilities. Is he right?

Asking the Europeans to do more to contribute to common defense has a long, long history. The 2-percent-target goes back many years. But because of his bluster and style Trump may be more credible than Obama on that.

Does he have more credibility by being more forceful in that matter?

Sometimes nastiness as a hard power is more effective than soft power.

Do you think the United States would ultimately appreciate a stronger European commitment within NATO?

The US has been interested in a stronger European military for some time, well before Donald Trump. There was a period when I was in the Defense Department in the 1990s when there were certain fears that France was trying to lead Europe out of NATO or reduce the American role in the alliance. That is ancient history. The view for a decade and more has been that a stronger Europe inside NATO is better for the United States. That is actually a pretty widely shared view among those people in the United States who pay attention to foreign policy.

What are the main and most urgent strategic challenges for NATO?

The issue of the return of great power politics and the issue of how Russia will behave will require a combination both of deterrence and also a way to think about retaining the democratic processes in Eastern and Central Europe. Both challenges are going to be central to NATO. I don’t expect countries like Poland or Hungary to defect to Russia. That is not plausible. But the quality of democracy in some of these former Visegrád countries has been under challenge from this same type of right-wing populist nationalism which has affected the United States. In addition to having a strong deterrent posture to prevent Russia from using its strength to bully its neighbors and expand, both NATO and the European Union have to think about the internal quality of democracy.

The issue of the return of great power politics and the issue of how Russia will behave will require a combination both of deterrence and also a way to think about retaining the democratic processes in Eastern and Central Europe.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

Are you less optimistic than 20 years ago that there will ever be a world in which Russia does not see NATO, the United States and Europe as competitors or even enemies?

20 years ago, we believed there was a profound change going on in terms of democratization and liberalization of Russia. That has been reversed. Part of it may have been mistakes made by the West. The Bush administration’s efforts to expand NATO membership right to the borders of Russia in Georgia and so forth were not appropriate in terms of reassurance for the Russians. But it is also true that some of the changes that occurred inside Russia have to do with problems in Russian society and economy which were not caused by NATO expansion.

But this serves as a good explanation for Russia blaming NATO for its domestic difficulties …

That is right. If one looks back at Putin’s policies and especially his Munich Security Conference speech in 2007, you can see this kind of blaming. The views that we had in the 1990s, when Yeltsin was in power and we used the NATO-Russia Council as a way to integrate Russia into NATO were overly optimistic. But if you take a long-run view we certainly should be hoping that changes inside Russia will allow a Europe that includes Russia again. But I don’t expect that in the near term, unfortunately.

When Obama was president one could get the impression that the relationship with Russia was not at the top of his agenda. Could that change with Donald Trump?

Ironically, one of the things that Trump got right in foreign policy was to think of ways to try to reduce the tensions with Russia and to improve the relationship. It is not that one has to accept Russian behavior. But it is true that Russia is a great power. We have to do business with them. To sharpen antagonism is not healthy for Russia, for Europe and the United States. In that sense, Trump’s insight might have been better even if his motives were somewhat unclear. Putin and the Russian intelligence overachieved in their efforts to interfere in the 2016 election and they have made rapprochement with Russia so radioactive inside American politics that not even Trump can do anything about it.

Putin and the Russian intelligence overachieved in their efforts to interfere in the 2016 election and they have made rapprochement with Russia so radioactive inside American politics that not even Trump can do anything about it.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

The Munich Security Conference 2018 will focus in particular on the future role of the European Union as a global actor and its relations with Russia as well as the United States. What is your opinion on the EU’s future role?

The EU plays a very important role. I have always thought of the EU as a magnet which should draw others towards an open, rules-based society both domestically and internationally. On the other hand, there is a historical danger of Central Europeans like Germany being drawn too much into the Russian orbit. The effort is to build bridges – but sometimes in the effort to build bridges they may go too far. The key question for Europe is whether it is careful enough not to be played by Putin in order to divide the United States from Europe. It is interesting to me that the sanctions were applied to show that a country cannot steal its neighbor’s territory without paying a price. Those sanctions applied after the annexation of Crimea have maintained an important role and the West is not divided on that so far.

Do you think the sanctions should stay for the near future?

Yes. Until you see changes in Russian behavior. One could imagine steps that might be taken to reduce Russian interference in Luhansk and Donbass for example which could lead to some degree of relaxation of sanctions in a step-by-step process. A total removal of sanctions right now would be a mistake.

There is much more movement within the European Union than in the United States. Some countries are in favor of lifting the sanctions …

Correct. Italy and other countries like the former Visegrád countries would like to see more rapid progress than is healthy. What is interesting to see is that the transatlantic relationship has survived these temptations.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

NATO provides a security blanket in the sense of reassurance. Despite of different national interests and different political pressures which tend to pull states in different directions there is an overarching security framework which helps states to avoid rash or desperate types of actions. NATO in that sense is a complement to the EU. But the heart of the future of Europe is obviously to find ways to continue the process that has begun under the rubric of the European Union. That does not mean a federation. The political and public opinion do not back this kind of system right now.

NATO and the EU are complementary, like hard and soft power.[quoter]Joseph Nye[/quoter]

NATO and the EU are complementary, like hard and soft power. The danger is that the Trump administration disrupts this larger picture. So far – and it is only a little over a year into his presidency – he has adapted more than I expected and has not broken that basic consensus in the Atlantic area. I don’t want to sound like somebody who is a Trump supporter because it is very clear that I am not. But it is important that we keep what he is doing in some degree of perspective. So far he has not broken the basic hard power framework which underlies a smart power policy.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. was interviewed by Juliane Schäuble, head of the politics department at the Berlin daily paper Der Tagesspiegel.

Listen to the Transatlantic Call:

Der Beitrag Nye: “Nastiness can be more effective than soft power” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

U.S. President Donald Trump’s improbable rise to the White House caught many by surprise. Outspent and out-staffed, his unexpected victory over former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, had Washington reeling. Still, since taking the oath of office, his Administration has been anything but smooth. Stunning setbacks, crippling defeats, and perennial controversies have marked his one-year in office. Yet through it all, the former real-estate tycoon and reality television star continues to reshape Washington and the geo-political landscape issue-by-issue; challenge-by-challenge; crisis-by-crisis.

[related]Despite a less-than-stellar record of legislative accomplishments, undoubtedly the Trump Administration will point to a plethora of achievements since winning the highest office in the land. A record-setting and record-breaking stock market; more judicial appointments, including the appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the U.S. Supreme Court, than any American president in recent history; the roll-back of several Barack Obama-era regulations ranging from environmental protections to criminal justice reform. President Trump’s “Make America Great Again” is becoming the new reality and Americans are not the only ones being impacted by these seismic shifts.

On his first visit to Brussels for the NATO Summit, the mercurial White House occupant unnerved some with his heated calls for more members to meet their financial obligations to the historic multilateral organization. Moreover, stalwart U.S. alliances are now frayed and hanging in the balance amid the president’s continued support of incendiary and racist propaganda. Already U.K. and German leadership have voiced strong denunciations of actions taken by President Trump. A stark contrast to the reception granted to Obama during his tenure. Yet, while some relationships have become strained, others have been strengthened. Once icy relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia under the Obama Administration have thawed and these Middle Eastern nations are enjoying a robust revival in the Trump era.

While some relationships have become strained, others have been strengthened.

The toughest and most demanding job in the land is challenging for even the most seasoned of politicians. Former President Lyndon B. Johnson, who was a master of the Senate, grew weary and broken from a failed Vietnam policy and decided not to run for re-election. His successor, Richard Nixon resigned in disgrace to avoid impeachment after the Watergate break-in. Debilitating foreign and domestic setbacks led to a surprise challenge from within his own party for Democratic President Jimmy Carter.

Now, Trump, the political neophyte has been beset by a cavalcade of crises as he grapples with the limits to his presidential powers. As the Chairman and CEO of the Trump Organization, a private company, his decision is final. But, the U.S. government does not work that way. Even the president has to answer to the U.S. Constitution and the norms and customs governing bureaucratic institutions. No doubt the enormous breadth and depth of the presidency is humbling and overwhelming, especially when compared with the operation he’s led for decades.

The verdict is still out on the Trump presidency.

The verdict is still out on the Trump presidency. Even by the most diplomatic standards, his first year in office has been an unmitigated disaster—much of his own making. Indictments; guilty pleas; unheard of turn-over in the Executive Branch; and mounting losses have left the Trump Administration demoralized and deflated. Many political observers and historians are doubtful of his ability to orchestrate a vast turnaround, lift his presidency, and personally rise to the ideals of the Oval Office as immortalized by the framers of the constitution. Russian collusion, claims of racism, and nuclear war are just a few of the very real threats plaguing this Administration. As President Trump moves into his second year, the world is watching and waiting for American leadership’s re-emergence.

The world cheered when America (under Obama) restored its stature on the world stage: from ending the Iraq War to saving the U.S. economy from the greatest collapse since the Great Depression, to re-establishing relations with foreign states such as Iran and Cuba. But now, it appears America is absent.

Under Trump, the U.S. positions on climate change; global trade; Jerusalem, Iran and more have the U.S. standing alone. In the past where America moved, the world followed. Now, not so much.

“Making America Great Again” was a great campaign slogan, but as president that greatness can only be achieved when reaching upward not stooping low.

Eric Ham (Atlantik-Brücke Young Leader 2011), is co-author of the bestseller THE GOP CIVIL WAR: Inside the Battle for the Soul of the Republican Party.

Der Beitrag President Trump: One Year Later erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Part VI of our series: Richard D. Hooker Jr. says the American commitment to NATO is ironclad, based on fair burden sharing. The Special Assistant to President Trump and Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs in the National Security Council outlines the U.S. strategy for the alliance. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke Hooker emphasizes the importance of “maintaining peace throughout the North Atlantic Treaty Area.”

Mr. Hooker, which strategy for NATO does the United States under the administration of President Trump seek to develop?

The US seeks to advance and strengthen a cohesive alliance in the interest of maintaining peace throughout the North Atlantic Treaty Area.

How steadfast is the U.S. government’s commitment to article 5?

In president Trump’s words, our commitment is ironclad, based on the principle of reciprocity and fair burden sharing.

North Korea has threatened to attack the island of Guam which belongs to the territory of the United States. Would such an event invoke NATO’s mutual defense clause?

This would be a question for the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to decide. We are confident that any attack on the United States and its territories would be met with an appropriate response.

President Trump’s “America first” strategy seems to create American protectionism in a broad range of policy fields. To what degree does this affect NATO’s strength and the United States’ long-known requirement to shape the liberal world order?

‘America first’ does not mean ‘America alone,’, nor does it equate to protectionism, but to fair trade practices that do not disadvantage American workers and to a foreign and security policy centered on American interests. This administration believes in NATO, and is committed to retaining, defending, and strengthening NATO as the bedrock of our own national security, and of Europe’s.

This administration believes in NATO, and is committed to retaining, defending, and strengthening NATO as the bedrock of our own national security, and of Europe’s.[quoter]Richard Hooker[/quoter]

Russia is trying to expend its spheres of influence. Especially the Baltics and Poland feel threatened by Russia’s aggressive behavior. How reliable is NATO’s security guarantee in this European region?

Our commitment to article 5 is ironclad. The large sums being spent on the European Deterrence Initiative are indicative of this commitment, as are U.S. participation in EFP (Enhanced Forward Presence), increasing amounts of prepositioned equipment and the U.S. rotational armored brigade combat team in Poland.

The crisis in Ukraine is still not solved. Would the revitalization of the NATO-Russia-Council help to improve both this situation and the American-Russian relationship?

Our policy is ‘no business as usual’ until Russia changes its behavior in Ukraine. While we support open channels of dialogue with Russia, and are always open to substantive discussions, we do not support a resumption of regular, recurring meetings of the NRC that are not productive or meaningful. We remain opposed to ‘normalizing’ relations with Russia until Russia demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.

We remain opposed to ‘normalizing’ relations with Russia until Russia demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.[quoter]Richard Hooker[/quoter]

Michael E. O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, supports the hypothesis that the end of NATO’s eastward expansion and the implementation of a zone of neutral nations would reduce tensions with Russia. How do you assess this proposal?

This again is a question for the alliance as a whole. The United States is unwavering in our support for NATO’s open door policy. It is a core NATO value that sovereign countries choose their own security arrangement. No third country has a veto on NATO membership.

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years‘ time?

[related]Enduring alliance, the most successful in history, and one that has weathered many storms and challenges in its existence. We are confident that a decade from now, NATO will still be performing its key role as the principal provider for transatlantic security.

Der Beitrag Hooker: “‘America first’ does not mean ‘America alone’” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

Part V of our series: Lieutenant General Frederick B. Hodges highlights the value of logistics and interoperability for NATO in Europe. Hodges who has served as Commanding General of the U.S. Army Europe until December 15, 2017 also expresses his hope that the strained American-Russian relationship will improve. In conversation with Atlantik-Brücke he wishes for Russia one day being “welcomed back into the community of responsible nations.”

Lieutenant General Hodges, your service as Commanding General of the U.S. Army Europe is about to end. When you look back to your duty in Germany, which cooperation projects between American and European armed forces have been the most successful?

The most important cooperation project has been the improving interoperability for our communications systems between all the Allies. Right up there with it are our efforts to improve cross boarder military mobility, so that military formations can move quickly across Europe.  Crossing international boundaries, trying to improve infrastructure. All of these things are of course intended to speed up our ability to assemble, which would give political leaders more options.

With its concept Strong Europe the U.S. Army seeks to strengthen the defense capabilities of its NATO allies in Europe. What does your first resumé on this look like?

U.S. Army Europe has contributed in several ways: First, we go to everybody’s exercises and we invite people to all of our exercises. We have created and are continuously improving more sophisticated multinational, joint, and multi-echelon exercises that test logistics and interoperability.

Secondly, the 7th Army Training Command with their training centers in Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels and their ability to export training capabilities to other places like Georgia, Romania, Poland and Lithuania have significantly improved training opportunities for our Allies and Partners. The quality of what they do for ranges, for example, or with the observer controller trainers has helped raise the bar for quality training for many countries in the alliance and in Europe.

Russia is trying to expend its spheres of influence. Especially the Baltics and Poland feel threatened by Russia’s aggressive behavior. How reliable is NATO’s security guarantee in this European region?

NATO is the most successful Alliance in the history of the world and it is successful because of its shared values and the commitment to collective security. That is an unshakable guarantee and I am very confident that the members of the Alliance are safe. When 29 nations stick together and we all continue to do our share in contributing to that collective defense that is a powerful message and powerful commitment.

I am very confident that the members of the Alliance are safe.[quoter]Lieutenant General Frederick B. Hodges[/quoter]

The crisis in Ukraine is still not solved. Would the revitalization of the NATO-Russia-Council help to improve both this situation and the strained American-Russian relationship? For example, the collaboration in fighting international terrorists like ISIS in Syria could be enhanced.

[related]As a Soldier, of course I hope that Russia one day is welcomed back into the community of responsible nations. It is a great country with a great history and great people. There are so many places where we could cooperate and we thought that this was going to be the case, up until a few years ago. But, Russia has to respect international institutions and order. And when they do that and respect the sovereignty of European nations, then we can get back to training together, and have cultural exchanges and all those kinds of things. As well as cooperating on important issues. But this is not the 18th Century, where they get to pick and choose countries to divide up.

NATO’s new command structure with additional headquarters aims to accomplish a better capability of deploying troops. Do you think the potential deterrence towards Russia deriving from this step goes far enough?

It reflects the forward leaning adaptive nature of our great Alliance. I am impressed with both of the major command changes that have been proposed. And, I hope that Germany is the country that takes the lead on this. Particularly the rear area operations command. That is a logical choice from geography as well as capability and their organizational skills. It would do an awful lot to improve our ability to receive reinforcements as well as move allied formations across Europe.

Michael E. O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, supports the hypothesis that the end of NATO’s eastward expansion and the implementation of a zone of neutral nations would reduce tensions with Russia. How do you assess this proposal?

I believe nations get to make their own choices. If those nations want to join the EU and they meet the criteria then they should be able to join the EU. If they want to join the Alliance and they meet the criteria and the Alliance accepts it, then they should be able to do it. So, that is what we are all about, the self-determination of sovereign nations.

President Trump’s “America first” strategy seems to create American protectionism in a broad range of policy fields. To what degree does this affect NATO’s strength and the United States’ long-known requirement to shape the liberal world order?

Everything that was promised under the Obama administration has been delivered under the Trump administration. Rotational forces, preposition equipment, enhance Forward Presence battle group and an increase by over a billion dollars of the European deterrence initiative. When the United States is serious about something, we put Soldiers on it, we put money on it and that is what is happening in Europe today. The president, the vice president, secretary of defense, secretary of state, everybody has confirmed our commitment to Europe and guaranteed our commitment to the Article 5 of the Washington treaty.

Everything that was promised under the Obama administration has been delivered under the Trump administration.[quoter]Lieutenant General Frederick B. Hodges[/quoter]

What role will NATO be playing in transatlantic security policy in ten years’ time?

It will continue to adapt, it will continue to be the most successful Alliance in the history of the world. The fact that the Alliance continuously looks at its’ structures, procedures and policies and the fact that NATO works very hard to be effective, and its’ historical success is what will guarantee that it is still here ten years from now. As the principal and most effective security framework in the world.

Der Beitrag Hodges: “NATO is the most successful Alliance in world history” erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..

October 8 to 13, 2017

Over the course of six days, the Atlantik-Brücke delegation traveled to the United States and met with a diverse group of politicians, CEOs, journalists, academics, and others, in Charlotte, North Carolina and Washington, DC, the nation’s capital.

Each year, a group of the organization’s members undertakes this journey to gain new insights and to strengthen the links between Germany and the United States. With a new administration in place that has new priorities,  it is even more important to persist in creating dialogue. And each year, the delegates visit Washington as well as one other American city, to get beyond the beltway bubble. This year, the group traveled to Charlotte because of its strong trade ties to Germany, as well as to experience “the new South.” This term was originally coined by the journalist Henry W. Grady and characterized the new beginning for the economy of the South after the civil war and the end of slavery. In the meantime, the term has come to refer to successful economic growth in the American South, which is also promoted by innovative technologies.

Hope for the Transatlantic Relationship

“This president was elected to be disruptive,” is a sentiment echoed multiple times over the course of the week the group spent in the US. It became obvious that there is a major battle going on within the country. President Donald Trump’s attitude reflects some of the most negative ideas in American political thinking: isolationism, populism, nativism. Similar trends can be seen in Europe right now. What is unique in the US is that President Trump is acting as an independent president – independent from the party lines and positions which puts off many within his own party. The fact that many government positions have not yet been filled makes cooperation with transatlantic partners difficult.

“This president was elected to be disruptive,” is a sentiment echoed multiple times over the course of the week the group spent in the US.

And this is dangerous. Multiple government security officials noted that states with a different view of international order than the West are becoming more powerful (read Russia and China). For the American security apparatus, they see German leadership in multilateral organizations as greatly appreciated, and would like to see more of it in Central and Eastern Europe. On an “America First” note, it was pointed out that Americans “are spending as much as 3.5% of their annual salary on other countries’ security. Germany, as one of the most prosperous countries in the world must step up its own efforts.”

Despite these tensions, the relationship between the two countries remains a vital one at many levels: individual, corporate, political, administrative. Congressman Robert Pittenger (R), the US Representative for North Carolina’s 9^th Congressional District, assured that “We love Germany. Don’t believe the media, they are not our friends.” Several high-ranking members of government noted that “nothing has actually changed. Connections are as strong as ever.” As a consolation it was repeated that the “administration is still working itself out” and that partners should not be discouraged from interacting because the behind-the-scenes work remains the same as always. It seems that those who actually carry out the work do not share President Trump’s negative opinion of working with Germany. As Ambassador Daniel Fried of the Atlantic Council pointed out, “actual US foreign policy under President Trump is in fact picking up where the Obama administration was headed in its final months.”

Trade: Leave the Washington, DC Bubble

Frances Burwell, Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council and an expert on TTIP, foreign policy and transatlantic relations, warned that “not only is the government rhetoric on trade bad, but so are the policies themselves, under this president.”

The completion of TTIP, as the group heard often, is unlikely. “TTIP Light,” an edited version of the agreement which focuses on shared standards and other regulatory questions rather than import taxes, may be possible.

There is a “big push for protectionism combined with a lack of historical sense in the highest levels of the administration,” weighing heavy on long-standing partnerships. The completion of TTIP, as the group heard often, is unlikely. “TTIP Light,” an edited version of the agreement which focuses on shared standards and other regulatory questions rather than import taxes, may be possible. But as Congressman Pittenger noted, “the president prefers independent trade agreements” which would of course fundamentally alter the premise of TTIP.

NAFTA is another matter of great concern, particularly for the Canadians. The question on the table is whether there will be an exit from NAFTA, or just a renegotiation. There are no clear answers yet. In both cases – TTIP and NAFTA – the conditions for renegotiation certainly aren’t favorable. As the motto goes, “Buy American, Hire American.” Wilbur Ross, US Secretary of Commerce, however, has shown openness to join the conversation on how TTIP can be renegotiated. He is aware of the relevance of free trade for the US economy.

[related] In the end, a form of encouragement came from those who counsel against the fixation on Donald Trump. In reaching out to politicians, civil society representatives, universities, and innovators from across the country, one can find partners and allies outside of the Washington bubble. This is exactly what became obvious during the visit to Charlotte, where one notices firsthand the effect of German businesses in the region: Siemens Energy, Daimler Trucks North America, Groninger, Bosch Rexroth, Schaeffler Group USA Inc, and 200 others, including 59 US headquarters. This makes Germany the most largely represented foreign country in the region. With daily nonstop flights to Frankfurt and Munich and an active German community, the partnership between Charlotte and Germany is thriving.

The city’s outgoing Mayor, Jennifer Roberts, presented the city’s historic links with Germany – the city was named after Charlotte of Mecklenburg-Strelitz – but also its international nature. 18% of the city’s population is foreign-born, and the city boasts 1000 foreign companies, 200 of which have headquarters in Germany. 17% of the labor force of the city is foreign born, according to John Silvia, the chief economist of Wells Fargo, American international banking and financial services holding company. He also noted that nationally, foreign-born workers have accounted for half the growth in the labor supply over the past decade. Despite the unfavorable policies concerning foreign-born individuals living in the United States, Silvia hopes that “business is resilient, even with the fluctuation in politics.”

Preparing for Work in the Future Economy

In various meetings with the National Association of Manufacturers, the Central Piedmont Community College and its vocational training program, and the software startup Tresata, the need for change in educating a future workforce – both in the US and Germany – was very clear. Vocational training programs have been among the most successful exchanges between the two countries. The German vocational training model is well-known, but has lately been further improved by various programs in the US, some of whom have even surpassed their German counterparts.

Former and current US administrations have emphasized the need to fill the skills gap. President Trump in his meeting with Chancellor Merkel in March 2017 was joined by company representatives from the US and Germany and several young apprentices. This clearly shows that there is common ground and a common goal to advance alternative training options to fill the skills gap and offer a real opportunity for young people.

A highlight of the trip was a visit to Central Piedmont Community College (CPCC) in Charlotte, which currently serves 70,000 students. 20% of those students are in the College and Career Readiness Program, which offers a variety of programs to prepare students for their working careers. CPCC has offered manufacturing apprenticeships since 1995. A four-year program that guarantees a job at the end that emulates the German vocational education and training (VET) system and is primarily used by German companies located in Charlotte. To graduates, IHK Karlsruhe offers certificates of completion for equivalency in competence for automation and CNC machining, and there are student/apprentice exchanges to Stuttgart, Heidelberg, Crailsheim, and Gaggenau. Fourteen CPCC faculty are trained in Berlin at the Siemens Technik Akademie, and there are ongoing facilitator and administrator visits and courses in Germany.

Kevin Poet, director of operations at the Siemens Charlotte Energy Hub, noted that Siemens Energy has a workforce of 1,550 employees and more than one million square feet of space under one roof. It has become the largest manufacturer in Charlotte, and the third largest among the 250+ energy companies based in Charlotte. To develop a trained labor force to operate the new Siemens plant, the company began a partnership with CPCC to develop a mechatronics apprenticeship program, in 2011. By introducing the German apprenticeship model to the US, Siemens has been able to train its Charlotte workforce successfully.

Conclusion

The 2017 members trip to the United States has proven the need for regular exchange between the US and Germany. In a time of uncertainty, it is more important than ever to reach out to those outside of the government bubbles in both countries, and create long-lasting relationships. This has especially seemed to be the case when it comes to preparing future generations to succeed in a new economy. The presence of German companies, individuals, and organizations in the United States greatly benefits the regions they are in, and the same is true vice versa. There is a great need now for a strong commitment to the relationship between the two countries, with a hope that it will continue into the future.

Der Beitrag The “New South”, New Skills, and Old Alliances erschien zuerst auf Atlantik-Brücke e.V..